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Abstract 
 
It has been twenty years since the introduction of the Young Offenders Act (YOA) in 
NSW, and the commitment of the criminal justice system to the principle advocated by 
the Act of detention as a ‘last resort’, the principle described in Article 37(b) of the 
Convention of the Rights of the Child 1989. Introduced in 1987, the YOA aimed to keep 
children and young people out of the criminal justice system by reducing the number 
of people proceeding to court and ultimately in detention. Providing a hierarchical 
response to youth offending, warnings, cautions and youth justice conferencing, are the 
diversionary options available under the framework of the YOA.  
 
This thesis argues that the picture today is evidence of a long-term criminal justice 
reticence to apply the YOA to its full extent. The most recent statistics show that 
diversion to youth conferencing is the lowest it has ever been since the introduction of 
the YOA. Further, certain youth populations bear the brunt of the failures in youth 
diversion. In particular, Indigenous young people are being diverted at a lower rate than 
non-Indigenous young people, where the likelihood of diversion for Indigenous 
compared to non-Indigenous young people has not changed since the introduction of 
the YOA. Thus, the current system in NSW is failing to divert young people away from 
court. 
 
This study focuses on the institutional factors and individual actors directly involved in 
the application of the YOA to explain the wide failure to refer young people to diversion 
in NSW. Using a mixed of qualitative and quantitative data, but relying heavily on 
qualitative material from in-depth interviews with experienced NSW police, 
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magistrates and youth justice personnel, the study analyses the decision-making process 
on diversion while presenting rival perspectives on the under-utilisation of youth 
diversion under the YOA.  
 
Theories of the dichotomy of punitivism and welfarism, social control, shame and 
reintegration as punishment, practices of ‘risk’ management and particular attention to 
occupational culture have been used to analyse the findings in this research critically. 
Grounded theory and qualitative content analysis provided the means to scrutinise the 
information and analyse decision-maker perspectives while providing insight into the 
tensions that are at the forefront of decision-making regarding ‘diversion’. 
 
This is the first research of its kind to examine the reasons behind youth diversion 
failures focusing on both broader social/political and micro institutional reasons for the 
failure to divert. Overall, the findings indicate that individuals in a position to make 
decisions regarding whether to divert young people away from the system have 
internalised the cultures, politics, and institutional practices of their respective 
organisations, and therefore reproduce them. Further, the findings confirm that theories 
of individual responsibilisation, risk-based strategies (with a focus on intervention) and 
punitivism, form a major part of the backdrop to decisions that shape law and order. 
This in turn, undermines and contradicts the principles of diversion, and court as a last 
resort. Findings highlight that key challenges in implementation of the YOA are deeply 
rooted in a system of youth governance where the paradigms of welfarism and justice 
result in competing interests and outcomes. Institutional cultures and professionals 
adhere more to one or other of these paradigms because of the perceived nature of their 
roles. Based on these findings, the thesis recommendation is to completely overhaul 
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and rebuild the youth justice system starting from the legislation, or at the very least 
and given political limits, to follow a set of modest suggestions that in a lesser way 
might address the failure to divert. 
  1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview 
This thesis examines the discretionary decision-making processes on youth diversion 
under the Young Offender Act 1997 in NSW (YOA). It explores the nuances and aims 
of ‘diversion’ through a historical account of youth justice in NSW. It traces ‘diversion’ 
back to the separation of children from adults in the criminal justice system, from the 
establishment of the Children’s Court to the current legislative framework for Youth 
Justice Conferencing (YJC), the YOA. Using data from in-depth interviews with those 
empowered to make decisions about whether or not to divert young people away from 
the criminal justice system (hereafter refer to as ‘decision-makers’), and to a limited 
use of official statistics and policy reviews it analyses the decision-making processes 
on diversion, presenting multiple perspectives on the under-utilisation of YJC. 
 
The thesis critically explores decision-making by various actors in the juvenile justice 
system, with a focus on state policing, the magistracy and the broader juvenile justice 
bureaucracy.  Theories of the dichotomy of punitivism and welfarism, social control, 
shame and reintegration as punishment, practices of ‘risk’ management and 
occupational culture have been mobilised to critically analyse the findings in this 
research. Grounded theory and qualitative content analysis provide the means to 
scrutinise the information and analyse the decision-maker perspectives providing a 
deep insight into the tensions that are at the forefront of decision-making regarding 
‘diversion’. 
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Background 
In 1997 the YOA (hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was introduced following some 
years of juvenile justice inquiries, reviews of legislation and community consultations 
during the 1990s (Chan, 2005; Hennessy, 1999). The Act introduced a hierarchical 
diversionary response to juvenile offending intending to keep children and young 
people out of the criminal justice system, by reducing the numbers of young people 
proceeding to court and ultimately in detention (Chan, 2005). Thus, warnings, cautions 
and YJC were the diversionary options to be practised while court was to be used as a 
last resort. At first glance, the Act, through diversionary and restorative justice practices 
appeared to offer a cutting-edge future for juvenile justice in NSW.  
 
Despite such appearances, the YOA was not to produce the much-needed benefits that 
were expected. The statistics and literature in the field indicate that in the immediate 
years following the enactment of the Act, the number of young people in detention had 
begun to rise. A great contributor factor was the increasing number of young people 
being placed on remand due to being denied bail (Stubbs, 2010a). During that time, the 
over-representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children in court and 
custody also continued to rise and, by the late 2000s, NSW had the largest proportion 
of Indigenous people both in court and detention (Taylor, 2009).  
 
This over-representation of Indigenous children in juvenile detention is well known and 
has been subject to many inquiries. In June 2011, the national inquiry into the House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
reported that Indigenous youth over-representation was worse than it was twenty years 
earlier when the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody was published.  
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This increase in Aboriginal over-representation is likely an artefact of the decrease in 
incarceration of non-Indigenous young people (see Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare (AIHW), 2017). Nevertheless, the latest records show that in 2016-2017, 
approximately 48% of young people in custody in NSW were Aboriginal, this is despite 
the fact that Aboriginal young people constitute less than 5% of the youth population 
in NSW (AIHW, 2018a). 
 
The principle advocated by the YOA of detention as a last resort is based on the 
observation that holding a young person in custody is not in the interest of the young 
person. This principle is described in Article 37(b) of the United Nations Convention 
of the Rights of the Child, 
The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with 
the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate period of time (United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 1989).  
 
Australia is a signatory to this convention, and accordingly, it could be argued that 
Australian states should have an obligation to protect the rights of children and hold 
this principle of detention as a last resort. However, such a signatory status typically 
has no effect on practice, and it shows. As reviews of the YOA have reported over the 
years, significant issues regarding the implementation of the Act had meant that the 
principle of detention as a last resort has been undermined. For example, the NSW 
Ombudsman submission to Justice Wood’s NSW Child Protection Inquiry noted, 
We found significant discrepancy in the use of diversionary options between 
(police) commands, and on occasions between different sectors of the same 
command. This suggests that use of the YOA (NSW) depends heavily on the 
views of an individual officer rather than the application of more general 
criteria. In our view, the issue should be closely monitor by NSW Police to 
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identify how referrals rates (to conferences) might be improved 
(Ombudsman, as cited in Justice Wood, 2008, p. 563). 
 
The concerns above have also been highlighted in a later review of the juvenile justice 
system in NSW by Noetic Solutions (2010). This review claimed that the juvenile 
justice system had lost its direction, noting that improvements seen in the early 1900’s 
with a focus on diversion and detention as a last resort ‘had been eroded and the outlook 
for the future is poor’ (Noetic Solutions, 2010, p. iv). Rather, as further noted in the 
review, an increased focus on the rhetoric by politicians on ‘law and order’ and getting 
‘tough on crime’ (see Hogg and Brown, 1998) had been driving policy changes. For 
example, as a result of such ‘tough on crime’ focus, between 2000 and 2011, there had 
been more than 18 amendments to the Bail Act 1978.  
 
The Noetic Review (2010) found that the changes to the Bail Act have had unintended 
consequences negatively impacting on children and young people. For example, 
restrictions in applying bail and the lack of community resources to house young people 
on bail resulting in young people being detained even when it is unlikely that they will 
receive a custodial sentence if, and when convicted in court. Thus, in practice, the 
principles of the YOA are being contradicted by other legislation applied to young 
people, such as for example, the NSW Bail Act 1978, Children and Young Persons 
(Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) and the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act.  
 
The picture presented was one of a long-term failure to apply the YOA to its full extent. 
Explanations sought on the limited application of the Act revealed that there has been 
limited literature in the field of criminology on the role of various institutional 
‘decision-makers’ to diversion. The NSW Police Force and the magistrates of the 
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Children’s Court have the decision-making positions in the administration of the Act as 
they get to determine if a young person can access a warning, caution or YJC. In 
determining this, NSW Police and the magistrates of the Children’s Court can deny 
access to a warning, caution or YJC for the young offender on the grounds that, in their 
‘opinion’ and having regard to the ‘interests of justice’, it is more appropriate not to 
deal with the matter by the way of diversion under the Act (Young Offenders Act 1997 
(NSW): Section 14; Section 20). Thus, the lack of research focusing on social, structural 
and institutional decision making within those agencies that have the power to 
determine whether to divert or not, presents a weakness in trying to understand the 
capacity and deployment of diversion under the Act. Accordingly, this thesis seeks to 
address this gap in the literature, to contribute to a full understanding of the Act and its 
application, and juvenile justice processes overall. 
 
In Australia, most of the criminological research on juvenile justice has focused on 
historical and contemporary practices of youth justice policies and the impact of such 
policies on specific groups of young people. Some of this work includes Chris 
Cunneen’s work on Indigenous juvenile justice (see, for example, 1997, 2001, 2006); 
Rob White’s research on young people and public space (1990, 1998, 2007); Kelly 
Richards extensive research on the emergence of restorative justice (2005, 2006, 2009, 
2010a, 2010b, 2014b, 2017); while studies by Christine Alder (2000) and Kerry 
Carrington (1993, 2006, 2009) focus on young girls and crime.  A broader perspective 
of juvenile justice legislation and the courts in Australia has been provided by studies 
by John Seymour (1985) and Terry Carney (1985), Allan Borovski and James M. 
Murray (1985), Chris Cunneen and Rob White (2011), and more recently, Rosemary 
Sheehan and Allan Borowski’s overview of Australia’s Children’s Courts in 
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Australia’s Children’s Court Today and Tomorrow (2013).  Nevertheless, such 
literature does not specifically focus on issues of policy implementation. Neither does 
it analyse policies concerned with the diversion of young people.  
 
Yet, the background to the YOA, as well as, its impact in youth justice governance has 
been reviewed in detail by Janet Chan (2005), and by Noetic Solutions (2010). 
However, these works do not engage with the specifics enabling and constraining 
diversion practices as experienced during the decision-making process by those 
determining access. Thus, this thesis integrates institutional ‘decision-makers’ 
approaches to decision-making in the youth justice context (namely NSW Police Force, 
the Children’s Court Magistrates and NSW youth justice personnel), in order to provide 
a deeper insight into the tensions that surround diversionary practices.  
 
The overreaching question that this research seeks to answer is why diversion of young 
people has failed in NSW? To this objective, the researcher has an interest to trace the 
problems that block the way for diversionary practices under the YOA. Thus, the focus 
is to identify a combination of social/political, structural and institutional impediments 
to youth diversion across the NSW Police Force, the Children’s Court and youth justice 
personnel.    
 
Chapter overview 
Chapter one in this thesis deals with different concepts and understandings of 
‘diversion’ across various fields. The variability of meanings within different 
institutional contexts results in different aims for diverting young people across 
multiple domains. The aims can sometimes focus on crime prevention and early 
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intervention, and at other times on sentencing options or alternative pathways for 
offenders to non-court institutions. As will be explained in that chapter, for the purpose 
of this thesis, ‘diversion’ is used to refer to pre-court and court initiated diversionary 
alternatives away from the criminal justice system as legislated by the YOA. Within this 
context, diversion provides a process intended to minimise intervention and ensure the 
use of detention as a ‘last resort’. 
 
Throughout the chapter, diversion is contextualised through a historical overview of the 
juvenile justice system in NSW. Such an overview recognises the progression from 
punitive ‘welfare focused’ responses for socially unacceptable behaviours during the 
first half of the 19th century, to an early form of diversion by the second half of the 19th 
century. This shift marked the beginning of progressive reforms in the criminal justice 
system, which increasingly differentiated children from adults. Such reforms paved the 
way for the basis of diversionary thinking, resulting in the diversion of children away 
from the adult system. This was accomplished through the establishment of a separate 
court system for young people aimed at protecting children from the stigmatisation of 
the adult criminal justice system. This period encapsulated the birth of the distinct 
concept of the ‘young offender' and more significantly, the dichotomy of welfare and 
justice that defines juvenile governance. The existent tensions and overlaps between 
these paradigms are discussed throughout the account of juvenile policies and practices, 
right up to the establishment of the YOA. It is within this context, that consideration is 
given to the role of NSW Police and magistrates as institutional decision-makers in the 
youth justice context. The role of discretion is of particular interest to determine 
whether a young person would or would not be processed under the YOA diversionary 
scheme, and if so at what level, ranging from warnings or cautions to YJC referrals. 
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Chapter two signals the theoretical framework of this thesis. The chapter addresses risk 
as a management and assessment tool that has a bearing on youth governance. It traces 
the tensions between welfare and justice paradigms. The setting of youth justice 
governance, especially within the UK, Australasia and North America appears to be 
increasingly subsumed by concepts of ‘risk’ management. This chapter concerns 
theories and practices of ‘risk’ management. Beginning with a contextualisation of 
‘risk’ in contemporary society, it progresses to a discussion of the relationship between 
risk and neoliberalism – ‘a particular project designed by and developed by an 
increasingly transnational elite that has radically transformed the character of the 
spheres of economic, social and penal interventions’ (Carrington, Hogg and Sozzo, 
2016, p. 15). Within this context, particular attention is given to the focus on individual 
responsibilisation in relation to crime. The chapter advances to discuss this specifically 
within the context of the YOA in NSW to consider how ‘risk management’ might result 
in the direction of particular groups into the traditional criminal justice system rather 
than away from it through the diversionary schemes of the Act. This failure to divert 
occurs in context-specific ways within the NSW Police Force and the NSW Children’s 
Court, which are the focus of this thesis.  
 
Chapter three justifies the use of mixed methods in this research, with an emphasis on 
qualitative methodologies.  The use of interviews with key informants as well as 
analysis of policy documents and official statistics provides a full depiction of the 
conflicting practitioner’s perspectives associated with the process of youth diversion 
delivery in NSW. However, primarily, it is the 25 semi-structured interviews with 
criminal justice professionals identified as ‘decision-makers’, namely the NSW Police, 
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Magistrates of the Children’s Court and youth justice personnel that provide the 
qualitative key data to meet the objectives of this research. 
 
Chapter four focuses on the role of the NSW Police Force in the decision-making 
process regarding diversion of young people under the YOA. The chapter examines the 
findings of six interviews with five youth liaison officers (YLOs) and one youth policy 
officer, hence unveiling some police thinking on a range of issues. These include their 
attraction to the role of YLO, understanding of this role by themselves and other non-
YLO police officers (for example general duties/arresting officers), the YOA 
weaknesses and strengths, as well as practices on the implementation of the Act. 
 
The discussion in chapter five contributes to understanding decision-making processes 
that will eventuate in diversion or not of young people under the YOA by the Children’s 
Court. An analysis of thirteen interviews including ten specialist Children Court 
magistrates, two Local Court magistrates and the President of the Children’s Court 
Magistrates in NSW provides a magisterial perspective unveiling magisterial thinking 
on matters of diversion. These include perceived differences between the role as 
Children Court magistrates and that of the Local Court magistrates (dealing with 
children’s matters), their involvement in the process of diversion to cautions and YJC, 
including experiences with other stakeholders/organisation involved, their viewpoint 
on the factors affecting decision-making processes, and the magisterial perspectives on 
weakness and strengths of the process of diversion.  
 
Chapter six contributes to understanding decision-making processes that will eventuate 
in diversion or not of young people under the YOA by adding to the narrative the 
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perspectives of five Assistant Managers from Juvenile Justice NSW (JJ) and one 
Aboriginal Legal Services (ALS) solicitor. The findings in this chapter corroborate 
some of the concluding remarks in the previous analysis chapters.  
 
In the final chapter, a summary of the research and key findings is presented. In turn, 
the overreaching question of why there has been a failure to refer young people to 
diversion in NSW is addressed. The chapter concludes with the ramifications of these 
findings for theory and policy. Consequently, it proposes an alternative to the way 
diversion is done in NSW and highlights a scope for future research. 
 
 
  
 
 
11 
CHAPTER ONE – JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NSW AND 
THE AIMS OF ‘DIVERSION’ 
 
Research on diversionary decision-making and practices must begin by acknowledging 
multifarious understandings of what the term means. The opacity of the concept ensures 
that the aims for diversion can vary significantly across different social and institutional 
contexts. Diversion can operate at different levels including, as a crime prevention 
strategy, a diversionary scheme, a sentencing option, or an alternative pathway for 
offenders from court, custody and the criminal justice system, or even re-offending 
(Richards, 2014a). At times, diversion often refers to a combination of crime 
preventions and early interventions strategies (Richards, 2014a). The reality is that 
there are multiple domains and consequently, multiple aims. Thus, the available 
evidence on diversion is limited, incomplete, contradictory and ambiguous, as it deals 
with multiple understandings of the concept. This has potential implications, 
particularly for the justification of diversionary schemes and for evaluating and 
understanding the effects of diversion. This chapter addresses these implications by 
first considering the historical context of youth justice in Australia, specifically focused 
on NSW. The governance of young people will be traced back to the Australian colonial 
government engagement with welfare. As will be shown, colonial welfare practices and 
policies were, and continue to be, instrumental in the criminalisation of Indigenous 
young people and their over-representation in the criminal justice system.  The 
historical discussion will lead to the first example of diversion, traced back to the 
separation of children from adults in the criminal justice system by the establishment 
of the Children’s Court in NSW in 1905. This marked the birth of a distinct ‘young 
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offender’, a new legal regime for youth was justified acknowledging children’s 
immaturity and vulnerability, thus earning them a distinct criminal treatment process to 
adults.  Even when the welfare model was at its strongest, the justice elements were 
never abandoned, with the Children’s Court retaining features of the adult court. This 
chapter illustrates that the juvenile justice system in Australia is a hybrid of welfare and 
justice principles, the system never exclusively fitting into either. The fallacy of the 
assumption that these models can be dichotomised will become apparent as the chapter 
moves to discuss further developments over time until the current legislative framework 
for youth justice conferencing, the YOA. Finally, with the broader focus of this research 
in mind, the roles of police and magistrates as key actors will be discussed within the 
politics of ‘diversionary’ discretion and decision-making that control access to youth 
justice conferencing. 
 
The ambiguities around ‘diversion’ 
The importance of diversion for young people in trouble with the law is stressed in 
several international legal frameworks. In accordance with the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Beijing Rules, the juvenile justice system 
in Australia dealing with young people in conflict with the law is underpinned by the 
requirement to treat juveniles with greater leniency than adults, and to divert them 
where possible from formal criminal justice processes (Cashmore, 2013; Richards, 
2011b). United Nations conventions, international law and human rights has uncertain 
legal force. Particularly in Australia, where without a Bill of Rights, there is no charter 
of enforceable rights (Kirby, 1999).  
 
 
 
13 
Nevertheless, international law is a legitimate and important influence on the 
development of common law and constitutional law in Australia (Kirby, 1999). 
Accordingly, the importance of diversion for young people in trouble, as stressed by 
international law, is apparent in Australia’s youth governance. At a federal level, this 
is manifested by the strong focus on the importance of diversion in the National Youth 
Policing Model (Attorney-General’s Department, 2010), the Juvenile Justice Standards 
(Australasian Juvenile Justice Administrators, 2009) and the Principles of Youth Justice 
in Australia (Australasian Juvenile Justice Administrators, 2014). At state jurisdictional 
level, each state and territory’s juvenile justice system involves a strong focus on 
diversion, at least theoretically, either via legislation or policy (see Australian Institute 
of Health and Welfare, 2018; Jordan and Farrell, 2013).  
 
Hence in the context of youth justice, ‘diversion is omnipresent’ (Richards, 2014a, p. 
9). While particular diversionary schemes are subject to criminological attention and/or 
evaluation, ‘diversion’ as a concept receives little attention and there has been no 
conceptual clarity about what it is, and what it is not (Richards, 2014a). As Richards 
(2014a) notes, Nejelski brought attention to this when emphasising that the term had 
been used so often and to justify such wide response to youth that it has become ‘a coin 
of debased value’ (1976, p. 394 cited in Richards, 2014a).  As Richards (2014a) adds, 
the concept of diversion is amorphous and takes on different meanings depending on 
context and its use by different institutional actors.  
 
Adding to this, Kelly and Armitage (2015) suggest that there are at least five 
understandings of diversion within academic and policy discourse: diversion from 
crime; diversion into alternative services; diversion from the youth justice system; 
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diversion from custody; and diversion from prosecution/court. As Kelly and Armitage 
(2015) add, these five understandings have their own ambiguities. For example, the 
notion of diverting away from the youth justice system depends very much on the 
defined boundaries of such system; while ‘diversion from crime’ depends on where 
‘interventions sit within the broader landscape of support provisions’ (Kelly and 
Armitage, 2015, p. 117).  
 
This has complicated implications. As Richards (2014a) notes, ‘diversion’ operating at 
three distinct levels: crime prevention strategies, diversionary schemes and sentencing 
options, refers to a variety of aims and it is not always clear what young people are 
being “diverted” from and towards. In some contexts, it is constructed as alternative 
pathways for offenders from court to ‘non-court institutions’, community support 
services and treatment programs (Richards, 2014a). In other contexts, it refers to 
alternative pathways for offenders from court, custody and the criminal justice system 
or even re-offending (Richards, 2014a). Thus, although the literature on diversion often 
refers to a combination of crime prevention and early intervention strategies, the reality 
is that there are multiple domains with varied meanings (Richards, 2014a). 
 
The conceptual confusion around whether diversion refers to diverting away from the 
criminal justice system, or away from offending itself, holds true for both local and 
international contexts (Richards, 2014a).  Indeed, almost all actors understand and 
interpret diversion differently (Richards, 2014a). This, in turn, has potential effects for 
the justification of diversion schemes and for evaluating and understanding the effects 
of diversion (Richards, 2014a). More importantly, as Richards argues, ‘the ill-defined 
ethos of ‘diversion’ is used to legitimise criminal justice measures that seek more and 
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less intervention in young people’s lives’ (2014a, p. 4). Hence the ‘evidence’ available 
on diversion is limited, incomplete, contradictory and ambiguous.  
 
Speaking on diversion in the Scottish system, McAra and McVie argue that 
policymakers have selectively drawn from the contours of youth justice evidence-based 
research on ‘what works’ and ‘risk factors paradigm’ (2010). Consequently, this, 
‘resulting in a reconfiguration of power between key elites and a recasting of system 
ethos into a somewhat conflicted and contradictory set of rationalities’ (McAra and 
McVie, 2010, p. 184) while neglecting the fact that young people involved in the most 
serious type of offending are among the most victimised and vulnerable group in 
society. Further, the McAra and McVie study found that the strongest predictor of 
offending was, in fact, previous contact with the system, leading to conclude that youth 
justice ought to ‘maximise diversion wherever possible’ based on the fact that 
‘diversion’ fosters desistance (2010, p. 202)1. 
 
 
In contrast, research in Australia by Weatherburn, McGrath and Bartels (2012) 
speaking on diversion away from the system and towards restorative justice processes, 
suggest that the evidence is lacking when it comes to alternatives to court diversion 
away from the system having any positive impact on recidivism. They claim that there 
is no evidence of the stigmatising and labelling effects that are often attached to the 
court system. Thus, they argue against a ‘hands off’ approach to youth justice but rather 
recommend risk- based diversion to treatment programs in the early stages of contact 
with the system. Consequently, they are arguing for the use of existing risk tools that 
 
1 See McAra and McVie (2010) study on young offenders, from the Edinburgh Study of Youth Transitions and 
Crime for evidence that the strongest predictor of a young person being charged by police was having previous 
police charges (see also Holman and Zeidenberg, 2006). 
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focus on, for example, the number of prior contacts with the juvenile system, gender, 
age at first contact, and other factors influencing offending, in order to select those 
young people deemed for diversion to treatment programmes. This is a very different 
approach to diversion from the system, as their acknowledgement clearly notes such an 
approach would ‘undoubtedly increase the number of young offenders coming before 
the Children’s Court’ (Weatherburn et al., 2012, p. 808).  
 
The use of recidivism rates to measure the worthiness of diversion is problematic for at 
least two reasons. Firstly, because the positivistic approach heavily focused on the value 
of scientific evidence here seems to more heavily burden juvenile justice diversion for 
‘evidence’ of recidivism, when in reality such evidence is difficult to attain, and in not 
finding it can cast more scepticism around these initiatives. Further, unrealistic calls for 
true evidence regarding the stigmatising and labelling effects of the court system can 
claim to be objective. However, they have serious real-world impacts on whether there 
is public and political support for different measures, in this case, diversion away from 
the court system. Secondly, in calling on recidivism-based evidence, the attention is 
shifted away from the need to divert young people in order to avoid the criminogenic 
effects of the traditional justice system. Diversion must be above all, about diverting 
young people away from the criminogenic effects of traditional justice. 
 
Jorden and Farrell (2013; cited in Richards 2014a) draw heavily on ‘labelling theory’ 
and the capacity of the youth justice system to label and stigmatise young people while 
arguing for a robust system that directs young offenders away from the criminal justice 
system outcomes, such as custodial sentences. The focus in their account is ‘diversion’ 
from the system, rather than ‘diversion’ from offending. Undoubtedly, offending and 
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contact with the criminal justice system are related for the reason that offending may 
lead to contact with the criminal justice system (Richards, 2014a). However, certain 
groups of young people come into contact with the criminal justice system not because 
they continually offend but rather because they are highly visible to police and other 
criminal justice agencies, thus they come under a high degree of scrutiny (Richards, 
2014a). Evidence shows this to be the case for Indigenous young people (Blagg et al., 
2005; Cunneen, 2008b), young people on bail (Richards and Renshaw, 2013), and 
young people from sex and gender diverse communities (Dwyer, 2011), among others. 
Accordingly, Richards (2014a) claims, although offending and contact with the 
criminal justice system are related, the connection between the two is more distinct than 
suggested by some authors (for example, see Weatherburn et al., 2012). Thus, making 
a distinction between diverting from the criminal justice system and diverting from 
offending is necessary to allow for a clearer understanding of the aims and the 
applications of diversion (Richards, 2014a). 
 
This is a key point, because diverting young people away from the criminal justice 
system is mainly concerned with minimising the criminogenic effects of this contact; 
while diverting young people from offending or re-offending is primarily concerned 
with changing the young person’s behaviour and structural factors that might affect the 
individual’s contact with the system (Richards, 2014a). Not surprisingly, distinct 
responses arise: diverting young people away from the criminal justice system 
advocates for less intrusive interventions or better still none; whilst diverting from 
offending urges for intrusive interventions (Richards, 2014a). ‘Real diversion’ should 
indeed be focusing on diverting away from the criminal system, particularly from 
custody, from prosecution and court. And this should be its core meaning. 
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These issues are important to consider as they demonstrate the inherent complexities 
with the concept of diversion. The emergence of restorative practices and diversion has 
coincided with the rise of the neo-liberal approach to governance in contemporary 
Australia (Cunneen, 2012b). Individual responsibility, accountability and risk 
management have increasingly become the focus of the justice’s system response to 
offending (Cunneen, 2012b; Muncie, 2006). Concurrently, prior notions of welfare 
have translated into methods of classification, control and coercion (Muncie, 2016). In 
this context, there is a lesser focus on the social context and greater emphasis on the 
individual, the family, and the community regarding responsibility and accountability 
(Cunneen, 2012b). As Garland (1996) claims by ‘governing at a distance’ the process 
of responsibilisation has been transferred from the state to community-based and non-
state individuals. Diversion can be understood as compatible with such politicisation 
and requirements of responsibilisation. For example, in youth conferencing, the victim, 
the offender and the community become responsibilised partners in the business of 
crime control. Further diversion tends to support the values of neoliberalism by placing 
requirements on individuals to engage in self-help, thus promoting individual 
responsibility.  
 
In the neo-liberal regime, the privatization of crime control services and institutions, 
increased social and economic inequalities, fears of crime around terrorism, ‘illegal’ 
immigrants, ‘moral panics’ around issues of race, religious and ethnic minorities, all 
have affected the way criminal justice systems function. Demands for an authoritarian 
law-and-order response to crime have led to a greater emphasis on deterrence and 
incapacitation and a significant intensification of punishment. As previously noted, this 
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has occurred at the same time as diversion and restorative justice practices have been 
introduced (Cunneen, 2012b). Thus, elements of restorative justice (such as diversion), 
retribution, just desserts, rehabilitation and incapacitation are all operating at any one 
time. 
  
Further, the emphasis on the prediction of risk has resulted on an increased reliance on 
techniques for identifying, classifying and managing groups of citizens (Feely and 
Simon, 1994) resulting in incapacitation policies for those deemed the most dangerous. 
Thus, risk assessment becomes a technique in dividing populations. In the context of 
diversion, such technique is used to divide those that benefit from diversion and those 
that are channeled into more punitive processes, such as incapacitation (Cunneen, 
2012b). Further discussion surrounding these issues will be forthcoming. Nevertheless, 
their significance here, is of relevance with regard to the conceptual contestation around 
diversion, providing context for what will be the different perspectives by criminal 
justice practices and their own perceptions of what ‘diversion’ is.   
 
For this thesis, the concept of ‘diversion’ that will be favoured refers to pre-court and 
court initiated diversionary alternatives away from the criminal justice system (in 
particular court prescribed sanctions) as legislated by the YOA (NSW), thus providing 
a process intended to minimise intervention and use detention as a ‘last resort’. 
Diversion from the formal criminal justice system is in the best interest of young people 
because: 
• young people should be treated differently than adults; 
• diversion has the potential to use restorative justice approaches;  
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• minimising young people’s contact with detention is a principle under the 
international human rights framework to which, as previously noted, 
Australia is a signatory;  
• diversion addresses the needs of offenders in ways that are not stigmatising 
and criminalising; 
• diversion reduces further contact with the court system, and in turn, with the 
criminal justice system by reducing the risk of detention; and 
• left to their own devices, most young people grow out of crime. 
 
Young people should be treated differently than adults due to their limited life 
experience, maturity and flexibility to respond to positive interventions (Richards and 
Lee, 2013). As Richards (2011, p. 1) notes ‘it is widely accepted that crime is committed 
disproportionately by young people’. However, this does not mean that juveniles are 
responsible for the majority of the recorded crime. Rather, it is because offending 
‘peaks’ between 18 to 19 years of age when young people are no longer legally defined 
as juveniles (Richards, 2011). Most importantly, research shows that a small proportion 
of juveniles continue offending into adulthood (Skardhamar, 2009). Thus, ‘left to their 
own devices, most juveniles grow out of crime…juvenile crime is for the most part 
transient and self-limiting’ (Richards and Lee, 2013).  
 
Research on brain development demonstrates that, firstly, competence in decision-
making does not develop until the second decade of life; and secondly during the 
adolescence period the influence of peers can profoundly impact young people risk-
taking behaviour (Steinberg, 2005). In general, young people, commit less serious 
offences than adults, and they commit more property offences rather than person 
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offences (Cunneeen and White, 2007; Richards, 2011); tend to be less experienced than 
adults at committing offences and generally commit offences in groups and, in public 
areas (Cunneen and White, 2007). In addition, young people tend to commit offences 
that are unplanned, opportunistic, putting themselves at risk (Cunneen and White, 
2007).  
 
Due to their immaturity and heavy reliance on peer networks, young people are more 
at risk of a range of problems related to offending, for example, mental health problems, 
alcohol and drug use, as well as peer pressure (Richards, 2011). Further, young people 
are at increased risk of victimisation, by adults and by other juveniles (Finkelhor and 
Hashima, 2001; Richards, 2011). The over-representation of young people as victims 
of crime is critical to consider, as it is widely known that victimisation is a pathway 
into offending behaviour (Richards, 2011). 
 
Diversionary measures are premised on the beliefs of a deserving second chance, 
proportionate and participatory responses in the criminal justice system process, as 
reflected in the United Nations frameworks that relate to youth justice (see The Beijing 
Rules, 1985; CROC, 1989). Restorative justice recognises that children might be 
vulnerable, particularly to being dealt with by persons in authority, such as the police 
and the magisterial (Richards and Lee, 2013). Diversion holds young people 
accountable and encourage them to accept responsibility, yet allows opportunities for 
the child, family and community to participate in the decision-making processes that 
affect their lives (Richards and Lee, 2013).  
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Contact with the criminal court increases the risk of further contact with the criminal 
justice system (Richards and Lee, 2013). As previously noted, research suggests that 
young people, particularly vulnerable groups, can be easily entangled in the criminal 
justice system (Richards and Renshaw, 2013). Examples of such vulnerable groups 
include, sex and gender diverse (see Dwyer, 2011), young people on bail and out-of-
home care (see McAra and McVie, 2007), young people from remote rural areas (see 
Richards and Renshaw, 2013), and as a consequence Indigenous young people (see 
Richards and Renshaw, 2013). As Richards and Lee (2013) note, this is not necessarily 
because of young people re-offending, but because once these young people become 
‘known’ to the system, they are highly scrutinised by it (see McAra and McVie, 2007; 
Richards and Renshaw, 2013).  
 
For example, although technical breaches of bail are not classified as offences under the 
Bail Act 1978 (NSW), ‘the intensive scrutiny of young people on bail is likely to result 
in offences committed by young people being recorder that may not have otherwise 
come to the attention of police’ (Richards and Lee, 2013, p. 7). Further, a study by 
Richards and Renshaw (2013) of young people and bail, reports that young people in a 
care setting are more vulnerable to having their offending detected by the police. The 
limited experience and capability of some staff to deal with challenging behaviours of 
young people within out-of-home, and in turn, the reliance on police to resolve issues 
that occur in these settings results in the increased scrutiny of young people out-of-
home care (Richards and Renshaw, 2013). It is due to this scrutiny that these young 
people’s offences are more likely to be detected and recorded. In contrast, as Richards 
and Lee (2013) claim, young people diverted cannot be placed in detention, a sentence 
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order or on a period of remand. Thus, diversionary measures in place not only reduce 
young people’s contact with court but their risk of detention. 
 
Research demonstrates that the strongest predictor of a young person being charged by 
police is having had previous police charges. For example, results of a cross-national 
comparative study by Huizinga, Schymann, Ehret and Elliot (2004) reported that arrest 
and increased sanctions either have no deterrence effect on delinquency or, make 
matters worse. This is in agreement with other research findings. For example, a study 
by McAra and McVie (2007) of 4300 young people in Edinburgh in 1998, found that 
children who have been charged in previous years were over seven times more likely 
to be charged at age 15 than were children with no criminal history; this was so, 
regardless of their current involvement in serious offending. Such findings illustrate 
how very vulnerable groups get caught up in the system. The ongoing contact with 
court can have detrimental impacts including affecting young people’s, relationship 
with their families, their education educational and employment opportunities, which 
in turn increase their risk of detention (Carrington and Perreira, 2009).  
 
The effects of detention have been found to be particularly negative (DeLisi, 
Hochstetler, Jones-Johnson, Caudill and Marquart, 2011; Gatti, Tremblay and Vitaro, 
2009). It is commonly recognised that imprisonment can encourage further criminal 
behaviour through peer contact. This effect may be amplified for young people due to 
their immaturity and susceptibility to peer pressure (Richards, 2011). Further, detention 
can have a negative effect on a young person’s mental and physical health, including 
the risk of depression, self-harm and suicide (Holman and Ziedenberg, 2006). 
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Research further shows that many young people who spend time in youth detention 
progress to doing time in adult prison. A survey of adult entrants in Australia found that 
in 2010, 22 per cent of all entrants had previously been in youth detention and half of 
those had been there at least three times (AIHW, 2011). Similarly, a longitudinal study 
by Gatti, Tremblay and Vitaro (2009) of 1037 children born in Canada in 1984, found 
that contact with the juvenile criminal justice system significantly increased the 
likelihood of adult criminal justice intervention by a factor of seven. Further, the study 
found that an increase in the intensity of the intervention resulted in an increase in the 
negative impacts later in life. This illustrates the criminogenic effect of detention and 
the need to minimise intervention and use detention as a ‘last resort’. 
 
Diversion reduces young people’s contact with the court, and hence their risk of 
detention. Minimising the young peoples’ contact with detention, as previously noted, 
is a principle under international human rights framework to which Australia is a 
signatory (see The Beijing Rules, 1985; CROC, 1989). Diversion as a form of 
restorative justice is premised on enhancing accountability, empowerment, 
participation and voice while minimising the young people’s contact with the criminal 
justice system. Reflecting a normative approach, rather than a reductionist approach, 
the aims of diversion concern how young people in trouble with the law should be 
responded to (Richards and Lee, 2013). Thus, diversion frameworks take into account 
young people vulnerability and highlight the need for considerations to be given to age, 
maturity and cultural background (Richards and Lee, 2013). Accordingly, and as 
reflected in the premises of the YOA, diversion from the formal criminal justice system 
is best for young people. The development and foundations of such YOA ideals need to 
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be contextualised through a historical overview of the juvenile system in NSW. It is to 
an historical overview that this discussion now turns.  
 
Origins of ‘diversion’: Juvenile Justice and ‘diversion’ in NSW 
The governance of children in the criminal justice system is underpinned by beliefs 
about the role and responsibility of the state in protecting the ‘best interest of the child’ 
(Cunneen and White, 2002, 2007; Fernandez, Bolitho, Hansen, Hudson, and Kendall, 
2014; Muncie, 2008; Sheehan, 2001; Sullivan, 1993). These beliefs developed based 
on ideas about young people and cannot be separated from wider social, political and 
economic developments (Coppins, Casey, and Campbell, 2011; Cunneen and White, 
2002, 2007; Day, 2011; Fernandez et al., 2014; Seymour, 1997).  
 
The Australian approach to governing children and young people has varied across time 
(Picton and Boss, 1981; Swain, 2014). Following the aftermath of the goldrush era, a 
combination of economic and demographic factors made children increasingly visible, 
particularly in urban centres (Scott and Swain, 2002). This marked the beginning of the 
Australian colonial government’s engagement with child welfare. The colonial context, 
of course, meant something very different for Aboriginal children and young people. A 
key component of the colonial process was the ‘civilising mission’ (so-called by the 
Australia authorities of the time) which involved forcibly removing Aboriginal children 
from their communities and families (Cunneen, 2011). As Cunneen (2011) notes, ‘the 
Australian removal policies rested on specific assumptions about race, ‘blood’, and 
racial hygiene’ (p. 164).  
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The construction of Indigenous people as a dangerous presence justified regimes of 
regulation and protection that effectively created a new class of criminal and new 
categories of criminality based on racial and other exclusionary criteria (Carrington, 
2011).  Such regimes have taken place for most of the twentieth century, implemented 
through a range of policies such as immigration restriction, Aboriginal protection, and 
child welfare (Carrington, 2011). These policies aimed to cleanse the social body and 
to protect it from the contaminating influences of the non-British introduced 
normalising projects operated through the regime of penal welfarism (Carrington, 
2011). Regimes of penal welfarism allowed the justice system processes and 
institutions to focus on the character of the young person and their family background 
rather than the offence (Carrington, 2011). These blurred the lines between delinquency 
and neglect and permitted for the ‘problem child’ to become an instrument for the social 
control of non-normative families, particularly Aboriginal communities (Carrington, 
2011, p. 33).  
 
Deficit discourses were crucial to the operation of social control that resulted in the 
punishment and institutionalisation of the unruly and unwanted (Carrington, 2011). 
Deficit discourses as deviation from the norm (Rose, 1985) construct non-normative 
populations as the Other (Carrington, 2011). Within such discourse, the impact of 
colonialism, social background, social inequities and forms of exclusion are ignored as 
significant regarding the young person’s behaviour (Carrington, 2011). Rather, the 
delinquent or neglected child is seen as a symptom of deficits ‘attributable to a 
maladjusted childhood, dysfunctional family, deficiencies of character, or poor social 
background’ (Carrington, 2011, p.34). 
 
 
 
27 
Consequently, the first half of the nineteenth century was characterised by colonial 
attempts to provide for children seen at ‘risk and a potential risk in their current 
situations’ (Swain, 2014, p. 6). The removal of Aboriginal children, particularly those 
of mixed-blood parentage, was justified through this practice based on protection in the 
interest of the nation (Carrington, 2011). In 1997, The National Inquiry into the 
Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families 
(NISATSIC) found that most Indigenous families continue to be affected by the forcible 
removal of children during this time and the hugely disproportionate rate at which 
Aboriginal children are incarcerated today is reflective of a systemic denial of 
Indigenous Human Rights (see Cunneen and Libesman, 2000). 
 
The annulment of legislation which removed Aboriginal children on the basis of race 
alone was followed by further Child Welfare policies allowing for interventions and 
further removal of Aboriginal children based on ‘expert knowledge’ (Carrington, 2011, 
p. 35). This concern, for example, pertained to destitute children in public spaces, 
children having been picked up under prevailing vagrancy provisions, and children in 
prison (Swain, 2014). Those children who lived in socially unacceptable conditions 
were institutionalised in orphanages and asylums (Sheehan, 2013). There was a claim 
of concern over the child, but in reality children were seen as a threat to the social 
stability, and the ‘child saving’ welfare philosophy was directed to the impoverished 
classes, those apparently unsupervised children between the age of two and sixteen that 
arose fears amongst the most respectable classes of society (Scott and Swain, 2002) and 
were seen as ‘original sinners’ (Cunningham, 1995, p. 134).  
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The governance of Indigenous girls and young women was more amplified. Seen as the 
prime objects of moral regeneration, girls were committed to institutions where they 
could be apprenticed as domestic servants (Carrington and Pereira, 2009). Against a 
backdrop of a ‘bio-eugenicist’ aim protecting Australia’s white British purity, the threat 
of inter-racial contamination led to the institutionalisation of Indigenous girls in 
disproportionate numbers (Carrington, 2011). As, Carrington and Pereira note ‘the 
punishment of children for non-criminal conduct under status or welfare offences, such 
as uncontrollable or exposed to moral danger, permitted the criminalization of 
immorality, poverty and cultural differences’ (2009, p. 2), and Indigeneity more 
specifically. During this era, extra-judicial agencies in charge of welfare were allowed 
the latitude to sexualise girls’ offences, remove Aboriginal children from their families 
on the basis of their race, punish impoverished families and single parents by removing 
their children and treat abused children as delinquents (Carrington, 1993). Linking 
coercive assistance with punishment, penal welfarism effectively drove large numbers 
of the most disadvantaged, neglected and abused children from institutionalised care 
into juvenile detention for non-criminal activities (Carrington, 1993; Carrington and 
Perreira, 2009; O’Connor, 1997). Welfarism hence had the effect of criminalising the 
most disadvantaged through institutionalisation.  
 
In 1850 Australia saw the first special provision recognising the need to treat children 
differently from adults with the Juvenile Offender Act (14Vic No11) (Blackmore, 1989; 
Johnstone, 2014). The Act focused on the provision of speedier trials for children while 
addressing the undesired consequences of long-term imprisonment of children 
(Blackmore, 1989; Johnstone, 2014). The discretion placed on magistrates meant that, 
for example, offenders under 14 for simple larceny could be sentenced to as much as 
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‘three months imprisonment, or a fine of three pounds or dismissal on finding sureties 
for good behaviour’ (Blackmore, 1989, p. 6). At that time, the law was especially 
punitive. Then in 1866, the Reformatory Schools Act (30Vic No IV) provided for 
alternatives to prisons by the way of the establishment of reformatory schools; whilst 
the Destitute Children Act (30Vic No11) allowed for the provision of private and public 
‘industrial schools’ aimed at the institutionalisation of vagrant and destitute children 
(Blackmore, 1989). These changes were seen as a form of diversion that allowed the 
separation between two identifiable categories of children needing governance: ‘those 
who were neglected, orphaned or vagrant, and those who were young offenders’ 
(Blackmore, 1989, p. 6). In reality, these categories were not separable as poverty and 
orphan status was criminalised through institutionalisation practices as discussed. 
 
These changes mirrored legislative developments in England where, as noted by 
Goldson (2004, p. 87), Hendrick (2006, p.6) and May (1973, p. 7) for the first time 
Parliament legislatively recognised juvenile delinquency ‘as a distinct social 
phenomenon’. The contemporary political environment of reforms was influenced by, 
firstly, the necessary compulsory education of the ‘dangerous classes and warned of 
the fearful multitude of untutored savages’ (Lord Ashely, as cited in Cunningham, 
1991, p. 97); secondly, the need to theorise social-penal issues along the distinction of 
‘childhood’ and ‘youth’ – a central issue being how to conceptualise the child: as a 
‘victim’ or a ‘threat’? (Hendrick, 2003); and lastly the moral conception of ‘need’ based 
on proclamations that the prison, fail to obtain ‘willing obedience’ - a must for social 
stability and working-class compliance, it had failed to reform (Hendrick, 2006).  
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These trends marked the early beginnings of progression and reform in the criminal 
justice system that increasingly recognised the necessity to address the needs for 
children to be treated separately from adults, and differently to adults.  Most 
significantly, the reforms not only marked the importance of ‘age’ as a distinguishing 
feature of penal justice, they also began ‘to yield a structure of institutionalised 
surveillance and control’ (Hendricks, 2006, p.6), which was not so much about crime 
but rather about social equilibrium (Hendricks, 2006). The significance of this 
observation cannot be underestimated in that these issues invested crime and 
delinquency with new meanings that have determined attitudes in juvenile justice ever 
since. These reforms form the basis of diversionary thought and the creation of 
Children’s Courts, to which this discussion now turns. 
 
 
The Children’s Court: a history  
According to Polk (1993), the earliest diversionary practices for juvenile offenders in 
Australia occurred late in the 19th century with the establishment of a separate court 
system for young people. Diversion looked very different back in the 1800s. 
Nevertheless, it marked the beginnings of diversion as a practice.  
 
Juvenile justice in Australia is a state responsibility and consequently, legislation and 
systems vary across each jurisdiction2 (see Sheehan and Borovski, 2014, for differences 
between Children’s Courts in the states and territories). The first Children’s Court was 
established to deal with minor offences in South Australia in 1895 (Daly, 1999; 
Sheehan, 2013). 
 
2 Australia has nine legal systems compromised of six State and two Territory systems, and one federal system 
(Coppins, Case and Campbell, 2011). Criminal law, therefore, falls under the jurisdiction of each State or Territory 
(Crofts, 2015; Coppins et al., 2011), given that ‘criminal law is not one of the powers awarded to the Commonwealth 
Government under the Australian Constitution’ (Crofts, 2015, p. 124).  
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The first Children’s Court in NSW was established in 1905 under the Neglected 
Children’s and Juvenile Offenders Act (Blackmore, 1989; Fernandez, Bolitho, Hansen, 
and Hudson, 2013; Fernandez et al., 2014). Aimed at protecting children from the 
stigmatisation of the adult criminal justice system, discrete closed courts with two 
‘specialist magistrates’ were established in Sydney, Newcastle, Parramatta, Burwood 
and Broken Hill (Blackmore, 1989; Johnstone, 2014). The Children’s Court in NSW 
had jurisdiction over children’s care and protection matters as well as criminal matters 
(Crawford, 2005; Fernandez et al., 2014).  
 
This approach was founded on a welfare system or ‘needs-based’ approach (see 
Bernard, 1992) which recognised the psychosocial factors contributing to child 
offending and hence children’s susceptibility to reform and rehabilitation (Seymour, 
1997, 1998; Wundersitz, 2000a). This discussion ought to be placed within accounts 
exploring the evolution of the conceptualisation of the ‘young offender’ in juvenile 
justice. The notion of ‘juvenile offender’ is one that is relatively new, emerging in the 
late 19th century amid broader anxieties around the discovery of ‘adolescence’ (Aries, 
1960; Donzelot, 1979) as a ‘period marked by puberty, sexual initiation and the loss of 
innocence, a period of responsibility’ (Straton, 1992, p. 19), not a child, not an adult, a 
‘transition phase’.  
 
The evolving science of psychology brought attention to psychosocial factors such as a 
lack of maturity, a propensity to take risks, and susceptibility to peer influence, 
alongside additional factors largely attributable to dysfunctional elements in children’s 
environment such as intellectual disability, mental illness and victimisation; these 
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factors all increasing the likelihood of engagement in offending behaviours (see Hay, 
Payne and Chadwick, 2004; and Steinberg, 2005). Prior to this knowledge, childhood 
was a relatively short period that ended when children become highly valued for cheap 
labour (Cunningham, 2000). These changes in social understandings of childhood and 
adolescence occurred alongside significant economic, socio-political and structural 
change, which included compulsory schooling, abolition of child labour, urbanisation 
and child health regulations (Stephenson, 2007). Consequently, under the ‘child saving’ 
philosophy3 at the time, and the fostered paternalistic role of the state, a new legal 
regime for youth was justified acknowledging children’s immaturity and vulnerability 
(Crawford, 2005; Dickey, 1987; Fernandez et al., 2014; Seymour, 1998).  
 
The psychology of the adolescent, although significant, did not replace ‘social class’ as 
a principal concern of penal justice and youth justice. It rather fused class and age into 
the imagery associated with ‘delinquency’. The label of delinquent enabled 
representation of lower working-class youth as ‘Other’, a group in need of constant 
surveillance, discipline and punitive treatment (see Garland, 1985, p. 231). This thesis 
argues that these ideas have not shifted much; they remain the key drivers of the current 
juvenile justice framework and continue to underscore the perceptions and attitudes 
informing much of youth governance in contemporary Australia. 
 
The reforms commonly referred to as ‘the child saving’ movement, brought a welfare 
lens to youth offending (Crawford, 2005). The new Children’s Court to be presided 
over by a ‘special magistrate’ was to have ‘somewhat of a parental, informal character 
 
3 In the nineteenth century, a strong ‘child saving’ movement characterised by humanitarian and evangelistic nature 
developed in the United States, Britain and their colonies (including NSW as well as other Australian colonies) 
(Parsloe, 1978; Platt, 1977). Historians have noted this movement as instrumental in the reforms and the 
establishment of the children’s correctional system (See Dickey, 1987; and Ramsland, 1982). 
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rather than the severity, formality and possible terrorism of the ordinary courts of the 
land’ (Golder, 1991, p. 127). Consequently, in response to criminal offences and/or 
‘neglect’ in 1905, children aged between five and sixteen4 could be declared ‘a state 
ward’, a term given to describe children under the guardianship of a State welfare 
authority, resulting in their institutionalisation for the purposes of protection and reform 
(Blackmore, 1998; Crawford, 2005; Dickey, 1977; Fernandez et al., 2014). The 
definition of a ‘neglected’ child included a broad category of children. For example, 
children with no means of support; ill-treated; those taking part in dangerous public 
exhibitions; females who solicit men; children in places where opium was smoked; and 
any children that are living under conditions which indicate a risk of falling into a career 
of crime (Crawford, 2005). Thus, children placed under state care come from the most 
vulnerable sectors of society, particularly Aboriginal young people, but also unruly 
girls, Aboriginal or not. As Carrington claims state wards were ‘neglected, orphaned, 
impoverished children or children stolen from their families and communities by virtue 
of their ethnicity, ‘poor’ parenting, or mixed Aboriginal heritage’ (2011, p. 40).  
 
Unlike Britain, where most of these reformatory institutions were run by charities with 
government subsidies, in Australia until the middle of the nineteenth century these 
reformatory schools and industrial schools were run mostly by churches (in relation to 
Australia see Swain, 2014). With child welfare in Australia being a state rather than 
federal responsibility the legislation governing children can be described ‘as a 
patchwork rather than a coordinated model’ (Swain, 2014, p. 22).  The ideas that 
underpinned the legislation were borrowed and adapted from Britain. They have been 
 
4 The Neglected Children and Juvenile Offenders Act, 1905 had set a minimum age of five years for criminal and 
non-criminal matters of neglect, while it preserved the maximum age of sixteen as had been fixed by The Industrial 
Schools Act, 1866. This upper limit was raised from sixteen to eighteen in 1923 (See Child Welfare Act, 1923 
(NSW), section 3). 
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passed on by travellers, ‘experts’, having had the opportunity to visit 
institutions/facilities in the home-land (Swain, 2014). However, welfare was rarely a 
high priority for legislators within states, and the result was substantial latitude for 
interpretation of policies by those when it came down to those running the institutions 
(Swain, 2014). Thus, the reforms in NSW resulted in the expansion of social control 
over the lives of those young people and their families, deemed as ‘non-normative’ by 
the colonial gaze. Thus, class, race and gender based power structures were perpetuated 
through these reforms, rather than mere ‘child saving’ humanitarian agendas (see 
O’Brien, 1988; Seymour, 1988; and Windshuttle, 1980).  
 
Under the welfare model, however, diversionary programs were not deemed necessary. 
The Children’s Court was perceived to be acting entirely in the best interest of the child, 
focusing on rehabilitation whilst eliminating the chances of ‘contamination’ and penal 
identification that would have otherwise turn the child into career criminals (Binder and 
Binder, 1982; Seymour, 1988). The Children’s Court adopted preventative and 
corrective approaches for criminal offence matters 5 , classified as non-punitive 
measures and intended to ‘reclaim erring children’ (Seymour, 1997, p. 294; Ainsworth, 
1991; Fernandez et al., 2014). However, in reality, corrective and preventive 
approaches are punitive. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Children’s Court 
equipped with special provisions to respond to children at conflict with the law, was 
the final product in the creation of a separate system for children.  
 
 
5 As Blackmore (1989) notes, it was not until 1974 that the Children’s Court had the power to deal with indictable 
offences by way of fine or imprisonment. 
 
 
35 
The Children’s Court was considered, specially equipped to ‘help’ rather than ‘punish’ 
the young offender (Pratt, 1986). Consequently, any delay in the administration of 
treatment, which was perceived as potentially generated by diversion, was seen as the 
more harmful course of action (Pratt, 1986).  Thus, although police occasionally issued 
‘on-the-spot’ warnings to young people their diversionary powers were limited and 
tolerated rather than promoted (Seymour, 1998) since it was an informal process with 
no legislation behind it. Other than the occasional warning, as expected, the legislative 
changes resulted in a large number of referrals to the Children’s Court over the next 
two decades (Crawford, 2005; Pratt, 1986). However, despite the increase of number 
of prosecutions, ‘new sentences available, especially probation, is given as a reason 
for the decline in the number of those being committed to an institution’ (Crawford, 
2005, p. 13).  
 
With the new developments came new tensions. In particular, administrative tensions 
arose by moving the responsibility for welfare from the State Children’s Relief Board 
to the Department of Public Instructions in 1905. Magistrates were asked to justify their 
informed decisions when dealing with a child under the law; their decisions were 
reviewed by clerks and could be overturned by the Minister. This did not sit well with 
the magistrates6 (Crawford, 2005). Indeed, throughout the 1900’s there were several 
legislative changes around the Children’s Court of NSW, some of which were directly 
aimed at addressing the tensions mentioned above (see Fernandez et al., 2014). These 
included the revocation of the Neglected Children’s Act and Juvenile Offenders Act of 
1905 by the Child Welfare Act in 1923.7 The Child Welfare Act was amended many 
 
6 See Golder, 1991, p. 29 for a detailed account on the magistrates’ views. 
7 Under the Child Welfare Act 1923, a Statutory Child Welfare Department was established; significant amendments 
were made in 1939 containing new provisions for dealing with ‘mentally defective’ children, discipline in 
institutions, and transfers from prisons to institutions (Blackmore, 1989). 
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times until it was finally replaced by a new set of Acts dealing with young offenders 
and children in need of care in 1987 (Blackmore, 1989; Fernandez et al., 2014). 
Significant amendments included, in 1939, the provision of a new minimum age of 
criminal responsibility at eight years (Blackmore, 1989). Later, following further 
amendments, the age of criminal responsibility increased in 1977 from eight to ten 
(Blackmore, 1989; Fernandez et al., 2014). Notwithstanding the many changes, the 
philosophy underpinning the purpose, role and scope of the Children’s Court did not 
change until 1987 (Fernandez et al., 2014).  
 
Over time the ‘child saving’ ideology was increasingly criticised, and focus shifted 
towards the ‘rights of the child’ (Fernandez et al., 2014; Seymour, 1997). During the 
1960’s, the welfare system came under attack for its failure to rehabilitate and protect 
children’s legal rights (Naffine and Wundersitz, 1994). Conflict theorists, particularly 
around labelling and stigmatisation foregrounded a critical position concerning the 
existing social order and contact with criminal justice institutions, including the courts. 
Contact with the Children’s Court was conceptualised as resulting in the application of 
labels such as, ‘delinquency’ and ‘criminal’ which resulted in the lifelong 
stigmatisation of vulnerable young people (Becker, 1963; Cunneen and White, 1996; 
Goffman, 1963). Labelling and stigma theorists argue that negative labels become 
internalised, generating a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ whereby the individual becomes 
committed to the roles of his/her new identity as the ‘delinquent’, creating a ‘will to 
crime’ (Lemert, 1969; Matza, 1964; 1969; Skyes and Matza, 1957). According to such 
theories, a court hearing could cause secondary deviance rather than rehabilitation 
(Cunneen and White, 2002, 2007; Farrington, 1977). Although the validity of the theory 
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has been questioned over the years8, labelling and stigmatisation are ‘widely considered 
to play a role in the formation of criminal trajectories for young offenders’ (Richards, 
2011b, p. 6). Such factors play a role in the criminal careers of young people, whether 
they are to desist from crime or not (Richards, 2001b). A number of studies support the 
contention that prior contact with the criminal justice system is a strong predictor of 
recidivism (Chen et al., 2005; Hua, Baker, and Poynton, 2006).  
 
Indeed, evidence suggests that the negative effects of intervention and processing 
young people through the justice system outweigh the positive (see Bernburg and 
Krohn, 2003; Cunneen and White, 2002, 2007; Ericson and Vinson, 2010; McAra and 
McVie, 2007). Evidence further suggests that juvenile crime is mostly ‘episodic and 
transitory’ (Jordan and Farrell, 2013, p. 419) and the majority of young people will 
grow out of offending behaviour through maturity (Cunneen and White, 2002, 2007; 
Richards, 2011), including those that come into contact with the police once or twice 
(Rose, 2006). Such theoretical underpinnings are influential for the implementation of 
diversionary alternatives for young offenders in order to reduce their contact with the 
criminal justice system. 
 
During this reform phase, there was also a move towards deinstitutionalisation, 
decarceration, and decriminalisation (Polk, 1987; Wundersitz, 1997). Diversionary 
measures were established as pre-court mechanisms in the form of ‘formal police 
cautioning’, in the case of Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania and New South Wales, 
 
8 Although popular in the 1970’s, labelling theory was highly criticised from the 1980’s onwards for resting on two 
assumptions: firstly, that political and socio-economic power determines what is labelled; secondly that the “being 
labelled’ experience is instrumental in creating deviant behaviour (see Bernburg and Krohn, 2003). It was also 
criticized for theoretical inadequacies’ that were unable to withstand empirical testing (Paternoster and Iovanni, 
1989). 
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while Western Australia and South Australia favoured ‘Children’s Panels’ 9 
(Wundersitz, 1997). These diversionary measures were intended as a way to limit 
criminal justice intervention in the young offender’s life (Wundersitz, 1997). The aim 
of limiting intervention was to reduce the negative impacts that these interventions 
could have.  
 
Thus, it can be said that the Australian history of police diversion began at this juncture 
in the 1970’s, with a focus on ‘diversion out of the system’ (Polk et al., 2003). When 
young people come to the attention of the police, some discretion was formally 
available to give a verbal or written caution. Described as ‘true diversion’ by Cressey 
and McDermott (1974), this approach was advocated by social scientists who supported 
the concept coined by Schur of ‘leaving the kids alone whenever possible’ (1973, p. 
155). The reasoning behind such an approach was that ‘official intervention may 
intervene with the natural process of reform’ (Waegel, 1989, p. 236), whereby most 
youths will mature out of delinquency. 
 
In 1985, NSW was the last of the Australian jurisdictions to formalise the pre-court 
mechanisms that were influenced by the principles of ‘true diversion’ (Wundersitz, 
1997). However, early on research showed that in NSW and Tasmania, youth 
diversionary measures were used conservatively, accounting for less than 12% and 5% 
of matters brought to police (Polk et al., 2003).  By contrast, in Victoria where police 
cautioning had been formalised in 1959, by the 1980’s, 70% of children that came into 
contact with the police were dealt with by way of cautioning (Wundersitz, 1997). 
 
9 Children Panels was a form of pre-court diversion where a Panel consisting of a social worker and a police officer 
would meet the child and the parents in a local community welfare office for a twenty to thirty minutes discussion 
and the matter would usually be resolved by the way of a warning and counselling (Wundersitz, 1996). 
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Meanwhile, the juvenile justice system began to shift focus from ‘needs’ to ‘deeds’, 
moving from a ‘welfare’ approach to a ‘justice model’ with the aim of achieving a 
balance between increasing accountability, while upholding a less coercive approach 
(Polk et al., 2003).  On one level the ‘welfare model’ was rejected in favour of 
‘proportionality of sentencing’ and protecting the legal rights of young people (Naffine, 
Wundersitz and Gale, 1990; Wundersitz, 1997). While at a second level, there was the 
move as mentioned earlier towards less intervention (Wundersitz, 1997). Recognition 
of the failures of welfarism to rehabilitate, led to this shift towards a retribution/just 
deserts model of punishment based on proportionate sentencing, accountability and due 
process in which the juvenile offender was viewed as a ‘rational agent’ (Pratt, 1993). 
As noted earlier in the chapter, this coincided with authoritarian law-and-order 
responses, of a more retributive and punitive political stance in the 1980s.  However, 
by the 1990’s it was widely acknowledged that retributive, ‘just deserts’ forms of justice 
had the effect of stigmatising young offenders and amplifying deviance. This awareness 
marked a challenge to dichotomies of the welfare/justice nexus (Cunneen and White, 
2002; Carrington and Pereira, 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, youth justice goes beyond the fundamentals of social welfare and legal 
responsibility and punishment. Youth justice is concerned with those ‘at risk’ and with 
those posing ‘a risk’ (Muncie, 2004). Both penal paradigms had the effect of 
stigmatising the most disadvantaged and vulnerable members of the population 
(Cunneen and White, 2002). These tensions are apparent in restorative justice 
paradigms under which warning, cautions or conferencing become potential options, a 
point that will be elaborated later in the chapter. 
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s procedures and policies focused on ‘the rights of the 
child’, issues of due process, control and deterrence were further reflected at an 
international level with both the Beijing Rules (1985) and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) arguing for minimal system 
intervention in the lives of children 10 (Fernandez et al., 2014). For example, Article 40 
of the UNCRC states, 
[w]henever appropriate and desirable, measures for dealing with such 
children without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that human 
rights and legal safeguards are fully respected (UNCRC, Article 40(3b), 
1989). 
 
Indeed, diversion away from the criminal justice system aims to avoid ‘judicial 
proceedings’. Adding to this, according to the United Nations Committee on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC), the best interests of a child in conflict with the law are represented 
through the use of restorative justice principles as opposed to the employment of 
punitive philosophies (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner (OHCHR), 
2007). This is justified by the recognition that children are significantly different to 
adults in their emotional, intellectual and psychological capacities and needs, and that 
these differences are to be taken into account and provide the basis for the lesser 
culpability (OHCHR, 2007). A commitment to such procedures in Australia is 
illustrated through changes taking place throughout the late 1990s; for example, the 
introduction of the YOA in 1997. These changes include an emphasis on restorative 
justice and ‘diversionary’ alternatives to youth justice, to which the attention now turns. 
 
10 The UNCRC was the first legally binding international covenant to incorporate a full range of individual rights, 
and to strengthen the protection rights previously outlined in 1985 by the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (“The Beijing Rules”). 
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Restorative Justice, the development of the Young Offenders Act and 
Youth Justice Conferencing in New South Wales  
 
Over the 1990’s a broader range of sentencing options, including the use of various 
forms of alternative dispute resolution, were introduced across many western 
jurisdictions, including parts of Australia.11 However, the tension between the desire to 
reform or discipline, and the need to contain, deter and punish remains. More recently, 
further diversionary and community-based responses have been modified with the 
emergence of restorative justice approaches to juvenile justice (Daly, Hayes and 
Marchetti, 2006).  
 
Although the term ‘restorative justice’ encompasses a variety of practices, this section 
will restrict its focus to the rise of the restorative justice practice of conferencing as part 
of the juvenile justice system. Indeed, conferencing proves to be the lynchpin of 
restorative justice, with its widely accepted definition as ‘a process whereby all the 
parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to 
deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future’ (Marshall, 
1996, p. 37). While the reasons for restorative justice vary across jurisdictions, in 
general, restorative justice has a multi-pronged approach that is centered on victims, 
offenders and the community. It is aimed at finding meaningful solutions to repair the 
harms inflicted and ‘restore’ the moral equilibrium disrupted by the harmful and/or 
 
11 These included amongst others, the Juvenile Justice Act (Qld) 1992; the Young Offenders Act (SA) 1993, which 
as well as establishing a wider alternative for sentencing options, it introduced the Aboriginal child placement 
principle; and the Youth Justice Act (Tas) 1997 which guiding principles state that a young person was to be dealt 
with either informally or formally in a way that encouraged the young person to act responsibly.  
 
 
42 
criminal act (Bazemore and Schiff, 2001; Daly and Hayes, 2001; Marshall, 1996; 
Richards, 2010; Zehr, 1990, 2015). 
 
Parts of Australia and New Zealand have become ‘world leaders’ in the use of youth 
conferencing models, underpinned by the principles of restorative justice (Daly and 
Hayes, 2001; Marien, 2012b). Although some jurisdictional differences exist, typically, 
conferencing is used as a diversionary measure from court proceedings and aims to 
encourage the young offender to accept ‘responsibility’ for the offence and to bring the 
offender and the victim face-to-face in an attempt to repair harm (Dale and Hayes, 
2001). Prior to the YOA, youth conferences were conducted by police in NSW between 
1991 and 1994 through what was known as the ‘Wagga model’ (Strang, 2001). This 
model was then succeeded in 1995 by a pilot scheme of Community Youth Conferences 
at six locations around the state, which was then followed by the Youth Justice 
Conferencing scheme in 1998 (People and Trimboli, 2007; Strang, 2001). This 
adoption of restorative policing was influenced by the development of John 
Braithwaite’s re-integrative shaming theory (1989), pertaining to the ‘disapproval of a 
bad act…while sustaining the identity of the actor as good… and transmitting shame 
within a continuum of respect for the wrongdoer’ (Braithwaite and Mugford, 1994, p. 
142). Braithwaite (1986) claims that the proper use of shame might help the offender 
to seek reconnection with the community, and that upon expressions of shame the 
offender is welcome back in the community. The restorative justice conference serves 
as a reintegration ceremony that tends to nurture acceptance of responsibility by 
individuals and families, apology, restitution and forgiveness (Braithwaite, 1993b), 
thus making all parties accountable. 
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In the legal sphere, ‘accountability’ refers to holding offenders legally responsible for 
their actions and in turn imposing the sanctions deserved. The assumption is that the 
pain ‘administered to offenders for the pain they have caused’ should make them 
accountable (Zerh, 1997, p.68). Yet, little ‘under this model encourages offenders to 
understand the consequences of their actions’ (Zerh, 1997, p. 68). Further, the sense of 
alienation from society experienced by many offenders is only exacerbated by the 
traditional criminal justice process and prison (Zerh, 1997). Contrary to this, under the 
ethos of restorative justice, if crime is ‘harm’, the offender’s accountability means 
‘taking on’ responsibility, through encouragement to understand that ‘harm’, being 
confronted with the consequences of their actions in direct interaction with the victim, 
and proactively required to repair harms done by showing remorse and for example, a 
letter of apology (Zerh, 1997). This is ‘genuine accountability’, and in such respects, 
restorative justice does not disregard punishment, but instead addresses the 
shortcomings of the traditional justice process, by compelling offenders to take 
‘responsibility’ for their harmful actions. However, when it comes to the imputation of 
responsibility on children, and in particular very young children, as it is the case in 
Australia, it is difficult to claim legitimacy, via traditional justice, restorative justice, or 
any other means, when in many other areas social responsibilities and rights are 
reserved exclusively for adults (Godson, 2013; Goldson and Muncie, 2015).  
 
Braithwaite’s re-integrative shaming model has been widely applauded, but it is not 
without its critics. Re-integrative shaming involves the ‘public shaming’ of the offender 
followed by strategies of re-integration. Paramount to this theory are the importance of 
cultural integration and emphasis that the key component of ‘crime control is cultural 
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commitments’ (Braithwaite, 1989, p. 1) to shaming. This means that cultures/societies 
need to be intolerant of crime in a way that is both forgiving and stern. Furthermore 
emphasising ‘the importance of the repentant role’ (Braithwaite, 1989, p. 162) re-
integrative shaming focuses on the critical role played by emotions like shame and guilt. 
 
Criticisms regarding the potential of ‘shaming’ to be used as a weapon over vulnerable 
minorities, has been noted by many. For example, in Australia, shaming targeted at 
Aboriginal people has been noted to intensify rather than reduce social control over 
Indigenous groups (Blagg, 1997). A further criticism has been potential for the shaming 
process not working as effectively in different cultural contexts, since ‘shame’ is not 
conceptualised universally across cultures (Blagg, 1997). Notwithstanding the 
criticisms, the appeal of ‘re-integrative shaming’ is the provision of a platform for 
communication where the focus of disapproval is on the act (Braithwaite and Mugford, 
1994) rather than the offender, as witnessed in the rite of transition, disapproval, 
degradation and stigmatising shaming practices of a traditional criminal court 
(Garfinkel, 1956).  
 
Youth conferencing become an officially legislated option in NSW, following the 
enactment of the YOA. Introducing formalised procedures and guidelines for 
interventions designed to divert young offenders from the court system, the Act 
legislates for a hierarchical response to offending, commencing from warnings, to 
official cautions, to youth conferences and finally, court (Young Offenders Act 1997: 
Section 8, Part 2). The Act provides, firstly, for community-based negotiation in 
response to an offence by involving all parties; secondly, it emphasises restitution 
through making offenders accept ‘responsibility’ for their actions; and lastly, it meets 
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the needs of all parties involved (victims, offenders and communities). In these ways, 
youth conferencing reflects the fundamental principles of a restorative justice paradigm 
(Coppins et al., 2011; Zerh, 2015). Thus, the YOA by legislating for the use of the least 
restrictive form of sanction and a preference for alternative modes of adjudication with 
the best interest of the child in mind is then consistent with UNCRC (Coppins et al., 
2011). 
 
That said, the YOA does not evade the tensions between reform and retribution. 
Expanding on some of the dilemmas around the imputation of responsibility and 
accountability already noted, YJC is available to children aged ten to seventeen who 
are required to admit guilt and consent to conferencing (Young Offenders Act 1997: 
Part 5, Division 1:36). However, the issue of consent can be seen as problematic in this 
context as many offenders are under the age of consent as stipulated by other areas of 
the law (Richards, 2011b; Crofts, 2015)12. Currently, in NSW the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility is ten13, meaning there is a conclusive legal assumption that 
children under the age of ten cannot be capable of intent or a guilty mind (mens rea) 
(Children’s (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987, section 5). Referred to as the principle 
of doli incapax, the incapacity of a child for mens rea, means that a child under the age 
of ten is incapable of crime (Richards, 2011b; Crofts, 2015). In NSW young people 
between age ten and thirteen are considered doli incapax14, some variability is allowed 
in doli incapax to recognise that the rate at which children mature is uneven and can 
require individual judgment (Richards, 2011b; Crofts, 2015).  
 
12 See Morris (2002); and Lynch (2010) for a critical account of ‘doli incapax’ in the context of restorative justice. 
13 See Crofts (2002) for a history of the criminal responsibility of children. 
14 Under common law, in court, the prosecution is responsible for rebutting the presumption of doli incapax and 
demonstrate the accused youth at the time was able to distinguish between right and wrong, hence had the knowledge 
to form or possess criminal intent (Richards, 2011b). 
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The principle of doli incapax is supported by the UNCRC. The United Nations fails to 
give any specific guideline as to the appropriate age of criminal responsibility 
(Richards, 2011b; Crofts, 2015). However, it has on several occasions noted its concern 
on the relatively low age thresholds in Australia jurisdictions, with the UNCRC noting 
in 2007, that a minimum age of criminal responsibility below the age of 12 is not 
considered to be internationally acceptable. Further to this and more recently, Amnesty 
International (2015), has called on Australia to raise the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility to 12, to combat the rate of overrepresentation of Indigenous detention 
in Australia15. As noted by Cunneen (2017, p. 2) ‘the age of criminal responsibility is 
the primary legal barrier to criminalisation and thus entry to the criminal justice 
system’. The presumptions about child responsibility extend to presumptions of 
responsibility to communicate effectively, which is lacking in most children (Cunneen, 
2010). Effective communication is essential for restorative justice alternative measures 
such as cautioning or youth conferencing to work (Cunneen and Goldson, 2015). 
 
Returning to the YOA, contradictions between ‘welfare’ and ‘justice’ philosophies are 
further displayed by the selective nature of the Act in regard to the range of offences 
that are specifically excluded from coverage. Currently, the YOA applies to summary 
offences; indictable offences that can be dealt with as summary under the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)16; and other offences prescribed by the YOA (see Young 
Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 8, Part 1). Excluded by the Act are offences 
resulting in death, armed robbery, robbery in company, most sexual offences, domestic 
 
15 See Crofts, 2015 for a discussion on raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility in Australia. 
16 Many indictable offences can be dealt with summary, including property offences, drug offences and assaults (see 
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW): Chapter 5, Sch. 1). 
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violence, traffic offences 17  and serious drug offences (Young Offenders Act 1997 
(NSW): Section 8, Part 2). It is worth noting that a number of interested parties have 
argued that, in light of the Government’s stated commitment to diversion, the offences 
covered under the YOA should be expanded to include more serious offences (see NSW 
Law Reform Commission, 2005; Noetic Solutions Report, 2010; Youth Justice 
Coalition, 2011).  
 
The argument about expanding the Act to more serious offences is often made on the 
basis that the seriousness of certain offences is relatively trivial in the youth context. 
For example, currently the YOA excludes all offences under the Crimes (Domestic and 
Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). This includes breaches of an apprehended 
domestic violence order (ADVO). Many ADVOs taken out against a young person do 
not necessarily relate to actual or potential violence by the young person. Instead, they 
are often taken out by a family member as a behavioural management tool (Legal Aid 
NSW, 2012; McFarlane, 2015). Thus, many ADVO breaches are trivial and therefore 
the young person could benefit from diversion away from judicial proceedings and into 
conferencing where the family may be assisted to ‘restore’ the harms (Youth Justice 
Coalition, 2011). However, under the YOA the decision of whether or not to proceed on 
a diversionary pathway (providing the offence is not precluded) is very much at the 
hands of the police and magistrates. Thus, their interpretation of the Act becomes an 
important factor in the degree to which diversion is utilised.  
 
 
 
17 Traffic offences are excluded if the offender is old enough to hold a permit or a licence (see Young Offenders Act 
1997 (NSW): Section 8, Part 2). 
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Police and Magistrates as key decision-makers 
Youth conference referrals may be made either by the Department of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP)18, a trained and appointed Police Liaison Officer or a Magistrate 
(Young Offenders Act 1997: Section 38, Part 5, Division 1). Unlike New Zealand where 
youth conferences are mandatory19, NSW legislation grants the significant role of 
deciding who is eligible to participate in a conference, to police (Prenzler and Hayes, 
1999; Richards, 2010). This is perhaps the most controversial feature of the YOA. Low 
rates of police referrals have been identified as a critical issue in undermining the 
implementation of conferencing (Blagg, 1997; Cunneen, 1997; Richards, 2010; Stewart 
and Smith, 2004; Trimboli, 2000), with the majority of the referrals being made by the 
courts (Moore, 2011; Noetic Solutions, 2010; Taussing, 2012; Youth Justice Coalition, 
2011). The fact that juveniles have to face the courts before they are given the option 
of conferencing defeats one of its key diversionary objectives. Hence police reticence 
to refer youth to restorative justice conferencing becomes an area for further 
investigation, and it is one that has not, thus far, been subject to any rigorous scrutiny 
(Stewart and Smith, 2004). 
 
 
18 The DPP can also refer a young person to a YJC; however, the YOA provides that the DPP cannot refer unless the 
child’s consent is obtained (see Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 40, Part 1). However, in practice, the 
DPP does not directly refer young offenders to a YJC. This is because cases that come within the scope of the YOA 
are prosecuted by the police, whilst the DPP only deals with serious children’s indictable offences (NSW Law 
Reform Commission, 2005). At the time of the establishment of the YOA, it was intended that the DPP would take 
over from the police in regard to the prosecution of summary matters, but this has not happened (see Hennessy, 
1999; and the New South Wales, 2002 Parliamentary Debates Legislative Council, official Hansard, 27 August 2002 
at 4227, Speech of the Hon R Jones on the Young Offenders Amendment Bill 2002).  
19 The criminal age of responsibility in New Zealand is ten. However, except for the offences of murder and 
manslaughter, children under the age of 14 cannot be prosecuted. The very serious offences such as murder and 
manslaughter committed by any young person aged ten and over are automatically transferred to the Youth Court. 
In all other cases, children may be dealt with by warning, police diversion (caution), of a family group conference 
(FGC) (Maxwell and Morris, 2006). In contrast to most jurisdictions that have introduced conferencing, in New 
Zealand (Daly, 2001), all young people whom police want to take to court and who have not been arrested and 
charged have to be referred to FGC. In cases, when a young person is arrested and brought before the court, the 
Youth Court is required to refer all cases coming to it for FGC. Thus, judges cannot sentence offenders who have 
been arrested without first referring them to FGC (Maxwell and Morris, 2006). 
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Concerns over the highly uneven use of YJC as a form of diversion across the various 
jurisdictions have been noted over the recent years (see Cunneen, 2014; Richards, 
2010). For example, empirical data show that in 2007-2008, NSW police referred 2198 
youth conferences, comprising only 3% of all juveniles of interest apprehended by 
NSW police during this period (Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR), 
2008). This was one the lowest percentages of referral across jurisdictions, followed by 
6% in Queensland, whilst in contrast in South Australia and in the Northern Territory, 
17 percent and 25 percent, respectively, of all young people apprehended by police 
were referred to a conference (Richards, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, empirical data in some jurisdictions shows that police referrals to 
conferences have been declining in recent years. For example, in NSW, between 2000 
and 2004, the proportion of youth interventions resulting in a police referral to 
conferencing fell from 3.4% to 2.9% for Indigenous youth and from 4% to 2.4% for 
non-Indigenous youth (Cunneen et al., 2006). More recent data collected from 
BOCSAR for this study shows that the number of conferences referred by police in 
NSW has been in decline since 2003/2004 and it is currently at its lowest percentage 
since the enactment of the Act. Adding to this, diversionary options are not being used 
uniformly and equitably across NSW (Department of Attorney General and Justice 
(DAGJ), 2011a). Although a number of Local Area of Command (LAC) in NSW utilise 
conferencing, the majority are under-utilising it (DAGJ, 2011a).20 
 
 
20 Refer to Appendix 1 for graph representing the discrepancy on referrals to conferences across LAC’s as reported 
by Noetic Solutions (2010) in their review of the YOA 1997.  
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These figures highlight the need for a more nuanced understanding of police decision-
making and attitudes towards alternative justice measures. According to Alpert, 
MacDonald and Dunham (2005), several factors intersect to influence police decision-
making. While police are influenced by the attitudes, values and beliefs that they bring 
to the job, they also respond differently to the constraints of laws and policy which are 
often also dictated by the cultural and practical contingencies of their institutional and 
operational environment.  
 
The importance of police culture for understanding how police officers see their role 
and execute their duties has been highlighted by many (see, for example, Banton 1964; 
Dixon, 1997; Manning, 1978, 1989; Reiner, 2010; Skolnick, 1966; and Van Maanen 
1973). Reiner defines police culture ‘as a patterned set of understandings that helps 
officers cope with and adjust to the pressures and tensions confronting the police’ 
(2010, p. 87). The key characteristics that have consistently been identified in police 
cultural research are: a sense of mission; a thirst for action; cynicism and pessimism; 
suspicion; isolation and solidarity; conservatism; machismo; racial prejudice; and 
pragmatism (Reiner, 2010).  
 
Research has drawn attention to an exaggerated sense of mission. As Reiner explains 
(2010, p. 89) ‘policing is conceived as the preservation of a valued way of life, and the 
protection of the weak against the predatory’. Accordingly, there are excessive 
demands placed upon police officers and their operational strategies to reflect their 
institutionally valued role of crime-fighter (Manning, 1978; Ericson, 2007). A further 
problem associated with this relates to the assessment of police performance. Police 
traditionally measure their effectiveness by the collection and analysis of statistical data 
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around crime fighting (Fleming and O’Reilly, 2008). Research indicates that ‘in 
Australia while a demonstrated commitment to community policing is useful when 
applying for a promotion, such activity is not considered a priority’ (Fleming and 
O’Reilly, 2018, p. 219). Rather, priorities for promotion revolve around reactive work 
that can be statistically measured in traditional ways and have produced results for 
management before (Fleming and O’Reilly, 2008). This causes police to downgrade 
certain contemporary policing roles, such as community police roles, due to their low 
status and lack of official rewards (Manning, 1978).  
 
Regarding the central features of suspicion, authority, and, isolation and solidarity, 
police culture has been associated with the application of derogatory labels and 
stereotypes to suspects thus reproducing a pattern of discrimination depending on the 
perceived level of threat (Reiner, 2010), and the construction of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ 
mentality and dismissal of some groups as police property (Choongh, 1997).  However, 
while differential enforcement according to class, ethnicity, and gender persist (see 
Ally, 2007; Chan 1997; Choongh, 1997), as Walklate (2000) notes such practices are 
not articulated amongst all individuals and in all localities. Accordingly, Chan (1996, 
p. 112) suggests that it is ‘up to individuals to accommodate or resist’ the police culture.  
 
Furthermore, although the outlined features have been commonly found in police 
culture research, this does not indicate that police culture is monolithic, static or 
impervious to changes in social, political and cultural environments (Reiner 2010). 
Rather, certain characteristics become dominant. The continuities in themes of police 
culture continue to occur because the demands of the police role regarding coercion 
and control have not changed (Loftus, 2010; Millie, 2013). Further, regarding the 
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central feature of conservatism, researchers have consistently documented that the 
nature of the job attracts recruits that tend to be politically, morally and socially 
conservative (Reiner, 2010). The problem associated with this is that of intolerance, 
reluctance towards change and belief in existing ways of doing things (Reiner, 2010). 
Diversionary practices and the application of the YOA do not fit within the highly-
valued traditional role of crime-fighter. Hence there is potential for some police to 
downgrade the value of such practices, in turn intensifying conflicts between individual 
officers and their roles, and creating differential attitudes depending upon their level of 
conservatism.  
 
Research has also suggested that different sub-cultures exist within police 
organisations, according to rank (Chan et al., 2003b; Ianni and Ianni, 1983; Manning, 
1997) and role (Chan 1996; Chan et al., 2003b; Ericson, 1981; Fielding, 1995; Hobbs, 
1988; Young, 1991). Culture has also been found to vary between different police 
stations in the same localities (Foster, 1989). As Chan (1996) and Chan et al. (2003b) 
have noted the way in which officers construct cultural attitudes, working rules and 
accepted behaviour depend upon individual experience, role orientations, relationship 
with others and the organisational and political climate in which they work. From these 
findings, it can be inferred that there is a high probability that police culture directly 
affects the use of diversionary practices. The previously noted, unequal use of diversion 
reported across LACs could be a direct consequence of police culture variations 
between LACs, in turn producing different attitudes towards diversionary practices. 
 
Attitudes towards diversion have been found to be significant in police decision 
making. The existing literature on police decision-making about diverting young people 
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from the formal criminal justice system indicates that there are certain predictors of 
punitive attitudes towards young offenders among police officers. These predictors 
include rank, mental health difficulties and coping styles (Shafiq, Ohlsson and Mathias, 
2016). For example, research on an Australian sample by Parker, Mohr and Wilson 
(2004) found that police officers of a higher rank reported elevated rates of need for 
punitive policing and reduced rates of diversionary practice with young offenders. 
Similarly, the findings from a study of UK police officers by Shafiq et al. (2016) 
concluded that rank was an important international predictor of punitive attitudes 
towards young offenders; whereby higher rank police officers (Police Constables: PCs) 
displayed more punitive towards young offenders. 
 
Explanations for the association between rank and punitive attitudes include the amount 
of contact between officers and offenders (Shafiq et al., 2016). For example, PCs more 
operational type of role might result in increased contact with young offenders (Shafiq 
et al., 2016). Adding to this, Rowe (2008) suggests that increased rates of contact 
combined with a lack of training and awareness of the unique differences between 
adults and young offenders could lead to more negative attitudes, punitive approaches 
and reduced rates of diversionary practices. Thus, as Shafiq et al. (2016) argue, police 
organisations might benefit from providing higher rank officers with training 
opportunities to enhance their skills in working with young offenders. 
 
Mental health difficulties and coping styles can also influence the attitudes and actions 
of police officers towards young people (Shafiq et al., 2016). Police work is highly 
stressful and may impact upon individuals’ well-being and mental health (Patterson, 
Chung and Swang, 2012; Ranta and Sud, 2008). Existent research has noted that 
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officers with mental health difficulties are more likely to favour custodial methods, 
while those with a lower level of mental difficulties are more supportive of alternative 
rehabilitative approaches for dealing with juveniles (see Lazarus and Folkman, 1984; 
Lumb and Breazeale, 2002; Shafiq et al., 2016). Further, evidence regarding coping 
strategies to manage mental health difficulties shows that the use of direct coping styles 
(problem-focused, seeking instrumental social support) lead to less punitive attitudes 
towards young offender (see Copley, Johnson and Bain, 2014; Shafiq et al., 2016). 
Whilst, developing defensive styles of interactions with young people and hardened 
emotions leads to the potential use of more punitive approaches (Green, Gray, Bryant, 
Rance and MacLean, 2019). 
 
In addition to the impact of punitive attitudes on police diversionary decision-making, 
poor faith in the system of diversion to rehabilitate has also been noted to result in the 
sense of futility in using diversionary alternatives (Green et al., 2019). Nevertheless, 
knowledge about what occurs in diversion programmes is inconsistent across police 
officers (Green et al., 2019). Thus, as Green et al. (2019) note improving knowledge 
about the nature of the process and the therapeutic potential of diversion could diminish 
the widespread view that diversion is ineffective. Similarly, Shafiq et al. note ‘that 
improved knowledge of adolescent development and typical youth behaviour, as well 
as exposure to youth in non-law enforcements situations, can result in police officers 
demonstrating more empathic attitudes towards young offenders’ (2016, p. 83). While 
a report by the New South Wales Attorney General’s Department in 2002 suggest that 
police who have a good understanding of the YOA and who attend a youth justice 
conference have a positive attitude towards the Act. The findings of several studies have 
supported this. 
 
 
55 
 
For example, the findings of a study by Foley (2004) on police attitudes to the use of 
diversionary options for juvenile offenders in NSW, concluded that training programs 
on diversion had a positive effect on police attitudes towards diversionary options. 
Similarly, Stewart and Smith’s (2004) research on Queensland’s police officer’s 
training, experience and understanding regarding youth justice conferencing indicate 
that these factors have an impact on the likelihood of a youth justice conference referral. 
One hundred eighty-four Queensland police officers where conferencing was available 
participated in the study, some of which had never heard of conferencing, while others 
had received training or/and attended youth conferences. The results show that police 
officers’ understandings of conferencing were significantly related to their reported 
likelihood of referring a young person to a conference and the study concludes that ‘to 
increase police referrals of young people to conferences, police need to be exposed 
(both through training and attendance) to the philosophy of and procedures involved 
in conferencing’ (Stewart and Smith, 2004, p. 345). Building an understanding of 
diversion through effective training allows police to understand the complexities of 
young people and crime better, and gives purpose to the legislation (Schubert, 1981). 
Otherwise, the theory of diversion can be complex and at odds with traditional policing. 
 
One of the major issues with the central role of the police is that the legislative extension 
of police powers in restorative justice has not been accompanied by any further 
accountability (Blagg, 1997; Cunneen, 1997; White, 1994). This raises concerns of the 
inappropriate use of discretion with the possibility of ‘net widening’, a fishing metaphor 
used by Cohen (1985) to describe the phenomenon of entangling more offenders into a 
web of social control (see also Christie, 2009; Polk et al., 2003; Seymour, 1998). This 
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is exemplified in the referral of young people to conferencing for behaviour previously, 
not warranting official intervention (Polk et al., 2003). As noted earlier, a fundamental 
concept of the development of diversionary alternatives is that the state should focus 
on doing less rather than more. However, empirical data tends to indicate that ironically 
most diversionary programs have diverted youth into ‘other new programs’, resulting 
in a widening of the net (Cohen, 1985; Polk et al., 2003).  
 
Few Australian researchers have investigated the potential for the YOA to lead to net 
widening. A longitudinal study by Prichard (2010) of Tasmanian youth who had contact 
with the criminal justice system between 1991 and 2002 found no evidence of net-
widening as a result of diversion. Conversely, People and Trimboli’s (2007) evaluation 
of the NSW Community Conferencing for Young Adults pilot reported evidence of a 
net-widening-effect. There have been no specific studies providing evidence that youth 
justice conferencing contributes to net widening in NSW, yet the potential for its 
occurrence is taken seriously. Many scholars have noted that conferencing referrals can 
be over-utilised in cases where ‘true diversions’ in the form of cautions would be more 
appropriate (see Bargen, 1996; and Blagg and Wilkie, 1995). Richards (2010, p. 7) also 
identifies several key points indicating that ‘restorative justice measures are used to 
respond to juveniles who may – in the absence of restorative options – have been given 
a warning or caution’. Although older juveniles comprise most of those who come into 
contact with police, Richards’ analysis of the available data found that a significant 
proportion of juveniles referred by police to conferences were 10 to 14 years, 
suggesting that conferences may be disproportionally used for younger juveniles 
(Richards, 2010).  
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Furthermore, such interventions operate along gendered, racial and classed lines. For 
example, while female offenders are a minority group in the criminal justice system, 
Richards’ study found that commensurate numbers of male and female juveniles that 
come into contact with the police were referred to restorative measures, thus 
‘suggesting that restorative measures may be having a net-widening impact on female 
offenders’ (2010, p. 6). This is of note given that women are the fastest growing 
demographic within the Australian prison population (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS), 2018a). Net widening is also particularly problematic for young female 
offenders due to entrenched patriarchal assumptions regarding women (Fox, Dhami and 
Mantle, 2006). According to Otto, 
the ‘new’ juvenile justice system, rather than reducing the extent of control 
exercised…over young women’s identities and lives, aspects of the new 
system have the potential, directly or indirectly, to reinforce young women’s 
subordination (1994, p. 7). 
 
Issues relating to police-based referrals to conferencing and police involvement in the 
process are important considerations in terms of aspects that may affect or compromise 
effective participation by young women (Bargen, 2005). As a result of the social and 
political context of gendered relations and perceptions of young women offenders, 
young women face many practical and procedural disadvantages in informal processes 
such as conferencing which in turn affect their capacity to participate effectively in such 
processes (see Field, 2003 for victim-offender issues of power imbalance in 
conferencing). While the intent of conferencing is to empower offenders and allow 
them to ‘make things right’, the application of the concept of shaming or any 
decontextualized prerequisite to young women can have negative, intimidating and 
disempowering effects (Polk, 1994). This is particularly so since many women who 
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offend also tend to be victims of violence and abuse (AIHW, 2009; Clark and Fileborn, 
2011; Forsythe and Adams, 2009; Kilroy, 2001). 
 
A further troubling aspect is that of greater bifurcation in responses to those classified 
as repeat offenders to those who are first timers (Cunneen, 2006). In the Australian 
context, such bifurcation is specifically discriminatory of Indigenous youth due to their 
likelihood to hold previous convictions or at least be ‘known to police’ (Luke and 
Cunneen, 1995). Studies by Luke and Cunneen (1995) and Cunneen (2006), argued that 
racial bias in the criminal justice system contributes to higher arrests and in turn, a 
longer criminal record for Indigenous young people. The latest analyses, in line with a 
number of previous studies (see Chan et al., 2002, 2004; Cunneen and Luke, 2006; 
DAGJ, 2011; Loh and Ferrante, 2003; and Wundersitz and Hunter, 2005 for 
discrepancy between Indigenous and non-Indigenous rates of diversion), show that 
Indigenous young people are less likely to be cautioned or referred to conferencing 
while they continue to be most heavily overrepresented among offenders in all 
jurisdictions (Cunneen, 2008a; DAGJ, 2011; Ringland and Smith, 2013). This supports 
research in NSW that found that Indigenous young people were less likely than non-
Indigenous young people to be diverted, even after controlling for the effect of age, sex, 
offence type and offending history (see Snowball, 2008a; 2008b).  
 
It is worth noting also that there have been concerns over the lower rate of diversion 
for non-English speaking minority groups (see Strang, 1999). However, the statistics in 
relation to ethnic minorities are not readily available to be able to make such 
conclusions. Indeed, the discretionary power of police in referring Indigenous/minority 
group youth to conferencing is potentially hampered by the Courts’ power to refer 
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young offenders who may have ‘fallen through the net’ of the Act (see Young Offenders 
Act 1997 (NSW): Section 40). Nevertheless, the issue of police discrimination in the 
exercise of their discretionary powers must be addressed in order to reach a better 
compromise between flexibility and firmer policy guidelines.  
 
The YOA, in providing some guidance on decision-making, refers to the seriousness of 
the offence, the level of violence involved, the degree of harm caused to any victim, 
and the offending history, as important considerations to be taken into account (see 
Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 37, Part 3). In reference to the last point, 
the Act allows ‘gatekeepers’ to take into account ‘the number and nature of any offences 
committed by the child and the number of times the child has been dealt with under’ 
(Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 20, Part3; section 37, Part 3; and section 
40, Part 5). As noted by the NSW Law Reform Commission (2005, p. 52), this is in 
conflict with Section 15, part 3 of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 
(NSW), which ‘prohibits the admission of any evidence that a person has previously 
been dealt with under the YOA in relation to any subsequent offence’. This criterion, 
listed last in the relevant sections of the YOA, is part of a series intended to direct police 
and courts to consider ‘prior offending history’ after having considered the other 
criteria, that of seriousness, harm and violence. However, in practice, according to the 
NSW Law Reform Commission (2005), history of offending is often considered first. 
 
Research regarding police attitudes to divert shows that the seriousness of the offence, 
youth’s prior offending history and youth attitudes are the most influential factors in 
diversionary decision-making (Carrington, 1998; Doob and Chan, 1982; Doob and 
Cesaroni, 2004; Marinos and Innocente, 2008), whereby past record of offending plays 
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a predominant role (Carrington and Schulenberg, 2004; Marinos and Innocente, 2008). 
For example, research by Carrington and Schulenber (2004) on decision-making 
regarding young offenders in Ontario found that the more prior contact with police, the 
less likelihood of diversion. Equally, Marinos and Innocente’s (2008) study of police 
in Ontario, found that youth past record influence police attitudes in choosing not to 
divert. Similarly, a more recent study in NSW by Green et al. (2019, p. 9) reported that 
police officers ‘suggested being able to readily identify those young people described 
as ‘recidivists’ noting that they are less likely to dedicate time and effort to assist 
them’, which indicate that recidivism is a strong schema underpinning diversionary 
decision-making. 
 
Further to this, as noted in the Act the specialist youth police officer is to consider ‘any 
other matter the official thinks appropriate in the circumstances’ (Young Offenders Act 
1997 (NSW): Section 37, Part 3 (e)). This discretionary allowance enables police and/or 
magistrates to consider ‘any matter’ and come to any view that in their opinion is 
appropriate. As de Lint (1998) has noted regarding police discretionary decision-
making, the significance of the flexibility that allows the police officer to examine the 
contextual and mitigating factors when making the decision cannot be underestimated. 
Decisions taken by the police from their first contact with a young person to the point 
of decision-making concerning their diversion, ‘may influence later judicial decisions 
and ultimately impact’ (NSW Law Reform Commission, 2005, p. 49) upon their 
sentencing outcome (Cunneen, 2001; Luke and Cunneen, 1995; NSW Law Reform 
Commission, 2005). Thus, discretionary decision-making process of an individual 
police officer may translate into a ‘pattern’ of discretion which operates with 
detrimental effects for certain minority groups such as Indigenous youth (Cunneen and 
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White, 2002) or Lebanese or Indo-Chinese (Collins, Noble, Poynting and Tabar, 2000) 
or Pacifica youth (Cunneen, 1995; Ravulo, 2015). Punitive decisions, at this point, 
create a chain of escalation in the level of future intervention (Cunneen, 2001; Gale, 
Bayle-Harris and Wundersitz, 1990). Consequently, in this scenario, the offenders 
would be charged and sent to court, and in turn the magistrates would now have the 
discretionary power to consider diversion under the YOA. 
 
Children’s Courts as decision-makers regarding diversion to YJC 
In NSW, the Children’s Court is a specialist separate Local Court for children 
adjudicating on both criminal, and care and protection matters (Fernandez et al., 2014; 
Fernandez et al., 2013). The head of the Children’s Court is the President of the 
Children Court, is appointed (see Children’s Court Act 1987, s. 6A), and must hold 
office as a Judge of the District Court. There are thirteen specialist magistrates whom 
are appointed for periods of up to five years 21 and are located on permanent basis in 
specialist Children’s Courts in Parramatta, Glebe, Broadmeadow, Campbelltown, Port 
Kembla, Sutherland, Nowra, Woy Woy and Wyong (NSW Government, 2015a).  
 
Due to the significant geographical distances between rural and city areas of NSW, 
Local Court magistrates also deal with Children’s Court matters in locations where a 
specialist Children’s magistrate is not available (Fernandez et al., 2014). In 2010 a rural 
circuit for specialist Children’s Court magistrates was initiated to assist in rural and 
regional areas in dealing with criminal and care and protection matters (NSW 
Government, 2015b). Currently, the Children’s Court effectively operates four country 
 
21 The Children’s Court magistrates are selected from the general pool of magistrates appointed under the Local 
Court Act 2007 (NSW Government, 2015). 
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care circuits to which, through a circuit roster, specialist Children’s magistrates hear 
care cases at the following locations: Northern Rivers, Mid-North Coast, 
Dubbo/Orange, and the Riverina22 (Johnstone Judge, 2014b).  
 
The criminal jurisdiction of the Children’s Court is currently defined primarily by the 
Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987, the YOA and the Bail Act 1978. Upon the 
establishment of the YOA, it was originally envisioned that the majority of the referrals 
to YJC will come from the police. However, as previously noted, this is not the case, 
with the majority of referrals being made by magistrates (Moore, 2011; Tausing, 2012; 
Richards, 2010). The political and social environment of time and place often affect not 
just criminal justice policies but also sentencing decisions (see Stenffensmeier, Ulmer 
and Kramer, 1998). Similarly, jurors’ or judges’ decisions of guilt and innocence may 
be affected by their own opinions (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966; Smith and Damphousse, 
1998). Whether the factors that affect the decision to divert are different from those that 
affect sentencing decisions, has not been investigated. However, in sentencing research, 
the importance of examining the relationship between legal practitioners’ (legal 
representative, magistrates, judges and justice personnel) perceptions of sentencing and 
sentencing patterns has been previously highlighted as a key factor likely to affect the 
way a legal practitioner acts (see Mears, 2000; Rogers and Erez, 1999). Similarly, it is 
likely that magistrates’ perceptions of RJ and youth conferencing processes, as well as 
the philosophies that underpin them, are a key factor affecting diversionary decision-
making under the YOA. However, as Richards et al. (2017) note, there is little prior 
literature on magisterial views of RJ and youth justice conferencing. 
 
22 All the other courts not covered by the permanent circuit are able to seek the assistance of the President of the 
Children’s Court to allocate a children’s magistrate to hear complex cases requiring specialist knowledge or matters 
that require a lengthy hearing (Johnstone Judge, 2014b). 
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The limited existing research illustrates cautious support of RJ among magistrates 
(Richards et al., 2017). For example, studies by Bazemore (1998) and Bazemore and 
Leip (2000) on the views juvenile court judges in the United States about victims’ 
participation in court processes through RJ, found general support for RJ. However, 
some respondents expressed concerns about the value of RJ for both victims and 
offenders. For some judges, the loss of power in dealing with young offending was also 
a concern. In addition, many respondents expressed concerns about protecting the rights 
of the young person and ensuring fairness and equity across cases (see Bazemore and 
Leip, 2000). Stephens’ (2007) research with 12 judges experienced in the youth court 
from Toronto, Canada, also found general, yet cautious support for RJ. He found that 
respondents expressed support for youth diversion in general, yet, were cautious about 
supporting RJ measures for young Indigenous people. Naude and Prinsloo’s (2005) 
study with 69 magistrates and prosecutors in South Africa found extensive support for 
RJ generally. The support was greater for RJ for young offenders than adults. However, 
16% of the respondents believed that RJ measures were only suitable for adults. 
 
Additionally, respondents to these studies expressed concerns about RJ processes. In 
the Canadian study by Stephens (2007), the judges noted that a lack of resources, 
funding, and lack of information about community resources diluted their support for 
RJ. Similarly, in the study by Naude and Prinsloo (2005), two-third of respondents 
agreed that RJ can be ineffective due to inadequate access to community resources. 
Further, this study concluded that the South African magistrates and prosecutors need 
training about the objectives and effectiveness of RJ as they were misconceptions and 
uncertainties. This lack of knowledge translated to a reluctance to use RJ with particular 
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offences (such as sexual offences, and serious assault), and repeat offenders. The 
studies by Bazemore (1998) and Bazemore and Leip (2000), also found that there was 
a great deal of misunderstanding and misconception about RJ processes, particularly 
regarding restorative community conferencing. For example, judges in Bazemore and 
Leip’s (2000) study felt that a strong commitment to offenders’ rehabilitation conflicts 
with the goal of involving the victim. Nevertheless, the most highly rated RJ practice 
by the respondents where opportunities involving work and community service as part 
of restitution (see Bazemore, 1998). 
 
The limited research about the perspectives of judicial officers at a national level stems 
from the national study of the children’s court in Australia (see Sheehan and Borowski, 
2103). Findings from this study as they relate to RJ have been reported in relation to 
New South Wales (NSW), Victoria, Queensland (QLD), Western Australia, South 
Australia and the Australia Capital Territory (ACT). These reports illustrate, for the 
most part, general, yet, cautious support for RJ measures. For example, the study in 
Victoria, where 20 magistrates were interviewed found that all respondents supported 
a ‘therapeutic jurisprudence-informed problem-solving court’ (see Borovski and 
Sheehan, 2013, p. 387). The study in the ACT by Camilleri, Thomson, and McArthur 
(2013), where 46 stakeholders were interviewed found that RJ was seen as less formal 
and more useful to open communication between young people, their families and the 
court. In Western Australia stakeholders (including magistrates attached to the 
Children’s Court) reported overall support for diversion and early intervention (see 
Spiranovic, Clare, Bartels, Clare and Clare, 2015). However, respondents marked the 
lack of resources as a key concern impacting mostly the severely over-represented 
Indigenous young population (Spiranovic et al., 2015). This concern regarding the lack 
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of resources, as well as a lack of cooperation among likely stakeholders, was also noted 
by the 15 respondents interviewed in the South Australia study (see King, Del and 
Delfabbro, 2013).  
 
The NSW study found generally overwhelming support of RJ, particularly YJC (see 
Richards, Bartels and Bolitho, 2017). Some respondents indicated their support for RJ 
based on its perceived ability to: help people develop empathy, face consequences for 
their actions, and take responsibility for their behaviour (Richards et al., 2017). 
However, as Richards et al. (2017) note a strong support for YJC does not translate to 
a large number of referrals, particularly for Indigenous young people. The respondents 
in NSW expressed concerns that YJC is under-utilised, has not been used consistently 
across the state, and it is poorly resourced. Further, the NSW study reported a lack of 
understanding of RJ measures and consequently recommended better education and 
training is needed (see Richards et al., 2017). 
 
While more mixed results have been reported in QLD, there are also similarities. 
Tilbury and Mazerole’s (2013) research on the Children’s Court in QLD, found that 
YJC was seen positively. However, it was not considered the best way to deal with 
young people. The respondents expressed concerns that there is inequity in that some 
magistrates have never used it. Concerns were also expressed in that young people 
might not understand YJC, and the outcomes can sometimes produce harsher penalties 
that those that would have been imposed in court. The study concludes that education 
for magistrates and judges regarding the legislation, the principle of detention as a last 
resort, as well as child development skills will improve the quality of decision-making. 
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As some of the findings in the limited existent research on judicial perceptions of RJ 
and diversion indicate, the decision of legal actors, as do police, will also be susceptible 
to micro-institutional and macro political currents. Such institutional and political 
factors are discussed in the analysis chapters of this research as the findings from the 
interviews with the key decision makers on diversion are presented. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the historical trajectory of juvenile justice policies has been limited to the 
dichotomous prescriptions of welfare and justice models. The history of juvenile justice 
in Australia illustrates swings of the pendulum between ‘needs’ and ‘deeds’. The 
paradigm shifts to the justice model and the clear separation in the legislation between 
criminal and care jurisdictions in the Children’s Court in the 1980’s involved a 
pendulum swing from the ‘needs’ to ‘deeds’ of the child. Concern and tension raising 
as the ‘justice model’ fails to recognise the underlying cause of children offending 
which in most cases is essentially a welfare issue rather than criminogenic. New 
approaches since the 1990’s such as restorative justice, with a key focus on diversion 
from the system, attempted to redress some of the tensions between appropriate 
criminal responses and appropriate welfare responses to youth offending. The ideal 
expectation that the YOA in NSW will provide an inclusive and re-integrative form of 
justice while diverting young people from the criminal justice system has not been 
fulfilled. Hence the existing tensions between the ‘welfare’ and ‘justice’ paradigms 
continue to permeate ideas concerning diversion that include restorative justice 
alternatives. Such tensions are palpable through the structure of the YOA. There is not 
enough evidence to this date regarding how much these tensions shape decision-making 
by the key actors engaging in diversionary decision making and practice. However, 
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some of the contributions from this chapter, clearly hint to an exclusion/inclusion 
dichotomy shaping youth governance, with the most disadvantaged populations, 
specifically Indigenous youth, being excluded from diversion the most. The emergence 
of restorative practices and diversion has coincided with the rise of the neo-liberal 
approach to governance in contemporary Australia whereby individual responsibility, 
accountability and risk management have increasingly become the focus of the justice’s 
system response to offending. The following chapter addresses the neo-liberal emphasis 
on risk governance in Australian youth justice and its relationship to ‘diversion’. 
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CHAPTER TWO - ‘RISK’ AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR 
YOUNG OFFENDERS 
 
Introduction  
The setting of youth justice governance, especially within the UK, Australasia and 
North America appears to be caught between preventative and punitive paradigms. The 
preoccupation with ‘risk’ management exemplifies the tensions between prevention 
and punitivism in governing young offenders. Risk is prolific in contemporary youth 
governance, and its influence is often linked to crime prevention. Actuarial ‘risk 
assessment’ tools such as the Youth Level of Service/Case Management Inventory 
Australian Adaptation (YLS/CMI-AA) are said to be measures that aid in assigning 
young people into risk categories and thereby determine ‘appropriate’ interventions 
based on a risk calculation. However, application of risk management principles and 
practices to youth governance has been critiqued for undermining individualised 
responses to youth offending into a reductionist approach, whereby the focus is on 
managing aggregates (groups of young people) as opposed to individual young people 
(Case and Haines, 2015; Simon and Feeley, 1992).  
 
The concepts of risk are generated by and used to reinforce a neoliberal agenda. As will 
be discussed in this chapter, which provides a theoretical framework, risk discourses 
and practices have been used to mobilise rational choice and individual responsibility. 
These ideas are tools of neoliberal governmentality. The neoliberal reliance on market 
principles as a form of governing behaviour and the associated support for reducing the 
role of the State implies that individuals are rational agents upon whom responsibility 
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may be ascribed, while simultaneously absolving the State from responsibility. 
Governance in the neoliberal society is carried out at a ‘molecular level’ (Rose, 1996), 
individuals are expected to make choices that fit with the norm and avoid ‘risks’. 
Failing to avoid such risks leads to exclusion and marginalisation. Neoliberal political 
discourse revives the distinction between the deserving and undeserving. In that sense, 
if young people are socially constructed as ‘risky’, this would have implications in how 
they are managed. These implications include, for example; various degrees of 
punishment and control, an increasing concern with anti-social behaviour, and ‘get 
tough’ on crime responses. Such punitive responses are justified on the basis of 
deterrence, retribution and protection of the community. 
 
Nevertheless, amongst such complex technologies of governance, the struggle to 
govern focusing on reform at an individual level has not disappeared. For example, 
within a RJ ideal, the YOA intends to provide such a platform for individualistic 
restorative approach. However, the principles and objectives of the Act lie within the 
paradigms of restoration and prevention, as much as punishment. The path to diversion 
is made available to those viewed as ‘less risky’. While ‘traditional’ punitive justice is 
reserved for those classified ‘risky’ youth, usually these youth are already the most 
disadvantaged and in-need within society. Indeed, diversionary decision-making and 
its application, the YOA serves to bifurcate youth justice further.  
 
This segment of the thesis aims to locate neo-liberal and risk-oriented approaches 
within the context of the YOA in NSW to consider how ‘risk management’ might result 
in the direction of certain groups into the traditional criminal justice system rather than 
away from it through the diversionary schemes of the Act. This failure to divert occurs 
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in context specific ways within the NSW Police Force and the NSW Children’s Court, 
which are the focus of this thesis.  
 
Risk and modern Youth Justice 
A significant amount of work in the social sciences has featured ‘risk’ as a central theme 
(see Cohen, 1985; Beck, 1992; Douglas, 1992; Feeley and Simon, 1992; Garland, 1996, 
2001; Giddens, 1990, 1991; and Rose, 1999). The English publication of Ulrich Beck’s 
Risk Society: Toward a New Modernity in 1992 heralded a major shift in analyses of 
risk. According to Beck (1992), anxiety over ubiquitous perceived risks and a deep 
distrust of modern institutions’ abilities to manage such risks, defined modern western 
societies. Equally, Giddens argues that ‘in conditions of modernity, for lay actors as 
well as for specific fields, thinking in terms of risk and risk assessment is a more or less 
ever-present exercise, of a partly imponderable character’ (1991, p. 124). The 
omnipresent perceived risks and the lack of trust on institutions to manage such risks 
have influenced criminal justice and policy, youth justice governance inclusive, as it 
will be discussed later in the chapter.  
 
As Chan and Rigakos (2002) note, Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990, 1991) take an 
ontological perspective on risk, which lends itself to the argument that the current era 
of obsession with risk management is a mere reaction to what is, in reality, a more 
dangerous world (see Giddens, 1990, 1991; and Beck, 1992). As individuals and 
institutions respond to conditions of (post)modernity and industrialisation, science 
comes to the rescue but also functions to reveal more ‘risks’. Such articulations of risk 
cultivate insecurities while focusing on ‘scapegoats’ (Ericson and Haggerty, 1998, p. 
86) and relying on new expertise and knowledges to provide feasible solutions (Schehr, 
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2005). Consequently, an ever-expanding array of technological solutions is introduced 
to manage risk. However, risks also emanate from new technologies, thus making the 
cycle of risk endless and self-perpetuating (Beck, 1992). In Beck’s thesis, risk is 
conceived in terms of global hazards, such as the risk of global warming, new 
pandemics, a comet striking earth or world war, to name a few.  
 
The ‘risk’ of youth offending is nothing like the ‘risk’ of such global hazards. 
Nevertheless, risk theory has great value for understanding youth governance, 
particularly when focusing on the recent political drives whereby there is an oscillation 
between law and order politics and an over-playing of risk.  It is argued, that in such 
‘risk driven’ climate (of economic rationalism, neoliberalism and the drive for cost 
effective ways of dealing with offenders), conceptions of crime control are 
progressively replaced by a host of changes in contemporary crime control. Whereby 
social control practice is to be achieved by the newly responsibilised individual and 
non-state agencies (see Garland, 2001; and O’Malley, 2001). 
 
Understanding issues relating to risk, crime and crime control requires noting the 
contribution of institutional or ‘governmentality’ perspectives of risk, which refer to 
risk as ‘…ways of thinking and acting, involving calculations about probable futures in 
the present followed by interventions into the present in order to control that potential 
future’ (Rose, 2001, p. 7). Adopting a Foucauldian approach, some risk theorists focus 
on the roles of institutions in adapting surveillance technologies as a mode of discipline 
(see Burtchell, Colin and Miller, 1991; and Barry et al., 1996). For these theorists, the 
welfare ideals appear as actuarial and therefore, as part of the risk society (see Simon, 
1987; and O’Malley, 1992).  With greater stress placed on individual responsibility, 
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offenders are not regarded as victims of structural and social inequality; instead, they 
are seen as rational actors and choice agents responsible for their actions.  Thus, the 
welfare focus has shifted from therapeutic issues in sentencing and corrections towards 
more retributive sanctions where the primary focus is cost-effectiveness rather than the 
offender (O’Malley, 1992). 
 
Several criticisms have been directed at criminological theories of risk. For example, 
O’Malley (2001) notes, class, race and gender rarely surface within this theoretical 
framework. However, this governance is just as much about constructions of risks and 
the empirical mapping of rationalities and techniques of government, as it is about 
ostracising classes of people (O’Malley, 2001). Equally, as Chan and Rigakos (2002) 
note, risk theory is formulated within narrow conceptions of risk presenting ‘risk as a 
neutral concept and risk assessment as intended apolitical actuarial practice of late 
modernity’ (p. 743). Thus, the politics of gender, class and race are excluded. This is 
despite the fact that formulations of risks are firmly embedded in gender, race and class 
politics. For example, negotiation of risk-taking and risk avoidance indicate that 
understandings of risk are inherently gendered rather than universalised (Chan and 
Rigakos, 2002). Men and women are required to negotiate different types of risks. 
However, women’s negotiation of risks has not been completely recognised because 
‘risky behaviour’ is conceptualised through a masculine lens (Chan and Rigakos, 2002). 
Thus, women especially are under scrutiny for undertaking what are perceived as risky 
behaviours, as such behaviours do not conform to feminine gender norms (Jewkes, 
2004). 
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Indeed, there have been a number of important criticisms for many theoretical ideas on 
“risk”. For instance, governmentality approaches have been critiqued for their focus on 
instrumental rationalities, and as a consequence underplaying the expressive elements 
of contemporary penality (see Garland, 1997), that is the punitive sentiment that has 
become central to punitive justice and penal policy. Adding to this, criticisms of risk 
society tend to cluster around four key areas: the contention that the distinction between 
traditional and late modernity is overstated; the incorrect premise that risks are under-
regulated and have weakened social control; the overstatement of the claim that the end 
of traditional bonds exacerbates risks; and lastly that risks are multiplying is an  
incorrect diagnosis (see Kemshall, 2003). 
 
Analysing the far-reaching criticisms of risk theories and its many perspectives is not 
within the scope of this thesis. The point of significance is, however, that an overlap 
exists in conceptualising the ‘risk society’ as a plethora of progressive dangers that 
shape institutionalised practices and individual identities (Castel, 1991; Ericson and 
Haggerty, 1998). Individuals are ‘panoptically sorted’ (Gandy, 1993) and actuarially 
encoded by the headless monster of surveillance with an endless array of ‘tentacles’ 
(Foucault, 1991; O’Malley, 1991; Shearing, 1993). The governance of children and 
young people is likewise subjected to a risk-oriented ethos. 
 
Thus, risk theoretical frameworks are important for understanding contemporary crime 
and criminal justice. In the governance of crime, ‘risk’ is conceptualised as an estimate 
of future dangerousness and therefore, a concept embraced within the context of 
security (Lobo-Guerrero and Munster, 2008). Indeed, it is within this context that 
transformative and rehabilitative logics of correctionalism had been challenged 
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(Kempf-Leonard and Peterson, 2000). Whilst offender profiling and risk assessment 
had been embraced (Muncie, 2006). Under the proliferation of ‘what works’, the idea 
that ‘some forms of intervention can be successful in reducing some re-offending for 
some offenders at sometimes’ (Muncie, 2006, p. 779) has been welcomed. Policy 
makers have placed their focus on a broad range of techniques (Feeley and Simon, 
1992; 1994; Priday, 2006), amongst them: preventative detention, incapacitation, the 
increased use of community-based options and/or diversionary alternatives for ‘less 
serious’ offenders. Common to these techniques is their central role of risk assessment, 
regulating and managing in the most cost-effective ways, in a climate of economic 
rationalism and more broadly neoliberalism (Feeley and Simon, 1992; Priday, 2006). 
 
The growing significance of risk-oriented practices can be seen across the whole of the 
criminal justice system. For example, central features of debate and discussion on 
contemporary criminal justice often focus on reoffending by ‘hardened’ criminals. An 
illustration of this is the growing concern about sexual offenders which has led to an 
emergence of risk-oriented strategies to manage those convicted of such offences. For 
example, sex offenders register, Multi-Agency Protection panels focus on risk 
assessment and classification and sex offender notification systems akin to Megan’s 
Law from the US allowing residents to have information on offenders living in their 
local communities (see Keyzer and McSherry, 2015). 
 
Adding to this, new discourses on crime prevention centering on community 
engagement and citizens preventative actions are omnipresent, from the trend of living 
in gated communities to the marketing of CCTV, security devices and private security. 
Preventive harm-reduction and cost-effective techniques are prioritised over traditional 
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goals of the criminal system such as punishment and ‘just deserts’ (Garland, 2001). 
Similarly, policing strategies have significantly shifted to surveillance and proactive 
targeting of people in what has been noted as problem-oriented policing (Tilley, 2008). 
Disillusion with the ideal or possibility of reform and rehabilitation is part of this logic. 
There is a wider social discourse about risk of all sorts, that often refers to young people, 
crime, health, education failure and unemployment, to name a few. Thus, certain youth 
are looked upon as the very embodiment of risk – risk of ‘going bad’.  
 
In fact, over the last three decades, young people have been subject to a range of 
interventions based on the identification of population-risk factors (Turnbull and 
Spence, 2011). The construction of youth as both ‘risk subjects’ and ‘subjects at risk’ 
have informed front-line practice and are dominant constructions that drive 
contemporary penal policy (Feely and Simon, 1994; Goldson, 2000; Armstrong, 2004; 
Kemshall, 2008; Turnbull and Spence, 2011). Such predictions of risk and policies of 
incapacitation with an emphasis on actuarialism have much in common with the 
development of restorative justice and diversion strategies (Cunneen, 2008). Indeed, as 
Cunneen and Goldson (2015) postulate ‘risk assessment becomes a fundamental 
technology for dividing child and youth populations between those who benefit from 
restorative justice practices’ (p. 17) and those who having been refused diversion, ‘are 
channelled into more retributive (read punitive) processes’ (p. 18). Thus, discussions 
on risk are useful in contextualising the place of diversion and absolutely necessary for 
framing diversionary decision-making processes. Although risk thinking is part of the 
process, there are other factors at play. For example, punitiveness never went away, 
and it plays into risk paradigms. Further, underscoring the punitiveness are a host of 
social, structural and institutional prejudices or dispositions towards certain ways. 
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Thus, while risk is a key feature that may shape practices in criminal justice around 
youth diversion, many other nuances also factor in. 
 
In discussing the link between restorative justice and, risk and punitivism, it is crucial, 
however, to highlight that there is more to restorative justice.  Restorative justice 
practices simultaneously have antecedents unrelated to technocratic pressures. Over the 
last few decades, a sensitive new age focusing on the emotionality of the law and the 
non-rational, even spiritual, has spread around the world (Laster and O'Malley, 1996). 
Early forms of restorative justice were influenced by religious movements focused on 
inclusive, interpersonal, and problem-solving alternative solutions to traditional 
adversarial justice (Van Ness and Strong, 1997; Zerh, 1990). Restorative justice is very 
much about the emotionalisation of crime. For example, besides bringing victims to 
centre-stage, YJC reframes justice as a relational process that establishes an emotional 
connection between the victim, the offender and the community (Karstedt, 2002). YJCs 
focus on reintegrative shaming is a display of the emotionalisation of the law. In this 
sense, as Laster and O'Malley (1996) note 'the legal order absorbs and reciprocally 
shapes multiple and contradictory tendencies'. Currently, both technocratic and 
emotional strains compete and coexist within the legal formalities of the criminal 
system (Laster and O'Malley, 1996). 
 
Nevertheless, the shaping of contemporary crime control by risk practices as described, 
has partly transformed the criminal justice system. O’Malley (2001) argues that there 
are close links between the socio-economic changes associated with a neo-liberal ethos 
and the large number of changes in contemporary crime control. In doing so, he draws 
attention, first, to the rise of predictive rational models which in turn result in the 
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gradual displacements of more socially oriented approaches to explaining crime 
causation; secondly, to the progressive prioritisation of deterrence over rehabilitation; 
and thirdly, the emphasis on individual responsibilisation and cost-effectiveness (see 
O’Malley, 2001, 2006).  
 
From the risk society to neo-liberalism and responsibilisation  
Over the last three decades, the concept of neo-liberalism has dominated contemporary 
debates in youth justice. Neo-liberalism refers to powerful and uncontrollable shifts in 
political economy. In the global neoliberal economy, power and authority shift from 
nation states to the control of external multinationals for trade and capital mobility. 
This, in turn, results in restrictions on individual states and their power (Bauman, 1998; 
Beck, 2006; Bell 2011; Reiner, 2007). To attract international capital and avoid loss of 
jobs and taxable incomes, nation states of the globalised world are required to become 
competitive by adopting similar economic, social welfare and criminal justice policies, 
to one another (Bauman, 1998). This has occurred in parallel with a withdrawal from 
social welfare, which affects the governance of all vulnerable social groups, including 
children and young people (Muncie, 2005). 
 
Along this continuum, in the criminal justice context, a ‘neoliberal penality’, a form of 
rationality (within neoliberalism) in which the penal sphere is the only space where 
order is legitimately enforced by the State (Harcourt, 2010, p.77), embraces 
criminalisation. As Harcourt (2010) notes, the discourse of neoliberal penality 
‘facilitates the growth of the carceral sphere’ (p. 81). According to Wacquant (2008), 
this neoliberal punitiveness is fundamental rather than accidental, in a ‘political project 
that aims to subordinate all human activities to the tutelage of the market’ (p. 20). 
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Wacquant (2008) explains that as a political project, the neoliberal punitiveness is 
legitimised through zero-tolerance discourses and an increase of laws and surveillance 
strategies through the extension of crime control agencies.  
 
Neoliberalism cannot be noted to have a direct influence on the ideas and practices of 
people within the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, it has helped to create feelings 
of insecurity and egotism, which sustain the punitive sentiment amongst them (Bell, 
2011). Crime has become an issue fuelled by fears and insecurities and which neoliberal 
governments can use to gain electoral support (Bell, 2011). Complex issues in criminal 
justice are deliberately presented in simplistic terms in order to create consensus about 
tough policies in law-and-order. An authoritarian consensus between the government, 
the media and the public regarding the need for punitiveness, is difficult not to be 
followed by the judiciary (Bell, 2011). For example, despite their independence and 
high level of discretion in sentencing, the majority of the judiciary regarding themselves 
as public servants, consider that the public opinion cannot be ignored, and willingly 
formed part of the authoritarian consensus (Bell, 2011). As the Hon Sir Anthony Mason 
AC KBE highlights, however, ‘judicial independence is the feature of the system which 
is most prized by the judges themselves’ (2002, p. 31). Thus, the judiciary naturally 
prefer to decide cases based on the arguments presented according to the law, even if it 
is contrary to public opinion (Mason, 2002). 
 
It is relevant to note that in the abstract, the members of the public (both in Australia 
and internationally) think that sentences are too lenient and overall show little 
confidence in the response of the criminal justice system to crime (Jones, Weatherburn 
and McFarlane, 2008; Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur and Hough, 2003; Roth, 2014; 
 
 
79 
Warner, Davies, Walter, Bradfield and Vermey, 2011). However, these punitive 
attitudes tend to drop when people are given more specific information about the cases 
(Gelb, 2008; Moore, 2012; Warner et al., 2011).  
 
Less is known about public attitudes toward restorative justice opinions. However, 
existing research suggests broad support for it (see Moore, 2012; Pali and Pelikan, 
2010; Roberts et al., 2003). Public support for restorative justice has been associated 
with factors such as victim inclusion and reparation; offender restorative gestures and 
remorse; first-time juvenile offenders (Pali and Pelikan, 2010; Roberts et al., 2003); 
and concerning offences of theft/vandalism (Moore, 2012; Prison Reform Trust, 2011) 
and assault offences (Moore, 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, it must be recognised, however, that even when there is moderate and 
stable public support for restorative justice, the rhetoric in political debates is 
sometimes dominated by penal populism with distinct neo-liberal undertones. Risk 
discourses justify the necessity of the punitive turn. The idea of neo-liberalism is 
significant in understanding actuarial justice. Indeed,  
the development and advance of the capitalist neo-liberal state has produced 
a barrage of institutional processes and practices both to reduce danger and 
to encourage individualized risk management strategies (Walklate and 
Mythen, 2011, p. 101). 
 
At a macro level, risk management focuses on structural regulation while at a micro 
level, the focus is on self-management (Walkate and Mythen, 2011; Wilkinson, 2009; 
O’Malley, 2012). Neoliberalism moves away from state and collective 
responsibilisation (Priday, 2006). Likewise, the risk discourse emphasises the 
individualisation, responsibilisation and active citizenship (Giddens, 1990; O’Malley, 
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1992; 2010; Kelly, 2001; Priday, 2006; Kemshall, 2008; Briggs, 2013; Phoenix and 
Kelly, 2013) creating possibilities to govern at a distance (Burchell, 1996; Rose, 2000; 
Rose and Miller, 2008). Neo-liberal governance of young people is secured through: 
the dominance of risk thinking; policy changes and practice that individualise political 
and social produced risks; and strategies of responsibilisation aim at transforming and 
reconstructing the ‘young offender into prudential self-governing ‘young citizens’ 
ready to manage their risk and take responsibility for themselves’ (Phoenix and Kelly, 
2013, p. 421).  
 
For Garland (1997, 2001) responsibilisation is a strategy of governance, whereby non-
criminal justice local and community organisations are made responsible for delivering 
social control. Drawing on a key distinction between ‘authority’ and ‘accountability’, 
Garland (1997; 2001) argues that the strategy of responsibilisation serves the purpose 
of absolving the state of responsibility. This has been particularly illustrated regarding 
youth justice, where legislative changes required a new focus on multi-agency 
agreements bringing diverse and disparate agencies together towards a common goal 
(Phoenix and Kelly, 2013). An example of this is the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in 
UK (see Muncie, Coventry and Walters, 1995; Muncie, 2006 for the documented 
bewildering array of statutory and voluntary agencies being held responsible).  
 
Equally, as Bargen notes regarding the YOA in NSW, ‘the system under the Act has 
been implemented through an unusual mixture of cross government and community co-
operation’ (2011, p.7), where the responsibility of crime control is extended to the 
community. Garland’s concept of responsibilisation has further resulted in the 
argument being made that the “working together” strategy allows for something to be 
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done without even having to attend to the economic, political and/or social 
marginalisation (Goldson, 2002, 2005; Goldson and Muncie, 2006). In this sense, 
responsibilisation is not so much realised in the young person, but is, rather, a 
reconfiguration of governance through multi-agency relations with central government 
(Phoenix and Kelly, 2013).  
 
Although, Garland’s version of responsibilisation bears significance in the 
underpinnings and practices of the YOA, perhaps even more relevant in this context is 
the version of responsibilisation  exemplified by Rose and Miller’s (1992) observation 
on the shift of discourse towards the notion of ‘a responsible neo-liberalism citizen’ 
creating possibilities for ‘governing at a distance’ through practices of inclusion and 
exclusion (see Burchell 1996; Rose and Miller 2008). In this version of neoliberal 
responsibilisation, the State, local agencies and voluntary/community organisations are 
seen as being responsible for, firstly, creating the social and political conditions to 
enable individuals to participate as active agents; secondly, the categorisation and 
identification of individuals suitable for the practices; and thirdly, for appropriately 
intervening in order to shape conduct (Phoenix and Kelly, 2013). This concept can 
explicate how and why different categories of young offenders are brought into 
disciplinary processes (see Muncie, 2006 for a detailed analysis of contradictory and 
hybrid forms of youth justice governance). Responsibilisation here is seen as an ‘ethical 
reconstruction’ of the neo-liberal subject, whereby the aim is to act upon individual 
‘social actors’ so they can be transformed and become ‘ideal’, non-deviant neo-liberal 
exemplary citizens (Hannah-Moffat, 1999; 2001; Kelly, 2001; Kemshall, 2008; 
O’Malley, 1992; Rose, 2000). Thus, in the context of YJC, this is exemplified by the 
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shift of focus to victims’ needs and finding possible solutions to crime by encouraging 
young offenders to take responsibility for their actions. 
 
The emphasis is on individuals as ‘rational agents’, makers of their own worlds, 
‘making decisions according to calculations of risk and opportunity’ (Petersen, 1996, 
p. 47). This discourse individualises risk, making young people and their families 
responsible and expecting them to ‘self-rule’ (Briggs, 2013; Kelly, 2001; Kemshall, 
2008) and those who fail or ‘refuse to do so, are demonized and excluded’ (Briggs, 
2013, p. 19). This premise clearly underpins the YOA legislation regulating diversion, 
where the focus of individual responsibilisation is emphasised by the condition of 
‘admission of guilt’, an issue that raises numerous concerns regarding the rights of 
children. For example, one of the main techniques of risk management is that of 
responsibilisation through restorative justice by challenging perceived deficits in moral 
reasoning (Gray, 2005), an issue that will be further explored within the context of the 
YOA in the forthcoming sections of this chapter.  
 
However, it is also important to acknowledge how the regulation of youth and now 
youth ‘at risk’ oscillates between ideas of blame/responsibility and excuse/non-
responsibility; always a core tension in discourses about juvenile offenders. 
Simultaneously to the ideals discussed above, since the 1980s, the emergence of global 
human rights provisions concerning youth justice has taken place and come to have 
some bearing on youth justice policy. The development of global treaties, conventions 
and their face value has been previously discussed in chapter one. The significant point 
to emphasise here is that the movement towards a ‘child friendly justice’ system driven 
by globalised human rights concerns is, in many aspects in contrast to neoliberal justice 
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practices (Muncie, 2013). When it comes to the rights of children, the emphasis is on 
state protection rather than individual responsibility. Adding to this, unlike the typical 
expansion of the penal sphere seen in neoliberal practices, a system focused on children 
rights advocates for the reduction of the penal sphere by a promotion child dignity and 
prison/punishment as the last resort.  
 
Both global narratives, neoliberal penality and the rights of children contribute 
simultaneously to the incoherence of youth justice policies. Thus, policies and practices 
are applied in fragmented ways. Political, economic and cultural contexts shape the 
decisions of police, magistrates and juvenile justice staff regarding diversion. Adding 
to this, at times, the shifting views about determinism/risk versus blame (responsibility) 
might operate together rather than as extreme opposites. For example, Indigenous youth 
are positioned as simultaneously at the same time disadvantaged, victims of 
circumstances, ‘at-risk’ and in need of care, while also viewed as aware of the offending 
they do, and its harm to victims. The criminal justice system cannot adequately capture 
such intersections through such dichotomous understandings.  
 
Thus, returning to the discussion of risk above, in the intersections between the 
concepts of ‘risk society’, and neo-liberal techniques of preventive and individualised 
risk management, the project for ‘crime control’ becomes about crime prediction and 
which groups in society can be classified as most ‘risky’ (Cunneen and White, 2002; 
O’Malley, 2012). A broader preoccupation with ‘risk’ in social theory has been 
reflected in criminal justice practices, whereby ‘risk management’ technologies 
displaced the focus on rehabilitation and later, disciplinary styles of social control 
(Cohen, 1985; Feely and Simon, 1992; Kemshall et al., 1997; O’Malley 1991; 
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Robinson, 1999; 2002; Shearing and Stenning, 1985; Sparks, 2001; Walklate and 
Mythen, 2011). The notion of crime as a ‘normal social fact’ of risk societies (Cohen, 
1985; Feeley and Simon, 1992; Garland, 1996; Reichman, 1986) has generated 
narratives centered on crime prevention through the identification of ‘risk factors’23, 
through risk assessment and management techniques (Bessant, Hill and Watts, 2005; 
Sparks, 2001). However, as noted by Garland, ‘[o]ver time the accumulation of large 
databases, and a predictive knowledge of risk probabilities has produced a new way of 
reasoning that has significant social implications’ (1997, p. 181). For example, police 
reports are increasingly structured around issues of risk, shaping the information that 
can be recorded which leads to the non-recording of other information and the silencing 
of alternative knowledge (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; O’Malley, 2012).   
 
As Ericson and Haggerty (1997) note, in crime control the police as governors of 
security adopt a strategic position of gathering, sorting and forwarding information. 
Consequently, most police work is focused on ‘informational transactions concerned 
with risks’, rather than crime control (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997, p. 69). Risk 
discourses and principles in relation to juvenile offending depend on social, economic 
and political conditions (Cunneen and White, 2002) where this exchange of 
communication takes place, and in turn can shape the inclusion/exclusion discretionary 
decision making, such as the one which frames the YOA, particularly when the focus 
shifts to information as it relates to groups, rather than individuals. Thus, as it will be 
further explored in the next section, those labelled ‘risky subjects’ tend to be the more 
 
23 Risk factors ‘are prior factors that increase the risk of occurrence of the onset, frequency, persistence, or duration 
of offending’ (Farrington, 2002, p. 664). 
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marginalised and disadvantaged of young people and will be the most unlikely to be 
given the opportunities of diversion. 
 
For Feeley and Simon, in their work on the ‘new penology’, better known as ‘actuarial 
justice’, the criminal justice system had moved from the ‘individual’ to a ‘unit of 
analysis’, 
markedly less concerned with responsibility, fault, sensibility, diagnosis, or 
intervention and treatment of the individual offender. Rather it is concerned 
with techniques to identify, classify and manage groupings sorted by 
dangerousness (Feeley and Simon, 1992, p. 452). 
 
Within these risk discourses, ‘problems are being governed in terms of aggregates, 
populations and distributions rather than individuals’ (O’Malley, 1998, p. xi). These 
notions of a ‘systems’ approach to criminal justice have since been challenged, 
particularly by the emergence of a ‘what works’ narrative (Priday, 2006). In contrast to 
‘welfare’ ideologies as discussed previously, neo-liberalism shifts the focus from 
collective responsibility to individual responsibility for managing risks (Priday, 2006; 
O’Malley, 2012; Walklate and Mythen 2011; Wilkinson, 2009) while at the same time 
tailoring actuarial risk management strategies on aggregate populations rather than 
individuals. This proves a cost-effective approach to managing offenders that drives 
current policy around detention, retribution, incapacitation and the privatisation of 
corrections, alongside the increased use of community-based options or diversion 
techniques for lower-risk offenders. However, with risk management, as well as the 
growth of punitive sentiments in law an order, the definition of criminal behaviour has 
become looser to include ‘nuisance behaviour and incivilities’ (Bell, 2011, p. 5), the 
most likely type of behaviour defining ‘lower-risk’ offenders. Thus, not surprisingly, 
diversionary practices have been criticised on the grounds of net-widening, the claim 
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being made that the boundaries of social control are expanded to individuals that would 
not have been otherwise drawn into the system (Chapin and Griffin, 2005). Net-
widening within the context of YOA is discussed in the forthcoming sections of this 
chapter. The significant point to conclude here is that taken together, all these 
techniques are founded on risk assessment, regulation and management (Priday, 2006) 
and situated within a neo-liberal ideology of minimal state intervention, 
individualisation and privatisation.  
 
Neo-liberalism ethos in NSW youth governance and the YOA 
Australia, like other western countries, has adopted the political ethos of neo-liberalism. 
Through the adoption of evidence-based policy, a focus of neo-liberal governance is 
the responsibilisation of individuals, communities and other agencies in a mixed model 
of crime control (Sparks, 2001). Although, there is not enough evidence to determine 
the efficacy of such interventions (see Allard, Ogilvie and Stewart 2007), community-
based approaches are promoted as a means to ‘prevent’ the development of so called 
‘risk behaviours’ through early intervention and diversion techniques (Bessant, Hill, 
and Watts, 2005; Sparks, 2001). The neo-liberal strategies of responsibilisation and 
managerialism through modes of ‘risk governance’ are visible in the diversion 
techniques that characterise juvenile justice in Australia.  
 
In a risk oriented neo-liberal context, the favoured model of restorative justice is that 
of juvenile conferencing (Cunneen, 2008; 2012; Gray, 2005; 2009; Hudson, 2006) 
promising to create responsible and autonomous, rather than welfare dependent citizens 
(O’Malley, 2001). However, in NSW, this shift towards ‘risk-based’ policy occurred at 
a time when law and order politics and the desire to be tough on crime were 
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simultaneously mobilised as crime control tools. This is evidenced in the flurry of laws 
introduced since the 1990s24 (Cunneen and White, 2012). Most of these laws pertained 
to increased police powers and tighter control over public space.  
 
There are three broad explanations that have been put forward for the rise in police 
powers legislated through such laws: firstly, the ongoing penal populism drawing on 
insecurities from the ‘moral panics’ involving repeated claims of crime waves, and a 
more violent society (Hogg and Brown, 1998); this is despite whether or not youth 
crime has increased. The public fascination with crime news has often led to a 
representation of offending that is contradictory of crime statistics (Reiner, 1997; Potter 
and Kappeler, 2006). Secondly, the need to restore public confidence in the police post-
Royal Commission that had resulted in massive public exposure of corruption in NSW 
(Anderson, 2001). Lastly, the growing privatisation of public space had resulted in 
demands from property owners for greater regulation, control and surveillance in the 
public sphere (Anderson, 2001); while ‘security concerns’ have been used to justify the 
complementary regulations and legislative denial of civil rights (Anderson, 2001). 
 
As Cunneen and White (2012) have observed, although some of this legislation may be 
technically non-age-specific, their implementation has had a disproportionate impact 
 
24 A sample of the laws introduced between 1997 and 2001 affecting young people include the following, Young 
Offenders Act 1997 (“YOA”); Children (Protection and Parental Responsibility) Act 1997; Crimes Legislation 
Amendment (Police and Public Safety) Act 1998; Police Powers (Vehicles) Act 1998; Crimes (Forensic Procedures) 
Act 2000; Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000; Police Powers (Drug Premises) Act 2001; Police 
Powers (Internally Concealed Drugs) Act 2001; Justice Legislation (Non-Association and Places Restriction) Act 
2001; Police Powers (Vehicles) Amendment Act 2001; Police Powers (Drug Detection Dogs) Act 2001; Crimes 
Amendment (Aggravated Sexual Assault in Company) Act 2001; Crimes Amendment (Gang and Vehicle Offences) 
Act 2001. And more recently, for example serious crime and prevention orders, introduced by the Crimes (Serious 
Crime Prevention Orders) Act 2016 (NSW); public safety orders, introduced by the Criminal Legislation 
Amendment (Organised Crime and Public Safety) Act 2016 (NSW); investigative detention of terrorist suspects, 
introduced by the Terrorism (Police Powers) Amendment (Investigative Detention) Act 2016 (NSW); and new 
confiscation, forfeiture and search powers, and trespass offences that target protests, introduced by the Inclosed 
Lands, Crimes and Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment (Interference) Act 2016 (NSW).  
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upon young people. An example of this is the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Police 
and Public Safety) Act 1998 (NSW) under which it is an offence to carry a knife and 
other ‘implements’ such as scissors, in a public place. Furthermore, under the Law 
Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) LEPRA, the police have 
the power to stop search any young offender suspected of possession of prohibited 
‘implements’ while parents can also be found guilty of allowing children to carry the 
‘implements’ (Fitzgerald, 2000). This ‘allowance’ for charging parents, clearly 
illustrates part of the shift from ‘state responsibility’ to the relocation of responsibility 
with individuals. A further point of concern is the wide discretionary powers given to 
police, authorising them to carry out random searches and other duties deemed 
questionable within a civil-rights framework, but sanctioned by the Act. Due to the 
tendency of youth to occupy public spaces and their public visibility, it is with juveniles 
that these discretionary powers are most extensive (NSW Law Reform Commission, 
2005; Parker and Sarre, 2008) whilst significantly increasing their chances of being 
drawn into the criminal justice system (NSW Law Reform Commission, 2005).  This 
is ‘exacerbated when fears of young people are also racialised’ (Cunneen, 2008b, 
p.44). For example, the history of Indigenous-police interactions and its long-term 
impacts is a testament to differential treatment along racial lines. These practices 
undermine ‘the spirit of the YOA’ (NSW Law Reform Commission, 2005, p. 53).   
 
At the core of this new mode of crime control, ‘needs’ have been redefined as 
‘criminogenic needs’25 (Hannah-Moffat, 1999). The crucial goal in this framework is 
the aforementioned responsibilisation of the offender, through an individualised 
 
25 ‘Criminogenic needs’ refers to dynamic risks, such as anti-social attitudes or inadequate parenting, that are 
associated with offending and that are considered to be susceptible to change in order to reduce the ‘risk of 
reoffending’ (see Hannah-Moffat, 1999). 
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psychological program that aims to transform offenders to reflect the behavioural traits 
of the ‘rational agent’ (Cunneen and Luke, 2007; Kemshall, 2002). Critically, although 
the offenders’ choices and decisions are structured through socio-economic constraints, 
such social justice considerations do not come to bear on risk management through 
responsibilisation (O’Malley, 2001).  
 
The emphasis on responsibility that pervades YJC has been noted in the previous 
chapter. Under the YOA,  the central objective of conferencing is to emphasise the 
acceptance of responsibility by the offender and provide a community-based and 
negotiated response that emphasises participation and restitution of victims and 
offenders.26 Also previously discussed, this aspect of responsibilisation is problematic 
as it is at odds with the doctrine of doli incapax in NSW (NSW Commission for 
Children and Young People, 2011; Richards, 2011; Urbas, 2000). Moreover, the 
responsibilisation model has been criticised on the basis of exerting pressure on young 
people to admit an offence to obtain the presumed benefit of diversion and for the 
avoidance of a criminal record. This compromises issues relating to the mental element 
of the offence – mens rea and due process rights more broadly (Cunneen, 2008). This 
is particularly problematic in Australia, where currently in all states and territories, the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility is ten years of age (Cunneen and Goldson, 
2015). Further, it sits incoherently regarding the manner in which legal responsibility 
 
26 The objects of this Act are: 
 (a) to establish a scheme that provides an alternative process to court proceedings for dealing with 
children who commit certain offences through the use of youth justice conferences, cautions and warnings, and 
 (b) to establish a scheme for the purpose of providing an efficient and direct response to the 
commission by children of certain offences, and 
 (c) to establish and use the youth justice conferences to deal with alleged offenders in a way that: 
(i)  enables a community based negotiated response to offences involving all the affected parties, and 
(ii) emphasises restitution by the offender and the acceptance of responsibility by the offender for his or her 
behaviour, and 
(iii) meets the needs of victims and offenders.  
(Young Offenders Act, 1997, NSW: Section 3, Part 1). 
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and social rights and responsibilities are legislatively assigned (Cunneen and Goldson, 
2015). Hence there is substantial potential to ignore human rights for young people and 
sidestep the best interests of the child (Cunneen, 2008). 
 
A further point of concern with responsibilising young offenders through restorative 
justice processes such as YJC is the crucial need for effective communication that is 
required to allow children to properly articulate reflective narratives that might lead to 
‘remorse’ (Cunneen and Goldson, 2015). The evidence suggests that for young people 
in general, low levels of confidence/self-esteem, educational deficits, mental 
disabilities and/or substance misuse are likely to impact negatively on the abilities of 
the child to communicate (Cunneen, 2010; Cunneen and Goldson, 2015). As Cunneen 
and Goldson (2015) add, such difficulties can be intensified for children whose first 
language varies from the language of the programme. For example, as noted with 
Aboriginal children, linguistic problems can lead to ‘silence’, which in turn can be 
interpreted as disregard or unwillingness to assume responsibility (Cunneen and 
Goldson, 2015). This can result in unsatisfied or unforgiving victims and unremorseful 
offenders. 
 
Finally, implications have also been noted regarding the subject of responsibilisation, 
when the offender is a girl or young women rather than a young a boy. It is well 
established that behaviours are ‘judged, controlled, and discipline through gendered 
scripts in the justice arena’ (Cunneen and Goldson, 2015). Further, according to Cook 
(2006, p. 21), ‘the socially constructed categories of difference’, created through class, 
gender and ethnicity, ‘are not eliminated but instead used as subtle devices of 
domination’ in restorative justice conferences.  
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Despite these difficulties, several criminologists argue that restorative justice and 
programs of diversion such as conferencing within contemporary juvenile justice, 
should be viewed positively as the most inclusionary criminal justice option, and as 
measures that remain committed to the aims of social justice (O’Malley, 2001; Stenson, 
2001). According to Braithwaite, restorative justice holds the potential to restore the 
‘deliberative control of justice by citizens’ and to restore ‘harmony based on a feeling 
that justice has been done’ (2003, p. 57). Further, Gray (2005) has argued that current 
juvenile justice initiatives are about the responsibilisation of individuals through the 
management of their own risks that can be regulated through inclusionary programs 
with youth restorative justice responses being premised on all-inclusive solutions 
between all parties involved in the crime, including the victim, the offender and the 
wider community. Indeed, youth justice conferencing has been noted to provide the 
space to generate discourses of ‘social harm’, ‘social conflict’ and ‘redress’ that present 
an alternative to the language of punitive and retributive justice (Consedine, 1995; De 
Haan, 1990; Van Ness and Strong, 1997; 2002; Walgrave, 1995). At the same time, the 
YOA has led to the growth of  
confusing and sometimes unfair diversionary options…The legislation may 
also have ‘widened the net’ to capture children who have committed 
relatively minor offences (and who in any case are likely to grow out of 
offending) while detracting attention and resources from the most serious and 
persistent offenders who inevitably end up in the formal court process (NSW 
Commission for Children and Young People, 2011, p. 4). 
 
It is well documented within the current policy framework that youth justice is fraught 
with contradictions and confusing strategies (Ball, 1999; Fionda, 1999). Underpinning 
the YOA is the fundamental tactic of dividing populations between those who are 
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deemed to benefit from diversionary restorative justice and those who are directed to 
court for more punitive and ‘stigmatising’ processes through being refused bail, 
mandatory supervision or if necessary, incarceration (Cunneen, 2008). An analogy can 
be noted here to Nil Christie’s (1986) work on the notion of the ‘ideal victim’ and the 
‘ideal offender’. As Christie (1986) and others (see Rock, 2004) have since established 
these ideals legitimate the experiences of some individuals and dismiss those of others. 
Omnipresent within social discourse, notions of the ideal offender identities serve as a 
form of social control (Balfour, 2008; Chesney-Lind, 2002). Thus, risk mechanisms, as 
simple as the recognition of a prior criminal record, through the application of 
specifically designed risk assessment tools, has intensified such processes of 
bifurcation in the juvenile system. Thus, the YOA has emerged amid a potentially 
radical shift from exclusionary and punitive to becoming inclusionary and restorative 
(at least in principle and rhetorically). Yet in practice, these ideals are not necessarily 
applied nor available to all young offenders. Further, there is substantial debate about 
whether the YOA’s framework is permissive of authentic ‘restorative justice’. Indeed, 
as noted earlier while there are strong restorative elements within the YOA framework, 
there are also punitive measures, even where the use of imprisonment is outlined as a 
‘last resort’ (McAlinden, 2010). 
 
Evaluations and empirical evidence have demonstrated that the YOA provides a system 
that is, at times, unfair, disproportionate and ‘unnecessarily stigmatising’ by drawing 
certain offenders into the juvenile system more than others (see Cunneen and Luke, 
2006; Cunneen, 2007; McAlinden, 2010). As has been noted elsewhere, diversionary 
measures bypass some groups of young people in trouble with the law altogether 
(Richards and Lee, 2013), the ‘risky subjects’. For example, young people who breach 
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bail conditions are precluded from the YOA and need to be dealt with by the way of 
arrest (Richards and Renshaw, 2013). This is significant when, as reported elsewhere, 
half of the young people on detention in Australia are on remand (AIHW, 2012a). The 
exclusion from diversionary alternatives based on bail conditions has been identified as 
one of the drivers increasing the amount of youth on remand (Richards and Renshaw, 
2012). This has had particular consequences for young Indigenous offenders who 
comprise the most disadvantaged group in the criminal justice system.  
 
Under the YOA, first time offenders benefit from conferencing models and other 
diversionary schemes, while those classified as ‘serious and repeat’27 offenders are 
ineligible for diversionary programs (Cunneen, 2008; Snowball and Weatherburn, 
2007; Snowball 2008a; 2008b; Allard et al. 2010). Furthermore, the impact of the Bail 
Act 1978 (NSW)28, has intensified bifurcation between those classified as ‘low’ and 
‘high’ risk over the last decade, with the changes to legislation contributing to an 
increasing number of children in remand and greater restrictions on eligibility for youth 
conferencing and other diversionary programs (Cunneen, 2008a; NSW Commission for 
Children and Young People, 2011). For example, Indigenous youth ‘are often held in 
detention on remand simply due to lack of suitable accommodation and support to 
comply with bail conditions’ (Amnesty International, 2015, p. 5).  
 
 
27 The concept of “serious and repeat” offender is skewed and reflects a reality that is far more banal; such as being 
caught stealing biscuits or a packet of chewing gum as a second offence. This type of logic of grouping offenders 
with a second offence into the “serious” offender category is also characteristic of punitive sentencing regimes, such 
as mandatory sentencing and three-strike laws (see Garland, 2001). 
28 The primary aim of entering into a bail undertaking is to ensure the appearance of the defendant in court as 
prescribed, and to protect the community (Wong, Bailey and Kenny, 2010). However, the type of bail conditions 
imposed since the changes to legislation, are ‘generally aimed at altering behaviour, rather than ensuring than a 
young person returns to court’ (Wong et al., 2010, p. 2). For example, a common bail condition that is imposed is to 
‘reside as directed by the Department of Juvenile Justice’ (Wong et al., 2010, p. 2). As it is common for this type of 
condition to be imposed on ‘homeless’ young people, they are refused bail and consequently placed in custody 
(Wong et al., 2010).   
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The most recent data shows that for the June quarter in 2018, at a national level, 
Indigenous youth were 26 times more likely to be in detention than non-Indigenous 
young people; and 23 times more likely to be in unsentenced detention than non-
Indigenous young people (AIHW, 2018b). Further, despite representing just over 5 per 
cent of the Australian population of 10 to 17 years old, Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people represented 59 per cent of those in detention (AIHW, 2018b). The 
situation is grimmer for the youngest Indigenous children aged between 10 and 11 years 
old, who make up more than 60 per cent of all that age group in detention in Australia 
in 2012-2013 (Amnesty International, 2015).  
 
Whilst the rate in NSW at which Indigenous young people are in detention has been 
slightly lower than the national average, for example, 31.38 per 10,000 compared to 
34.37 per 10,000 nationally for the period of June 2013 to July 2014, nevertheless 
Indigenous young people are highly over-represented appearing to be 18 times more 
likely to be in detention when compared to non-Indigenous youth (Amnesty 
International, 2015; AIHW, 2014). It is worth noting that the lower rate of over-
representation in NSW is partly due to the rate of non-Indigenous detention being 
somewhat higher than the national average of 12529 (Amnesty International, 2015). 
Notwithstanding, Indigenous youth made up over half of the youth population in NSW, 
despite that Indigenous youth made up around 5.5 per cent of the population of 10 to 
17-year-olds in New South Wales (Amnesty International, 2015; AIHW, 2014). 
 
 
29  Throughout the 4-year period from 2010 to 2014, NSW had the largest number of young people in detention, 
followed by Western Australia, Victoria and Queensland (AIHW, 2014). 
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There are plausible contributing factors such as the lack of diversionary alternatives in 
regional or remote areas (Snowball, 2008a; 2008b) or policy constraints through 
jurisdictional context relating to Indigenous over-representation. Nevertheless,  
the relationship between risk and bail is a good example of how Indigenous 
youth lose out in generic measures of risk based on previous offending. 
Falling into a high-risk category for re-offending allows for the suspension 
of the right to bail and the presumption of innocence. Predicting the 
likelihood of re-offending determines access to what were once seen as 
fundamental rights and protections of the system. The offending histories of 
Indigenous young people place them outside these protections and redefine 
them as a group that society needs protection from and therefore justifies 
their pretrial detention (Cunneen, 2008a, p. 52). 
 
As Cunneen (2001, 2008a) argues, one of the crucial problems with risk discourses is 
that they ignore historical, socio-political and economic structures which provide a 
context for the criminalisation of juveniles, while, focusing more narrowly on neo-
liberal prescriptions for individual deviance and family failure. In the case of 
Indigenous young people, this ‘seems like an absurd assumption’ given the long history 
of state intervention into Indigenous family and community life (Cunneen, 2008a, p. 
52). Cunneen (2008a) notes that an Australian longitudinal study examining criminal 
recidivism and associated risk factors, found the following: 
Over time, the probability of those juveniles on supervised orders in 1994-95 
who are subject to multiple risk factors (e.g. Male, Indigenous care and 
protection orders) progressing to the adult corrections system will closely 
approach 100 per cent (Lynch et al, 2003, p 5). 
 
Reductions of structural circumstances and a person’s gender and cultural identity to 
‘risk factors’ reduces ‘identity’ to an equation of probability requiring management 
(Cunneen, 2008a). This can lead to further marginalisation through gender and 
 
 
96 
race/ethnicity. As Hudson (2006) notes, the conceptualisation of white male middle 
class ‘identity’ as a universal is behind the marginalisation of ethnic minorities and 
women. Women and anyone Indigenous or ‘of colour’ who are designated as ‘Other’ 
do not fare well under current actuarial techniques of risk management (Cunneen, 
2012a; Hudson, 2006). 
 
According to the YOA, measures for dealing with children are to be culturally 
appropriate ‘wherever possible’ and the sanctions imposed are to ‘take into account 
gender, race and sexuality’ (Young Offenders Act, 1997, s34 (1)(a); s34 (1)(c)). 
However, there is no provision for the meaning of ‘culturally appropriate’, or who will 
decide when or how to implement ‘culturally appropriate’ solutions (Cunneen, 2008a). 
There is little scope for these decisions to be conceptualised from a perspective that 
remains ‘authentic’ to the cultural experiences of the youth involved. For example, 
circle sentencing and healing programs in NSW are Indigenous initiatives seeking 
vision of justice aligned with Indigenous aspirations (Stubbs, 2000), but customary 
laws will always be filtered through dominant white criminal justice narratives (Daly 
and Stubbs, 2007). While individual responsibilisation has been found to be the most 
prominent focus of restorative justice alternatives (Gray, 2005; McAlister and Carr, 
2014), the aspirations of Indigenous communities often endorse wider visions of justice 
including self-determination (Cunneen, 2003; Stubbs, 2010b). Furthermore, the 
actuarial techniques of risk assessment that underpin ‘evidence-based’ policy such as 
the YOA, obscure the power/knowledge dynamics in relation to gender, ethnicity and 
race (Cunneen, 2008a, 2012; Chan and Rigakos, 2002; Hudson, 2006). When coupled 
with the well-documented tendency towards punitive solutions in policy and legislation 
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(see Cunneen, 1997; Cunneen, 2008; Hogg, 2001; Hunyor, 2015), this leads to a system 
of diversion, that as previously noted is exclusionary of disadvantaged minorities. 
 
Gendered inequities and diversion  
Gender adds to the structural marginalisation that is determined by constraints of class, 
age and race/ethnicity for juvenile offenders. This distinguishes young women, and 
particularly young Aboriginal women, as amongst the most disadvantaged groups 
within the criminal justice system. Although most research indicates that the risk factors 
leading to crime involvement are generally the same for young men and women, several 
factors have been particularly identified as significant for young women (AIHW, 
2012b). Young girls involved in crime are likely to have a history of childhood 
abuse/neglect, psychological/mental issues (anxiety, self-harm, attempted suicide), a 
history of out-of-home care, chronic illness/disability, experience of socioeconomic 
disadvantage and difficulties with school (AIHW, 2012b).  
 
For example, girls involved in the Australian juvenile justice systems are one and half 
times as likely as boys to have been involved in the protection system (McFarlane, 
2011). Over half of the girls in detention are also in the child protection system, 
compared to about 40 per cent of the boys (AIHW, 2017). While a study of a random 
sample on NSW Children’s Court criminal matters involving young women out-of-
home care found that 80 per cent of young women in detention reported having a 
psychological disorder (Justice Health & Forensic Mental Health Network and Juvenile 
Justice, 2017). 
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The combination of high rates of prior abuse and overly punitive responses to low level 
offending leads too many young women to incarceration. For example, the study 
mentioned above found that 50 per cent of young women were facing the court for 
property damage offences (Justice Health & Forensic Mental Health Network and 
Juvenile Justice, 2017). In Australian jurisdictions as well as other Western countries 
young women’s involvement in crime tend to be less serious and of shorter duration 
than that of young men, with young women being most commonly charged with minor 
assault, property offences such as shoplifting and offences relating to public order 
(Batchelor and Burman, 2004; Wundersitz, 2000b).  
 
Despite falling rates of young people under supervision among both males and females 
over the last five years to 2016-2017, in recent times, the rates of young women 
involved in crime when compared to young boys has increased. Recorded data in NSW 
show that young women were involved in only 1 in 13 criminal matters in 1960, with 
an increase to 1 in 4 by 2007 (Carrington and Pereira, 2009). In the juvenile justice 
system, the trend over the 10-year period shows that Australia wide, young males aged 
10-17 were five times as likely as young females to be under youth justice supervision 
in 2007-2008, and four times as likely by 2016-2017 (AIHW, 2018a). Further, young 
women are over-represented in remand. In 2017, 75 per cent of young women on an 
average night were unsentenced compared with 63 per cent young boys (AIWH, 2017).     
 
In addition to this, there is evidence indicating that young women’s involvement in 
violent crime has increased in recent years, both in Australia and internationally (Kong 
and AuCoin, 2008; Youth Justice Board, 2009). For example, research shows that over 
the last two decades, the increase in young women charged with violent offences in 
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NSW was greater than the increase for young men (Carrington and Pereira, 2009; 
Holmes, 2010). 
 
Explanations driving these changes have focused on the sexualisation of young 
women’s behaviour, their participation in youth sub-cultures (Carrington and Pereira, 
2009; Chesney-Lind, 1989) and the rise of cyberbullying and role of media 
communication in feeding girls’ violence (Carrington and Pereira, 2009). However, it 
has also been argued that the changes are reflecting legislation and policy changes 
rather than girls’ changes in criminal behaviour (AIHW, 2012b). Social concerns for 
girls’ sexuality and independence and policy shifts have resulted in young women who 
might previously appear in court for welfare matters are now entering the criminal 
justice system under criminal charges (Carrington and Pereira, 2009; Creaney, 2012; 
Gelsthorpe and Worrall 2009).  
 
Bias against young women in the criminal justice system is well documented in the 
literature (see, for example, Eaton, 1986; Federle and Chesney-Lind, 1992; Chesney-
Lind, 1988 for the gendered nature of delinquency).  This tendency is not a thing of the 
past, but an ongoing practice, the ‘young women continue to be arrested and 
incarcerated for behaviours that would not trigger a similar response for young males’ 
(Krisberg and Austin, 1993, p. 140). As discussed in chapter one, the gendered 
approach to juvenile justice is an extension of the paternalistic nature of the law 
(Federle and Chesney-Lynd, 1992; Graycar, 1995), and the ‘male-centricity of its form, 
language, and substance’ (Snider, 1998). Along this continuum, restorative justice has 
the potentially problematic consequence of net widening for young female offenders.  
Although female offenders are a minority group in the criminal justice system, as noted 
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earlier in this chapter Richards’ study in 2010 found that similar proportions of males 
and female juveniles that come into contact with police were referred to restorative 
measures, thus ‘suggesting that the restorative measures may be having a net-widening 
impact on female offenders’ (Richards, 2010, p. 6). 
 
The appropriateness of restorative conferences for women as offenders and/or victims 
has been highly debated elsewhere in the literature and briefly discussed in this chapter 
(see Cook, Daly and Stubbs, 2006, Daly 2011, and Ptacek, 2010). However, the focus 
here is the narrowly gendered framework criminology has assigned to the concept of 
risk. Highlighting the limitations of the concept of risk, feminist writers note that risk 
analyses tend to reduce ‘the relationship between women and risk’ to the context of 
‘risk avoidance’ while neglecting ‘risk-taking-activities’ (Miller, 1991). This prejudice 
reinforces the stereotyped image of women as crime victims, while, failing to 
acknowledge them as risk takers (Chan and Rigakos, 2002; Miller, 1991) and individual 
agents. Adding to this, the ‘unacknowledged gendered nature of risk assessments’ has 
metamorphosed into the ‘unacknowledged needs assessments for females at risk of 
offending’ (Hannah-Moffatt, 2006, p. 109). As Douglas (1992) notes, constructions of 
risk are socially and culturally engineered. Consequently, risk perceptions are 
subjective to the product of politically negotiated outcomes.  
 
Furthermore, as noted earlier in the chapter, young women that take part in risk 
activities are often harshly judged as such behaviours deviate from feminine gender 
norms (Jewkes, 2004). Traditional stereotypes of femininity have an impact on how the 
police treat female offenders (Horn and Wincup, 1995). In particular, women who come 
in contact with the police for violent behaviour are viewed as ‘bad’ and research has 
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found that normative gendered expectations guide how some police exercise their 
discretion in responding to women who offend.  For instance, police are more likely to 
arrest and charge women who engage in violence on the basis that violence is perceived 
as a masculine offence (Collier and Hall, 2000; Horn and Wincup, 1995; Miller and 
White, 2004). Similar processes operate in relation to groups that are racialised whether 
men or women (Cunneen, 1995; Hagan, Shedd and Payne, 2005; White 1994; 1997; 
2009).  
 
Police discretion  
Social and political forces guide the process of decision-making on which police 
discretion is based30 . Cunneen and White (2007) note the salience of this in the 
treatment of those classified as ethnically and culturally ‘Other’ including Indigenous, 
Arabic and more recently, as Coventry et al. (2014) add, Sudanese Australians. As the 
main ‘gatekeepers’ to diversionary alternatives, police discretionary powers are not 
‘carte blanche’ (Cunneen and White 2007; Parker and Sarre, 2008). As noted earlier in 
this chapter, according to legislation police are required to consider offence seriousness, 
offender’s criminal records, and whether the offender admits to the offence (Young 
Offenders Act 1997, s. 37).  
 
Additionally, police are also given license to treat offenders in accordance with ‘any 
other matter the official thinks appropriate in the circumstances’ (Young Offenders Act 
1997, s. 37(e)). Hence the legislation provides an open window for unchecked police 
discretion regarding whether to divert or not to divert offenders notwithstanding the 
 
30 Although it is not within this thesis plan, it is worth noting that policing results vary significantly via shifts in 
political and organisational priorities, structures and the level of resources allocated to different issues in different 
periods. Such, taskforces, might, in turn, lead to the criminalisation of young people in the public space (for example, 
for the criminalisation of antisocial behaviour, see Crawford, 2009; for graffiti criminalisation, see White, 2001). 
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legislative boundaries of the YOA. Shearing (1993) argues, in this context, that police 
attitudes have the potential to subvert legislative objectives. The dominance of the 
police in the context of risk management has been accompanied by a lack of 
accountability or control over their role (Cunneen, 2012a), which has had the effect of 
labelling more people as ‘risky’, particularly along gender and colour lines.  
 
The shift to a risk management paradigm rather than crime control exposes police 
officers to the double edged ‘risk society’ discourses embedded within ‘risk assessment 
tools’ and other actuarial techniques that have shaped current policy (Campbell, 2004; 
Stahlkopf, 2008). The existing risk discourses not only arrange offenders’ identities in 
sequences of less to more ‘risky’ – filtered through structures of class, race/ethnicity 
and gender – but they also determine consequences (Atkinson, 1990). For police 
officers, in general, decision making processes are part of the routine activities that 
produce and disseminate the methodological message embedded in current discourses 
around youth justice (Cunneen and White, 2007).  
 
An officer engaged in police decision-making ‘continuously struggles with the 
discursive boundaries of desirable and acceptable policing, shaped by ‘police culture’ 
discourses thereby sustaining and generating the integrity of its corporate reputation 
and identity’ (Campbell, 2003, p. 318). Thus, decisional choices are not reducible to 
legislation criteria, and cannot be explained entirely in terms of their present or 
absences (Campbell, 2003). Rather, the ‘criteria’ listed in the YOA, such as offender 
history, seriousness of the offence, the degree of violence involved, any harm to the 
victim, is likely to be considered or made meaningful within a mythology of police 
accomplishment within the prevailing culture of the Police Force.   
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As Blagg and Wilkie (1995) have previously noted, policing success is largely 
constructed in terms of arrest, ‘adding to the belief that ‘real policing’ necessarily 
requires the arrest and prosecution of individual offenders, rather than crime 
prevention or reduction’ (p. 20). While police discretion is necessary to foster fairness 
of each case by considering individual circumstances, the problem of such an approach 
is that the decision on whether to divert or not is dependent on the officer’s motivations 
for their decisions. Thus, diversion has the potential to be omitted as an option (Jordan 
and Farrell, 2013). After all, as it is well documented, youth crime is highly politicised 
and subject to moral panics spurred by reports of crime waves (see Cohen, 1972; 
Simpson, 1997; Collins, Noble, Poynting and Tabar, 2000), thus, resulting in policing 
practices being susceptible to political law and order agendas (Jordan and Farrell, 
2013).  
 
As previously noted, police have a very broad discretion under the legislation to make 
decisions about whether to divert from court or not. However, as it was noted in the 
2002 review of the YOA by the NSW Attorney General’s, police are not required to 
record the reasons for the decisions, thus making difficult to identify the factors 
motivating such decision. Such review concluded with the recommendation that the 
Police Service [since renamed Police Force] should issue guidelines in relation to the 
exercise of discretion under the Act.  
 
Police punitive culture must shift to become more accommodating to diversion. After 
all, as previously noted, the statistics show that the courts continue to do more referrals 
to YJC than the police, thus indicating there are missed opportunities for diversion 
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within the police. In 2010, the Noetic Solutions Review previously highlighted NSW 
Police Force lower referral rate to YJC in comparison to court-made referrals. Further, 
the same review suggested that diversionary options were not being used uniformly and 
equitable across NSW (Noetic Solutions, 2010). Adding to this, a study by Ringland 
and Smith aimed to measure the level of variation across LACs showed broad 
adherence across the state to the general principles of the YOA but also identified ‘some 
LAC’s had unexpectedly low rates of diversion’ (2013, p. 10). In response to the Noetic 
Solutions Review criticism on the low level of referrals,  the NSW Police Force noted 
that, the legislative requirement of admission of guilt (see YOA s36, part B) ‘is the 
predominant causal factor in the lower referral rate of police initiated Conferences as 
opposed to Court-ordered Conferences’ (Police Association of NSW, 2011, p. 11).  
 
As a response to this issue, the Protected Admissions Scheme (PAS) has been created 
as a circuit breaker designed to enable young offenders to make admissions to an 
offence whilst preserving their rights not to provide self-incriminating evidence. 
Designed to remove the apparent blockage to cautioning and YJC referral option by the 
police, the PAS was approved by NSW Police Force to be used in the context of 
cautions on April 2014, and this approval was extended to YJC on July 2015. However, 
the effectiveness of the PAS in addressing the issue of low referrals is unknown; no 
evaluations of the scheme had been published at the time of writing. Nevertheless, a 
protected admission can be offered to an offender if the police officer believes a caution 
or YJC is appropriate and the young offender refuses to make admission to the offence. 
When signing a Protected Admissions Form (see Appendix 2), which is provided with 
a Protection Admission Information Sheet (see Appendix 3), the young offender can be 
questioned about the offences listed in the form and the information gathered may not 
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be used in any criminal proceedings (Operational Programs Command Protected 
Admission Scheme SOPs, 2015 (“OPCPAS SOPs”)).  
 
However, as further noted by OPCAPS SOPs in the event that during the interview the 
young offender admits to additional more serious crimes, ‘police may elect to suspend 
the interview and commence a separate interview to ask about those offences. If this 
occurs, police will make it clear to the young person that what they say in the new 
interview is not ‘protected’ and can be admissible in criminal proceedings’ (2015, p. 
9). This practice raises significant concerns, with factors to be considered not different 
from those previously discussed concerning issues of due process and the individual 
responsibilisation of young offenders.    
 
As previously noted, in other areas of the law (for example, regarding medical consent, 
the right to vote and sexual consent) young people are not considered to be capable of 
making moral and civil decisions. However, the ideology behind the PAS assumes that 
young individuals are capable of absorbing and evaluating the complexities of the 
scheme and the inherent consequences of becoming part of such process. As previously 
noted, the use and/or misuse of the PAS, as well as its effect on the number of referrals 
to YJC by the police is yet to be explored. Nevertheless, with or without the PAS, the 
discretion as to whether to divert or not remains with the police officer and as previously 
noted decisions made by police at their first point of contact with the young person is 
highly likely to influence later judicial decisions and ultimately impact upon their 
sentencing. 
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Magisterial decision-making in regard to diversion under the YOA is an area unexplored 
to this day. According to the legislation, magistrates, in their ‘gatekeeping’ role to 
diversionary alternatives are required to consider the same factors as police; that of 
offence seriousness, offender’s criminal records, whether the offender admits to the 
offence (Young Offenders Act 1997, s. 40), and ‘any other matter the Director or court 
thinks appropriate in the circumstances’ (Young Offenders Act 1997, s. 40(e)). Thus, 
from a legislative viewpoint, magistrates are working within the same ‘risk’ paradigm 
previously discussed. As with police, magistrates are also given ample latitude for 
decision-making, thus raising questions on magisterial differences on decision-making 
and factors that might affect decisions within this context.  
 
Children’s courts in Australia are ‘a vital institution for holding young offenders 
accountable for their behaviour, helping rehabilitate them and protecting the 
community and for advancing the ‘best interest of the child’ and protecting them from 
harm’ (Borowski, 2013, p. 184). The capacity of the Children’s Court to achieve its 
desired intentions of balancing welfare and justice is a difficult challenge. For example, 
amid the ascendency of the justice model with its just desserts orientation, moral panics 
over youth crime led by politicians and the media have distorted restorative justice as 
‘a soft option’ (O’Connor, 1997). Although, the literature has well established that 
restorative justice in its many forms and uses, including YJC, is far from a ‘soft option’ 
(see Bottoms and Dignan, 2004; and Walgrave, 2004), this shadow over it, would at 
times unsettle a community which focuses on retributive justice, thus placing the 
magistrates at that difficult position of balancing community expectations and ‘the best 
interest of the child’.  
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The most recent and first close study of the Children’s Courts in NSW identified, that 
outcomes for young people appearing in court were seen as being contingent on ‘how 
the legislation is applied by individual judicial officers and practitioners, resources 
available, geographical considerations and orientations of the magistrates and other 
stakeholders’ (Fernandez et al., 2013, p. 31). For example, in the same study, 
magistrates have expressed concern and frustration that court process and outcomes 
potentially differ depending on geographical location, primarily due to ‘inequities in 
access to resources and services across the rural/city divide in NSW’ (Fernandez et al., 
2013, p. 41). Further,  
[g]eneralist judicial officers’ lack of knowledge and skill was seen as 
producing geographic variability in case processing and decision-making, for 
example, in criminal sentencing (typically harsher in regional and remote 
locations) and reviews of child protection cases (Borovski, 2013, p. 172). 
 
As part of the study mentioned above, a brief insight into the area of diversionary 
measures within the Children’s Court found that magistrates believe in the need for 
YJC to be available for more serious offences (Fernandez et al., 2014). Magistrates 
further noted, however, that ‘this must be coupled with an increase in services for young 
people to be referred to, addressing causes of juvenile crime’ (Fernandez et al., 2014, 
p. 37). Further, the study found a consensus amongst magistrates that the Bail Act was 
being punitive and therefore undermining the role of the Court to act in the ‘best interest 
of the child’ (Fernandez et al., 2013; Fernandez et al., 2014). Thus, as argued in this 
chapter, legislation subscribing to risk governance paradigms undermines the 
application of the YOA.  
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Conclusion 
Traditional crime control ideologies have given way to the ‘crime as risk’ ethos which 
drives what has been referred to by scholars such as Feeley and Simon (1992) as the 
‘managerialist turn’ within criminal justice practice. Juvenile justice has not escaped 
this; diversion interventions under the YOA may in part reflect techniques that have 
come to dominate the ‘risk management’ ethos. These risk governance techniques are 
concerned with classifying and managing individuals by levels of dangerousness 
(Castel, 1991) rather than assist young offenders to “make good” (Maruna, 2001).  
 
Neo-liberal ideologies have informed the management of crime as risk. The apolitical 
approach of neo-liberalism to social divisions of class, race/ethnicity and gender serves 
to reduce structural constraints and identity to the actuarial equations measuring 
probability and ‘risk’. This results in increased ‘management’ of certain groups who 
are perceived to be more ‘risky’ due to factors of structural disadvantage. Meanwhile, 
the neutral, unquestioned ‘identity’ who judges who is more ‘risky’ than others is seen 
as the universal; resulting in the marginalisation of ‘Others’ that fall outside the narrow 
ambit of the ‘white male justice narrative’ (Hudson, 2006).  
 
The question of how these risk-oriented approaches to crime affect diversion is one that 
is crucial. The ambiguous nature of YOA prescriptions around diversion grants 
‘gatekeepers’ wide discretionary powers. Hence diversion becomes subject to the 
police and magistrates’ decision-making that must take account of the broad aims of 
risk management, in balance with the cultural and institutional constraints within which 
police officers, and magistrates, operate. An analysis of the cultural and institutional 
constraints will be explored in the following chapters of this thesis. 
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The empirical data indicates that police diversion decision-making remains faithful to 
the exclusionary system that marginalised those categorised as high risk. Here the 
potential of ‘risk management’ techniques to subvert the inclusionary objectives of 
restorative justice schemes becomes clear. The preoccupation of risk management with 
bureaucratic efficiency results in pre-emptive action and the diversion of certain groups 
into the traditional criminal justice system rather than away from it. These groups 
include individuals who have already been processed through the system and are least 
likely to be aided by traditional criminal justice. It is at this point that diversion fails; 
risk management disables the potential of restorative justice. The immobilisation of 
restorative justice through the conflicting imperatives of dominant risk management 
paradigms occurs in context specific ways within different institutional cultures. It is to 
the specific institutional imperatives of the NSW Police Force and the NSW Children’s 
Court that the remainder of this thesis shall be devoted. 
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CHAPTER THREE - THE NSW STUDY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed description and justification of data gathering and 
methodologies deployed in this research. Methodological pluralism frames this mixed 
methods study. The next section introduces the sources of information for this study. It 
is followed, by a section on managing the research processes including issues such as 
access to participants, interviews with ‘elite’ members of the youth justice system (and 
the broader community), and ethical considerations. Finally, grounded theory and 
qualitative content analysis are discussed as methods used to analyse the data. 
 
The overarching question that this research seeks to answer is why has there been a 
failure to divert young people in NSW? The researcher has an interest in tracing the 
problems that block the widespread implementation of diversionary practices under the 
YOA. Thus, the focus is to identify a combination of social/political, structural and 
institutional impediments to youth diversion across the NSW Police Force, the 
Children’s Court and youth justice personnel.    
 
Methodological pluralism 
This study is committed to taking a critical criminological approach31. Despite much 
debate over what defines critical criminology, as opposed to other criminological 
paradigms, there is no broadly accepted formulation (Stubbs, 2008). Moreover, critical 
 
31 It is worth noting that the commitment to take a critical criminology approach does not mean that “Critical 
Criminology” is the set framework of this thesis. This is a mixed-methods study that reflects historical and 
sociological awareness of socio-economic difference and inequality but not immersed within the Critical 
Criminology paradigm. 
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criminologies are diverse and subject to continuous development ‘likely to be 
influenced by borrowings from and dialogue with allied disciplines, and innovations 
generated by inter-disciplinary work’ (Stubbs, 2008, p. 13). However, despite the 
diversity of origins, methods and political beliefs, a close concern with ‘the unequal 
distribution of power and material resources within contemporary society provides a 
point of departure’ (Friedrichs, 2009, p. 2010). A common point of agreement is that 
major social inequalities around class, gender, race and ethnicity are significant in 
understanding the aetiology of crime, criminalisation and criminal justice responses 
(DeKeseredy and Dragiewicz, 2011; DeKeseredy and Schwartz, 1996; Young, 1988). 
Accordingly, critical criminologists advocate for policies that target socio-economic 
and political factors that contribute to crime; questioning the status quo and rejecting 
punitive approaches that view crime as a manifestation of individual deviancy or 
pathology. Critical criminologists argue for an examination of how criminal justice 
systems may perpetuate crime in their development, enforcement and application of 
laws, policies and practices. (DeKeseredy and Dragiewicz, 2011). 
 
Understanding issues of crime and the criminal justice system from a critical 
perspective with reflexivity is necessary to avoid a narrow approach that leads to ‘truth’ 
claims that fail to take account of the complexity of the systems being examined. In 
particular, the nuances of ‘diversion’ can be examined from several frameworks while 
integrating theoretical knowledge from a diversity of disciplinary fields to pose 
fundamental questions about order, power, authority and social justice (Stubbs, 2002). 
 
This research is situated within critical criminology as it is concerned with questioning 
the inequalities in the youth justice system, particularly concerning diversion. As such, 
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attention is given to the tensions between punitivism and welfarism (Grahman and 
Moore, 2006; Van der Laan, 2006), social control (Cohen, 1985), net-widening (Cohen, 
1985; Seymour, 1998), risk management (Feely and Simon, 1994) and racialising 
criminal justice discourses (Keith, 1993). However, it is occupational culture that 
provides a suitable platform from which to make sense of the findings (for police 
culture see Chan, 1996; Delahunty, 1998; Durivage, Barrete, Montcalm and Laberge, 
1992; Goldsmith, 1991; for police attitudes to diversion see Marinos and Innocente, 
2008; Shafiq et al., 2016; and for magisterial views on youth conferencing see 
Bazemore, 1998; Bazemore and Leip, 2000; Camilleri, Thomson and McArthur, 2013; 
Naude and Prinsloo, 2005; Richards et al., 2017; Sprianovic et al., 2015; Stephens, 
2007; Tillbury and Mazerolle, 2013). 
 
While it utilizes mixed methods, this project primarily relies on qualitative research 
methods and mainly by way of interviews with criminal justice practitioners. Inductive 
in its approach (Leedy and Omrod, 2010), qualitative analysis makes use of verbal and 
textual information to develop insight and understanding (Neuman, 2000) of lived 
realities (Blance, Durrheim and Painter, 2006), in order to acquire an ‘‘appreciation’ 
of the social world from the point of view of the offender, victim or criminal justice 
professional’ (Noaks and Wincup, 2004, p. 13). Hence, the qualitative interviews 
conducted for this research provide a platform from which to investigate the underlying 
understandings, assumptions and common understandings around diversionary 
processes, alongside the benefits and constraints of the process of ‘diversion’.  
 
Richards and Bartels claim, ‘qualitative researchers often face the assertion that our 
data are not of sufficient quality and not subject to rigorous testing’ (2011, p. 5). 
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‘Triangulation’32 is a way to overcome partial views and present a fuller picture of the 
issues under consideration (Richards and Bartels, 2011). As Richards (2011c) notes, 
some researchers find the idea of triangulation awkward. For example, Fielding and 
Fielding (1986) state that using multiple methods driven by competing theories cannot 
produce an objective ‘truth’. In this research, the purpose of triangulation is not to 
confirm existing information or to find an objective ‘truth’ but rather to juxtapose new 
information and enrich the knowledge on ‘diversion’. The central image for multi-
method, qualitative inquiry should be ‘the crystal, multiple lenses, not the triangle’ 
(Ellingson, 2009, p. 190). In this research, the multi-method approach, including 
interviews with key informants, as well as content analysis of policy documents and 
official statistics provides, from multiple angles, a depiction of practitioners’ 
perspectives associated with the process of youth ‘diversion’ delivery in NSW.  
 
Previous studies and reviews of the YOA have focused on quantitative data on referrals, 
reoffending, likelihood of custodial orders (see for example, Luke and Lind, 2002; 
Ringland and Smith, 2013; Wan, Moore and Moffatt, 2013), and surveys of participants 
(see Hennessy, 1999). Others have also included analysis of policy documents, and/or 
interviews/focus groups with policy officers, practitioners and other interested parties 
and public reviews (see Chan et al., 2003a; NSW Attorney General and Justice, 2011; 
NSWS Law Reform Commission, 2005; Noetic Solutions, 2010). The methodological 
approach in this study is to draw out and specifically analyse the perspectives of, and 
tensions between, key decision-makers within processes of diversion in youth justice.  
 
 
32 ‘Triangulation’ is a term widely used when discussing mixed research methods. It is important to acknowledge 
that there are divergent interpretations, and its value has been critically questioned (See Fielding and Fielding, 1986; 
Hammersley, 2008; Seale, 1999). 
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This research focuses on the inner workings of the criminal justice system and required 
ongoing researcher reflexivity. Reflexivity is an active process permeating all aspects 
of research from the selection of the topic to access and engagement with participants 
and institutions, data collection, analysis, dissemination and applications of findings 
(Lumsden and Winter, 2014). The process of knowledge production itself, analysing 
dominant ideas and practices, ideologies or discourses is also an essential part of 
reflexivity (Stubbs, 2008).   
 
Importantly, qualitative approach provides the opportunity for reflexivity and 
adaptation (Katz, 2002), enabling the researcher to follow up leads and explore 
unforeseen themes that emerge during the research (Richards and Bartels, 2011), letting 
the data lead where the research goes (Katz, 2002; Richards and Bartels, 2011). Indeed, 
one advantage of qualitative data is that it can be retrospectively interrogated in relation 
to unexpected questions emerging later in the research process (Richards and Bartels, 
2011). Bartels and Richards highlight that without quantitative concerns about 
representations and generalisations, ‘qualitative criminologists are free to capitalise on 
serendipitous occurrences such as the discovery of new sources of data’ (2011, p. 7).  
 
This research focuses on divided sectors of the criminal justice arm: state-policing, 
magistracy and the juvenile justice bureaucracy. Within these environments, the ability 
to adapt the research plan and be prepared to reassess is essential. From the very 
beginning of this dissertation, the researcher was aware of the need to engage in this 
reflexive process. It was anticipated that the ideas, concepts and themes underpinning 
the study would develop over time. Official source material analyses and interviews, as 
well as the writing process, presented new issues to consider and inevitably shaped the 
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final analysis and outcome. As a researcher, the potential for the extant literature to 
shape data analysis was recognised. Aware of this, the data needed to be scrutinised 
and checked while keeping the analytical focus on the participant’s account. 
 
In this research, grounded theory and qualitative content analysis provide the means to 
scrutinise information. The study objectives were to be immersed in all aspects of the 
discretionary decision making processes on youth diversion in NSW, to become 
familiar with the relevant decision-makers and their institutionally informed narratives. 
Findings and theories were built from these insights, from the ground up. 
 
Data sources  
Analysis of official statistics and policy reviews, specifically of the legislation and 
policies governing youth diversion in NSW, provided a foundational backdrop to the 
study. It was the close examination and analysis of these sources that determined and 
informed the most appropriate strategies for investigation. As noted, the sources of data 
for this research included official source materials and interviews.  
 
Interviews 
The rationale for conducting interviews included to investigate the attitudes of the 
police and magistracy to ‘diversion’, to identify how some of these key practitioners 
interpret diversionary policy, and how they act in accordance with legal policy and 
practice. The interviews also aimed to capture how decision-making processes work in 
practice from these perspectives. A purposive sampling of police and juvenile justice 
experts was used. This type of sampling is used when specific persons are identified as 
having knowledge and experience that will advance the objective of the study 
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(Llewellyn, Sullivan and Minichiello, 2004). Rubin and Rubin (1995) suggest that in 
any purposive sampling strategy, informants should be knowledgeable about the 
cultural arena being studied, willing to talk and be representative of multiple 
perspectives. With this in mind, youth justice personnel, NSW Police and magistrates 
of the Children’s Court were the ‘three fields’ identified as key informants to meet the 
objectives of this research. Specifics on sample size varied across the three fields (see 
Table 1) and will be discussed and justified individually. 
Table 1: Number of Participant (n) across the three fields 
 
NSW Police Magistrate of Children’s 
Court 
NSW Youth Justice Personnel 
n = 6 
[Senior Policy Officer-youth (n=1); 
Youth Liaison Officer (n=5)] 
n = 13 
[President of the 
Children’s Court (n=1); 
Specialist magistrates 
(n=10); 
Local Court Magistrates 
(n=2) 
n = 6 
[Assistant Managers of 
Juvenile Justice (n=5); 
 
Aboriginal Legal Services 
solicitor n = 1) 
 
1. NSW Police 
The Senior Policy Officer in Youth Command in charge of facilitating access to Youth 
Liaison Police Officers (“YLO”) was interviewed for his/her expertise in the oversight 
of youth policy within NSW Police. YLOs are the administrators of the YOA for NSW 
Police. When a young person comes to the attention of the police, the YLO becomes 
the primary ‘gatekeeper’ to ‘diversion’. According to legislation, the YLO delivers 
cautions to young people and is responsible for the final decision about referring youth 
to a YJC. There is a YLO at each of the 80 LAC across NSW. The study targeted 40 of 
80 LACs, focusing on half the LACs was determined as an adequate sample to draw 
from and a manageable alternative that aligned with the research objectives. Out of the 
40 YLOs invited to participate in the research, five agreed to participate. The low rate 
of participants volunteering for this study is an issue that will be discussed in chapter 
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five. The YLO interviews in this study provide some insights into the day-to-day 
problems encountered with providing access to ‘diversion’. 
 
2. Magistrates of the Children’s Court  
Judicial officers in NSW were of paramount importance in providing knowledge and 
evaluation of the merits and limitations to ‘diversion’ processes in the YOA and insights 
to consistency issues on referrals to YJC. The Children’s Court is led by the President 
of the Children’s Court, and there are 15 specialist magistrates appointed. All 15 
magistrates were invited to participate. In addition, 12 Local Court magistrates who 
hear Children’s matters in rural areas were invited to participate, with two magistrates 
agreeing to participate. From this, a total of 13 interviews were conducted. Participants 
included the President of the Children’s Court, ten specialist magistrates and two local 
Court magistrates. Interviews took place at the following specialist Children’s Courts 
locations: Parramatta, Glebe, Sutherland, Campbelltown, and Woy Woy; and the local 
court locations of Armidale, Dubbo and Orange. This distribution provides a good 
spread as it includes eleven of the total fifteen specialist Children’s Court magistrates 
appointed at any given time. Further, their locations cover all existing specialist 
Children’s Courts in NSW. Analysis of findings from these interviews is presented in 
chapter five of this thesis. 
 
3. NSW Youth Justice Personnel  
Juvenile Justice New South Wales agreed to provide access to a total of eight Assistant 
Managers across NSW. A total of five participants in this group agreed to be 
interviewed. One further interview was conducted with an Aboriginal Legal Services 
solicitor. This sample size was adequate, given that this group does not perform a 
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decision-making function regarding diversion, even if, at times, they come to play a 
significant role in the process itself. Their expertise provided insights into the day-to-
day problems encountered with trying to negotiate ‘diversion’ opportunities in NSW. 
The analysis of these interviews is presented in chapter six of this thesis. 
 
Official source material 
As noted in the first chapter of this thesis, in 2010 the Noetic Report identified that 
diversionary options are not being used uniformly and equitably across NSW; with the 
exception of a number of police LACs that are utilising conferencing ‘quite heavily, the 
majority are under-utilising it’ (DAGJ, 2011, p. 57). To further understand the under-
utilisation of youth diversion, the researcher sought access to de-identified/aggregate 
data from BOCSAR. The data that was accessed was recorded crime statistics of the 
number of persons of interest aged 10 to 17 years proceeded against by the NSW Police 
Force by LAC via a warning, caution, YJC and against to court from July 1998 to June 
2017. 
 
BOCSAR was the optimum source of data to provide a complete picture on the use of 
diversionary alternatives, including warnings33, cautions and YJC since the enactment 
of the YOA until June 2017 (the most current available records). As previously noted, 
the data analysis plan was to identify the correlates between police, court diversion and 
more significantly how frequent the use of diversionary alternatives by NSW Police 
Force under the YOA are practised, while allowing for court to be used as ‘the last 
resort’. This data is presented at relevant points of the analysis chapters. 
 
33 Recording of warnings changed in late 2008, and as a result, BOCSAR could not provide records of warnings by 
police prior to 2010.  
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Research process 
Data management is essential when taking a grounded theory approach that considers 
multiple perspectives. ‘Mapping’ was essential to garner support and ‘entry’ into the 
field of research (Richards, 2009, p. 22). Mapping involved getting to know the 
research sites, the context in which participants operate, and understanding rules, 
regulations and institutional cultures. An essential initial step of the exercise was to 
make early contact and form relationships with key informants. This was critical to the 
success of this study. The closed nature of law and order institutions and the reticence 
of employees to divulge too much about their practices was a key challenge to surmount 
in order to avoid being denied access to the sample population. For example, ‘cop 
culture’ and the challenges it presents for researchers is well documented (see Chan, 
1996, 1997; Horn, 1997; Brookman, 1999; Waddington, 1999;  Marks, 2004; 
McGovern, 2011; and Reiner, 2010) as are the difficulties of obtaining access to 
interview the ‘elite’ (see Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Beamer, 2002; Goldstein, 
2002; Kezar, 2003; and Smith, 2006).  
 
Thus, the background information gathered by the researcher during this period of 
familiarisation with the cultures of the organisations and the nature of its key players 
was key to gaining access and building rapport and participant interest. It also presented 
an excellent opportunity to observe and gain insight into occupational practices and 
cultural settings. This assisted in reflecting upon the broader context of the study and 
helped develop questions to be used during the interview process.   
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In this three-year study, as noted above, the researcher interviewed a total of 25 
participants across three criminal justice fields (courts, police and youth justice 
personnel) and observed 49 children’s court proceedings. Importantly, all participants 
were key parties in the area of juvenile criminal justice and were positioned as 
practitioners who made decisions regarding diversion and/or in a position to contribute 
to the process of diversionary decision-making. 
 
With reference to the Children’s Court Magistrates, often the participants held or had 
held positions across several sectors within the criminal justice system covering the 
establishment, development and/or administration of juvenile welfare and justice. 
Magistrates were considered to be ‘elites’. It is important to acknowledge that 
definitions of elite are broad (see Fumanti, 2004; Odendahl and Shaw, 2001) and at 
times, are subjectively seen as elite to the researcher (Richards, 2011c). For example, 
McDowell defines the elite as ‘highly skilled professional competent and class-specific’ 
(1998, p. 2135). Others defined the elite in relational terms to their social position 
compared to the researcher or to the average person (Stephens, 2007). In other 
instances, elite status is given to those who are able to exert influence because they hold 
important social networks, social capital and strategic positions within social structures 
(Woods, 1998; Smith, 2006). Adding to this, it is important to note that as it has been 
well documented by many, the predominance of professional background among 
magistrates, has identified them as a particular social elite holding considerable social 
capital (see Burney, 1979; Dignan and Wynne’s, 1997). Recent research shows an 
increase of diversity across the magistrates’ professional backgrounds, age and 
ethnicity. However, as Gibbs and Kirby (2014) stress, there is a need to strengthen such 
efforts to achieve greater social representation. 
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In the context of this research, the researcher defines elites as those who have 
significant decision-making influence or power within and outside the context of youth 
justice diversion. When understood in this sense, both the police and magistrates are 
elites as they have significant discretionary decision-making powers, yet magistrates 
are more elite than the police. This is based on the diversionary power as per legislation, 
by which magistrates can divert offenders even after police have decided against doing 
so. This allows magistrates the opportunity to regulate police discretion elevating 
magistrates’ position in the criminal justice hierarchy.  
 
While undertaking this research, difficulties emerged in two key areas: firstly, in 
physical access to participants; and secondly, in overcoming barriers to gaining and 
maintaining the participants’ trust34. The experiences in obtaining access to individual 
participants in this study varied greatly across the three fields.  
 
For example, as McGovern states, ‘researching the police can be an exercise in 
patience’ (2011, p.66). In the current research, the process of negotiating access to 
YLOs in the NSW Police Force was lengthy and difficult. As McGovern (2011) notes, 
this been the case for many other researchers (see Brookman, 1999; Fox and Lundman, 
1974; Punch, 1989, 1993). The traditional nature of police organisations is one of 
‘closed’ settings heavily guarded by many layers of bureaucracy, administration and 
management (McGovern, 2011). This ‘closed’ nature of the police bureaucracy prevails 
despite claims to a growing emphasis on openness, accountability and transparency, 
 
34 This challenge is one that has been pointed out by many before. For research experiences in a criminal justice 
setting, see Flynn, 2011; Wise, 2010; and for research experiences with police, see Dixon, 2011; McGovern, 2011). 
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especially with regards to external researchers that have traditionally been perceived as 
challenging the role of the police (Silverman, 2001). This is reflected by the lengthy 
formal process required by the NSW Police Force to obtain approval to conduct 
research, and for this study, in particular, the further extensive period of time consumed 
in the process of obtaining access to YLOs for interviewing.35 The timeline from initial 
contact with NSW Police Force to the successful interviewing of the YLOs spanned 16 
months. This placed great challenges on the research management overall.  
 
This long process was challenging to navigate because negotiation and confirmation of 
access to police participants were beyond the researcher’s control, and often beyond 
the control of individual members of the NSW Police Force. For example, changing 
managing structures and the departure of personnel and/or the arrival of new personnel 
often delayed approval to conduct research. For similar reasons, once approval was 
obtained access to research subjects was further delayed. After formal authorisation at 
a higher level, there was limited access that was meaningful in terms of the research 
objectives which related to understanding YLOs perspectives and decision-making in 
respect to diversionary decisions. This limit was the lack of interest at a local level to 
participate in the research. As previously noted, only 5 of 40 YLO’s invited, agreed to 
participate. 
 
Fortunately, these hurdles were uncharacteristic of the organisations controlling access 
to the other two fields of research. Richards (2011c) notes that it has been commonly 
 
35 In November 2014, contact began with Educational Services within the NSW Police, which deals with all 
researcher enquiries and overseas research within the NSW Police. In February 2015, the researcher was advised 
that a Research Application needed to be submitted. This research application was submitted to NSW Police in 
March 2015. In late November 2015 official approval was issued by NSW Police to begin fieldwork. However, it 
was not until late February 2016 that a contact within the organisation in charge of distributing the invitation to 
participate to the YLOs would be provided. Finally, in April 2016 interviews were conducted with the YLOs. 
 
 
123 
argued that elites are hard to access, and it can be quite difficult to persuade them to 
become involved. Even if elites can be accessed, as busy officials who are in demanding 
positions, they may not be willing to give their time to be interviewed (Aberbach and 
Rockman, 2002; Beamer, 2002; Kezar, 2003). In this respect, in some instances, the 
experience in this research was different from that described above, while in some ways 
similar to the one experienced by Richards when conducting restorative justice research 
in 2004 (see Richards, 2011c). As did Richards, this researcher too found elite 
participants’ willingness to be interviewed far from challenging. The experiences when 
trying to gain access to the magistrates in the Children’s Court of NSW in the current 
study was that these elites were easy to access and eager to be interviewed. The 
magistrates consent reflected a major display of professional self-confidence, power 
and autonomy. 
 
In 2014, informal contact with the President of the Children’s Court was made. At the 
time, the intention was to become familiar with a possible research site, but most 
importantly, to explore what would be involved in gaining access to magistrates of the 
Children’s Court. This initial contact was a smooth experience and informed significant 
decisions on the research design and process that was to follow. For example, the 
President of the Children’s Court indicated his enthusiasm for the study and his 
willingness to support access to the 15 Children’s Court magistrates in NSW. The 
President also offered a letter of endorsement to support the NEAF ethics application 
with the university. From this initial contact, an ongoing relationship including three 
meetings with the President of the Children’s Court as well as an ongoing relationship 
with his administrative staff by phone and/or email facilitated this part of the research 
beyond the researcher’s expectations. Overall, the topic of the study appeared to be well 
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received by the Children’s Court and the interest of the magistrates. Thus, in addition 
to the interview with the President of the Children’s Court, ten specialist magistrates 
agreed to participate, out of 13 approached. 
 
Issues of temporal pressures, even when access to an elite participant had been obtained 
is another commonly accepted claim in the literature on interviewing elites given that 
their typical high-status and highly demanded roles can make it difficult to set time 
aside (Richards, 2011c). Particular strategies can minimise potential problems in this 
area (see Odendahl and Shaw, 2001). In this research, the busy schedules of criminal 
justice elites meant that the researcher had to be flexible and accommodating of hold 
ups, last minute cancellations and extended travel. In addition to this, important 
consideration was also given to the choice of interview length and format when 
interviewing elites.  
 
The interviews were ‘semi-structured’ or ‘guided’, following a flexible series of 
questions based on a pre-designed interview schedule36, which permitted deviation 
from the questions. This format has been noted highly suitable for this type of 
participant (see Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Hertz and Imber, 1995; Stephens, 
2007). As Aberbach and Rockman note, elites prefer to express their views without 
‘being put in the straitjacket of closed-ended questions’ (2002, p.674). Consequently, 
‘elites respond well to inquiries about broad areas of content and to a high proportion 
of intelligent, provocative, open-ended questions that allow them freedom to use their 
knowledge and imagination’ (Marshall and Rossman, 1999, p. 114).  The flexible 
format of semi-structured interviews also allowed for adherence to the varying 
 
36 See Appendix 5 for pre-designed schedules for each of the three fields.  
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constraints and need of participants concerning interview length. Interviews ranged in 
length from 30 minutes to one hour and a half with the average duration at one hour.  
 
The intent was to conduct the majority of the interviews face-to-face. However, options 
for video and/or phone interviewing were available for those expressing a preference 
for either of these methods. The literature suggests that participants tend to provide less 
detailed responses in a telephone interview than in a face-to-face interview (Sturges 
and Hanrahan, 2004). Nevertheless, some data from elite participants was better than 
none. One magistrate, one YLO and one Assistant Manager in JJ NSW expressed their 
desire to only be interviewed by phone due to mobility issues. 
 
Although the above procedures might have minimised time issues and facilitated access 
to participants, the research needs to be at a certain place for these measures to be of 
any significance. For example, in the case of trying to access Local Court magistrates, 
a flexible option regarding the choice of phone, video or face-to-face, bore no 
significance concerning the unwilling participants.  
 
As noted in chapter one, youth criminal matters in NSW are heard by both specialist 
Children’s Court magistrates and Local Court magistrates. The former handle 60% of 
such cases and the later handle 40% of the cases, generally in regional and remote 
locations. Access to the Local Court’s magistrates needs to be approved by the Chief 
Magistrate of the NSW Local Court. Initial contact was made with NSW Local Court, 
which resulted in a meeting with The Chief Magistrate who appeared supportive, but, 
displayed much less enthusiasm about this research than the President of the Children’s 
Court. The lack of involvement in the way of participants within the Local Court 
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jurisdiction further illustrates the lack of enthusiasm from this court. With the intention 
to match the number of local court magistrates’ interviews to that of specialist 
magistrates that decided to participate in the research, 12 local court magistrates were 
invited to participate. This resulted in two respondents only, and consequently, two 
interviews. This is perhaps a reflection that Children’s matters are not the main focus 
of the Local Court, an issue that will be further discussed in chapter five of this thesis. 
 
Some ethical considerations 
In this research, the fact that the Children’s Court in NSW as previously noted is not 
open to the public dictates that permission needed to be negotiated with the appropriate 
authorities within the Court. To facilitate the ethics application approval process, a 
letter of endorsement of research by the President of the Children’s Court was included 
in the application. 
 
Experiences regarding confidentiality in the area of elite interviewing are mixed. 
Odendahl and Shaw (2001) note that a widely accepted claim about elites is that due to 
their high-profile positions, maintaining confidentiality is important to elite 
participants. Contrary to this, Richards notes that her experience interviewing the elites 
‘suggest that not all elites are concerned about confidentiality’ and often gave their 
‘qualified consent to be identified’ (2011c, p. 73). In this research, the maintenance of 
confidentiality was noted in the introduction letter, information sheet, and consent form 
provided to participants on their email invitation; and was again re-stated at the 
beginning of each interview. Nevertheless, certain participants sought continuous 
reassurance during the interview that the information provided could not be linked to 
them personally. This concern was exclusive to the Juvenile Justice Assistant Managers 
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and Aboriginal legal solicitors, indicating that the issue was not research design related. 
Nevertheless, issues of this nature emphasise how researchers must consider ‘the 
balance of reporting of findings against ethical considerations for participants’ 
(Richards, 2011c, p.74).  
 
The integrity of this research was once again tested through the formal application 
processes previously noted in gaining access to NSW Police Force. The issue of 
privacy, confidentiality and anonymity paramount to ethics approvals has been 
discussed in the context of qualitative data collection above; but just as paramount the 
process of data interpretation presents ethical issues particularly for the qualitative 
researcher. As Richards notes, although ‘interviews consist of participants’ own words, 
they are constructed and constrained by the parameters of interviewers’ research’ 
(2011c, p. 73). This highlights the imperative to justify the process of data analysis. 
 
Data analysis 
As previously established in this chapter, this study adopts a multi-method approach, 
including quantitative and qualitative methods. For the quantitative component, 
correlation across time was applied to statistics collected from BOCSAR, to examine 
patterns of diversion across time from June 1998 to July 2017. The qualitative 
information was subjected to analysis by critical grounded theory and qualitative 
content analysis. 
 
Constructivist grounded theory 
A key approach to qualitative field research pioneered by Glaser and Strauss (1967) as 
a method of constant comparative analysis, grounded theory reshapes the interactive 
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relationship between participants and researchers, provokes a need to reflect upon 
underlying assumptions, and highlights the researcher’s awareness to listen to 
participants as openly as possible (Mills, Bonner and Francis, 2006). Constructivist 
grounded theory ‘applies the strategies of traditional grounded theory within a 
constructivist paradigm thus rejecting notions of emergence and objectivity’ (Mills, 
Bonner and Francis, 2006, p. 31). Constructivist grounded theory was considered 
appropriate for this research allowing it to be open to multiple versions of reality, 
multiple readings of data. Within this research, the term ‘construct’ in the coding 
analysis is used to emphasise that knowledge is constructed from the data because of 
active processes of interpretation and comparison (Mills, Bonner and Francis, 2006). 
Constructivist grounded theory’s methods of generating discursive themes through 
analytic tools not only encouraged multiple readings of the data. It also enabled the 
differences and diversity in meaning across contexts to emerge and strengthen the 
analysis. Thus, constructivist grounded theory’s technique of analysis was highly 
suitable for examining the often contentious, political phenomenon of youth diversion 
in the criminal justice system.  
 
Constructivist grounded theory was used to analytically identify codes, categories, 
themes and discourses within the data.  These were constructed through four iterative 
coding stages: initial, focused, axial and theoretical coding. The initial coding stage 
dealt with the raw data from: official source materials and interviews. The data was 
examined line-by-line to label and conceptualised patterns of action and meaning (see 
Charmaz, 2005, 2006). The focus in this initial stage is merely on labelling, rather than 
imposing theoretical interpretations (Charmaz, 2006). As an iterative analysis, the 
researcher must check constructed codes against each other and the rest of the raw data 
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(Charmaz, 2006). Importantly, all coding stages in a constructivist grounded theory 
approach, are open-ended. That is, they allow the ‘researcher to reflect deeply on the 
contents and nuances of your data and begin taking ownership of them’ (Saldaña, 2009, 
p.81). Following Charmaz (2006) advice to constructivist grounded theorists, 
‘sensitising concepts’ (p. 17) reflecting the research question were considered through 
the initial coding stage. However, the researcher did not allow for those to close off the 
research from other potential insights.  
 
The second coding stage, the focusing coding, is a more analytical and theoretical 
approach ‘because it requires the analyst to reflexivity interact with data and the active 
codes’ (Johnson, 2001, p. 126). The initial codes were categorised according to the 
meaning of the codes and data, and the relationship to each other and to the data in 
general. This resulted in more meaningful and sophisticated categories. Concurrently, 
the frequency of particular codes, contradictions and silences of codes were also noted 
as worthy for consideration. 
 
Axial coding, the third stage, took the research from categories to themes. A critical 
examination of the codes, categories and data was conducted, and similarities regarding 
discursive features of each were identified (see Hall, 2001) as ‘central axes’ (see 
Johnson, 2001, p. 127; Saldaña, 2009, p. 151). This stage of the data analysis was where 
the relationships between categories and concepts were made explicit and integrated 
into a theoretical framework (Charmaz and Michell, 2001, pp. 1-3) that indicated the 
processes and practices that governed the research participants’ decision-making 
process on youth diversion. 
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The final coding stage, theoretical coding, overlapped with the qualitative content 
analysis. Those categories sharing similar conditions and consequences were collapsed 
into themes, in other words, the analysis progressed ‘toward discovering then central-
core category that identifies the primary theme of research’ (Saldaña, 2009, p. 151). At 
this point, the analysis can also progress towards theoretical saturation, whereby ‘the 
data are sufficient to make an interesting argument’ (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p. 74). 
For this research, theoretical saturation was considered to have been reached when the 
coding and theory constructed from the data could not produce new codes or data 
regardless of further iterative consideration. The relationships that existed within 
themes and between and across narratives were fundamental to complete the next 
methodological stage that of qualitative content analysis.  
 
Qualitative content analysis 
The focus of qualitative content analysis is on the characteristics of language and 
communication, with particular attention on the content or contextual meaning of text 
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Content analysis was originally used to refer to methods 
that focused directly on quantifiable aspects of text (Titscherm, Meyer, Wodak and 
Vetter, 2000). However, as critics of classical content analysis argued, the quantitative 
orientation of content analysis neglected the particular quality of texts (Kracauer, 
1952), and it failed to recognise the latent contents and contexts of text components that 
do not appear in texts (Glaser and Laudel, 2013). Qualitative content analysis 
overcomes these limitations by moving beyond counting words to examine meanings, 
themes and patterns that may be hidden in a particular text (Zhang and Wildemut, 
2005). Thus, it deals with the relationship aspect and involves interpretation of the 
underlying meaning of text. 
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In this study, the qualitative content analysis employed an interpretive analysis, the 
emphasis of which was on meaning produced by text and the influences that shape 
diversionary decision-makers interpretations of their social worlds. Further, texts are 
not produced within a vacuum. Rather, they are products of a given cultural context and 
informed by values that guide social life (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2007), they offer a 
deeper understanding of the reality being studied. In this study, qualitative content 
analysis was used to investigate not just what the gatekeepers have to say, but, from 
where these primary definers might have been drawn. Thus, allowing the analysis to 
particularly focused on what shapes the ‘decision-making’ process and outcomes on 
diversion of youth in the criminal justice system. 
 
To apply qualitative content analysis, each set of interview data obtained were first 
reviewed sentence by sentence to determine their meaning. Data analysis started with 
reading all data repeatedly to achieve immersion and obtain a sense of the whole. The 
labels and codes that emerged were reflective of more than one key idea. These were 
sorted into categories based on how different codes were related. These emerging 
categories were used to organise the group codes into meaningful topics.  
 
Relationships between topics were analysed for their strength, direction and meaning 
to identify attitudes, values, motivations and positive or negative tones within the data. 
The data were then analysed by topics, and each interview was segmented by topic into 
major themes or categories. Meaningful themes were identified which related to 
decision-makers perceptions regarding the concepts, importance and process of youth 
diversion. Theme and code matching, condensation, and finalising were then 
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performed, which involved collating in-depth information and accommodating the 
diversity of experiences, attitudes and perceptions of each participant. Similar data 
analysis procedures were repeated for interviews across the three fields of study. The 
emerging themes between the three fields were then compared and contrasted. Lastly, 
a list of finalised themes and sub-themes was formed, and each was supported with 
sufficient verbatim data. This methodological approach enabled the exploration of 
diversionary decision-making and the identification of social/political, structural and 
institutionalised impediments to youth diversion in NSW.  
 
As indicated, in the initial stages of data analysis, constructivist grounded theory was 
applied to the official source materials and the interviews with participants as well as 
to the writing process. From the beginning and throughout the research process, the 
researcher identified codes, categories, and themes. The interview data were then 
subjected to a content analysis. Constructivist grounded theory and qualitative content 
analysis of the data was considered useful in meeting the objectives of this thesis. The 
advantage of combining the two methods was in allowing the thesis to move from a 
process of identification of categories to that of critically analysing the content. Figure 
1 shows the data analysis procedure, as described in this section. 
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Figure 1: Diagram of Methodological Analysis Process 
 
  
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has presented the sources and methodologies deployed in this research. 
The study, in the tradition of critical criminology, aims to integrate theoretical 
knowledge from a diversity of theoretical fields to first, explore the gatekeepers’ 
attitudes and understandings of diversion; second, to identify the political and policy 
constraints and opportunities surrounding the pursuit forms of youth diversion in NSW; 
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and finally to gather information and suggestions on the reforms on the current juvenile 
justice system that are necessary to maximize diversion under the YOA.  
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CHAPTER FOUR - INTERVIEWS WITH POLICE  
 
Introduction 
The chapter focuses on the role of NSW Police Force in the decision- making process 
regarding the diversion of young people under the YOA. It examines the findings of one 
telephone and five face-to-face interviews with, five YLOs and one youth policy officer 
of the NSW Police Force. 
 
Interviews were conducted between February 2016 and April 2016. The interview 
questions37 were designed to enable respondents to express their views on a broad range 
of issues relating to diversion under the YOA. The questions fell into three broad 
categories. In the first set of questions, police YLOs were asked about their 
understanding of the general role of the YLO, their own interest/attraction to the role, 
and the differences they perceived between their role and that of “general duties” 
officers. The second set of questions focused on the process of diversion to cautions 
and YJC, including key decision-making points, factors affecting the decision-making 
process, and their perspectives on the weakness and strengths of the process of 
diversion. Lastly, the YLOs were asked a set of questions on their experiences working 
with other organisations involved in youth liaison, and for any recommendations that 
they thought might improve the process of diversion. 
 
As previously noted, interviewees included one youth policy officer and five YLO’s. 
The youth policy officer position in NSW Police Force, whose role is related to youth 
 
37 Refer to Appendix 5 for the YLO of NSW Police Force interview schedule. 
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strategy, can be a civilian position. The person in this role can have a direct bearing on 
policing in this area. Thus, it has been included in this chapter, with the five YLOs. Due 
to the small sample, it is not possible to make generalisations about the entire YLO 
workforce based on their responses. Nevertheless, the aim of this research is not to 
make generalisations, but rather to look at some attitudes to youth diversion from those 
who are experts in the area, which broadly coalesce with or depart from broader views 
in policing and other parts of the criminal justice system and/or political sphere. The 
accounts within those interviews generated common themes and hence, some important 
findings about a range of complex issues in regard to diversion.    
 
Occupational and demographic profile of participants  
Participants in this group consisted of one man and five women, between 36 to 50 years 
of age.38 They had worked in the NSW Police Force for a period of time. This ranged 
from 9 to 17 years. They had worked in their current position for a period of time, 
ranging between 2 to 15 years. The youth policy officer was based at Central 
Metropolitan Region, two YLOs were from the South West Metropolitan Region, one 
from the Central Metropolitan Region, one from the North West Metropolitan Region 
and one from the Northern Region.39 Table 2 provides a summary of these participants’ 
demographics. 
 
 
 
 
38 Two of these participants chose not to disclose their age. 
39 At the beginning of each interview, respondents were required to sign an informed consent form and it was 
reiterated, during the interview, that they would not be individually identified in the final write up. Although it would 
have been desirable to document the LAC of each participant, because the number of YLOs participating was very 
low (five participated out of a total of 80 YLOs in NSW Police Force) and there is only one YLO per LAC, it was 
decided that Regions rather than LAC would be noted to avoid potential identification. 
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Table 2: Demographics of NSW Police Force participants 
 
Participant YLO1 YLO2 YLO3 YLO4 YLO5 YPO** 
Gender F F F F M F 
Age 50 36 42 43 * * 
Time with 
NSW Police 
Force 
10 years 17 years 17 years 9 years 9 years 10 years 
Time in 
Current Role 
8 years 5 years 15 years 4 years 6 years 2 years 
Region South West 
Metropolitan 
South West 
Metropolitan 
Central 
Metropolitan 
North West 
Metropolitan 
Northern Central 
Metropolitan 
* Undisclosed 
**Youth Policy Officer (civilian role within NSW Police Force) 
 
Findings  
The data gained from interviews with NSW Police Force participants is divided into 
key themes that relate to issues of diversion, including their understandings of the YLO 
role, their role as gatekeepers to diversion, key decision-making points that guide 
decisions related to diversion under the YOA. 
 
Understanding of and attraction to the YLO role 
This section illustrates the participants’ interest in their role, their perceptions regarding 
the differences between YLOs and general duties officers, and their understandings of 
their role as YLO in relation to the YOA. In explaining their interest and trajectory into 
their current role, YLO responses indicate mixed personal reasoning for choosing this 
role. While for some, the attraction to the role derives from wanting to help children 
and, perhaps an idealism around intervention to prevent children from entering criminal 
pathways, others had made their decision for the job position due to practical reasons. 
For example, some cited the flexibility of working hours. YLO appointments are 
usually a 9 to 5, Monday to Friday shift, in contrast to the nature of shift work of general 
duties officers. 
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A history of working with young people prior to joining the NSW Police Force and/or 
an overall desire to help children was raised by two YLO’s. For example, YLO4, who 
had a previous career in Early Childhood Education remarked, 
I'm interested in the youth side of things in and what we do and the Young 
Offenders Act and how to divert them and what we do with them and 
programs that we use to work with them. 
 
Similarly, YLO3, who holds a university degree in primary teaching and had worked 
as a youth group leader and a sports coach to young children, explained that her 
background along with the display of a passion for helping children was significant in 
having landed the role. According to this YLO, early training education in the NSW 
Police Force academy included very limited coverage of youth justice conferencing as 
an alternative for young people. However, it was this information along with her desire 
for helping children that led to her current role. YLO3 particularly idealised the 
possibilities for intervention to lead children away from the pathways of criminal lives, 
I wanted to do something where I could do something preventative and 
helpful to the community to try and help people, stop people from getting in 
trouble before they got to the point of getting in trouble. 
 
This respondent’s remark alludes to the preventative promises made by the YOA 
legislation. Yet, it also illustrates this YLO’s desire for diversification away from the 
traditional ‘law enforcer’ police work and acknowledgment of the need to line up with 
preventative intentions. Such intentions clearly deviate from the traditional and 
pervasive understanding of police work as oriented towards catching the ‘wrongdoer’ 
and collecting evidence for the formal justice process towards more preventative work. 
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While the desire to help children is common to the majority of the YLOs interviewed, 
the origins of this motivation are varied. The majority of YLOs tend to state that this 
devotion was always there and further shaped by educational orientation and previous 
career choices.  In one particular case, this dedication was connected to religious 
beliefs, 
I used to … work in a before-and-after school childcare centre as a 
coordinator of a 7 to 5 play centre for about five or six years. Also, I was a 
youth worker at Castle Hill for a number of years, probably two years I 
worked with at-risk kids running activities like camps and surf camps and 
snow camps and camps with at-risk kids. As well as … I also ran, I was a 
manager of an indoor climbing centre where we used to do a lot of children’s 
activities and parties and school … school sports and all that sort of thing… 
I’ve also been a youth pastor with my wife for a couple of years and also 
been on youth teams in local churches down in Sydney; in youth groups and 
that sort of thing (YLO5). 
 
This particular YLO expresses the drive and desire to assist children in making better 
decisions ‘or getting them back on track in direction in their life’ (YLO5). This 
statement clearly aligns more with traditional pastoral roles than traditional policing 
practices. As noted in chapter one, one of the core characteristics of police culture is 
the crave for work that is crime oriented and promises excitement (Reiner, 2010) with 
an overall emphasises in detecting crime. As opposed to the philosophy under the YOA, 
which places less focus on detecting crime and more in repairing harm, and clearly, it 
is this later philosophy that the statement by YLO5 aligns best with.   
 
For other YLOs that did not have a previous career outside the NSW Police Force, the 
common narrative with those presented above was that their interest in their current 
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role was also defined by passion or love for working with children. For example, when 
asked about their initial interest in their current role, YLO2 commented, 
 
I assisted as the backup Youth Liaison Officer some years ago, so back in … 
2001, and loved it. So, I enjoy working with young people, they’re 
challenging but they're also, it’s very rewarding for me as well as for them. I 
still run into young people I worked with ten years ago who have children 
now. But … I don’t know, while I still enjoy it, I’m still going to do it. And 
I don’t know, just ... love it. 
 
For some, the attraction to the role derived from personal interests in regard to the 
working hours. For example, YLO1 explained that the YLO position offers more set 
shifts than available in general duties, and that as a single parent of a child that required 
hospitalization on regular basis this was an attractive prospect. 
 
As previously noted, the limited number of YLO’s that agreed to participate in this 
research places limitations on making generalisations of the above accounts. However, 
it is clear that a passion for working with children and/or a focus on prevention rather 
than punitive justice is a driver noted by most YLOs interviewed. 
 
On defining the YLO role and their role as gatekeepers to diversion 
The position of the YLO was created and implemented by 1998 as a response to the 
YOA. The position was designed to assume responsibility for the implementation of the 
Act, provide training (to general duties police officers), monitor the use of diversion, 
act as Specialist Youth Officers (“SYO”), as well as promote the provisions of the Act 
within their LAC. Eighty YLO positions were created in total, with one per LAC (see 
NSW Attorney General’s Department, 2002).  
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On describing their roles, YLOs at times referred to Specialist Youth Officer’s 
(“SYO”)40 and general duties/arresting police officers, by way of comparison. The 
interviews in this study indicate, that in practice, SYO act as YLOs when a YLO is not 
on duty. Most of the YLOs described their role in terms of the range of activities they 
need to engage with that align with the official description in the NSW Police Force 
website 41 . Overall YLOs outlined the following aspects to be part of their role: 
engagement with primary-school aged students by the way of delivering presentations 
at their schools; delivery of cautions; referrals and attendance at YJCs; liaising with 
young people in custody; training other police officers on the YOA; and, as YLO2 noted, 
‘doing anything from a primary age talk to maybe a behavioural school talk to a youth 
refuge presentation, to youth workers, to parents…also run programs in the 
community’. It was clearly noted throughout the interviews that the YLO role deviates 
from the most traditional view of police as officers of crime control. 
 
A misunderstanding or devaluing of the work done by YLOs by general duties/arresting 
police officers was an issue raised by some. For example, YLO1 remarked, 
So, I suppose general duties wouldn't have the faintest idea of the background 
work that the Crime Management unit does; so as … for my role, they’d have 
no idea how much interaction I would have with families, how much 
telephone work I do or what I go out and actually do, what my job is all about. 
So, I deal with their schools [attended by young people], I deal with the 
agencies who the young person might be working with. So, I have the idea 
of what’s happening in the background in that child’s life. General duties 
 
40 As a response to the legislation the NSW Police Force, also created SYO positions. SYO were to have a crucial 
role under the Act, as they were to be trained to ‘apply the criteria of the Act to matters before them and have the 
delegated authority of the Commissioner of Police to refer matters for youth justice conferencing or to court’ (NSW 
Attorney General’s Department 2002, p. 13). 
41 On describing the role of the YLO, NSW Police Force note in their official web-page, 
‘Youth Liaison Officers are the administrators of the Young Offenders Act for NSW Police. As part of their duties, 
they are responsible for delivering cautions and referring children and young people to youth justice conferences. 
The Youth Liaison Officer role also involves implementing strategies to reduce juvenile crime including: crime 
prevention and safety talks at schools, juvenile crime reduction programs; and networking with other agencies. They 
are the primary point of contact between NSW Police and Juvenile Justice’ (NSW Police Force, 2016).  
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don't have that; they have one vision, ‘this child is committing crime’ and 
they’re judged under that banner. Whereas my role, I come from the softer 
side trying to put things in place to help this young person make better 
decisions. 
 
The above quote reflects YLOs’ perception that general duties police are not 
sympathetic to the YLO role as “real” work (for the construction of community police 
as ‘not real police work’ see Garcia, 2006).  Further, it illustrates a common reflection 
amongst YLOs, in that they find general duties policing generates a more negative view 
of young people as offenders.  
 
The negative view that many police have of the YLO role, and more specifically on the 
existence of the YOA, is further noted by YLO4, 
 
I can’t just make a blanket statement and say, “Every general duties police 
officer thinks that the Young Offenders Act is a … heap of poo”. But there 
are still pockets of that… in New South Wales Police and it’s … I think 
sometimes … sort of talked down from the more senior, some of the more 
senior people that are very old-school about how they used to deal with 
juveniles back in the day. I hear a lot of: “Well, back in the day when I was 
dealing with them, we would do this, this and this … and then the Young 
Offenders Act came in.” So, some of those attitudes and information I think 
still gets passed down, down to junior ranking police as well…There is still 
a bit of resistance to change in the way we think about diversion and 
restorative justice because I believe that, that can absolutely happen and be 
beneficial. I just don't think that we’re quite there with innovative thinking 
with regards to how we’re managing juvenile offenders. 
 
The above quote illustrates that there is a general problem with some senior figures 
accepting change. This is displayed through negative attitudes towards restorative 
justice and diversion in managing juveniles, particularly when they are not first-time 
 
 
143 
offenders. This is consistent with research that, as discussed in chapter one, shows that 
rank is an important predictor for punitive attitudes among police. Whereby, higher 
rank police officers have been noted to have more punitive approaches (Shafiq et al., 
2016). 
 
The final comments on continuous resistance to change accentuate the YLOs belief that 
the dynamic of police culture has not changed enough to embrace the intentions of the 
YOA fully. This is clearly shown in the concluding remark, ‘I just don’t think that we’re 
quite there with innovative thinking in regard to how we’re managing juvenile 
offenders’ (YLO4). At the same time, this quote reflects the YLOs’ need and process 
of reassuring themselves in regard to the significance of their role. From this viewpoint, 
the YLOs interviewed attribute the general belief amongst general duties officers and/or 
senior officers that YLO as not ‘real police work’ to a stagnant system failing to 
embrace innovation and alternative justice procedures. 
 
Although one YLO interviewed felt that those sentiments of resistance were more 
aligned with the past, there was an overall agreement that such resistance to embrace 
restorative responses as a part of police work continues to be present currently. 
According to the YLOs interviewed, this is partly due to an unwillingness to see 
alternatives to arresting, ‘charging’. Also, it is due to law enforcement with an emphasis 
on force, as ‘real’ police work, and lastly a lack of understanding of the value of the 
YOA by general duties. YLOs describe themselves as key in re-enforcing such values: 
 The Young Offenders Act has been around for a long time now and I think 
with having the role as a Youth Liaison Officer really helps the command 
and the young people in the community because we’re educating officers in 
here to say, “Hey, there is a better way” … I guess, giving young people a 
chance that, yes, they do make mistakes, but we can obviously assist them – 
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still deal with the incident and the issues around the incident – but they’re 
not going to end with charges and that sort of stuff (YLO5).  
 
The emphasis on the YLO’s role in helping the ‘command and young people in the 
community’ (YLO5) through the education of officers acknowledged above, illustrates 
that, from the YLO’s viewpoint, when it comes to dealing with young offenders by the 
way of diversion away from court, the system has not yet reached a desirable point. A 
broader cultural shift in police/political law and order conservative/punitive approach 
is required to embrace diversionary alternatives fully. 
 
The one issue that YLOs seem to agree and be clear about is that general duties officers 
are not necessarily well equipped to communicate with young people, or if they do, 
they lack the opportunity to take advantage of this, partly due to time constraints 
resulting from the numerous demands of a general duties role. For example, YLO2 
remarked, 
admittedly, my communication skills might be very different to some other 
police when it comes to young people but in saying that, they also deal with 
lots of other incidents and adults and everything from car accidents to 
domestics to robberies to … my advantage is I have time. So, if it takes time 
for me to speak to a person I'm not bound because I have to go to the next 
job and … I’ve got the advantage of following-up and taking the time to make 
referrals. So, I think it's just the role itself enables you a little bit more 
flexibility to engage more so than police that are on the … like responding to 
incidents where they are bound by having to go to the next job. 
 
Equally, emphasising this issue YLO5 noted, 
in general duties you’re, I suppose...: “You’re sort of a slave to the radio 
because whatever jobs come over you have to go out and just do those jobs.” 
And sometimes you could have … ten or so jobs outstanding and you don’t 
actually get the time in general duties to actually, maybe make any impact 
[on] people’s lives.  
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The accounts provided by the YLOs interviewed suggest several factors constraining 
decision making under the YOA. These include, firstly, cultural factors whereby 
restorative justice alternatives, particularly YJC referrals are not seen as ‘real police 
work’ and thus not worth focusing on. Secondly, structural constraints, faced with 
competing demands over their time YLOs are not able to review all handling of young 
offenders, as intended by the legislation, thus affecting decision-making outcomes at 
times.  
 
As per legislation, when it comes to cautions and YJC, these referrals ought to be 
overseen by the YLO. Thus, decisions by general duties/arresting officers in this 
context will sometimes be made with the consultation of the YLO or SYO. However, 
in those instances when decisions are made to ‘charge’ a young person rather than 
‘divert’, although the charges will need to be approved, as noted by YLO2, the YLO is 
in a position to make recommendations, but ‘it is up to the officers [general duties] but 
it has to fit the criteria and I [the YLO] have to provide guidance’. 
Or as YLO1 stated,  
If I want to go above their head [general duties] then I need to go to a Crime 
Manager or the Commanders but at the end of the day, it’s the officer that 
makes the final decision…I can only make recommendations. At the end of 
the day, any police officer making a decision –whether they’re charging or 
bringing a young person through the YOA, it’s their decision because they are 
the one that has to go to court, they are the one that gives evidence, there’s 
no sitting back there and saying –“Oh my boss told me that I had to do this”. 
There is none of that; you have to take responsibility, so it’s their decision.  
 
YLO1’s remark emphasises the bureaucratic imperatives of the institution in which 
individual officers are held responsible for outcomes. Further, it highlights that YLOs 
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have very weak occupational authority. This raises questions regarding the YLOs’ 
power in relation to decision making. The main issue is whether it is enough to be able 
to provide advice and guidance while being powerless in making the final decisions. 
This issue will resurface several times throughout the interviews. YLOs, after all, are 
the most trained officers when it comes to the YOA; this is the reason they are the 
consulted for guidance by police making decisions in such a context. However, 
institutional constraints limit the engagement between YLOs and general duties, thus 
having negative effects on diversionary decision-making.  
 
Guidance given by YLOs to the general duties officers varies across LACs, as it is 
dependent on accessibility, level of engagement and communication between YLOs 
and those receiving it. As will be illustrated, these matters were further discussed in the 
interviews while focusing on the next point of analysis, the diversion process itself.  
 
The gatekeeping role to diversion: a closer look at the process  
This section provides a further understanding from the viewpoint of those interviewed 
on the bureaucratic process of diversion and the individuals and organisations that play 
a role; the key decision-making points for a YLO within the process; the factors 
affecting YLO decision making; and lastly the strength and weaknesses of the process 
as described by the YLO.  
 
Regarding their gatekeeping role to diversion, YLOs explained that young people 
between the ages of 10 and 17 to which the YOA applies, having come to the attention 
of the police, do not always come back to be dealt with at the station, where the YLO 
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is based and able to assist directly.  Sometimes, the police officer might decide that it 
is in the young person’s interest to be dealt with in the field. However,  
If …the officer makes the decision to deal with it [under the YOA]; they 
should consult a specialist youth officer, which is not always a YLO. So, we 
have other officers that are trained to give that advice, but every incident is 
sent to me to review, to look at. And if I'm happy then they're happy. If I 
think that they're missing something or potentially it's an offence that can't 
be dealt with under the Young Offenders Act, then I'll send it back to the 
officer and they will need to make other arrangements. So literally I don't … 
I don’t [make the decision]. It’s up to the officer [general duties] but it has to 
fit the criteria [of the legislation] and I provide guidance (YLO2). 
 
The above quote illustrates two points. Firstly, that there are sharply different views 
between officers when it comes to diversion. Secondly, that when it comes to diversion 
under the YOA, the YLO has more of an advisory role, rather than an active decision 
making role. Thus, at least during that first point of contact where the young person is 
being considered for ‘diversion’ or ‘charge’, YLOs have limited say. The practices 
described here, bring into question that the most intense training on the Act is received 
mainly by YLOs. If the final decision is with the investigative officer, it will make more 
sense to train/educate all investigative officers on the purposes/intentions of the Act. 
 
In regard to issues of power and who has it, interviewees were keen to vocalise some 
distinctions between their role and that of the SYOs. According to legislation, and as 
previously noted, the role of the YLO is defined to include: the implementation of the 
Act, provision of training, monitoring the use of diversion, acting as a SYO, as well as 
promoting the provisions of the Act. In contrast, SYOs are trained to ‘apply the criteria 
of the Act to matters before them and have the delegated authority of the Commissioner 
of Police to refer matters for youth justice conferencing or to court’ (NSW Attorney 
General Department 2002, p. 13).  
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Referring to SYOs, YLO3 explained, 
So, they’re not the same as YLO’s but they’re able to make determinations 
on what happens to young people, so they can verify if someone’s, a young 
person’s getting charged they give advice to other police. So, the aim is to 
have them around when we’re not on duty, so that other police can seek their 
advice, if we’re not around [for] the advice. 
 
The common account in regard to SYOs was that they are a significant point of contact 
for general duties seeking advice and they have the potential to affect the process of 
diversion, especially on weekends, as YLOs are only on duty Monday to Friday. SYOs 
officially have the power to override general duties police officers’ diversionary 
decisions, particularly in cases that do not meet the criteria for diversion. However, for 
the most part, they act as advisors rather than decision makers. Further, certain concerns 
were raised in regard to the training provided to SYOs. For example, YLO4 remarked,  
I feel like it's really hit-and-miss with SYO’s… And I've shared my thoughts 
on that; I don't think that you should become an SYO just merely to tick a 
box that, yes, “We need SYO, you right to do it? You go and do the training 
and just get put on.” I think that you should have a genuine interest in the 
Young Offenders Act and its place within New South Wales Police and the 
benefits of it. Some kind of knowledge around restorative justice and its 
principles; not just a box that’s ticked that, “Yes I’ve got that qualification 
now.” I've seen some really good SYOs and I’ve seen some really poor 
SYOs. 
 
When asked to elaborate on what defines a ‘really poor SYO’, YLO4 added, 
 
once you’ve become an SYO that’s it, you don't have any refresher training; 
you don't get anything else. That’s it, you’re just an SYO for … until the 
dawn, end of time. So, there's no, there is no keeping … they’re not in the 
same loop as the YLOs, so they’re not on the YLO – what we call a muddle 
– so an email muddle which is all of our communication amongst YLOs 
across the state. The SYOs aren’t a part of that so they're not getting that fresh 
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information… which means you’re not going to probably do the best when it 
comes to … outcomes for juveniles. 
 
When asked to explain what the SYO role is, YLO4 added: 
 
To be, I guess, the YLO when we’re not here…sort of like a back-up YLO 
when the YLO can’t be here. Because as I said, when I'm here I'll get a 
majority of them unless an SYO feels confident enough to … And what I 
find, a lot of SYO’s are not, because of that lack of … updated knowledge 
they’re not overly confident and will ring me and say, “Am I on the right 
track with this?” And I’ll go, “Yeah” or “No” or whatever…So, it’s because 
it's a one-off, it’s just a one-off thing if you just go and have that … you know 
three-day training you may never touch, there may be … SYO’s out there 
that haven’t even yet utilised those skills. So, they haven’t even, haven’t 
verified a charge, haven’t quality reviewed a juvenile incident. So, they're 
still very green in their knowledge base and how to, how to do one. So … 
that can sometimes occur as well. 
 
As these comments highlight, all interviewees emphasise the need to have ‘really good’ 
SYOs able to fill in for the YLO.  
 
What arose from the interviews was that there also appears to be fragmentation of the 
prescribed responsibility and authority of YLOs and SYOs. As previously noted, the 
YLO’s position was created as a response to the YOA. Accordingly, YLOs as 
administrators for the NSW Police of the Act are responsible for delivering cautions 
and referring young people to YJC. In contrast, SYOs were appointed under the YOA 
to make determinations about whether a YJC should be held, a caution administered or 
proceedings to court commence (YOA, 1997, s38). However, in practice as reflected on 
the accounts of those interviewed, the SYOs appear to take more of a backup role when 
it comes to determinations. Further, it appears that for the most part, the general duties 
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carry much of the authority and/or responsibility regarding diversionary decision-
making. 
 
Thus, whether with SYOs or YLOs, the necessity to have conversations with general 
duties was discussed as paramount for obtaining desirable outcomes. For example, 
YLO4 remarked,  
I’m here in the office and I’m here basically Monday to Friday and obviously 
being juveniles, a lot of the activity will probably be centered around the 
weekend. So, a juvenile might get picked up on the Friday night, I'm not 
seeing that until I'm back at work on Monday. And if I'm not around there is 
no conversation [with general duties/arresting officer] really that can be had; 
no advocacy of diversion, when it can be, when the juvenile can be diverted. 
So, in their minds they [arresting officers] are wanting to charge…So, come 
Monday morning that kid’s been charged and they’ve got a court date; 
whereas, if there had have been conversation with me and that's 
happened…I’m obviously coming from the advocacy of the Young 
Offenders Act, that’s my role…So, because that conversation doesn't happen 
then - and maybe there’s no other advocates for it around to have that 
conversation during that period of time, then diversion doesn't happen... a lot 
of the time the reason that I'm still seeing … that they’re not being diverted 
is because they’re not making admissions, so they’re not wanting to be 
interviewed, they’re not wanting to talk, they’re not making those admissions 
which we'll be all, we know that we need to have those. But in saying that, I 
don't know whether there’s … a lot of work that goes on with regards to the 
way we communicate with these kids about how we address not getting those 
admissions. Because sometimes it can be a conversation with the juvenile, 
their support person and we can change the outcome of how that matter is 
dealt with. 
 
Emphasising the significance of these conversations as a way of educating the general 
duties, YLO1 stated, 
Look it takes a while, especially you need to take the time to explain to 
general duties, a lot of them don't know what a conference is about. They 
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don’t get trained... I'm lucky enough to know in depth what a conference is 
about, how the process works. It's less work for them. So, when I can sit down 
and explain things to them, they get to understand that a conference is 
actually a better outcome than a charge. 
 
The above remarks indicate the existence of a power conflict and disparity of 
knowledge between two different groups within the NSW Police Force. Adding to this, 
while all police officers are seen as doing the same job, the roles of YLOs for example, 
are defined by welfare paradigms while crime control/law enforcement and justice 
paradigms define other police work.  
 
The significant role of the YLO as advisers to general duties when making diversionary 
decisions was clearly articulated by YLO4 when she remarked, 
… we are so well informed and should have a very high knowledge base in 
the field, then we should be looking for those opportunities for diversion. If 
they haven't been utilised properly. So, with that … quality review that we 
do - and I quality review every event, - if I see something in there that I don't 
think is right or we should [divert], then I am straight onto the Constable 
going, “Did you think of this? Did we look into this? What have you done in 
this space?” And there’s usually a conversation… and unfortunately there 
still are those…black holes where, like I said, because we don't have 24/7 
YLO coverage…there’s only one YLO generally in a command. … there's 
going to be gaps and it's those gaps where some of those kids could have 
been diverted and weren’t. 
 
The necessity to overcome resistance from those who prefer a legal response to crime 
is not surprising. For example, YLO3 described their LAC as very proactive when it 
comes to re-educating those that favour traditional justice methods, 
I do find, we do a lot of proactive stuff here, so we have a … Every 
probationer that comes through the station as a probationary police officer 
has to do a youth issues training day and that's actually very local, a local 
initiative; all the probationers have to attend the day. And it's just a day where 
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we just talk to them about youth issues, we talk to them about why young 
offenders offend, what the risk factors are, what the protective factors are, 
how they could work in better with them; we talk to them about the Young 
Offenders Act, just all that kind of stuff to try and give them a good start, a 
good base to go out there and work as a general duties officer. And sort of, I 
guess, try and get in there early with them so that they kind of get that and 
know how to work better with young people…So, we do a lot of that kind of 
stuff here at this LAC to try and work with the GD [general duties] staff to 
help them, you know…know how to do their job better. 
 
YLO2 told a similar story: 
So, I do training with the new police that come out and I talk about the Young 
Offenders Act; we look at warnings, cautions, conferences, Protected 
Admissions. I’ll do a PowerPoint, stand up, we do some interactive questions, 
we look at what offences are covered just to make sure that they’ve got an 
understanding of when the Young Offenders Act can be applied and how 
important it is that they apply it. And what’s required: So legal advice, 
support people – who they can be – when they can use it, when they don't use 
it.  And then also with training day; so, police from all ranks on our training 
days. In addition to assisting with police, training them to be Specialist Youth 
Officers; so, I assist with that as well. 
 
The above accounts were unique in that there was no mention of this sort of training in 
other regions where interviews were conducted. However, because there were only a 
very small number of participants, it is not possible to say whether such training days 
are regular in some LAC and not others. Indeed, the most common narrative put 
forward by those interviewed was the aforementioned lack of knowledge about the YOA 
amongst the general duties and other officers (even including those regions that have 
mentioned the existence of the training day) and a blatant resistance to the Act resulting 
from general officer’s disinterest. For example, YLO4 remarked, 
I've had stand-up arguments with Sergeants, with Inspectors, with junior 
police about kids that needed to be diverted and their mindset was, “No, they 
needed to be charged; they needed to go before the court.” ... Because that’s 
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what police do; yes, they do, because that’s what Police do; Police go out, 
catch the baddies and we put them before the court; that’s what we do. That’s 
as basic as what policing is; that’s our job. To catch the criminals and we put 
them before the courts for the courts to decide what will happen. 
 
While this is only the view of one YLO participant in this research, it is a view that 
reinforces findings from existing research and literature around police culture in 
Australia and other comparable national contexts. The general claim in such research 
is that regardless of the broad variations between roles in police work, it is the 
traditional role of law enforcement that is seen as the priority (see Manning, 1978; 
Cockcroft, 2013; Crosgrove, 2016).  
 
The idea of the police as the agents responsible for bringing wrong-doers to court 
(where justice will be served) does not only remain deeply embedded within the 
institution. It is also an idea of police work that prevails outside the institution, in the 
general community. For example, as YLO4 added,  
I absolutely think … even in the general community – victims, the victims 
that we’re dealing with – I've had … as an example; a victim ring me after a 
kid wrote an apology letter in a caution, I sent the letter to the victim, 
obviously without all the details just the [letter]… he was straight on the me 
and said, “I’ve just received this letter of apology in the mail from a caution,” 
I said, “Yes,” I said “Yes, he’s written that, the juvenile’s written that so 
you’re entitled to have that.” And he said, “So you’re telling me that he, this 
person did this, and they just came and saw you, got a slap on the wrist, wrote 
an apology letter and that’s done?” And I went, “Yes, that’s how that juvenile 
was diverted,” and he said, “Well, that’s not good enough … it might as well 
have just been nothing.”  So, I still think that there is … a mindset in the 
community too, that the court is the be-all and end-all as well. That there's 
nothing else that’s going to cure that kid unless they go to court. 
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The quote above illustrates that divided police attitudes to diversion partly reflect 
broader punitive attitudes in the general community.    
 
Thus far, it has been ascertained that YLOs are the officers most adequately trained 
with regards to the YOA. However, as the narratives of YLOs indicate, diverting young 
people from court by a police referral goes beyond the role of the SYO and the YLO. 
If a young person is to be referred to a caution or a YJC under the YOA, the YLO will 
have overseen these referrals. In instances where young people are being ‘charged’ 
rather than diverted, the findings of these interviews indicate that there is a potential 
scenario that those charges have not been discussed with, and assessed by, a YLO. The 
next segment of interview data provides an overview of how YLOs manage this issue. 
 
Time at which the YLO becomes involved  
Some YLOs indicated that for the most part, decision-making and logging of incidents 
by general duties were discussed with them. For example, YLO3 noted 
…most of the police will go through me because I've been here for so long 
and they know me; so, they will come and ask me for advice. And often they 
have been situations where I've actually challenged them on decisions that 
they've made; it's actually more with cautions than charges, I've had a few 
times where a young person has been put down for a caution and I've actually 
spoken to the officer in charge and said, “You know, look actually I think 
that this is more suitable for a conference, the offence is quite serious, you 
know, there’s quite a degree of violence involved” and all that kind of stuff. 
And we've actually changed, so even though they've booked in a kid for a 
caution, they've done the interview and booked them in, and they are in my 
folder, we'll actually stop that process and have upped it up to a conference 
instead. So that's happened quite a few times. 
And to be honest that resistance is, like they don't really resist, they are quite 
happy. 
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This YLO had a unique view in regard to the previously discussed pockets of resistance 
and the difficulties of convincing some general duties officers who wanted to ‘charge’ 
rather than divert. According to this YLO, there were occasions when she also 
challenged general duties decisions to ‘caution’. The challenge of ‘only a caution’ as 
not enough, coming from those with most training, the YLOs, certainly undermines the 
YOA. After all, the Act does legislate for a hierarchical approach where the less intrusive 
option is chosen whenever possible, from warning to caution, to conference and finally 
court. The ‘punitiveness’ framework that shapes traditional police practices appears to 
take over once again. 
 
Further, this YLO, provided a different narrative to most others, in that she noted that 
there was not an issue in YLOs not being available 24/7 for consultation, as she had 
great faith on the capabilities of the SYO to take over, noting: ‘Here … we’re very 
fortunate we have probably one of the highest numbers of specialty officers so we do a 
lot of training. I train, do the SYO course two times a year; so, we have lots of SYOs’ 
(YLO3). Hence, regarding the issue of decisions made without consulting the YLO, the 
picture painted by YLO3 was, using her own words, ‘pretty good’.  
We have had a few times where we’ve stopped a charge and referred it back 
to a conference instead, that's happened occasionally. I find that most of the 
charges in our area tend to be for things that can't get conferenced, so they 
are usually, like, looking at the last three months most of my charges were 
Breach Bail, so you can't do a conference for Breach of Bail anyway. Or 
Breach AVO or something like that. Or for our very high-risk offenders that 
have already done time in juvenile detention centres and been in and out. Or 
PCA offences like drink driving, that kind of stuff. So, I find most of my 
offences are very … black and white, like you can’t conference for them 
anyway. So, I find, I find they are pretty good here; they really are pretty 
good. 
 
 
 
156 
However, the YLO’s description of the situation as ‘pretty good’ is implausible. On the 
one side, there is the acknowledgment that most of the charges encountered do not 
qualify to be dealt with under the Act. In turn, this points to some of the structural 
problems of the legislation. Nevertheless, describing the situation in such benign terms 
indicates that success is measured (by the YLOs interviewed) on being able to apply as 
much diversion as the Act will allow, rather than measuring success on notions of being 
able to help children, an occupational drive, that as noted earlier in the chapter, was 
advocated for by YLOs. 
 
In contradiction to this picture presented above, YLO1 acknowledged that not all 
matters that get diverted come through to her prior to being directed to either diversion 
or court,  
I read all disseminations, so every day I would read the dissemination and if 
I pick up something would then be able to put a stop to the charge straight 
away … if there needs to be a diversion. Most of our guys are pretty good in 
our station because we have a very good communication line (YLO1). 
 
Similarly, YLO5 claimed,  
So, any time any police officer puts in the computer ‘a young person’, I get 
a dissemination on that. And if I read it and I don’t think they’ve … you 
know, dealt with it the right way or if they can’t deal with it a certain way 
and I need to give them advice, then I can either resubmit the event or I can 
actually email the officer and, or go and speak to them and discuss, you know, 
their options and that sort of stuff. 
 
But most importantly, YLO1 and YLO5 claims of a ‘communication line’ and a 
‘discussion’ as a process of dealing with decisions made by other officers, are vastly 
different to the previous claims of YLO3 saying she openly opposed a charge being 
placed and made this into a ‘challenge’ (a ‘challenge’ that nevertheless, as illustrated 
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on the anecdote does not always result in the lowest level of intervention for the young 
person). Regardless, these accounts, clearly illustrate the different approaches and 
perceptions YLOs hold regarding the need to ‘train’ general duties officers, which will 
no doubt, in turn, at times, produce different final results. 
 
Adding to this, and presenting another incongruity, some YLOs note that the 
opportunity to review the process of decisions already made by general duties is not 
something that is promptly attended to. As YLO2 explained, 
all the legal process actions with juveniles are reviewed every month and part 
of my role is to make sure that young people are being dealt appropriately … 
if they can be diverted through the Act, that, they are dealt with under the 
Act. Police have to outline in their narrative, in their reports as to why they 
haven't dealt with it. Simply saying a young person, you can't just put, “The 
young person was a pain in the butt, I'm not sending them to the …” like they 
have to, there has to be … and we had Custody Managers as well who, if they 
decide to charge a young person it must be verified by a Specialist Youth 
Officer. Not every officer can accept that charge, so we have police that are 
gatekeepers other than myself and they have to approve that they should be 
charged and not dealt with under the Young Offenders Act. So, it’s not, the 
officer can't just decide, “I'm going to charge them,” it has to go through a 
senior … SYO as well. 
 
Issues discussed above, such as the small mix of opinions in regard to who gets to be 
diverted, the concerns over training matters, and the availability or not of those most 
trained during certain periods of time, indeed leads to concerns over the quality of the 
perceived seriousness of the review process. Additionally, it is important to note, as 
documented by the Noetic Report in 2010, that since the disbandment of the Youth 
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Justice Advisory Committee42 in 2007 there is no external oversight of police diversion. 
This consequently leads to the necessity for quality assurance via internal reviews 
around diversion.  
 
Adding to this, while admitting that there is a lengthy time frame between the events 
occurring and their review, YLO2 emphasised that when young people are charged 
(rather than diverted), it is primarily because ‘they’re [young offenders] refusing to be 
interviewed’, and there is not much else of an option. This indicates conformity between 
YLO perspectives and ‘the way things are’. It also highlights, as noted in previous 
chapters, the recognised potential for the admission of guilt as per the YOA requirement 
for diversion, to undermine the use of diversion. However, this viewpoint fails to 
explain the unexpectedly low rates of diversion in some LACs noted by Ringland and 
Smith study in 2013 (see Chapter Two). 
 
Overall, the above accounts present contradictions. From some YLOs perspectives, if 
general duties officers do not consult YLOs they might not be adequately equipped to 
promote diversion as opposed to ‘charging’. These narratives were significant as they 
highlighted the need to shift a police culture set on old traditions. However, some YLOs 
presented this issue as insignificant and as unlikely to have repercussions in outcomes. 
According to these latter accounts, there are no missed opportunities to divert. The 
YLOs’ only plausible explanation in regard to the number of referrals made by court 
being higher than those made by police, is that they are not a consequence of ‘misses’ 
by the police and most of the time diversion is not happening due to young offenders 
 
42 Established in 1991 The Youth Justice Advisory Committee, consisting of representatives from NSW Attorney 
General’s Department, NSW Police, Department of Juvenile Justice and Legal Aid, played an important role in 
monitoring and facilitating improvement in the Act’s operation (see Youth Justice Coalition, 2011). 
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not making admissions of guilt while within police custody. This shows a commitment 
to ideas of individual responsibility where the blame is apportioned to individuals 
refusing to cooperate in the right way, rather than some sort of adherence to institutional 
accountability. These issues are further elaborated in the next sections where the focus 
turns to the key decision-making factors when applying the legislation. 
 
Key decisions making points for a YLO - applying the legislation  
When asked about their key decision making points regarding diversion, YLOs referred 
to the five criteria under the legislation. For example, YLO 3 remarked, 
so obviously you’ve got your five criteria: So, violence, harm to victim, 
number and nature, seriousness of the offence and then any other of the five 
categories. 
 
As YLOs ‘are the administrators of the Young Offenders Act for NSW Police’ (NSW 
Police, 2016), it is therefore expected that they will draw on the five criteria from the 
Act to make diversionary decisions. The forthcoming discussions will reveal that the 
weight placed on each of those criteria in the Act appears to vary on a case-by-case 
basis and between different decision-makers. It can be argued that the high level of 
discretion within the Act when it comes to applying the criteria allows for subjectivity 
that can and possibly leads to un-informed decisions.43  
 
Adding to this, YLO3 emphasised the adherence to the hierarchical order as prescribed 
by the legislation, where cautions should be considered before a YJC, unless the 
maximum of three cautions has been reached: 
 
 
43 For issues of legal regulation of police discretion in this context see Chan et al. 2004 and Bargen, 2005. 
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If something is automatically three cautions then obviously, for me, in most 
cases I’ll definitely refer it for a conference rather than going to court for the 
fourth offence. Unless it’s something that I can’t do a conference for (YLO3). 
 
This YLO is explaining that given the scenario where an offender that can be dealt with 
under the YOA has exhausted the maximum legal number of three cautions, the next 
sensible stage would be to refer the offender to YJC, rather than to court. However, 
further into the interviews, it was revealed that at times consideration of the other 
criteria previously mentioned, such as, for example, seriousness of the offence and 
history of the offender, would result in young offenders being considered for YJC 
without having exhausted the three cautions. Equally, at times court referrals will occur 
without considering the opportunity to refer the young person to YJC, particularly in 
cases where the young person had been diverted to a YJC in the past. This is, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Act places no limit on the number of YJC an offender 
is entitled to, but recommends the use of court referral as a ‘last resort’. This path of 
action by police is not surprising. It aligns with previous comments made by NSW 
Police to the Department of Attorney General in 2011, where in response to whether 
the principles of the Act are still valid, NSW Police noted that  ‘applying the least 
restrictive form of sanction is not an adequate principle if this simply means that we 
are delaying a young person’s contact with the court system, rather than acting to 
prevent this from occurring’ (NSW Police Force, 2011, p. 2).  
 
Nevertheless, the YLOs insisted that eligibility is the foremost criteria for diversion or 
otherwise, as YLO2 remarked: 
 
Is the offence eligible? If the young person can be cautioned, usually that 
comes first and that’s only because it’s a lesser … intervention. And for us 
here…we have a lot of cautions because we tend to get a lot of shopliftings 
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from Westfield so … sometimes the conferencing, it’s not because we don’t 
want to use that intervention, it’s just that the young person is eligible to be 
dealt with by caution first. So, eligibility … it’s really whether the young 
person is eligible in terms of the offence and whether they make admissions. 
 
Overall, YLOs agreed on the key decision-making points, and it was clear that they feel 
that they follow the legislation in this respect. However, when it comes to the specifics 
on how serious an offence is, or how an offender’s history plays a role, this is where 
there appeared to be numerous interpretations. For example, some YLO4 remarked: 
So basically, I … yes, it’s referring directly back to the Act: Have they made 
the admissions, what’s the background? How many cautions have they 
already been up for? Are we going to get, is it serious enough to jump straight 
into trying to put it to a youth justice conference? And I've done that before 
I’ve, I’ve … the kid hasn’t had … I did get it knocked back, but I wanted to 
try to push it through that the kid hadn't had a caution … I thought it was 
more serious and the circumstances were probably more … appropriate to 
deal with, have it dealt with by conferencing rather than caution. Juvenile 
Justice disagreed with me on that occasion, which is, that's okay, there was 
discussion there…Yes, so they [Juvenile Justice] suggested it came back to 
me and we dealt with it by caution. That was, that’s fine; sometimes I feel 
like it's a little bit subjective with regards to how I'm thinking and then how 
JJ’s [Juvenile Justice] are thinking but I have a very good relationship with 
the Assistant Manager at Juvenile Justice, which I think is also very 
important. So, we can have those conversations; we can go back and forth 
and … sometimes I win, sometimes I lose. 
 
The quote above clearly emphasises the subjective interpretation of the guidance 
provided by the YOA. This is not surprising. As discussed in chapter one, police 
attitudes towards diversion and charging (see Marinos and Innocente, 2008) are 
influenced by factors such as: rank, age and mental health (Shafiq et al., 2016); the 
individual’s knowledge about the nature of diversion (Foley, 2004; Green et al., 2019; 
Shafiq et al., 2016) and the level of understanding of the YOA (NSW Attorney General 
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and Justice, 2002); as well as, whether a police officer has attended a youth justice 
conference (Stewart and Smith, 2004). The subjective interpretation of the guidance 
provided by the YOA is a reflection of the various police attitudes towards diversion 
and charging.  
 
At the same time, the comments from YLO4 illustrates the belief of the YLO in the 
‘need’ to treat ‘more serious’ offences in a more ‘appropriate’ way, thus indicating that 
cautions are perhaps ‘not the appropriate way’ of dealing with certain behaviours. This 
is consistent with existent research findings regarding police attitudes that show that 
the seriousness of the offence is one of the most influential factors in diversionary 
decision-making (Carrington, 1998; Doob and Chan, 1982; Doob and Cesaroni, 2004; 
Marinos and Innocente, 2008 (see chapter one)). However, this tendency to place such 
emphasis on the seriousness of the offence is not appropriate, in that it undermines 
diversion. If the law provides that an offence is eligible for a caution, then it should be 
dealt by with a caution as suggested by Juvenile Justice NSW in the case described 
above, and as intended by the Act. 
 
Before continuing with this discussion on diversion discretionary decision-making, it 
is critical to set the discussion against the backdrop of the statistical data on this context. 
Data obtained from BOCSAR (File Reference sr-16-14336)44 for use in this study 
allows for a comparison for the period from July 1998 to June 201745, on the number 
of juvenile offenders processed by the NSW Police Force by the way of caution, YJC 
 
44 The data was extracted from a live database and figures are subject to change.  
45 These figures record the numbers of offenders dealt with in each financial year period- that is from July 1998 until 
June 1999, and so on until July 2017.    
 
 
 
163 
and against to court. Table 3 shows such comparisons from which the first initial 
observations can be outlined: 
• The number of juvenile offenders processed by the NSW Police by the 
way of caution, youth justice conference and to court has varied over 
time.   
• The number of cautions peaked in 2008/2010 with 12,410 offenders 
processed this way. Also, it can be seen that the number of cautions has 
declined since then with only 7497 in 2016/2017.  
• YJC referrals by police also peaked, but in 2001/2002 with 1789 young 
offenders processed this way. While, the number of juvenile offenders 
processed by YJC consistently declined from 2007/2008 to 2016/2017, 
with only 648 offenders processed this way. 
• Lastly, the number of juvenile offenders proceeded against to court 
declined from 1998 until 2003-2004, but again increased between 2004 
until 2008, peaking in 2007-2008 with 25,506 young offenders 
proceeded against to court. Between 2007/2008 and 2016/2017, the 
number of juvenile offenders proceeded against court consistently 
declined, falling to 18,731 juvenile offenders in 2016-2017. 
Taken together, this data suggests dramatic changes in youth offending in NSW in 
recent years, particularly since 2007/2008. The reasons for these declines are unclear. 
Suggestions can be made that they are not local in nature (centric to NSW) since they 
have been noted to be consistent with a downward international trend (see United 
Nations Economic and Social Council, 2013). 
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An overall decline in youth offending is welcome.  Nevertheless, for the purpose of this 
research, the focus is on the large number of young offenders that continue to be sent 
to court. It appears that a drop-in youth offending has also correlated with a decline in 
diversionary decision-making, not because of lower numbers of offenders but because 
the use of court as ‘a last resort’, as stipulated by the YOA, is undermined. Focusing on 
the percentages of young offenders processed each year by the way of caution, YJC 
and court (noted in red in Table 3), it can be noted that the number of young offenders 
proceeded by the way of YJC referral by NSW Police Force for 2016/2017 was at its 
lowest since the Act was established, with only 2.4% processed this way. In contrast, 
the number of children that, proceeded to court is 69.7%, the highest it has been since 
1998 (when it was 70%), the first year of the YOA enactment. Thus, it can be concluded 
that in 2016/2017 the diversionary practices of the NSW Police Force under the YOA, 
were declining more than ever before. 
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Table 3: Number of young offenders dealt with by NSW Police under the Young 
Offender’s Act 1997 (NSW) 
 Warnings Cautions YJC Court 
1998/99  8935    26.5 % 942 2.8% 23824 70.7% 
1999/00  9544 31.6% 1560 5.2% 19115 63.3% 
2000/01  10738 34.8% 1624 5.3% 18527 60.0% 
2001/02  11479 34.5% 1789 5.4% 19992 60.1% 
2002/03  11441 36.0% 1586 5.0% 18757 59.0% 
2003/04  10559 35.0% 1501 5.0% 18095 60.0% 
2004/05  10774 33.4% 1462 4.5% 19982 62.0% 
2005/06  10860 32.0% 1087 3.2% 22008 64.8% 
2006/07  11672 32.5% 954 2.7% 23300 64.9% 
2007/08  11956 30.7% 1432 3.7% 25506 65.6% 
2008/09  12255 31.4% 1341 3.4% 25429 65.2% 
2009/10  12410 31.9% 1422 3.7% 25087 64.5% 
2010/11 5692 11488 31.6% 1215 3.3% 23624 65.0% 
2011/12 7892 10018 30.3% 953 2.9% 22138 66.9% 
2012/13 7526 8869 29.2% 1000 3.3% 20501 67.5% 
2013/14 7580 7708 27.3% 857 3.0% 19705 69.7% 
2014/15 9423 7528 27.5% 982 3.6% 18840 68.9% 
2015/16 10144 7721 28.1% 745 2.7% 19024 69.2% 
2016/17 10111 7497 27.9% 648 2.4% 18731 69.7% 
Source: NSW Bureau of Crime and Research (BOCSAR) File Reference sr18-16582 
 
It is worth noting briefly, that so far, the figures discussed are limited to the diversion 
by NSW Police Force. If court referrals to YJC were to be added, the total percentage 
of YJC would increase to slightly more than double for each financial year. This will 
be elaborated in chapter five. Nevertheless, the total percentage of young offenders 
diverted from court, continue to be significantly low compared to the percentage of 
children sent to court.  
 
The suggestion could be made that perhaps referrals to YJC are not high because there 
is a large number of cautions being delivered. However, one of the problems with 
cautions is that there is no way to know whether these children would have come into 
the system prior to the Act, when the most likely option was that of charging. As noted 
in chapter one, the possibility of a net-widening effect has been an issue of concern 
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regarding diversionary alternatives and the use of cautions (see for example, Christie, 
2009; Seymour, 1998; and Polk et al., 2003). Most significantly, given that most young 
offenders commit the least serious offences, these figures are problematic as they 
clearly indicate that court as a ‘last resort’ as intended by the Act is not the outcome the 
system has been able to achieve. From this viewpoint, youth diversion is underutilised, 
highlighting the importance of understanding the factors as they relate to NSW Police 
Force diversionary decision-making. 
 
Applying the legislation: further issues  
Regardless of the legislation not having a limit on the number of times a youth can be 
conferenced, YLOs expressed a very conservative approach in their decision making in 
this regard. For example, YLO2 explained, 
If they have three conferences for the same offence and they’re relatively in 
a short timeframe, I would consider we need another intervention. I don't 
think having three conferences all for shoplifting … and they’ve had three 
cautions for shoplifting all in a 12-month period means that the other person 
is … learning or has put strategies in place to address their criminality. I think 
we need then to send it to court. So, I'm pretty much … whether this is right 
or wrong, but I'm pretty much a three conference … depending on the 
timeframe; if they’re 13 and get a conference and now they’re 17, well that's 
different because there's been a year’s gap, there’s a time frame. 
 
The above demonstrates that subjectivity/discretionary decision-making will, at times 
result in outcomes that do not align with the intentions of the YOA. When legislating 
for court as the ‘last resort’, indeed ‘the last resort’ is a subjective viewpoint. The most 
common account by most YLOs interviewed is that two conference referrals are 
sufficient before moving on to court referral. For example, YLO1 remarked: 
…my experience is when a child hasn’t learned their lesson or realising that 
they’ve done the wrong thing by the second conference, what more can you 
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do for them? What more can you put in an outcome plan to tell them … you 
know, help them fix themselves? 
 
Indeed, two was an arbitrary figure considered to be the acceptable as a maximum 
number of referrals to conferences, by most YLOs. For example, YLO3 remarked, 
I generally wouldn’t do more than two conferences…Because I kind of think 
if … if they’ve done two and they’re not changing, - especially if it’s the 
same sorts of offences – then I’ll be thinking that they’re not changing their 
behaviour, we need to step it up… If it had been for an offender that had, 
they had a conference that they did successfully when they were younger and 
then another one again and then another one again, then I would contemplate 
if they had all been successful and they responded well and had done the 
outcome plan and had, you know, shown remorse and that kind of stuff; then 
yes, I would look at doing another one. But if they’re kind of just … you 
know, not showing the greatest attitude at the first conference that they’ve 
been to or the second conference that they’ve been to, I’d be reluctant to use 
another one. I’d be thinking it’s not working; let’s trying something else. ...at 
some point I feel like there’s still that sense at some point you’ve got to let 
the courts take charge…At some point to me, we’ve got to put the 
responsibility back on the courts to do something about it.  
 
The above quote represents a common perspective amongst YLOs interviewed, in that 
from their viewpoint, to refer a young person twice or three times to YJC, it is quite a 
generous act. This is an interesting perception, as YLOs claimed to see numerous 
advantages of YJC over ‘charging’. For example, when asked on the strengths of the 
Act, YLO3 claimed to ‘love, love, love conferencing’, 
But yes, I’m all for conferencing. I’ve seen some great conferences over the 
15 years that I’ve been doing Youth Liaison and I’ve seen some really good 
turn-arounds and some really good satisfaction from victims. And just I think, 
it’s the only way that the young offender actually gets to realize the depth of 
what they’ve done and how much it’s affected them, like to me the court 
system is, doesn’t allow for that and … is very frustrating for victims and … 
not effective for the young offenders. So, to me the Young Offenders Act I 
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love, love, love conferencing… [long pause] Cautioning I like too, I like 
conferencing more because obviously you have those additional powers of 
doing the outcome plan and the victim being there and all that kind of stuff. 
But for a lot of the kids that I have here at the station, cautioning is extremely 
effective; like a lot of them are first time shop offenders, shoplifting offenders 
and I never see them again. So, I would say most of mine are for that type of 
offence, so a caution is, obviously, the most appropriate and to me, definitely 
effective. And I’m so glad that they can get a caution rather than having to 
go to court. I think that’s fantastic. So yes, I’m all for … yes, those levels. 
Not so big on … court. 
 
Most of the accounts indicate that YLOs and police in general when noting that they 
are ‘not so big on…court’ (YLO3) are directing such remarks towards the 
dissatisfaction brought about by the perceived leniency of magistrates on offenders. 
Thus, at times, YLOs appear to contemplate the possibility to secure some sort of 
intervention by opting for a YJC. Nevertheless, the idea of unlimited conferences does 
not sit well with YLOs. For example, YLO5 remarked, 
Look, I mean I’ve recently – there’s probably two people in this command 
that I know have had probably five youth conferences – and even then, I 
would sort of question it and go, “Well, we’re looking at five…” because I 
go to everyone, do you know what I mean, I see the same faces all this time 
and I sort of think, ‘Well …’  and I know that police might have referred one 
or two initially and then they’ve gone to court thinking, ‘Well, they are still 
offending; why are they still offending? Obviously, youth conferencing isn’t 
working even though they are completing the outcome plan. Maybe it needs 
to be something more serious.’ And then, on those occasions then, when 
those same kids are sent to court, they are referred back to a youth conference 
… and then it’s like the process starts again…So, there’s got to be a point 
where both the court and the police, and obviously we are aware of it because 
we are referring to court instead of giving another conference, but I think the 
court needs to look at that process as well and say, “Well, look mate you’ve 
had …  how many chances do you get?” … I think there needs to be some 
sort of limit on youth conferencing. 
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Once again, this quote reflects, firstly the perceptions of YLOs that when it comes to 
police, two referrals to conferencing is more than enough, and it is really up to the 
courts to decide what is next. Second, the quote illustrates YLOs dissatisfaction with 
the court system for not taking a more punitive approach and instead of using the Act 
to further refer to YJC. As previously noted, the courts continue to account for over 
51% of YJC referrals. However, the recorded data does not indicate how many of these 
court referrals were offenders that have made admissions to the police, and hence could 
have been diverted by the police. Given that the offences covered by the Act are 
summary offences and indictable offences that may be dealt with summarily under the 
Criminal Procedure Act 198646, the reality is that most of the re-offenders that are being 
 
46 The YOA 1997 section 8, states as follows: 
Offences covered by the Act: 
 
(1) The offences covered by this Act are, except as provided by this Act: 
(a) summary offences, and 
(b) indictable offences that may be dealt with summarily under Chapter 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 or 
another prescribed law, 
committed, or alleged to have been committed, by children. 
(2) Despite subsection (1), an offence is not covered by this Act if: 
(a) the principal person who investigates the offence is not an investigating official within the meaning of this Act, 
or 
(b) the offence is a traffic offence committed by a child who was, when the alleged offence occurred, old enough to 
obtain a learner licence under the Road Transport Act 2013 to drive the motor vehicle to which the offence relates, 
or 
(c) the offence results in the death of any person, or 
(d) the offence is an offence under section 61E, 61L, 61M, 61N, 61O (1), (1A) or (2), 66C, 66D, 80, 81A or 81B of 
the Crimes Act 1900 , or 
(e) the offence is an offence under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 , or 
(e1) the offence is an offence under Division 1 of Part 2 of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 other than an 
offence to which subsection (2A) applies, or 
(f) the offence is an offence under Division 2 of Part 2 of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 other than: 
(i) an offence under section 23 (1) (a) or (c) of that Act to which subsection (3) applies, or 
(ii) an offence under section 27 or 28 of that Act of aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring, soliciting or inciting the 
commission of an offence under section 23 (1) (a) or (c) to which subsection (3) applies, 
(g) the offence is prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this section. 
(2A) An offence under Division 1 of Part 2 of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 is covered by this Act if 
in the opinion of the investigating official or prosecuting authority: 
(a) in relation to an offence relating to a prohibited drug other than cannabis leaf within the meaning of 
the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 -the offence involves not more than the small quantity applicable to that 
drug under that Act, or 
(b) in relation to an offence relating to cannabis leaf: 
(i) the offence involves not more than half the small quantity of cannabis leaf within the meaning of the Drug Misuse 
and Trafficking Act 1985, or 
(ii) there are exceptional circumstances in that: 
(A) the offence involves more than half, but not more than the total, small quantity of cannabis leaf within the 
meaning of that Act, and 
(B) it would be in the interests of rehabilitation, and appropriate in all the circumstances, to deal with the matter 
under this Act. 
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referenced in the above quote are engaging in the less serious types of offences.47 
Nevertheless the interviewees keep saying two or three YJC, or as noted above ‘I 
think... the fact that it’s got three cautions is, you know, good – like three strikes and 
that sort of thing’ (YLO5), alluding to the US “three strikes” notion that is also 
embraced under populist presumptions that “three strikes laws” can reduce crime 
through clear deterrence messages.  
 
This indicates that YLOs are not immune to the generally punitive culture of policing 
institutions. Some described themselves as not ready for ‘the innovative thinking’ 
promoted by the YOA legislation. As YLO5 claims, 
So that’s what I’m saying, it needs to then probably go to court and the 
magistrate needs to probably decide … I don’t know what his parameters are 
of what he can choose for the young person to do. But I think that then should 
be selected by the magistrate to then go, “Well hang on mate, you had three 
conferences already, I can see that you’ve completed them but obviously they 
are not working. So, we need to look at another avenue” …But…I don’t get 
paid $500,000 to make those calls so you’ll have to go to somebody higher 
than that. 
 
This YLO who earlier indicated an interest in saving the young people from making 
the wrong choices, here indicates that such passion is clearly challenged by feelings of 
occupational rivalry. Rivalry that led the YLO to conclude that he/she is not paid 
enough to be expected to make certain decisions. The legislation clearly places the role 
 
(3) An offence under section 23 (1) (a) or (c) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 is covered by this Act if 
in the opinion of the investigating official or prosecuting authority: 
(a) the offence involves not more than half the small quantity applicable to the prohibited plant within the meaning 
of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 , or 
(b) there are exceptional circumstances in that: 
(i) the offence involves more than half, but not more than the total, small quantity applicable to the prohibited plant 
within the meaning of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 , and 
(ii) it would be in the interests of rehabilitation, and appropriate in all the circumstances, to deal with the matter 
under this Act. 
47 Other indictable offences such as murder, manslaughter, offences resulting in death, sexual offences and drug 
trafficking offences many not be cautioned (YOA 1997). 
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of gatekeepers with the police as much as the magistrates, regardless of the latter’s more 
elite occupational status. It appears, however, that this YLO disagrees with that 
principle and feels that taking responsibility for tough decisions on punishment should 
be left to those that get paid more. This sort of attitude is not particular to policing, but 
it demonstrates irresponsible occupational mindsets, particularly since the lives of 
young people are at stake. This raises questions about the appropriateness of police as 
potentially unwilling yet primary gatekeepers to diversion. It would appear that it is 
important to determine whether or not police officers are committed and have the best 
interest for the juvenile at heart even at times when it requires the making of ‘tough 
decisions’, or if indeed as indicated above they feel that it is not part of their job 
description. 
 
Overall, a ‘lack of faith’ in the courts appears to be a common discourse amongst NSW 
Police Force. However, interestingly, some YLOs use it to promote the use of YJC 
referrals amongst police. YLOs promote conferencing referrals by police as a better 
alternative to ‘charging’ and sending to court when speaking to general duties. For 
example, in this context of promoting diversion to YJC to general duties that are 
inclined to ‘charge’, YLO4 remarked, 
And that's another thing I say to police, “If you’re thinking in your head that 
something amazingly terrible is going to happen to these kids in a court; do 
you know what’s going to happen? They’re gonna come back for a youth 
justice conference. They are going to be referred back to a youth Justice 
conference, so effectively we’re doing the youth justice conference the long 
way around” …That’s another conversation I have with the police who are 
absolutely adamant that this young person should be charged. So that’s 
another, that's another thing I see happening that a lot of the … a lot of the 
kids are coming back for conferences after the court referral anyway. 
 
 
 
172 
In this sense, YJC is being promoted not necessarily for its merits, but as an inevitable 
outcome that ultimately could be kept within the police decision-making domain rather 
than the courts’. At the same time, the narratives indicate a message regarding the 
benefit that such approach has in saving extra work for the police. These conversations 
around the acknowledgement that referrals can be made instead of ‘charges made’, only 
to be sent back by the court (opting to divert), are at times contradictory to the most 
common account presented by YLOs in which they remarked that a lot of those court-
referred YJC ‘will just be purely legislative procedural issues where we haven’t got 
those admissions, so we’ve have no choice’ (YLO4). According to the YLOs, the failure 
to gain admissions of guilt by youth is the most significant factor undermining the use 
of the YOA.  
 
Legislative constraints to diversion: ‘admission of guilt’  
The requirement of the Act for the person to admit the offence in order to be dealt with 
a caution or YJC has been known as a difficulty in the implementation of the Act, as 
well as an area of much tension regarding police accountability (see Bargen 2001; NSW 
Attorney General 2002; Turner, 2002; and Noetic Solutions, 2010). Some of the 
criticisms in this area include that young people have reported feeling pressured into 
consenting to diversion without having been given ‘sufficient information about 
diversionary options available and the consequences of withholding consent’ (Schetzer 
and Henderson, 2003, p. 188). Past criticisms have also included the fact that police 
subject young people eligible to be diverted under the YOA to full interviews, under the 
presumption that the matter might end up proceeding to court. For example, responding 
to the review of the YOA by the DAGJ, the Law Society of NSW noted that: 
Section 10 of the YOA requires only that an adult be present when a child 
makes an admission for the purposes of the YOA, not that the child be subject 
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to a full interrogation. It is unfair to subject young people to a full interview 
- young people are immature, usually with low levels of comprehension, are 
often daunted by the whole process in an unfamiliar environment, where a 
real power imbalance exists (2011, p.8). 
 
This power imbalance has been noted to be of greater significance when it comes to 
Indigenous youth, where there is a danger ‘that minority youth will be classified by 
police as ‘unsuitable’…particularly if they have prior offending histories or are deemed 
uncooperative’ (Cunneen, 2008a, p. 293). Previous research notes that both police and 
legal representatives believe that Indigenous youth may refuse to admit guilt because 
of unfavourable attitudes towards police (Little, Allard, Chrzanowski, and Stewart, 
2011).  
 
As continuously highlighted by research (see, for example, Liederbach, 2007; White, 
1997; 1998; Cunneen and White, 2007), relations between police and young people are 
often characterised by conflict and tension, and high levels of anger, fear and mistrust. 
Young people’s negative perceptions towards police have been linked to the fact that 
many young people feel they are over-policed for no reason (Alder, O’Connor, Warner 
and White, 1992; Collins et al. 2000). Conversely, police perceptions of young people 
as uncooperative and disrespectful of the law have been noted to contribute to adverse 
interactions (Alder et al., 1992; White, 1998). Further, studies have revealed that in 
their interactions with the police, young people may experience intimidation, verbal 
abuse or physical violence (see Alder et al., 1992; Borrero, 2001); and young people 
are reluctant to complain because they perceive police harassment and violence as the 
‘norm’ (Borrero, 2001). In particular, when it comes to Indigenous young people, 
research indicates the use of physical, intimidating violence by the police, and 
Indigenous youth being afraid to report this on fear of police retaliation (see Cunneen, 
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1990; White, 1997). Such negative interactions serve to reinforce unfavourable 
attitudes and perceptions that exist between police and young people, and this is likely 
to lead to less cooperation or compliance; for example, the young person unwillingness 
to admit guilt. 
 
Many researchers and practitioners in the field have expressed concerns with the 
requirement of admitting guilt as an impediment to diversion48. Some YLOs too noted 
their concerns with this process throughout the interviews. The issues around this have 
resulted in the recent development of the Protected Admissions Scheme (PAS)49. Under 
the PAS, if an offender will not admit an offence for which they could be dealt with by 
the YOA, they can be offered the option to make a ‘protected admission’. Under PAS a 
‘protected admission’ means that young offenders are able to make admissions to an 
offence while preserving their right not to provide self-incriminating evidence that can 
be used in court.  When the offender signs the document indicating that they will make 
a protected admission, they are given a written undertaking by police that the admission 
will not be used under any circumstances. Following this the offender can be 
interviewed, but if the matter is not cautioned or sent to a YJC, and the offender gets 
charged and sent to court, the information gathered in the interview cannot be used, in 
fact the court does not get to know that there was a PAS signed at any given point. 
 
PAS come into operation in mid-2014 exclusively to facilitate the use of cautions by 
NSW Police Force. However, in November 2015 the scheme was rolled out to further 
 
48 See for example, Bargen, 2001; Snowball, 2008; and DAGJ, 2011. 
49 The PAS is the apex of negotiations between the NSW Police Force, the Aboriginal Legal Service, Legal Aid 
NSW, and the Department of Police and Justice. Aim at increasing the use of cautions and YJC referrals to young 
people PAS can be offered to young people when the offence committed falls under the YOA. Anything a young 
person tells police under the scheme cannot be used as evidence against them and police can instead issue a caution 
or a YJC (NSW Police Force, 2015). 
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facilitate the referrals to YJC as well. The actual number of times that PAS gets used is 
unknown. Currently, as the Youth Policy Officer noted ‘the police do not have a way 
to include this information in the Computerised Operational Police System’ 
(“COPS”)50. The YLOs views in regard to whether the rollout of the scheme affects the 
number of referrals to YJC, is not a positive one.  
 
When YLOs were asked if PAS had made a difference to the number of guilty 
admissions, the common account presented PAS as an unwelcome procedure by 
investigation officers. Overall there was a lot of mixed, and sometimes contradictory, 
information about how widely used or recommended PAS is. For example, YLO1 
remarked,   
…we haven't used that, I think we’ve used it once since it’s come 
in…Because it’s, it’s not very secure. I think it has a hole in it - this is my 
opinion - I feel that if we’re going to offer that to the young person, we should 
be able to deliver that caution there and then. The caution should be done 
there and then, it should not be that the young person has to go away and then 
come back because the possibility of them not returning, not coming back for 
the actual caution to be delivered and then what does police have to be able 
to take them to court? We’ve got nothing. Because we can't use that 
admission in court because it was done under the protection; we’ve got 
nothing. 
 
When remarking ‘I think it has a hole in it’, YLO1 was referring to the fact that from a 
police viewpoint an interview is conducted to collect evidence, and admissions are 
evidence to gain convictions. As noted, PAS prevents any admissions made by the 
young person to be used in court as a form of evidence. Thus, the police have culturally 
 
50 COPS is integral to the everyday operation of the NSW Police Force. COPS primary purpose is to record all police 
activities by NSW Police (for example, it is used for logging criminal incidents, gathering intelligence and issuing 
charges, amongst other things). As its secondary purpose, COPS is used to produce crime statistics for NSW via 
BOCSAR and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2007).  
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driven objections with a guilty ‘admission’ that has no real value in terms of evidence. 
The framework of the PAS does not sit well within traditional law enforcement oriented 
policing practices. 
 
Adding to this, when prompted in regard to how often it is used, YLO1 added, 
We all have to use it [PAS], we have to; every station has to use it.  
Police don’t have a lot of success using it. A lot of kids either don’t want to 
say anything but also, you'll find police might not offer it because they feel 
that … they’ve got nothing to go to court with. We’ve got no backup. Where 
do we go? It’s wasted, the kid’s free! So, we can't do anything in charging 
that young person if they don't turn up for the caution. 
 
From the above remarks, it can be seen that the YLO is cautious because the PAS is 
expected to be used, which leads the YLO to emphasise that everyone must use it; but 
at the same time the YLO is acknowledging that police will be deterred from using PAS 
due to imperatives, namely the value of ‘admission of guilt’ as prosecutorial evidence. 
This shows that occupational imperatives are taking precedence over the best interests 
of the young person, in this case, to obtain an admission that allows for diversion. 
 
There are also some contradictory and implausible claims being made. First, it is 
indicated that, if needed, PAS gets offered all the time because it is a requirement; while 
at other times it is implied that police perhaps do not facilitate the use of PAS as they 
feel ‘cheated’ of the guilt admission. The dislike of PAS appears to stem from the 
perceived senseless value of admissions that cannot be used as evidence. This goes 
against the meaning of an ‘interview’ as evidence in the traditional sense of policing. 
Nevertheless, the common account amongst all YLOs interviewed is that PAS has not 
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been used very often, if at all. Often the reasons provided for this relate to resistance 
against it by the police officers. As YLO3 remarked:  
I think there's a bit of resistance, and I actually quite understand it to be 
honest. I personally have issues with PAS, there are a few things that I don't 
like about it. I see lots of issues in the fact that if a young person doesn't turn 
up for a caution then you've got nothing. And what do you do with it? That's 
a big issue and that has happened in other areas; I know that has happened 
… where they've done their statement on PAS so they've been put forward 
for a caution and then the young person doesn't turn up and their statement is 
… you know … inadmissible because obviously they can't use it; and then 
they haven't got enough to go to Children's Court. So that is one issue. 
In general, and I think people, police see it as a bit of a … almost like an 
inducement, like you really are conning them into making their statement for 
you, like it seems to me to be going a bit above … what we’re doing. You 
know it’s like, “You know, if you give us this statement, we’re not going to 
use it in court,” like I don’t know, it’s a bit … yes, I’m not … I’m not 100% 
behind it so I haven’t … really, to be honest, promoted it and … educated the 
police as much as maybe other YLO’s that would be behind it would do; do 
you know what I mean?  
 
This YLO’s opinion reflects the sentiment expressed by all YLOs that were 
interviewed.  
 
Additionally, there continues to be a view amongst YLOs that young people that are 
going to refuse to be interviewed continue to do so when offered the PAS. For example, 
when asked if they always provide the option of PAS to those offenders not making 
admissions, YLO1 noted that 
...if they are eligible for a caution or a conference, we obviously, we always 
offer it to them. It gets offered, but it doesn't get taken. Some young kids are 
just stubborn; the ones that are new to the system and maybe first offenders 
would be likely to take something like that but – 
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The above remark was made in the context of using the PAS for cautions, while the 
exchange below illustrates YLO1 comments on using PAS for YJC,  
No. Normally if a young person is eligible for the Young Offenders Act, they 
would be told that; when we call Legal Aid, we would say that. However, we 
find that … and it's a problem, I've been doing this for seven years and for 
seven years Aboriginal Legal Aid always advise, the majority of them advise 
their kids not to interview. To say nothing. It still doesn’t work…because 
they don’t want to go into the interview process. 
 
Indeed, the common account that when the PAS is offered to young people, it is still 
being declined, continued to re-emerge during the interviews. For example, YLO2 
claimed, ‘I’ve had young people, after legal advice, decline Protected Admissions’. One 
comment from a YLO, when asked “how often do you use PAS?”, was,  
Not very much and it is because most people are happy to be interviewed 
without Protected Admissions…So we tend to find young people … we have 
maybe used it twice this year, Protected Admission, because they’re happy 
to be interviewed … without Protected Admissions (YLO2). 
 
This view that young offenders are willing to be interviewed is unique, in that as 
previously noted, all other YLO’s emphasised young people’s unwillingness to the 
admission of guilt as the major impediment for referral.  
 
As noted previously in the course of the chapter, the low number of YLOs that were 
willing to participate makes it difficult to ascertain whether the experiences provided 
by those interviewed are the norm. However, if indeed Indigenous offenders and/or 
Aboriginal Legal Aid have a reluctance to accept the PAS at face value, this would not 
be surprising, given the known poor relations between police and Indigenous young 
people. As previously noted, poor relations are likely to lead to less cooperation; in this 
 
 
179 
case, the officer reluctance on wanting to use PAS, and on the other hand, the young 
people on being unwilling to be interviewed.  
 
Police interrogation has long been a source of problems and controversy, with 
malpractice reports including from false confessions, fabrication of confessions (often 
referred to as ‘verballing’51), and violence and torture (Dixon, 1997; Dixon and Travis, 
2007). Further, research shows that Indigenous people in Australia are over-represented 
among the wrongfully convicted (see Roach, 2015). This long history of police 
interrogation malpractice would easily justify suspects and Legal Aid trust issues with 
the promise that ‘admissions’ to the police under the PAS will not be used against them. 
As the PAS has been introduced recently, at this point, there is no research or literature 
on what value, if any, it will add. 
 
The findings in this section so far illustrate some of the factors that constrain the use of 
diversion. These have included, but have not been limited to, the subjective 
interpretation of legislation. The history of the young person and the seriousness of the 
offence are some other examples provided. Finally, the admission of guilt was noted to 
be the most significant factor that, according to YLOs, undermines diversion under the 
YOA. However, through the attitudes/concerns towards PAS, police culture is clearly 
an issue further undermining the opportunities to divert rather than process through 
court. The next section continues to unveil some other organisational constraints as 
described by the YLOs experiences with the Act. 
 
 
51 ‘Verballing’ is a term used by suspects and others in Australia and UK to refer to police putting “words into their 
months” or into their written confessions. 
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Experiences of the YLO in working with other organisations and their views on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the YOA 
This section illustrates the participants’ views regarding strengths and weaknesses of 
the process of diversion, including managing the letter of the law, particularly, the range 
of offences that are covered or not covered by the Act. Further, it presents participants’ 
experiences and working relationships with other organisations involved in the process 
of diversion. 
 
In describing the overall relationships with other organisations involved in the process 
of diversion, overall, the police noted that there is no need for engagement with the 
courts. However, the relationship with Juvenile Justice NSW is one that often cannot 
be avoided, as they need to liaise with one another to organise YJC referrals.  In this 
context, YLOs describe good relations characterised by consultation prior to decision 
making in order to assess the best way forward. This might include issues of 
clarification in whether the offence qualifies under the Act or/and whether a caution or 
YJC is more appropriate for a particular case. For example, commenting on how much 
weight to place on the previous history with YJC of the young offender when deciding 
how to proceed, YLO4 remarked: 
…and I’m pretty…confident if it’s during the day I would ring the 
Department of Juvenile Justice and I would probably say, “I’ve got this 
young person, police want to refer him or her to a conference, but he’s had 
three in the last six months, what do you think”. 
 
The above remark illustrates the most common account amongst those interviewed 
describing working relations with the Juvenile Justice NSW. However, on commenting 
on weaknesses of the Act, some YLOs felt that YJC falls short because it does not allow 
for integration of all the services that could assist the young offender: ‘I think if we 
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work together more with other agencies and make it a more collaborative approach- 
even inside those conferences- I think we would see stronger conference outcomes’ 
(YLO4).  
 
This view indicates to some extent that perhaps some YLOs want a more active role in 
the actual process of YJC. But at the same time, it indicates that there is not much faith 
in the process as it is, because of the lack of a broader approach. It could be argued that 
this lack of faith could affect decision-making, particularly in the case of those young 
people considered more ‘risky’ or in need of greater interventions beyond the scope of 
those within reach for YJC processes. This is clearly illustrated by YLO2, who noted 
at times asking themselves, ‘am I loading this person up, that he has no 
accommodation, no support networks, I’m sending him into another conference where 
he is going to agree to do certain things. He’s already got three other plans 
outstanding, is this right?’  
 
It is no secret that when it comes to Indigenous people, the requirements of 
accommodation and support networks are often harder to comply with than for non-
Indigenous communities. Accordingly, the above remark prompted the interviewer to 
ask the YLO for his/her views on how gender and ethnicity shapes diversion. YLO2 
responded, 
no, I’ve never based anything other than… the criminality component 
because I, conferencing is... I find it can be very powerful and I had 
conferences with varying ethnicities, varying sexualities, varying ages, 
various support networks, some who were out of home, some that are in-
home, some that have never been in trouble with police 
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YLOs did not seem to be interested in the implications, that focusing on certain 
requirements such are mentioned above, might be further excluding certain populations 
over the rest. Indeed, the topic of Indigeneity and gender seemed taboo with YLOs who 
were quick to note that diversion is equally available to Indigenous as it is to non-
Indigenous youth and insisted on the egalitarian approach to all from police.  According 
to the YLOs interviewed, if at any time this is not the case, it is due to the Legal Aid 
advice given to Indigenous youth to refuse interviewing.  
 
On discussing the weaknesses of the Act, a key issue that was noted by some YLOs is 
that police, in general, do not think the YOA produces solutions. As noted earlier in the 
chapter, YLOs are not in favour of an unlimited number of YJCs for the same young 
person. In fact, as previously discussed, there appears to be an unofficial agreement that 
for the most part, a maximum of two or three YJC will warrant a charge the next time 
around. This sentiment clearly aligns with a more punitive stance than the one that 
seems to be intended by the Act. When asked to note weaknesses of the Act, some YLOs 
also noted that cautioning should only be used once, for those that ‘come under the 
police notice for the first time’ (YLO1), rather than the possible three times as 
prescribed by the Act. As YLO1 remarked, 
As far as conferencing, it works really well for those kids, again, who need 
things put in place. Where I’m very interested is the percentage out of 
Juvenile Justice conferences that have been successful…Otherwise I think 
it’s not doing anything. It’s a waste of money…they’re still committing 
offences; it’s a waste of money…They need to go and do time…Enough is 
enough, like for young people when do we say: enough is enough? Because 
if they keep getting [off], they laugh at us at court. We go to court and they 
laugh at us as police. They laugh in our face, they go, “Magistrate will just 
let me off; I’ll get what I want”. So, a lot of police feel dealing with YOA or 
young people is a waste of time. 
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The above remark illustrates the struggles of a YLO in supporting the YOA, a process 
that appears to be viewed in their institution as a ‘soft approach’ and hence results in 
young people disrespecting and ‘laughing at police’. YLO1 added, 
They think it’s a joke. As in young kids that… have done their three cautions 
and their conferences, to me they’ve gone, they’re far gone. You can’t save 
them because now they’re going into the charge process and they’ve had 
warning after warning, talk after talk. I’ve spent each caution, half an hour 
talking to that person. You know, how much more talking can you do? 
 
Indeed, it appears some YLOs expect the YOA to be a ‘silver bullet’, whereby one single 
referral to YJC would result in no further reoffending. Finding that this is not the case, 
YLOs are willing to deem the process as a failure and give up quite quickly. Further, 
these perspectives illustrate the high expectations among interviewees regarding the 
engagement by young people, and/or intervention for young people. There seems to be 
a sense that repeatedly referring young people to diversionary measures can result in 
them failing to receive interventions and to address their criminogenic needs. The need 
for diversion away from the system as per intended in the YOA is dismissed or 
misunderstood. The focus shifting to diversion of a different kind, that of early 
intervention. However, the aims, and consequently, the outcomes, of diversion away 
from the court, as opposed to diversion to early intervention are distinct (Richards, 
2014a; see chapter one). The perceived tension between the two types of diversion at 
the time of decision-making undermines diversion under the YOA, and, consequently, 
the principle of detention as a 'last resort' is compromised. Nevertheless, some YLOs 
noted that this attitude was not shared by all police, and it was a reflection of a lack of 
training and/or support amongst certain LACs. 
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In discussing the strengths of the Act, for some YLOs the potential to repair harm to the 
victim through the YJC is a positive point on which to focus. However, other YLOs 
were sceptical about the value of conferencing on this front. For example, YLO2, a 
convenor of YJC as a second job (outside the NSW Police Force), noted that recently 
the convenor has to screen the young person, including aspects such as sports, play, 
leisure, drugs and alcohol, and home life amongst other things in order to provide more 
appropriate assistance to the offender. This participant further added: 
Now that that system is in place, conferencing is more about restoring the 
young person, which I am all for …as much as the victim is left in the 
background- and I’ve been a victim myself- there is nothing for the victim in 
a conference. Nothing. Victims don’t get anything (YLO1). 
 
The above remark is significant, in that it furthers contradictory understandings of the 
process amongst YLOs, with some thinking that the most valuable asset of YJC is the 
inclusion of the victim and others believing that the process replicates the traditional 
court system in that the victim’s need are excluded. 
 
A further weakness of the Act was expressed concerning the charges covered by the 
Act. Although for the most part, YLOs are in agreement with the legislation including 
only those ‘less serious’ offences, at times they find this aspect difficult to work with. 
For example, due to the latest amendment to the Act in regard to ‘graffiti’, as YLO2 
noted,  
…the police now have to charge a young person; however, the courts can 
refer them for conferencing…there are a few YLOS’s that are quite 
frustrated…especially if they are 14-year-olds [who have] never been in 
trouble, yet I can head-butt you as a young person and cause an injury and 
get a caution…So, I think there’s some offences that need to be looked 
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at…The offence of intimidation; so, I can threaten to hit you, so I have to be 
charged but if I physically hit you, I can get a caution or a conference. 
 
Such scenarios were commonly described as ‘frustrating’ and ‘ridiculous’. Further, this 
was noted to postulate difficulties in the promotion of the use of the YOA within the 
police and when trying to promote the Act to the community as well. As YLO4 noted,  
In the minds of some police and even the community they think: “That can’t 
be right; we can’t be dealing with a full-blown assault under the YOA but yet 
we’re sending kids off to court for scribbling on a wall with a texta”. 
 
As illustrated above, in regard to which offences can be diverted, the YOA at times 
appear incoherent and disproportionate, thus undermining the validity of the Act. 
Adding to this, when speaking about ‘graffiti’, the YLOs frustrations were also focused 
on the waste of time for the police with this process. As YLO4 claimed ‘…effectively 
what we’re doing is…going around the long way again. Because nine out of ten 
referrals to court for graffiti will come back for juvenile conference’. Charging 
someone involves intensive paperwork, only for charges to come back after a court 
referral. Further, it was also detected that police frustration regarding the inability to 
divert graffiti offences themselves were about the issue of power in decision making, 
as the court are granted such diversionary decision-making powers, but the police are 
not.  
 
For some YLOs, it was also important to gain more power in regard to being able to 
attach conditions to cautions. For example, YLO3 noted,  
I’ve always said that I would love to see that YLO’s could attach conditions 
to caution because at the moment all we can do is ask them to write an 
apology letter. I would love to actually have some sort of thing where I can 
make them do something…for example, if they’ve done a shoplifting…that 
they…have to go a reimburse for the damage that was done to the clothing. 
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Further examples given of conditions to be attached to cautions included drug 
rehabilitation programs or counselling. These remarks illustrate a desire to have the 
power to impose further sanctions, but more importantly, they signified the lack of 
acceptance of ‘caution’ as ‘a caution’ and only that, as intended by the legislation. 
Rather, a more punitive approach is driving this desire/need to attach punishment to a 
caution. This reinforces the tensions that were noted throughout this chapter. On the 
surface, there is an understanding of the possibilities of a less intrusive way of dealing 
with young offenders, while at a deeper level the police are having difficulties accepting 
an approach that is not punitive. This can undermine the utilisation of the Act. 
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has focused on the role of NSW Police Force within the decision-making 
process that will eventuate in the diversion, or not, of young people under the YOA. 
Presenting the findings from interviews conducted with five YLOs and one youth 
policy officer of NSW Police Force, the chapter unveils police thinking on a range of 
issues. As it has been noted throughout, the limited number of the YLO’s that agreed 
to participate in this research restricts the ability to generalise based on the findings. 
Nevertheless, it does unveil significant factors to be considered. 
 
The findings yield some interesting observations. YLO attraction to the role in the first 
place is gendered. It is about the suitability of the working hours for personal reasons 
such as mothering. For some YLOs, this is further linked with the desire to help 
children, or/and idealism about intervention to protect children from criminal pathways. 
It is not unusual for the latter to have had a professional background outside the NSW 
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Police Force that focused on working with children, further illustrating a passion for 
helping children.  
 
On describing their role, YLOs see themselves as specialists on the YOA, with 
exclusive in-depth knowledge on the Act, the processes and its capabilities for 
rehabilitation when in comparison to traditional criminal justice. In contrast, YLOs note 
that this knowledge is beyond the scope of the general duties police officer. Similarly, 
YLOs claim that the SYO, which role is to act as YLO, lacks this comprehensive scope 
of the YOA. The lack of education and training is one of the main reasons provided as 
an explanation for this.  However, it is possible, that these observations by YLOs are 
based on a need to justify or legitimise their position within the hierarchal nature of the 
institution. Yet, through the interview process YLOs appear, in the end, to share more 
similarities with general duties officers, as demonstrated through their attitudes and 
practices, than they would like to admit. An example is seen in the punitive approach 
that guides the arbitrary limits they impose on YJC as a restorative practice.  
 
The lack of training is an issue of concern. The lack of training and/or education was 
linked to time constraints, but most significantly at times, also linked to a lack of 
support within the NSW Police Force, in that, according to some YLOs youth matters 
do not seem to be relevant on the agenda. At the same time, this lack of education is 
seen as a consequence from negative attitudes that many police officers have of the 
YLO’s role and more specifically on the existence of the YOA which is seen as a ‘soft 
option’, an alternative to deserved ‘punishment’. This, in turn, once again, undermines 
the significance of youth matters further.  
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The necessity to overcome resistance from the general police officers is significant, 
given the fact that at the end of the day, the decision making in regard to whether to 
charge or not lays with them. In this context, the YLOs power in regard to decision-
making relies on providing advice and guidance as opposed to being the one making 
the final decision. This can compromise diversionary decision-making, particularly 
across LACs, where there is a lesser level of engagement and communication between 
YLOs and general duties officers. Indeed, certain YLOs express knowledge of unequal 
level of support across LACs. 
 
The juxtaposition of their roles further accentuates the existence of power conflicts and 
disparity of knowledge between groups within the NSW Police Force. The legislation 
defines the YLOs’ role to include the implementation of the Act, provision of training, 
monitoring of the use of diversion, acting as SYOs, as well as promoting the provisions 
of the Act. Accordingly, the participants acknowledge the nature of their role to focus 
on prevention and rehabilitation rather than punishment. In contrast to this, traditional 
police work within the criminal justice system has been more reactive than proactive, 
emphasising and privileging law enforcement. Some YLOs consider this a significant 
impediment in their successful promotion of diversion under the YOA, both, when 
trying to promote it amongst police officers, as well as within the community. 
 
Nevertheless, the YLO’s role in the implementation of the Act cannot be undermined. 
YLOs directly oversee cautions, and YJC referrals, thus their understandings of 
diversion and attitudes are of critical significance. The discussion of these, reveals that 
the high level of discretion within the Act when it comes to applying the criteria for 
diversion allows for subjectivity that can possibly lead to uneven decisions.  
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For example, for the most part, YLOs claim to adhere to the hierarchical order as 
prescribed by legislation, that is warnings, cautions, follow by YJC and court as a ‘last 
resort’. However, the discussion demonstrates that this hierarchical order is not 
necessarily adhered to. Often, consideration of other criteria in the Act, such as the 
‘seriousness’ of the offence and history of the young person out-weighs the eligibility 
of the offence in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the weight of these other 
criteria varies and is subjected to numerous interpretations. Subjectivity cannot be 
avoided in discretionary decision-making, and it is definitely unavoidable due to the 
wide discretionary powers vested in police and YLOs by the legislation. However, 
concerns need to be raised when biases might come through discretionary decision- 
making because of the cultural context in which the decisions are made. One could 
argue that the ‘punitive’ culture within NSW Police Force undermines the use of the 
YOA to its full capacity. 
 
One of the factors, perhaps showing a more uneven viewpoint amongst YLOs, but one 
that does not align with the intentions of the legislation is the number of times that an 
offender should be cautioned or conferenced. As noted, the legislation allows for an 
offender to be diverted by a caution up to three times; while an offender can be diverted 
through a YJC an unlimited number of times. However, it appears, that except for 
limited cases, two or three YJCs are seen as generous by most YLOs. Equally, the 
number of three cautions is not always agreed to be the best option, with some believing 
that one caution is enough. At the same time, the lack of faith around the courts is 
spoken about by YLOs, particular relating to the courts’ alleged failure to satisfy the 
NSW Police Force desire for intrusive interventions. This results in YLOs speaking of 
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YJC as an alternative to getting some intrusive intervention. Again, the philosophy of 
‘punishment’ and ‘justice’, rather than welfare is favoured, and YLO attitudes are 
clearly influenced by punitive philosophies entrenched in law enforcement cultures. 
Such attitudes are difficult to overcome.  
 
Overall, this all leads to a mix of opinions in regard to who gets to be diverted. This, in 
conjunction with, the challenges over training issues and the availability, or not, of 
those most trained during certain periods when a charge is being considered, then lead 
to concern over the capacity of the NSW Police Force to implement the YOA as it was 
intended, with court as a ‘last resort’. However, YLOs are not accepting of these factors 
as possible responsible causes of the low number of diversions. 
 
In fact, the only plausible explanation YLOs are willing to accept is the requirement of 
the Act for the person to admit the offence and the unwillingness of the young person 
to admit to the offence. Further, now that the PAS has been rolled out as a response to 
such criticisms, YLOs believe this will bear no difference in the number of referrals. 
The interview findings indicate that, partly, this is due to police resistance to use a 
document that is viewed as an inducement. However, it is also due to the fact that a 
young person of interest to the police, particular one of Indigenous background, will 
view such a document with scepticism and mistrust. That is the lack of admission of 
guilt continues to be viewed by YLOs as a major factor that constrains the use of 
diversion. Thus, within the police bureaucracy, there is a dispersal of responsibility of 
utilisation rates to structural ‘failings’ within the legislation itself. 
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Finally, in discussing the weaknesses and strengths of the Act overall, YLOs illustrate 
contradictory beliefs on the potential of YJC to provide victim satisfaction. For some, 
this is a positive aspect of the process, while others perceived that the process is solely 
focused on the young person’s rehabilitation instead. However, the one factor of 
agreement amongst the YLOs is that in regard to the broad scope of offences precluded 
by the legislation, the Act is incoherent. This is a significant issue that poses difficulties 
in promoting the use of the Act, and hence undermining the entire use of diversion. 
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CHAPTER FIVE - INTERVIEWS WITH MAGISTRATES  
 
Introduction 
The discussion in this chapter contributes to understanding the decision-making process 
that will eventuate in the diversion (or not) of young people under the YOA. Exploring 
magisterial thinking on matters of diversion, the chapter examines the findings of one 
video and twelve face-to-face interviews with, ten specialist Children Court’s 
magistrates, two Local Court magistrates, and the President of the Children’s Court 
Magistrates in NSW.  
 
Interviews were conducted between February 2015 and October 2015. The interview 
questions52 were designed to enable respondents to express their views on a broad range 
of issues relating to diversion. These included a preliminary set of questions that 
focused on participants’ career trajectories to the Children’s Court magistrate role and 
perceived differences between their roles as Children Court magistrates and Local 
Court magistrates. A second group of questions focused on magistrates’ involvement 
in the process of diversion to cautions and YJC, including participants being asked to 
outline their experiences with other organisations involved in diversionary practices; 
factors affecting their decision-making process; their perspectives on the weakness and 
strengths of the process of diversion; and recommendations that might improve the 
process of diversion. 
 
 
 
52 Refer to Appendix 5 for the Children’s Court Magistrates interview schedule. 
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Participants from the New South Wales Magistracy 
As noted, this group of participants included the President of the Children’s Court, ten 
specialist53 Children’s Court magistrates and two Local Court magistrates. To ensure 
the anonymity of the participants, regardless of their positions as President, Local or 
specialist magistrate, each is numbered from Magistrate 1 to Magistrate 13. The entire 
group is referred to as the ‘magistracy’. 
 
The magistrates’ sample consisted of seven men and six women aged between 46 and 
67.54 They had worked in the criminal justice system for periods of time ranging from 
17 to 50 years. The specialist Children’s Court magistrates had worked in their current 
positions55 for a length of time ranging from 5 to 12 years. Local Court magistrates had 
worked in their current positions between 3 to 5 years. Appointed to the District Court 
in 2006 and having heard criminal cases since 2007, the President of the Children’s 
Court had been in his position for three and a half years at the time of interview. 
 
At the time of the interviews, five specialist Children Court magistrates were based in 
Parramatta; two in Bidura (covering matters from Bidura; La Perouse and Lane Cove 
areas); one moved between Sutherland, Port Kembla and Nowra; one in Campbelltown; 
one moved between Orange and Dubbo; and one moved between Woy Woy, Wyong 
and Hornsby. This cohort and distribution provide a good spread, both occupational 
and geographical, as it includes eleven of the total fifteen specialists Children’s Court 
 
53 As noted in previous chapters, the head of the Children’s Court Children is the President of the Children’s Court, 
to whom 15 Court magistrates are appointed as specialist Children Court magistrates. These magistrates are located 
in specialists Courts in Parramatta, Glebe, Broadmeadow, Campbelltown, Illawarra, Woy Woy and Wyong. Local 
Courts in all other areas of NSW sit as Children’s Courts as needed. Adding to this, a country care circuit for 
specialists Children Court Magistrates operates in the regions of Lismore, Dubbo and the Riverina (Fernandez et al, 
2014). 
54 Two of these participants chose not to disclose their age. 
55 ‘Current position’ refers to their position as magistrates, but not their particular location at the time of the 
interviews.  
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magistrates appointed at any given time while their locations cover all existing 
specialist Children’s Courts in NSW.    
 
Adding to this, one of the two Local Court magistrates interviewed was placed in 
Armidale; and the other one was placed in Dubbo and Wellington. 56  From this 
perspective, it was not possible to make generalisations of the entire Local Court 
magistrates that handle children’s matters based on the responses of the two 
interviewed. However, those interviewed provided significant insights about a range of 
issues in regard to youth diversion. Specifically, their position (as Local Court 
magistrates rather than specialists of the Children’s Court) and locations allowed for 
comparisons with reference to priorities, resources and differences in diversion between 
urban and rural settings. Table 4 provides a summary of the demographics of the 
participants as well as the regions in which they practice. 
  
 
56 As noted in chapter three, a total of twelve Local Court Magistrates were invited to participate. However, only 
two agreed to take part in this research. 
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Table 4: Demographics of NSW judiciary participants 
Gender Age Time in the 
CJS 
Time in current 
role 
***Regions covered 
 
Male 67 50 years 8 years Parramatta;  
Bidura 
(Glebe/Broadmeadow); 
Campbelltown; 
Southerland/Port Kembla 
and Nowra; 
Orange; 
WoyWoy/Wyong/Hornsby  
Dubbo/Wellington; 
and Armidale  
 
 
 
Male 63 Over 20 years** 5 years 
Female 56 24 years 12 years 
Female 63 * 5 years 
Female 65 40 years 2 years 
Male 60 26 years 6 years 
Male 46 28 years 3 years 
Female * 17 years 5 years 
Female * 31 years 4 years 
Male 60 32 years 3 years 
Female 50 24 years 3 years 
Male 47 26 years 5 years 
Male 66 44 years 9 years 
*Undisclosed. Some participants expressed their wishes not to have their age recorded, as they 
indicated that they found this factor irrelevant to the research. 
** Exact time undisclosed by participant. 
*** To avoid the identification of the participants, the courts at which each sit have not been 
singled out, but instead are presented as a group. 
 
It is important to note that the two Local Court magistrates interviewed attend to 
children’s matters when necessary. According to Magistrate 12, children’s matters 
make up ‘about 20% or less of their work’. Nevertheless, their role is defined by the 
Local Court; hence, they respond to the Chief Magistrate of the Local Court rather than 
the President of the Children’s Court. The fact that for these magistrates in the Local 
Court, children’s matters are a small percentage of the work of the Court appeared to 
generate a different level of interest in this research when compared to the specialist 
Children Court magistrates. This was illustrated by the low level of interest displayed 
by Local Court magistrates to participate in the research. 57  Additionally, because 
children’s matters are not the primary focus of the Local Court, there are further 
differences between the Local and Children’s Court magistrates regarding issues of 
communication, court processes and decision making towards diversion. For example, 
the information collected during the interviews raised concerns regarding lawyers and 
magistrates that work in rural areas relative depth of knowledge of the YOA. 
 
57 Only two Local Court Magistrates agreed to participate of a total of 12 that were invited (see Chapter Three). 
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Attractions to, and understandings of, the Magistrate’s role 
This section discusses the participants’ trajectory to their current role, their views in 
regarding the significance of the Children’s Court magistrate role, and finally their 
views on their role in relation to diversion under the YOA. 
 
The Governor in Council formally appoints magistrates and judges in NSW.58 A list of 
professional and personal criteria approved by the NSW Attorney-General is to guide 
the selection process (see State of NSW (Department of Justice), 2016a).  Vacancies 
for Local Court magistrates are advertised calling for expressions of interest. However, 
it has been noted that in some instances, appointments are made of persons that have 
not applied (Judicial Conference of Australia, 2015). Children’s magistrates are 
selected from appointed Local Court magistrates having regard to their knowledge, 
qualifications, skills and experience in dealing with children, young people and their 
families (State of NSW (Department of Justice), 2016b, para. 2).  
 
In explaining their professional trajectory, the magistrates’ responses indicate that prior 
to their current appointments the majority of the magistrates had a long career within 
the criminal justice system, although those careers displayed a diversity of pathways to 
their current role. Table 5 provides an overview of the professional background of each 
of the participants. 
  
 
58 See Section 37 Supreme Court Act 1970; Section 11 Land and Environment Court Act 1979;  
Section 18 District Court Act 1973; and Section 16 Local Court Act 2007. 
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Table 5: Professional background prior to appointment as Magistrates 
Professional background 
DPP/national crime authority (organized crime/investigations unit of Nazi war crime)/ 
Prosecutor in Netherlands of the international criminal tribunal for Yugoslavia 
Lawyer/Judicial member of compensation court 
Solicitor/Private practice (criminal law/children’s care work) 
Commercial Litigation/Mediation/Workers compensation 
Lawyer in the Court of Petty Sessions (now the Local Court)/DPP/Private practice 
Social Worker (children/family in juvenile criminal system)/Family and community 
services /Lawyer in Criminal Law  
Police officer/ Police prosecutor/ Private practice (family law/children’s court) 
Humanities degree/social worker 
Legal Aid Solicitor (indictable offences-criminal law) 
Legal Aid Lawyer 
Private practice (everything except crime)/Lawyer with DPP (murder and rape trials) 
Clerk at Legal Aid/Policy Review/ Prosecutor in Western Australia (sex trials)/Solicitor 
advocate (coronial enquiries; prosecutions) 
Commercial lawyer in private practice/Judge in District Court (civil cases; commercial 
disputes and professional indemnity) 
 
The most common trajectory was a long-time career practising criminal law with Legal 
Aid followed by some years in the Department of Public Prosecutions. Further, most 
participants have had careers mainly in the public sector, although a couple of 
magistrates had a few years in private practice as well. Their areas of practice varied, 
from commercial law, criminal law, coronial enquiries, organised crime, policing, to 
social work. The diverse professional backgrounds are indicative of a more 
representative magistracy typical of recent years (see Kiefel and Saunders, 2015).  
 
As previously noted, Children’s Court magistrates are selected with regard to their 
knowledge and experience in dealing with children. The interviews with the 
participants in this study revealed that the degree of experience in dealing with children, 
young people and their families varies greatly from one magistrate to another. For 
example, one of the participants was appointed as a Children’s Magistrate following 
what he described as an ‘unusual career’ investigating Nazi war crimes in Australia 
and abroad yet having had no previous experience related to children’s matters.  
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All Local Court Magistrates in NSW need to do country service as part of their 
orientation. Country service involves courts in a circuit and as noted by Magistrate 2:  
When you are a country Magistrate, you do everything! I would do adult 
crime, but also do children’s crime. I’ll do civil cases, coronial work. And in 
the children’s jurisdiction I would also do care jurisdiction. 
 
Except for four magistrates that had previous involvement with children’s matters in 
their criminal justice system careers, it was through country service that most 
magistrates had become experienced with children or family matters. Following 
country service, some magistrates were asked to take appointments in the Children’s 
Court, while others described their time of exposure to children’s matters during 
country service as a turning point that led them to submit an expression of interest for 
the role of ‘specialist’ magistrate in the Children’s Court when it became available. For 
example, Magistrate 2 described the exposure to children’s matters as ‘the most 
challenging work that I’ve experienced in my legal career. It’s the type of work where 
you feel as though you have the possibility of making a difference’. Similarly, 
Magistrate 1 noted ‘I like being in this jurisdiction because you get an opportunity to 
turn kids away from what could become a life of crime’.  
 
Whether in their current role because of particular personal or professional interests, all 
‘specialist’ magistrates in the Children’s Court described themselves to be in a position 
where they are presented with the possibility of making a difference. These magistrates 
add, that this view comes from the acknowledgement that young people need to be dealt 
with differently to adults (see Johnstone 2014a, 2014b; Richards, 2011b) and the 
emphasis of the Children’s Court on rehabilitation (see Section 6 of the Children’s 
Criminal Proceedings Act) rather than retributive punishment and deterrence. Indeed, 
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all magistrates interviewed emphasised the significant difference between the 
Children’s Court and the Adult Criminal Court to be clearly defined by the focus of the 
Children’s Court on rehabilitation. As Magistrate 1 remarked, 
the focus in the children’s court is completely different to the other work of 
the Local Court or the District Court or the Supreme Court in its criminal 
jurisdiction…The difference is that the focus in the Children’s Court is 
rehabilitation of young people rather than retribution. Retribution and general 
deterrence are important, but they play a secondary role to rehabilitation. 
Whereas in the Local Court for example, and in the criminal justice system 
rehabilitation is not the focus; the focus is looking after the community’s 
interest and ensuring general deterrence and punishment for wrongdoing. 
 
Or, as Magistrate 13 noted,  
We work on the basis that detention, being the most serious of penalties, 
should only be used as a last resort. And that is because we know, all the 
studies tell us that if a child is put into detention, or a young person is put in 
detention, the outcomes for that person in later life are quite deleterious, you 
know, they have less chance of getting suitable work, they are less successful 
in marital relationships, they generally don’t do as well in life as someone 
who hasn’t been in a detention centre.  
 
Magistrate 13 further explained that, ‘firstly, the knowledge that 80% of children under 
the age of 18 who commit crime stop offending in the very early twenties’, and secondly, 
the knowledge emanating from brain-science research on the development of the 
adolescent brain that ‘tells us that children commit crimes impulsively and without a lot 
of thought’ (Magistrate 13), are all reasons to advocate for ‘the four pillars of an 
enlightened youth justice system’ (Magistrate 13). According to Magistrate 13, these 
four pillars are: • prevention - dealing with socio-economic and health issues that lead to 
crime; 	
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• early intervention; 	• diversion – not only through the YOA, but including other diversionary 
processes available through the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) and the 
Mental Health (Forensics Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW); and 	• rehabilitation – the idea being that once a child has been convicted of a 
crime, the system should direct its energy to rehabilitation through various 
programs. 	
These views clearly align, at least theoretically, with the framework and aims of the 
YOA in as much as it provides an appropriate tool for emphasising rehabilitation needs 
rather than deeds when it comes to young children. 
 
The significance of the Children’s Criminal Court providing a legal avenue for children 
that is appropriate to their age was further emphasised by several magistrates who spoke 
about the importance of communication and court processes to be carried out in a way 
that recognises children as a vulnerable group that need specialised treatment before 
the law. Some of the examples mentioned included the significance of the ‘closed’ 
nature of the Children’s Court in protecting the vulnerability of children. Further, two 
magistrates spoke about the significance of communication and of being able to provide 
an environment that is most appropriate to this particular group. For example, 
Magistrate 4 remarked,  
when I sit in the local court there is a sea of people in any court room, usually, 
huge numbers of people waiting for their five minutes when their matter is 
called and they are dealt with in some way or another... in the children's court 
of course, it is a closed court and there is a lot more personal interaction 
perhaps, a lot more direct contact with the young person, with his or her 
family, they are clearly identified, they are in your court and they are with 
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you, still could be five minutes sometimes...but they are with you, whereas 
in the local court it seems more like a distant relationship. 
 
Specialist magistrates emphasised the opportunity provided by processes such as the 
one described above to have a positive impact on a young person’s trajectory away 
from crime.  The practical measures in place, such as the closed court and increased 
levels of personal interaction with children and their families, facilitates relationship 
building even if briefly, something that is missing from other criminal court settings. 
In contrast, some of the local court magistrates’ accounts within this context 
emphasised the difficulties that the non-exclusive nature of their courtroom presents 
regarding implementing such processes that the non-exclusive nature of their 
courtroom presents. Furthermore, there were feelings of concern from some local 
magistrates when these processes might take up the court’s time and make the juggling 
of adult and children’s court matters difficult. Above all, their concern was about 
wanting to do their utmost to protect children and the constraints placed on this aim by 
the local court environment. For example, Magistrate 11 remarked, 
I actually find that very annoying today because today I’m not supposed to 
have any kids listed on my adult day and the police listed two kids court 
charges on an adult day. The reason I find it annoying is that I don’t think it’s 
fair for kids to wait outside on the list day where, you know, you have a lot 
of matters coming through court and obviously a lot of adult offenders, and 
I just don’t think it’s appropriate to have kids on at the same time. And we 
do have a separately set out day for kid’s court, but because the police put 
the wrong date on the charge, that was the day the kids had to come to court. 
So, that is about it that I don’t like because I think it bad for the kids. Also, it 
means I’ve got to close the court in the middle of the day which takes time, 
you know, just to close the court, find the clients, bring them in et cetera et 
cetera. I think it’s very distracting for the children because they’ve just got 
solicitors coming in and out not realising it is kids court; they’re supposed to 
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put a sign on, but they obviously didn’t. And I think is very distracting for 
the children whose matters are being dealt with, it really, it really bothers me.  
 
The quote above illustrates the effect of the location with respect to the city versus the 
rural location on the processing and effectiveness of the Children’s Court. The issue of 
rural/city divide has been previously noted by Fernandez et al. (2013), particularly in 
regard to equitable access to significant difference of resources available in rural areas 
of NSW. Fernandez et al. (2013) note these differences to be ‘in terms of specialist 
courtrooms, availability of specialised staff including legal representatives and 
magistrates and access to training’ (p. 31). The participants in this research add to those 
findings in terms of the effects that, first, the differences between specialist versus non-
specialist courtrooms practices, and second, the access to a specialised magistrate 
versus local magistrate, might have when dealing with children’s matters and more 
specifically in the context of diversion.  
 
Another specific issue of concern expressed by the participants is the need for 
magistrates that handle both adult and children matters to be able to move from one 
particular outlook to another effectively. For example, on handling children’s matters, 
a local court magistrate noted: 
And then of course, you got to get your head around the fact that you are 
sentencing in a completely different way. So, the fellow, the boy today who 
had a charge of aggravated break and enter and steal, if he was over 18 that 
would be, that would go through to the DPP list and he would then be 
committed for trial or sentenced in the District Court by a judge. The 
maximum penalty is, like, 20 years in jail if you’re 18 but because he was 16, 
he doesn’t go to the DPP; it stays in the kid’s court – the maximum is two 
year’s detention so it’s a completely different mindset and the principles of 
sentencing are completely different. So, I find it difficult to go from one to 
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the other. But that’s the reality being in a country court sometimes 
(Magistrate 11). 
 
The experiences described by this local court magistrate are shared in a similarly by 
some specialist magistrates. For example, a specialist magistrate noted, 
...sometimes you are not needed here and you will be sent to the Local Court 
and you have to change your mindset and sometimes it is not easy to do that, 
and sometimes initially I forget to do that, and then I realise, oh look I can't 
or shouldn't be calling the offender by the first name like I do here in the 
children's court, I've got to look at it more in terms of the adult concepts of 
punishment, deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation has obviously got a part to 
play, but you got to give focus, probably a lot of more other focus to the other 
concepts of punishment, like retribution, deterrence than you do here, so it is 
a different mind-set, and you have to remind yourself, sometimes you forget, 
but you have to remind yourself to do that (Magistrate 6). 
 
Magistrate 9 elaborated on the difficulties inherent in being required to change outlooks 
by stating that: 
after you've been doing the Children's Court for a while it is actually, I find 
it quite difficult to swap back to adults. Because the penalty, it's a completely 
different regime for the children's Court … The focus of the children's Court 
is pursuant to section 6 in the Act - Children's Criminal Procedure Act - 
which focuses on rehabilitation rather than retribution. And adult courts don't 
do that. And so really the penalties in children's Court for really quite serious 
crimes are comparatively minor. Really, they’re very light. 
 
These quotes suggest that an ability to maintain emphasis on rehabilitation in order to 
deal with children matters as opposed to adults’ is dependent on being in a specialist 
court dealing with children’s matters only. However, some magistrates disagreed, 
claiming that the outlook towards children’s or adults’ matters is framed by each 
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magistrate’s individual experiences and attitudes to their work. For example, 
Magistrate 8 noted:  
Well obviously, [in the local court] you’re dealing with adults, not children, 
so the mindset is that different stage of life development and of course, 
different laws and different rules apply. So, that’s where the mindset perhaps 
is different. And obviously in relation to children, because they are children 
and youth, depending upon their age, is they are treated differently through a 
number of diversionary programs, such as the Youth Justice Conferencing 
and other outcomes under the Young Offenders Act. But the same 
diversionary programs apply in the local court, but I think the answer to your 
question [how do you adapt to the different mindset required] is very much 
an individual experience as it relates to, not only the judicial officer’s 
background – mine was humanities, always working with people as a 
behavioural scientist and then coming to law, - so I’ve got the enmeshment 
of both, if you like, - areas of knowledge. Whereas other magistrates may 
have probably only done law and then, of course, got appointed. So, they 
haven’t had that exposure to persons and working with them. So, I guess for 
me as an individual I would approach local court work similarly to Children’s 
court work in the sense of using diversionary programs and therapeutic 
outcomes, not only as required under the law in the appropriate occasion, but 
also understanding what would fit that particular person best in terms of a 
therapeutic outcome, or a diversionary outcome. 
 
Diversionary options under the YOA require a focus on restorative outcomes, so it is 
crucial to ensure that all magistrates dealing with children’s matters foreground 
restorative justice. Some of the difficulties noted by magistrates, of swapping back and 
forth from adult’s to children’s matters, raise concerns in this respect. Whilst all 
magistrates acknowledged the focus of the children’s court to be on rehabilitation and 
that legislation such as the YOA offers a platform to divert away from the more punitive 
sanctions of the court, the question remains with regards to whether this is always 
stressed fully.  The following section provides a closer look at the magistrates’ 
interpretations of the Act and their various applications of it. 
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Children’s Court magistrates on diversion versus court 
Some senior magistrates acknowledged that the need to lead the court towards 
outcomes where detention is kept as a ‘last resort’ are a primary focus of discussion 
within the current children’s court in NSW. Discussions within the court management, 
look to examples such as Sweden where, as Magistrate 13 noted ‘they don’t stigmatise 
children by labelling them as criminals, they deal with it as a social problem’. 
However, as Magistrate 13 further noted, such an outlook is significantly at odds with 
common-law systems such as the one in Australia, deeply rooted in the philosophies of 
Jeremy Bentham and where ‘it’s only in the last 150-160 years that we’ve even accepted 
that people who commit crimes can be rehabilitated’ (Magistrate 13). In this manner, 
it was specifically noted by senior magistrates that the philosophy of diversionary 
alternatives to court is totally inconsistent with the ideologies of common law and in 
particular the adversarial aspect of Australian courts. The welfare ethos that is strong 
in Scandinavian countries is treated with disregard here. Social and cultural context 
places pressure on magistrates to place blame or locate responsibility in individual 
children.  
 
Nevertheless, some magistrates believe the existing system can be improved. For 
example, New Zealand, in which adversarial models have provided the framework for 
social and legal needs since colonisation, has been, in more recent decades, embracing 
non-adversarial approaches to justice (Brookbanks, 2015). Specialised alcohol and drug 
court, collaborative family proceedings, transformative mediation, preventative law 
and family group conferencing are examples of such non-adversarial approaches. In the 
context of youth justice, this has resulted in nearly 80% of young offenders being 
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diverted and not resulting in a youth court appearance (Becroft Judge, 2003; Cleland, 
2016). The opinion that this should be the direction that the children’s court should be 
taking in NSW was noted in the following statement by Magistrate 13, 
in New Zealand it is compulsory for every child who commits a crime to 
have what is called family group conferencing, so they are all assessed. And 
80% of children in New Zealand don't even go into the criminal justice 
system, they don’t go to court; they are all dealt with in community programs 
pursuant to a family group plan or family plan that addresses their issues and 
that's all done by the police under a diversionary process. So, only 20% of 
children in New Zealand even get into the justice system, so that gives you 
are a bit of an indication of where I think we should be going.  
 
However, this sentiment is at odds with most of the magistracy interviewed. Most 
magistrates were not willing to laud New Zealand’s diversionary system, where most 
children do not go to court. Nevertheless, at times, some were willing to admit that the 
New Zealand approach makes sense in economic rationalist terms. For example, 
Magistrate 10 remarked,  
it is much cheaper to use diversion options as they do in New Zealand, there 
is a whole range of matters that come to this court that shouldn’t, that they 
are a waste of enormously valuable and expensive resources, that could be 
better devoted to dealing with more serious matters and dealing with the 
minimum timely matter, so there is an economic rationalist argument for that. 
 
On the issue of cost effectiveness, according to a study by BOCSAR, YJC is more cost 
effective than court (see Webber, 2012). However, the acknowledgement of such 
economic rationales by the magistrates was followed with remarks emphasising that 
from their viewpoint, the New Zealand approach will not work here because such an 
approach will require more resources than are available in NSW. Magistrate 10 noted, 
It [the NZ approach] needs to be done with adequate training of those people 
who are going to be making the decision, it needs to be done with the full 
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level of resources available, and quite frankly, at present the resources 
available in NSW don't match what is available in New Zealand. It requires 
even things like, in New Zealand, I know from my attending conferences 
there and talking to their judiciary that the government agencies providing 
various services are way more cooperative, so it's even those sort of things, 
it is not just about the legislation, it is about how things operate in practice, 
so the people from the education department talk to the people from the child 
protection area who talk to the people from the juvenile justice are, who talk 
to the people from the health area, rather than, in our society where they are 
treated as a whole bunch, or too often they are separate silos that 
don't  cooperate with each other. 
 
Further to this, one magistrate provided contradictory sentiments when it came to this 
point of discussion, 
 
I do think that a lot of the offences that come before us, shouldn't have been 
here, and should’ve been and could’ve been somewhere else, but whether we 
follow the New Zealand model and have a presumption of diversion over 
court, I am not at that point yet. I think that a lot of what we do, for a lot of 
young people does take them off one path and puts them on the path of doing 
the right thing, obeying the law. So, the seriousness of coming here is 
sometimes important, in some young people's life (Magistrate 4). 
 
Clearly the quote reflects an opinion that for some young people, court over diversion, 
is the best approach. However, Magistrate 4 then added, 
I also know in terms of actual rehabilitation, putting them in some type of 
diversionary program, where they are actually made to confront it, not in 
front of a magistrate, but confront it personally, talk about it personally, that 
may have a much greater impact than coming here. So, I don't know about 
preferences yet, I think [in] Australia, NSW [has] pretty much got it right so 
far, in what I can see. 
 
There are significant flaws with the above remarks. It is acknowledged here that there 
is something to be gained from not bringing children to face the court; further, through 
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the course of the interviews, the magistracy also noted their concerns about what they 
saw as under-utilisation of diversion to YJC. However, a reluctance to consider an 
approach such as New Zealand which has been doing better than Australian approaches 
(according to existing research) is eminent. The sort of opinion expressed above 
illustrate that there are elements of the magistracy that adhere to the punitive spirit of 
YJC. Furthermore, it is a reflection of an ethos on individualisation and 
responsibilisation of young people in Australia society. 
 
The remark noting that Australia or NSW “pretty much got it right so far”, made by 
Magistrate 4 above, is also problematic given that on an average day in 2015-2016 there 
were 1494 young people in NSW who were under youth justice supervision59 (AIHW, 
2016). This makes up to 27% of all young people under youth justice supervision in 
Australia (AIHW, 2016). The rate of Non- Indigenous young people aged 10-17 under 
supervision on an average day in NSW was 10 per 10,000, compared with 167 per 
10,000 for Indigenous young people (AIHW, 2016). In NSW Indigenous young people 
constitute 5% of the state’s population aged between 10 to 17, but as these figures 
indicate they made up 47% of those under youth justice supervision on an average day 
in 2015-2016. 
 
Such views place doubt over the preparedness of NSW magistracy to fully embrace 
diversionary alternatives for young people. Indeed, such doubts were further stressed 
by a quarter of the magistrates interviewed who clearly indicated their objection to a 
system such as New Zealand’s on the grounds of what they saw ‘as mandatory 
 
59 Young people under supervision includes young people in community-based supervision and detention (sentenced 
and un-sentenced). 
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referral’. This is well encapsulated by Magistrate 3 (who spoke of mandatory referrals 
as if it was mandatory sentencing) when remarking,  
there is no magistrate I have ever come across who likes mandatory sentences 
and what New Zealand has is in my opinion a mandatory sentence. I am, I 
think is abhorrent, I am so anti any mandatory, don't bring anything into this 
court if it "has" to be a mandated sentence, in other words if I am being forced 
to do something, get a computer to do it, don't use my skills and waste my 
time in something like that, so I am very much against being forced to 
consider diversionary programs. Where I think there will be a benefit would 
be to give us more flexibility, open it up, don't minimise options by forcing 
us, open it up for all matters so it is my discretion as to whether I will or 
won't. I am not going for instance to refer a sexual assault matter to a 
conference, I am not going to make ridiculous decisions, but if I got that 
ability as I mentioned for the robbery in company, I might consider using it.  
 
The problem of such a demand from the magistracy to hold power over diversionary 
decision-making is that it undermines the principles of the YOA that clearly seeks to 
ensure that where possible court is presented as the last resort. All magistrates 
interviewed claimed to be enthusiastic of restorative justice diversionary alternatives 
away from court. However, the remarks presented above indicate that such support does 
not necessarily translate to embracing such diversionary alternatives if they 
compromised the traditional role of the magistracy in making justice decisions typical 
of our adversarial system of the court. Having said that, it is important not to exaggerate 
the significance of the reluctance expressed by some magistrates to embrace a more 
diversionary approach such as the New Zealand model. Firstly, it appears that the above 
concerns are more to do with losing power of the elite position to make decisions that 
traditionally rest with the judiciary. Secondly, and most importantly, magistrates 
expressed support for diversion under the YOA and claimed to be generally supportive 
of YJC.  
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Children’s Court magistrates on the YOA: some issues on rural/city 
divide 
All participants claimed to be supportive of the YOA, describing it overall as a desirable 
alternative sentencing option. This aligns with a recent study by Richards et al. (2017) 
similarly noting judicial and magistracy support an enthusiasm for restorative justice, 
and YJCs in particular (see chapter one). However, as uncovered in the current study, 
familiarity with the Act itself varies between ‘specialist’ and local court magistrates. 
The latter, at times, suggesting that their knowledge of the Act is not what it should be. 
For example, a local magistrate in a rural location claimed not to know ‘off the top of 
my head’ (Magistrate 11) what offences are precluded by the Act, adding ‘I think they’re 
sexual offences. But I can always look them up, I just don’t use it often enough to know 
what it is precluded’ (Magistrate 11). This is problematic because it begs the question, 
when and why this magistrate will consider it necessary to check whether an offence is 
precluded or not in the Act and hence could be diverted or not. However, as specialist 
Magistrate 7 noted, 
[g]enerally, one of the practitioners who is acting for the child, will say that 
they get referred to youth justice conferencing, that is usually what happens. 
I mean that doesn't mean that I don't look at the matter and think when I read 
all the material that it might be an appropriate matter for youth justice 
conferencing, but generally it comes from the practitioner, the solicitor or 
barrister that is acting for the offender. 
 
The comment by Magistrate 7 clearly indicates that it will generally be expected that 
the suggestions for referrals to YJC would come from those representing the offender. 
This was a common point made by all magistrates. However, in rural areas with non-
specialist children’s courts, the ability by the legal representatives to know when to 
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make such suggestions in regard to YOA diversion was doubted by some local court 
magistrates. For example, Magistrate 11 noted, 
really it is for the lawyers, in my view, to identify for me that this is the matter 
that could, say, go to a YJC. But I find up here [rural area], they don’t do that 
as much as they were doing in Parramatta children’s Court; where a lot of 
lawyers tend to specialise in children’s Court, so they are far savvier at 
knowing what the alternatives are. 
 
Thus, this magistrate who had previously noted that her knowledge of the Act could be 
rusty, further indicates that for the most part it is really up to the not so ‘savvy’ lawyers 
to suggest to the court the opportunity to deal with a young offender by the way of 
diversion. This raises issues regarding equality of opportunity for young people to 
diversion, particularly in these areas where the stakeholders lack the 
training/knowledge/experience to be aware of the possibilities. 
 
The lack of training was acknowledged by some magistrates to be a contributing factor 
to the issues mentioned above. When asked to elaborate on what other alternatives, if 
not the YOA, are used in her court to keep children out of detention, Magistrate 11 
remarked,  
you know - a caution, a good behaviour bond, probation and then as an 
alternative to detention, community service order. And only then you go up 
to a suspended sentence, but yeah, I mean a Control order is always the last 
option. 
And after pausing added,  
I think certainly we could know more about it [YOA] and how effective it is, 
particularly in an area where -like the country – where you are dealing with 
a lot of kids and you are dealing with a lot of very visible crimes that do have 
a real impact on the community. And I think if there was some, perhaps at 
the country magistrate’s conferences, specific training on those available 
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sentencing options and the youth justice conferences et cetera, yeah, I think 
it definitely wouldn’t hurt (Magistrate 11). 
 
Overall, the above comments suggest that a lack of deep understanding by some local 
court magistrates in what the Act has to offer might be jeopardising diversion. This lack 
of understanding then leads to questions of its usefulness. For example, another local 
court magistrate noted,  
the difficulty is that the criminal justice system is not able, in my view, to 
deal with the underlying social issues for the children who are offending. If 
the Young Offenders Act would allow that to occur better, then I would think 
it was useful. I’m not sure that it does, okay? I'm not sure that it doesn't either. 
But the children that I see are having inadequate parenting … From 
generational problematic issues - largely aboriginal children down here - and 
it's an incredibly complex social, social situation.  
 
So, the Young Offenders Act - if it's premised on having children who are 
just being a bit naughty and have gone off the rails but have a generally 
supportive environment that is not the children that I'm dealing with. They're 
coming from parents who are mentally ill, drug dependent. There is violent 
offending in the home; the home is not safe very commonly. We're talking 
about the really hard [offenders], the kids that are doing the aggravated -break 
and enters (Magistrate 12). 
 
In such accounts, concerns are being raised about whether the Act is ‘useful’ or not in 
addressing the complex social and structural needs affecting most young people coming 
in contact with the law. Magistrate 12 further noted that is the young person’s capacity 
for empathy or lack of it, which determines whether the Act is useful or not. From this 
magistrate’s point of view, the young person’s capacity for empathy is directly related 
to a functional and structural environment around the young person. Accordingly, if a 
young person’s socio-economic and familial environment is dysfunctional, this would 
not foster the capacity for empathy to develop in this young person. And although, 
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Magistrate 12 claimed ‘because I can't, I would not be able to predict who those kids 
who have empathy and those kids who don't are, even kids who’ve had very difficult 
backgrounds might succeed, so I'd be prepared to give them a go’. Nevertheless, the 
suggestion made is that the Act fails to be useful given the nexus between ‘care’ and 
‘crime’.   
 
Undoubtedly, the deeper young people are entrenched into the criminal justice system, 
the more likely they are to have been subjects of neglect, abuse and mental health 
problems (Cashmore, 2011; 2013; Indig et al. 2011). Judge Mark Curtis Marien, former 
President of the Children’s Court in NSW, has previously noted that the separation of 
the criminal and care and protection jurisdictions of the Children’s Court fails to 
recognise the nexus between care and crime. He specifically noted that the Court ‘fails 
to recognise that with respect to many offenders who come before the Children’s Court 
charged with a criminal offence, the clear underlying cause of the offending behaviour 
is essentially a welfare issue rather than criminogenic’ (Marien, 2012a, p.6).  
  
From this view, the system overall undermines justice/care for those most in need; and 
the YOA, as a piece of legislation operating within such a system, is no different, failing 
to reach out to those entrenched within. This is unlike in New Zealand where the ‘Youth 
Court cannot impose any measure or sanction unless a family group conference has 
been tried’ (Walgrave, 2004, p. 566). In Australia, however, YJC and other 
diversionary programs are generally diversionary alternatives for the less serious 
offences, leaving the most serious offending to the court (Walgrave, 2004). 60 
 
60 See Restorative Justice, the development of the Young Offenders Act and Youth Justice Conferencing in New 
South Wales in Chapter two of this thesis for details on offences precluded by YOA (NSW). 
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Furthermore, the discretion decision-making to divert or not among members of the 
magistracy is subject to their training, knowledge and experience with the YOA.  Thus, 
young people appearing in non-specialist courts might be disadvantaged by the lack of 
in-depth knowledge of the diversionary alternatives. 
 
As the comments by Magistrate 12 above further suggest, some non-specialist 
magistrates feel that the Act is inadequate because it does little more than divert from 
court, a ‘soft option’ that should be reserved for those ‘a bit naughty’ (Magistrate 12). 
Similarly, Magistrate 11 remarked, 
if I’m not asked for it and it’s a very serious charge and it does have a very 
big impact on the community here and also on my circuit courts; so, I am 
highly unlikely to make the referral [to YJC] myself…If it’s a less serious 
charge, like if it’s a shoplifting or maybe even a drug charge or you know, a 
fight with a girl – “Because she slagged me off on Facebook,” that sort of 
thing, then I might say, “Well, why can’t this go to a Youth justice 
conference? Has anyone thought about that? Go and have a word to the client, 
you know, the young person about that.” So, yeah if it’s a less serious charge 
I’d certainly think about it but probably not for break and enter, just because 
of the effect on the community.  
 
In reality, restorative justice such as YJC is not ‘a soft option’ and offer different levels 
of penetration (Bottoms and Dignan, 2004). However, this view was appreciated more 
so by the magistrates who were specialists of the children’s court. For example, 
Magistrate 4 claimed  
if it's a first or a second offence for a fairly  low level crime or  low level 
objective seriousness our choices are, for sentencing, if we don't go down the 
youth justice conferencing route, there are bond, a 33,1b bond for it to be a 
good behaviour, it seems to me that that puts something over the head for a 
little while but it doesn't get them to do very much, to understand what they've 
done, why they've done it, so it seems to me that a youth justice conference 
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while it appears as a dismissal after they've completed the work, it appears 
on the record as a youth offenders act dismissal, they personally are required 
to do more than a bond, so it seems to be potentially more effective. 
 
This magistrate’s view was shared by most specialist magistrates, which also suggested 
that the ramifications of completion of YJC resulting in a dismissal for the offence is a 
process consistent with the rehabilitation function of the court and the general 
promotion of rehabilitation and understanding that offenders are young and ‘they’re 
foolish at times’ (Magistrate 4). Contrastingly, these types of accounts were not 
emphasised by local court magistrates, the non-specialist magistrates to the children’s 
court. 
 
As the above illustrates, there also appears to be a gap between specialist and local court 
magistrates when it comes to in-depth knowledge and understandings of the YOA. Some 
of the most senior specialist magistrate’s responses claimed as much when they spoke 
about the way forward being one where all children matters are handled by specialist 
magistrates. For example, Magistrate 13 remarked that the ideal scenario for the 
Children’s Court would be one where  
in its crime jurisdiction, for all children in New South Wales to be dealt with 
by specialist children's magistrates who have become more proficient in 
understanding the brain development and all the issues that I've just been 
discussing, so that we can get a more consistent outcome across the whole of 
the state. So, that means that what I want to see is the children's Court better 
resourced and separated away from the local Court and have the capacity to 
deal with young offenders at every location in New South Wales. Well, that 
means having a children's Court which extends across the whole of the state.   
 
The importance of a discrete, separate, specialist jurisdiction (totally independent of the 
local court) dealing with children across the whole state as a way to resolve issues in 
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regard to inequality of the handling of children’s matters was equally noted by 
participants in the recent study of the Children’s Court in New South Wales by 
Fernandez et al. (2013). In the present study, in the context of diversion, the suggestion 
by the specialist Children’s Court senior magistrates was that such independence would 
allow for specialised training and education seeking ‘to keep children out of detention’ 
(Magistrate 13), and potentially increase the use of the YOA, hence youth conferencing 
referrals. 
 
Currently, as part of their statutory responsibilities, the Children’s Court President must 
provide training for Children’s Court magistrates to ensure that they have the necessary 
expertise and skills to do children’s court work. Consequently, as explained by the 
specialist magistrates interviewed, they meet twice a year for a full day ‘to discuss 
mutual issues of interest, problems and have people present to us [the magistrates] on 
particular topics that are relevant to the jurisdiction’ (Magistrate 13). However, these 
meetings are not attended by magistrates from the Local Court. This potentially affects 
both processes and outcomes, including diversion opportunities of children’s matters 
dealt with in the rural areas. As one specialist magistrate noted,  
in relation to diversion it’s my perception that there is a lot of, the opportunity 
to divert children under the Young Offenders act by the police and by the 
courts, is underutilised. So, if for example where I mentioned before, 
Children's court magistrates are usually good at diverting kids under the 
Young Offenders act, either by way of a reprimand or caution or to a youth 
Justice conference. Some of the local Court magistrates aren't as good and 
mainly some of them don't fully understand and appreciate that opportunity 
is available or that process is available to them. So, that’s an issue (Magistrate 
13). 
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Adopting the current view of the Children’s Court on the need for a specialist children 
court that covers all of NSW will ensure that all magistrates handling children’s matters 
are equally trained and skilled. Thus, if the lack of training is a factor undermining 
diversion by magistrates, having a specialist Children Court might potentially increase 
the use of the YOA and diversion to YJC. However, this study discovered that factors 
undermining diversion go beyond the training and skills of the magistrates. As the focus 
turned to decision making points and the legislation itself, the findings indicated that 
diversion is undermined by the magistrates’ attitudes and/or high expectations on 
diversionary practices as a ‘quick fix’, as well as limitations of the legislation itself.  
 
Magistrates decision making points and views on specifics from the 
legislation 
When considering whether it is appropriate or not to use the YOA to refer a young 
person to a YJC, the magistracy claimed to focus on the type of offence and following 
the hierarchical order as prescribed by the legislation. They further emphasised that 
age, prior record, the young offender’s needs and their willingness to demonstrate a 
capacity to engage in YJC might persuade a magistrate’s decision. For example, a focus 
on the offence and prior history clearly noted when Magistrate 9 remarked, ‘if it’s an 
offence that falls within a conferrable matter, and it’s their first offence and they’ve got 
some other, you know, indicators that think it might work I would definitely try that 
first’. 
 
Indeed, as noted in previous chapters, the Act established a scheme for the purpose of 
providing direct response to certain offences by providing alternative processes to court 
through the use of warning, cautions and YJC (see Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): 
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Section 3) while clearly mandating that the investigating official must determine 
whether the offence is covered by the Act prior to proceeding (see Young Offenders Act 
1997 (NSW): Section 9, Part 2). The magistracy’s first point of focus being the nature 
of the offence and its eligibility is naturally expected, since offences that are precluded 
by the Act cannot be diverted. However, the difficulty arises when an offence is eligible 
for diversion under the Act and other factors are taken into account.  
 
As noted in previous chapters, the YOA, in providing some guidance on decision-
making notes that important considerations to be taken into account are: the seriousness 
of the offence, the level of violence involved, the degree of harm caused to any victim, 
the offending history and ‘any other matter the official thinks appropriate’ (see Young 
Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 37, Part 3). In reference to the offending history, 
the Act allows to take into account ‘the number and nature of any offences committed 
by the child and the number of times the child has been dealt with under’ (Young 
Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 20, Part 3; Section 37, Part 3; and Section 40, Part 
5). However, at the same time the Act stipulates that ‘the less restrictive form of sanction 
is to be applied’ (Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 7, Part 2) and that a child 
is not precluded from being given a warning, caution or/and YJC ‘merely because the 
child has previously committed offences or being dealt’ with under the Act (see Young 
Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 14 (3), Part 3; Section 20 (6), Part 4; and Section 
37 (5), Part 4). As the Act guidelines noted here illustrate, there is a significant amount 
of flexibility that allows the judiciary to examine contextual and mitigating factors 
when making their decisions.  
 
 
 
219 
The interviews in this study clearly indicated that for the most part, the magistracy 
placed a significant amount of weight on the ‘offender’s history’ and more specifically 
in the number of times in which the young person have been dealt with by the YOA, 
particularly when it came to YJC. For example, Magistrate 6 noted ‘if they’ve [young 
offenders] been involved before [in YJC] that might persuade me not to go that way, 
because you do not want to set up kids to fail’. Through a focus on recidivism YJC 
diversion for repeat offenders might be potentially undermined, which is not how the 
legislation was intended. 
 
As noted in previous chapters, the legislation counts the maximum number of times 
that an offender might be dealt with by the way of a caution at three (see Young 
Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 20 (7), Part 3). However, there is no limit on the 
number of times a young offender can be dealt with by the way of referral to YJC. 
Although the magistracy claimed that it is impossible to generalise in regard to how 
many times, they will refer the same young offender to a YJC, they indicated that for 
the most part, one or two YJC referrals are considered to be the norm. This was clearly 
noted by the majority of the magistrates. For example, Magistrate 1 noted, 
from time to time I had a young person appearing where they had conferences 
before and I'm prepared to give them another conference if the circumstances 
are appropriate, so I have referred young persons to more than one conference 
but it's not common; there is no sort of clear cut rule that you don't send 
anyone to a second or third conference. I don't think I have sent anyone to a 
third conference, but I have sent people off for a second conference. 
 
Similarly, Magistrate 13 noted, 
No, I would really only ever refer once to a youth [YJC]; if someone, in my 
view someone, a young person really only gets one opportunity, if you like, 
to use the Young Offenders Act, sometimes two, depending on the nature of 
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the crime. But if they haven't learnt from the first time around then they need 
a more serious penalty the next time around. 
 
The above remarks reflect the sentiments expressed by the majority of the magistracy 
in that if a young person is appearing before them for the ‘same type offence’, most of 
the magistrates were inclined not to use YJC a second time. For a particular magistrate, 
however, the time lapse between ‘same types of offences’ was important:  
where the young person had received a Young Offenders Act caution and 
been given the benefit of a conference in 2012 and here we are in 2015, 
prosecution said 'no, this young person clearly has not learn from it', I end up 
referring to youth justice conference because in 2012 this young person was 
12 nearly 13, he is now, 15 nearly [PAUSE] yes 15 and half, it seems to me 
there're insights to be gained as a 12-13 year old versus 15-16. I can't assume 
that there will be no further insight gained. I think it [YJC] is more onerous 
sometimes what they have to do is a more positive and active thing, rather 
than just sitting back and saying well I've done wrong and now I have to wait 
for 6 months or 9 months or 12 months for the bond to expire, you know, 
they actually have to do something (Magistrate 4). 
 
Time between offences was a factor that divided the magistrates, with some noting that 
it will not make a difference in regard to decision-making. For example, in regard to 
whether YJC would be considered for a young offender that returns two years later with 
the same charge, a specialist magistrate noted, 
No, probably not so much, if they have been 15 and they have been through 
a conference for an identical offence, and they are back before me for an 
identical type offence, I will be disinclined to do conferencing again. So, I 
will see that as a failure of conferencing, but I have never turned my mind to 
the issues of development of children (Magistrate 7).  
 
Although on rare occasions young people have been given further referrals, for the most 
part, the magistracy clearly saw two YJC referrals as ample opportunity to desist from 
crime. Magistrate 9 echoed these sentiments when she remarked, 
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Look, frankly if they are coming back before me, I might give them two 
conferences, maybe, just maybe. After that, forget it - because they are not 
participating. And particularly, and if they fail to participate in the 
conference, I won't consider it again. Because there is obviously something 
else going wrong; they are not amenable to that. 
 
For some, this decision appeared to be due to a high emphasis placed on recidivism. 
Such emphasis on recidivism, once again emphasises responsibilisation of individual 
youth more than the social and structural circumstances that lead to youth offending.  
The following comments illustrate as much: 
If they have already been diverted, I have a strong question mark in whether 
there is any benefit at all in repeating the process (Magistrate 3). 
 
Well, the thing we need to measure, I think is, what is the recidivism rate for 
children that go on those things? How often do they reoffend? And if it’s 
been only, if after the first time they’re sent to a YJC and that’s all that 
happens, and they don’t learn from that, well they come back, well the next 
time round you don’t, as I’ve said, I’ll only use, myself, once more often than 
not I won’t send them back a second time under the Young Offenders Act, 
I’ll give them a more serious sentence (Magistrate 13). 
 
The expectation of a quick fix was omnipresent in the decision-making processes. If 
one conference had not stopped the young person from further offending, the 
magistracy questioned the value of referring to YJC for a second time. This viewpoint 
was shared amongst those interviewed and indicates that YJC is being reserved mainly 
for first time offenders. This is notwithstanding that there are no limits on how many 
YJC referrals can be given to a young person.  
 
Secondly, the efficiency imperative by which diversion is viewed by the magistracy 
places serious limitations for youth measures with less than positive implications. As 
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noted in chapter one, studies have reported mixed results in regard to the effect of YJC 
on recidivism. Some research showing YJC can be more effective in reducing re-
offending than court (see Luke and Lind, 2002; Bergseth and Bouffard, 2007; and 
KPMG, 2010); other studies have found that YJC is not significantly more effective 
than court in reducing the risk of offending (see Nadine and Weatherburn, 2012). 
However, reducing the risk of offending is not the only argument for YJC. For example, 
victim satisfaction and economic arguments justify the use of YJC (for an overview see 
Moore, 2012). Further, diversion to YJC is always a better option because any entry 
into the system results in a revolving door into the criminal justice system. 
Nevertheless, the magistrates placed significant weight on whether a first YJC referral 
results in desistance when considering further referrals. Thus, it can be said that 
magistrates are limiting the scope of the legislation based on their perception in regard 
to the significance of recidivism when it comes to diversion via YJC. 
 
In other cases, some of the magistrates articulate their awareness of the community’s 
views on diversion. In particular, the community’s view of JYC as a ‘soft option’ and 
the community expectations, with Magistrate 1 stating: 
what can be learned this time from a conference that wasn't achieved last 
time…what hasn't he learned? Because if they keep on offending, the time 
arrives in my view where you just can't keep on dismissing charges, the 
community expects that the court will take a little bit more serious 
intervention. 
 
Similarly, the community’s expectations were referred to when explaining decision-
making processes by a local magistrate in one rural location: 
See, the thing is, look: people have got to realise in the country every time 
someone’s house is broke – people leave their houses unlocked, - every time 
someone’s house is broken into, people start locking their doors. And that 
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might seem weird to people in the city, “Oh, well why wouldn’t you lock 
your door?” But that’s the mindset of people who live in the country, “That 
it’s so safe here, we don’t have to.” So, when that, when there is a break and 
enter, they, that changes people’s mindset in how they live in their own 
homes. So even, “Gosh, even if I’m at home, I’ve got to have the front door 
locked.” And it really does affect people. It affects, yeah, how safe they feel 
in their own home; and a Youth Justice conference, people might just think, 
“Well, what’s that? Like, what they had to write a letter of apology? I mean, 
big deal what is that?” And it’s … it would be seen as being far too lenient, 
compared to the effect that the crime has had on the local community 
(Magistrate 11). 
 
Magistrate 11 further explained the many factors to be considered in such cases, and 
how the likely scenario might not be diversion: 
Look, it just, it depends how old they are, is it the first offence, is it the 
second? What’s their background like? I mean, a lot of the kids here, most of 
the kids I deal with in kids Court … are … kids who have been removed from 
their parents, they’ve had significant drug and alcohol issues and domestic 
violence they’ve had to encounter as they’ve been growing up. But I don’t 
know, look I would probably, if it was their first offence, give them a bond 
or probation under the supervision of Juvenile justice. And then if it was 
another offence, then I might be considering either, if they got a bond first, 
then probation or if they breach probation, did another one, some time as a 
Control order.  
 
In addition, the community’s perceptions were also an issue of concern for Magistrate 
4 when discussing why YJC is not appropriate for certain ‘more serious offences’:  
I think it [YJC] can send that message because it ultimately results in a 
dismissal of the charge, under the Young Offenders Act, so it's seen as a first 
level or low-level intervention, a first level, low level punishment and for 
some young people, at least initially I think they see it as a less serious 
outcome for them. My view is that, it involves them doing more, so that the 
ultimate punishment…what they are required to do is greater, than what they 
are often required to do just by having a bond, however the perception is that 
[it] is, perhaps for less serious crimes, and I don't want domestic violence to 
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ever be seem as a less serious crime. It is just an impression. I guess is 
because is one of our first level interventions, is a low level intervention for 
the court [YJC], it only applies for less serious offences, so there is a general 
impression that even if you are refer to a youth justice conference for a 
serious offence, the court sees it perhaps as less serious, and the outcome is 
less serious (Magistrate 4). 
 
Although it cannot be said that these magistrate’s responses are representative of all 
magistrates’ views on the same scenarios, the accounts nonetheless highlight the 
significance placed on community expectations by the magistracy in general. The quote 
from Magistrate 4 above, echoed the sentiments of most magistrates interviewed on 
their belief that the restorative justice processes of YJC encourage young offenders to 
take responsibility for their behaviour and the consequences of their crime, more than 
the traditional sentencing process would, even if the community might think otherwise.   
 
Nevertheless, admitting that YJC might be more onerous for the young person than 
court did not equate with satisfaction with the YJC process. As previously noted, the 
magistrates interviewed expressed support in general terms. However, there were 
differences of opinion across many areas of the discussion, and concerns were evident. 
One such difference of opinion between magistrates was in regard to conference 
outcome plans. For example, some magistrates expressed their satisfaction with 
outcome plans: 
From my perspective, by and large, I always think that the action plans that 
have produced are appropriate and adequate. I have heard some magistrates 
complain that there is insufficient, insufficient, if you like, action required of 
some young people who have quite serious offences, and they reject the plans 
and insist on them being a bit more onerous or requiring something more, 
particularly in some of the sexual offending type cases. But from my 
perspective they're usually very good (Magistrate 13). 
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However, one local magistrate expressed her beliefs that the outcome plans in the rural 
areas are not as solid as those in the city, stating that  
some of them up here are a little bit light on, in my view: Like, writing a letter 
of apology and I don’t know, some of them only say that.  But certainly, in 
Parramatta I found it was far more [silence] I don’t know, I think there was 
just a lot more meat to the plans up there.  I think maybe up here; people 
aren’t as [silence] creative, if I can use that term? In you know, suggesting 
different outcome plans.  Having said that, I’ve never said no to an outcome 
plan, I’ve never said, “Look, it needs more.” My view is, if that’s something 
the victim has agreed to then, you know, who am I to interfere with that when 
I haven’t been part of it? So, I’m unlikely to change it but I think the ones 
here [rural area] are probably a little bit lacking in substance (Magistrate 11). 
 
From the perspective of this magistrate, whether a matter is heard in a city court or a 
rural area of NSW would result in different outcome plans, with those for the rural areas 
‘lacking in substance’ (Magistrate 11). This could be attributed to the aforementioned 
differences in resources, the availability of specialised staff including legal 
representatives and magistrates, and access to training.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that when it comes to dissatisfaction with the 
outcome plans, some specialist magistrates in the city areas were equally unimpressed. 
For example, Magistrate 4 made the following comments: 
I am trying not to be too difficult, but sometimes I have a very strong feeling 
that perhaps that is not enough, so maybe that's a weakness, in that maybe 
there should be some further guidelines about minimum outcome plans. 
 
The above remark emphasises the viewpoint from some magistrates that the Act should 
be more rigid in regard to the minimum requirements that ought to be met by outcome 
plans. This is an interesting viewpoint in light of the earlier resistance on turning YJC 
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into mandatory sentencing option. Yet, a suggestion is being made here to introduce a 
minimum mandatory requirement for the outcome plan. 
 
Currently, the Act provides recommendations for provisions (see Young Offenders Act 
1997 (NSW): Section 52 (5); (5A)) that may be contained in an outcome plan. However, 
there are no minimum requirements and as per Section 52 (1) of the Act, ‘the 
participants at a conference may agree to make such recommendations or decisions as 
they think fit’. From some magistrates’ point of view, a letter of apology and/or 
attendance to a Police Citizens Youth Club (PCYC) which are frequently seen as the 
extent of some outcome plans, does not place enough individual responsibility on the 
young offender. As one magistrate noted: 
I think it will be useful to include in an outcome plan some community 
service work, up to a certain number of hours. I know that sometimes they 
are required to do some sort of community work, but not a lot, you know for 
graffiti offences, so you know they are referred to clean up etc., but I would 
of thought if they can actually incorporate up to say 20 hours of community 
work, that would be advantageous. Because, when I do see the outcome plan, 
sometimes I think, well you know, there is a letter of apology and they are 
going to go to the PCYC on a number of occasions, that is the extent of the 
plan, often I think that is a little bit on the low side in terms on what the 
individual should be, and the outcome plan, but I understand that there is a 
restriction in terms of what can be required of the outcome plan (Magistrate 
7). 
 
Such viewpoints where outcome plans are generally considered to be limited, either by 
not placing enough responsibility on the offender or/and not being an appropriate form 
of punishment, have the potential to undermine diversion, particularly when it comes 
to those offences considered to be more serious. As Magistrate 7 noted,  
I will be more inclined to refer more serious offences to juvenile justice 
conferencing if there was an ability to impose some community service 
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requirement, because I will see that as an alternative to a control order, and 
there I guess appropriate punishment for the offence…Yes I would like to 
see more children refer to youth justice conferencing, but there needs to be 
as we have discussed more options open in terms of the outcome plan, so that 
is the problem at the moment, the limited options are the things I normally 
look [at], as well when deciding to refer, and that is why serious offences 
generally don't get a referral. Whereas if there was, look it might well be as 
part of conferencing, the conferencing decided that they might need juvenile 
justice supervision. Of course, if I refer them to youth justice conferencing 
that cannot happen. And that is something that is in the back of my mind, 
because I am thinking I want to make sure they are properly rehabilitated, I 
want to make sure that someone is looking, that there is an oversight of them 
for a period of time. 
 
Responsibilisation in the Australian context tends to be measured in how punitive 
justice and restorative justice are in practice (Cunneen and White, 2007). Youth 
offenders are seen as responsible for their actions and must be served with their just 
deserts (White and Wyn, 2008). The shift from punishment to repairing harm, typical 
of restorative justice, does not minimise the emphasis placed on holding the young 
offender responsible (White and Wyn, 2008). As the remarks by some magistrates 
indicate, outcome plans lack a desired level of intervention, often viewed as deficient 
in holding the young person accountable. Although there is a claim being made that the 
intervention is about the assurance of rehabilitation, in reality, the process, particularly 
for those persistent offenders, is one of individual responsibilisation and ongoing 
surveillance that brings young people into the system. However, it is important to add, 
that in expressing their dissatisfaction with outcomes plans, magistrates are lamenting 
the ‘McDonaldization’ (see Bohm, 2006; Umbreit, 1999) of YJC, in that outcome plans 
are very similar to one another. Accordingly, magistrates feel that at times, YJC fails 
to meet the young person individual needs, and in turn, it fails to influence young 
people’s criminogenic needs by not being enough of an intervention. Similar 
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disappointments on outcomes plans were noted by magistrates in a recent study by 
Richards et al., 2017. However, as the authors note, such concern is not supported by 
research. Instead, research on outcome plans of YJC in NSW shows that 80% of young 
offenders are required to complete at least two more tasks, in addition to the letter of 
apology (see, for example, Taussig, 2012). Nevertheless, it is safe to conclude that the 
use of YJC as diversion is undermined by the magistrates’ views on outcome plans that 
lack a certain level of intervention.  
 
The magistrates here seem to fail to focus on the understanding of how restorative 
justice and YJC as an example, extend both responsibility and accountability beyond 
the individual. Failing to focus on this, leads to incorrect assumptions about 
responsibility and accountability under restorative justice. ‘From a restorative justice 
perspective, justice is always unfinished business until an account has been accepted 
by the stakeholders in the injustice’ (Braithwaite, 2006, p. 35). The potential of 
restorative justice, and in this case, YJC to hold the courts and criminal law accountable 
does not appear through the accounts in these interviews. For example, the magistracy 
could be held accountable for giving up on the procedural commitment to restorative 
justice too quickly. Instead, the magistrates’ focus seems to be on making youth more 
accountable through responsibilisation. Hence, the suggestion that outcome plans ought 
to require more of the young people beyond an apology. Notwithstanding, overall the 
magistrates claim to see value on YJC, as it allows, at times for that level of intervention 
(more meaningful) that the court will not be able to provide. Overall, there was a general 
desire amongst magistrates to see YJC expanded to include more offences.  
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For the most part, all magistrates agreed in regard to offences such as, for example, 
assault in company, travelling without a ticket, traffic offences and robbery in 
company61, where the overall sentiment was that it made no sense to have these types 
of offences precluded from the YOA. For example, Magistrate 3 made the following 
comment: 
the robbery in company, which is precluded, robbery in company is one of 
the major charges we deal with, but there is a whole range of what comes 
under robbery in company which has a maximum penalty of 20 years jail. 
They can be the really nasty ones and of course I will never consider those 
for conferences, but almost, the typical one, I get a little bit cranky with the 
police for charging, because it is two or three kids, pick on someone and say 
"give me your cigarettes, give me your phone" and that is definitely a 
"robbery in company" if the child is the one saying "give me" but it is the 
lower end of the scale. Those sorts of matters, I would like to refer a child to 
a conference, because it is one thing they are saying, you and your mates 
surrounding this poor boy/girl adds fear because of the numbers, how do you 
think the victim would feel? That is just me posing the question. Having the 
victim said, "I was scared to death", "every time I see someone with red hair, 
or wearing clothes like you I'm in fear it’s going to happen again", that has a 
lot more impact than me trying to get the child to consider that [in court]. 
 
Magistrate 9 adding to this noted,   
 
A lot of offences in company are also precluded [from the Act], but that’s 
exactly what kids do! It’s ridiculous to preclude kids, kids from youth 
diversion and also, they’re up charged, you know like an – it sounds really 
bad – a robbery, but really what they’ve done is a group, you know, nicked a 
few packets of chips or something, you know, I know that’s minimizing it. 
But you know, the fact that it’s in company doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be 
conferrable. 
 
61 Robbery in company is a robbery involving more than one person. ‘If the person who committed the robbery was 
accompanied by another person, or a group of other people, at the time and those people are seen by the victim and 
perceived to be part of the threat, it becomes a Robbery in Company - regardless of the role those other people 
played, or whether they were charged’ (Legal Aid NSW, 2008, para. 5). 
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Such comments raise some important issues. Firstly, as it has been long recognised 
young people have a tendency to commit crimes in company to a greater degree than 
adults (Cunneen and White, 2007; McVie, 2009; Shaw and McKay, 1942/1969) 
because they are more gregarious and peer-oriented (Carrington, 2002; Warr, 2002). 
Secondly, although the law assumes, as it does for adults, that people that commit 
crimes in company are more dangerous, this might not be the case when it comes to 
young people.  
 
Instead, the little research on this indicates that youth who commit crime alone exhibit 
more responsibility, temperance, perspective and their crimes are not spontaneous acts, 
but instead call for careful consideration and calculation (Goldweber, Dmitrieva, 
Cauffamn, Piquero and Steinberg, 2011). In contrast to this, as youth co-offending 
stems from poor impulse and lack of self-control collectively, co-offenders tend to be 
less reactive and less strategic in their criminal behaviour. Thus, co-offending says 
more about adolescence as a period than about the offenders who participate in the 
criminal activity (Goldweber et al., 2011). Therefore, although the law considers 
offences committed in company to be of a more serious nature, simply because this is 
the case for adult offenders, it fails to consider youth offending as differential to adult 
offending.  
 
Nevertheless, as Magistrate 3 noted, ‘robbery in company’ offences are considered 
aggravated/more serious by the law simply because they are ‘in company’. As a result, 
‘in company’ offences have been precluded from the Act from diversion. For most 
magistrates’ this makes no sense and prevents the use of diversion to YJC at times when 
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many magistrates suggested it could work. The frustration concerning this is clearly 
noted by Magistrate 10: 
an aggravated break/entrance/ steal offence, so if the young person broke into 
somebody's house by themselves that could be diverted to a YJC; if they are 
with a friend and they break in, it can't be diverted, now that is crazy to 
me…yes, well because I don't think in reality the offending is any more 
serious because [it] is done in company. I can see again why for adults [it] is 
an aggravating feature, but for the perspective of the young person, um, it’s 
probably more serious if they do it by themselves rather than being egged on 
a bit, or having some sort of mutual courage raising from having a friend with 
them, so I think it just doesn't recognise the dynamics of the way young 
people think (Magistrate 10). 
 
 
Some magistrates’ also expressed disappointment on the preclusion from diversion of 
other type of offences. For example, in regard to traffic offences, the following 
comments were made: 
Look I think total diversion, for minor traffic offences, I don't see why a 
caution under the YOA, say driving whilst unlicensed, wouldn't be an 
appropriate outcome that the police should be able to deal with directly. I 
don't think it should have to come to court. I think the real issue is when there 
might be a need for license disqualification or something like that because of 
the nature and seriousness of the offence, um…so I can see why for argument 
sake, drink driving offences or driving under the influence of drugs, or 
dangerous driving is sufficiently serious that a court should deal with it, but 
driving whilst unlicensed or speeding over a certain speed limit, as long as it 
is not one of the more extreme versions of speeding, or driving an un-
registered motor-vehicle, there is a whole lot of things that I would of thought 
should be able to be dealt with under the YOA, um…and again even if they 
come to a magistrate, even if there needs to be a driving license 
disqualification and also a referral to a conference, why wouldn't that be an 
appropriate outcome for a dangerous driving offence, again you got to treat 
the seriousness of the offence as a critical factor, but I don't quite understand 
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why [it] is unavailable, depending on the seriousness of the offence 
(Magistrate 10). 
 
The frustrations expressed by the magistrates in regard to traffic offences extended to 
other types of infringement notices62. For example, in regard to ‘travelling without a 
ticket’, the following remarks were made: 
there are certain categories that I think scream out for it [the need to be 
included in the Act], for instead travelling on train without a ticket, that 
comes with a very hefty fine that I will found an ouch factor, a child cannot 
afford $400, is much more trying to get them to accept that what they did was 
incorrect and how to avoid it in the future (Magistrate 3). 
 
Infringement notices are the most common penalty issued by criminal justice systems 
in Australia (NSW Law Reform, 2012). The penalty received under an infringement 
notice is fixed. For example, under the Fines Act 1996 unlicensed-driving-offences 
carry a penalty notice of $796, and maximum court imposed fine of $2200 if first time 
offence, or $3300 for second or subsequent offences, as well as mandatory 
disqualification (NSW Roads and Maritime Services, 2014). The imposition of 
monetary penalties has been widely criticised for having a disproportionate impact on 
low socio-economic groups, including young people (DAGJ, 2011b).  
 
The impact of infringement penalties is further heightening for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander young people. This is due to, firstly, their over-representation in low 
socio-economic groups and, in the criminal justice system in general. Secondly, due to 
other issues, for example, a high proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander’s 
live in remote rural areas and may not routinely receive mail which in turn can lead to 
 
62 Infringements notices generally refer to regulatory penalties such as traffic infringements, health and safety, 
national parks and wildlife, passenger transport, and rail safety (NSW Law Reform Commission, 2012). 
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a greater risk of accruing fines (NSW Law Reform, 2012). Further, Indigenous people 
are over-represented compared to their non-Indigenous counterpart as recipients of 
‘criminal infringement notices’ (CINs)63, such as, for example, ‘offensive language’ 
offences (NSW Ombudsman, 2009). The significant issue remains that fine defaults 
provide a potential pathway from a fine to imprisonment, or at the very least to court.  
With fines being penalties for usually minor offences, this path contradicts the principle 
of court as a last resort, thus contradicting the aims of the YOA. This is a point that 
specialist magistrates were eager to emphasise during interviews.  
 
In addition, some magistrates noted their frustration in regard to graffiti offences for 
which the Act does not extend the possibility of diversion to the police. The overall 
sentiment is illustrated here: 
There is absolutely no logic, in the current arrangement. I will be stunned to 
find that there was any difference before the current situation and after the 
current situation in terms of the amount of graffiti, the amount of detection 
of graffiti, um, the current law actually even makes it more cumbersome to 
get a young person to do clean-up work than when it was possible to refer 
graffiti matters under the YOA (by police), police should be able to refer those 
matters directly. Look in fact, [it] is counterproductive, because anyone who 
has even a small clue about youth offending realises that even bringing young 
people to court is a negative thing, because it makes them associate with other 
offenders and runs the risk of, what people call the contamination effect of 
coming to court, the risk of the young person forming a criminal association 
by coming to court is much higher that the benefit of a tongue lashing from 
some crusty old magistrate like me (Magistrate 10). 
 
 
63 Criminal infringement notices (CINs) are infringement notices that can be issued by the police for minor summary 
offences. These generally include public order offences, some low-level larceny or obtaining goods offences. They 
also include conduct described as offensive language (see Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) Section 4A(1)). 
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The Graffiti Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (NSW) has removed the power for police 
to divert graffiti offences. Instead, a person charged with graffiti will be required to 
appear in court. Under the YOA, the court may still issue a caution or divert to a YJC. 
As a transgressive act of property crime, graffiti has become an emotional issue of 
public concern (Fitzgerald, 2000; White, 2001). Thus, to this extent policy objectives 
of the legislation to reduce graffiti are called upon by the community.  
 
The perception in the community that graffiti is linked with violence leading to fear and 
anxiety is baseless (White, 2001). Research shows that those within the graffiti culture 
who are attracted to the illegal aspect of the act, and consequently engage in other high-
risk criminal activities, including violence, are thought to represent a minority of all 
graffiti offenders (Jones, 2003). The majority of the magistrates interviewed expressed 
that the current process, by which all graffiti offences required to appear in court, 
increases financial costs to both the offender and the wider community while it 
contravenes the principles of ‘pre-court diversion’ intended by the YOA.  
 
There is an overwhelming view amongst magistrates interviewed for this study, that the 
YOA itself is undermining the possibilities for diversion through the nonsensical 
preclusion of certain offences. However, there were differences in opinion regarding 
whether domestic violence should be available for YJC. For example, Magistrate 13 
stated,  
the Young Offenders Act is limited in its application, as you know, and we 
tend to only utilise it for the lesser crimes. I'd love to have the Victorian 
system, where they have used diversion for even more serious crimes and 
something like, I think a large proportion of youth crime in Victoria goes 
through the youth diversion process. And it's a much better system, as far as 
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I'm concerned, because it - as you say - involves restorative justice as 
opposed to traditional adversarial processes.  
 
In addition, in support of extending the Act to domestic offences, Magistrate 10 noted, 
the various domestic violence offences, they are excluded, and then again I 
think there is some good sentiments to be involved, but a lot of the domestic 
violence offending by young people is within the family and usually is the 
young person over a parent, most commonly a mother; I can see why you 
will not provide that sort of option for adults, where the more usual dynamic 
will be partner to partner violence, um, but, some reconciliation process 
between a young person and a parent, I would of thought  will be a smart 
option, rather than one that has been excluded for blinkered, shallow 
ideological reasons (Magistrate 10). 
 
While, Magistrate 9, provided this example, 
 
Mum says, “You can't do X,” so they are cranky, and they might have, they 
might be using drugs. So, they kick a hole in the wall. Or they threaten Mum 
or Dad with a knife; they call them every name they can lay their tongue to, 
and they think that that's okay - it's Mum or it’s Dad…Sometimes it extends 
to a girlfriend; that really worries me, and I do jump on that. But once again, 
I think they need training. I would like them to have the opportunity for a lot 
of these offences to go through that Youth Justice Conference…to have the 
opportunity of a creative outcome plan that would involve counselling. More 
ordered counselling, you see? You can at least order it. Or as part of the 
outcome plan it becomes something that they have to do (Magistrate 9). 
 
In contrast, Magistrate 4 expressed her concerns regarding the diversion of domestic 
violence offences to YJC. According to the magistrate, the YOA ultimately results in a 
dismissal or ‘it’s seen as a first level or low-level intervention, a first level, low level 
punishment and for some young people, at least initially I think they see it as a less 
serious outcome’. Thus, sending domestic violence offences to YJC, ‘we don't want to 
 
 
236 
send too many messages to young people involved in domestic violence that it isn't 
serious’ (Magistrate 4).  
 
The legal meaning of domestic violence is very broad and can include for example: 
physical assault, from punching, hitting, kicking, pushing to use of weapons; emotional 
abuse; verbal abuse, including shouting, name-calling, swearing; damaging of property; 
and financial abuse (see Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) or the Crimes (Domestic and Personal 
Violence) Act 2007 (NSW)). The magistrates’ views in regard to YJC for domestic 
violence offences reflect the tensions internalised by the professionals. The tensions 
between protecting and seeing justice done for victims of domestic violence and giving 
young offenders – in the less serious cases – a chance, while seeing the most serious of 
offenders, under the charge of ‘domestic violence’, being penalised proportionally as 
part of a justice framework that condemns domestic violence.  
 
The overreaching legal meaning of sexual offences was also highlighted by the 
magistracy as a concern. Not surprisingly, similar concerns with ‘sending the wrong 
message’ shaped the magistrates’ views in regard to sexual offences, with those who 
chose to speak about them making the following comments: 
I frankly think there's a real weirdness when a young person is charged with 
a sexual offence. I don't like it at all, and I think they need specialist treatment 
somewhere else. I wouldn't recommend youth justice conferencing for that. 
So yeah, so I wouldn’t support youth justice conference for a number [of 
sexual offences], I don’t even want to have it as an option; because also the 
community outrage (Magistrate 9). 
 
Sexual offences, that’s very, very tricky because I think we have to look at 
crimes within the gender disempowerment in the community, yeah… the 
disempowerment issues in relation to men and women, gender 
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inequality in society, you’d have to be looking at the victim’s 
willingness to participate, which I think in most of the cases would be 
absolute zero (Magistrate 8). 
 
However, similarly, as it was the case with domestic violence, some magistrates noted, 
that certain common charges of sexual offences, particularly amongst young people 
tend to be of a less serious nature than the charge suggests. For example, Magistrate 10 
noted, 
 
I will think that where any sexual assault involves the overcoming of the… 
or the disregard of the will of the victim is sufficiently serious that YJC, even 
the most serious part of the YOA is not suitable. I do however, think that there 
are some offences, say, where let say both of the participants engaged in 
under-aged but consensual sex, so where the, their capacity to consent is 
irrelevant, should be able to be a minimal to a YJC. Um, so I think that again 
it depends on issues of consent, it depends of issues of power, it depends on 
knowledge, it depends on the need, the therapeutic need that might be 
involved in dealing with the offence. 
 
 
Once again, the findings presented signal a difference of perspective and attitudes 
between magistrates in regard to specific offences. Although domestic violence and 
sexual offences are currently precluded from the YOA, nevertheless, these attitudes are 
relevant to highlight the differential in decision-making. This is of significant 
relevance, given that a number of the magistrates interviewed suggested more 
flexibility and greater discretion would improve the opportunity to increase YJC 
referrals. For example, 
well I think that we need to have total discretion; we shouldn't be limited by 
statute from not being [able] to use the Young Offenders Act because of 
certain types of offence. We should have full discretion to utilise the 
diversionary process where we think it’s appropriate (Magistrate 13). 
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And, 
I think that there has got to be some trust in the fact that the magistrates will 
deal with these matters appropriately and not make ridiculous referrals. I can 
see, as I said earlier, I can see why there is a concern about the extent of 
matters that police can refer, and there should be much more significant limits 
on that, but I don't see a problem with having magistrates with a much greater 
scope of matters that they can refer (Magistrate 10). 
 
Lastly, in noting the findings of this section, it is important to note that when discussing 
Indigenous referrals to YJC most magistrates claimed Indigenous youth have the same 
opportunities to diversion as their non-Indigenous counterparts. Only two magistrates 
deviated from this position and expressed concern that the YOA is not equipped to deal 
with Indigenous social issues. While another magistrate noted,  
we often get a lot of Aboriginal kids, in particular that I see, that the family 
are not really interested in this process, and often you get the child back after 
they have been diverted, say that they go to a police caution, for example, 
and they can't even tell me what's happen, you know? So, it is very, diversion 
is very important if the people around that person are supportive of the 
process and reinforce the process (Magistrate 5). 
 
The comment by Magistrate 5, reinforce discourses of Indigenous Australians as 
failures. The externalising of blame places the reason for failure squarely on the 
families, while absolving the policy makers, or in this case, the gatekeepers from any 
responsibility. 
 
As noted in chapter one, research shows a discrepancy between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous rates of diversion, with Indigenous youth less likely to be diverted than non-
Indigenous. The level of flexibility and non-specific guidance within the Act, as 
previously noted, allows for ‘any other matter the official thinks appropriate’ (Young 
Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 37, Part 3) as important considerations to be taken 
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into account when making decisions on whether to divert or not, is significant in this 
context. The suggestion could be made that those magistrates who believe the YOA not 
to be specifically equipped to deal with Indigenous social issues and/or any magistrate, 
such as Magistrate 5, that considers that Indigenous youth would not have a family 
network supportive enough for YJC to succeed, might be less inclined to refer a young 
Indigenous person at times. Indeed, such attitudes could undermine the use of YJC for 
the already overly disadvantaged Indigenous youth cohort. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The findings presented in this chapter provide a sample of the magistracy’s perspective 
on matters as they relate to diversion, and the role of restorative justice versus 
adversarial justice, particularly with regards to the use of YJC. The findings show that 
NSW Children Court Magistrates are generally supportive of YJC. However, the many 
objections discussed throughout this chapter place doubt on the preparedness of the 
NSW magistracy, to fully embrace diversionary alternatives. This is reflected for 
example, but not only, in the discussions regarding the arbitrary number of referrals to 
YJC, and on the objections to adopting a more inclusive model such as the New Zealand 
model, on the grounds that it constitutes ‘mandatory referral’.  
 
Diversionary options under the YOA require a focus on restorative justice and 
rehabilitation, the latter a prescribed priority of the Children’s Court. Some findings 
suggest that the difficulties of swapping back and forward from adult to children’s 
justice modes of operation, as well as lack of training and resources are factors that 
divide rural versus city, thus undermining diversion in rural areas. 
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The discussion on decision-making and the magistrate’s perspectives on the legislation 
indicate that at times diversion is further undermined by the magistrate’s attitudes 
and/or high expectations of diversionary practices. Firstly, the flexibility that allows the 
judiciary to examine contextual and mitigating factors when making decisions might 
result in inconsistencies across magistrates’ decisions on diversion. Secondly, a focus 
on ‘recidivism’ leads to claims that if one or two YJC has not stopped the young person 
from offending, there is no point on making further referrals. YJC is seen as a 
sentencing option, rather than visualised as a true alternative to move children away 
from the criminal justice system. This attitude clearly undermines the intentions of the 
YOA in that it aims to provide a framework where the use of court is seen as the last 
resort. 
 
Thirdly, significant weight is placed on community expectations. The general view is 
that the community see YJC as a soft approach. For some magistrates, this meant that 
the use of YJC with certain offences might not be appropriate, as it will give the wrong 
message of tolerance for those crimes. For example, this was the position by some 
magistrates, although not all, in regard to sexual offences and domestic violence.  
 
Restorative justice processes and YJC, in general, was welcomed by magistrates in that 
it aims to encourage young offenders to take some responsibility for the actions in a 
way that the court does not, often, being described as more onerous for the young 
person. However, mixed opinions in regard to the rigorousness of outcome plans were 
evident. Some magistrates wished that they had more substance, suggesting that 
individual perspectives on the appropriateness of outcome plans might influence 
decision-making whether to refer to YJC or not, at least for offences categorised as 
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most serious. Outcome plans including more than a letter of apology would be 
considered more appropriate, as they will make the young offender more accountable 
for their actions. Thus, YJC referral might be undermined by the perception of the 
outcome plans not to be demanding enough of the young offender.  
 
In addition, the judiciary expressed their frustration towards the preclusion of certain 
offences. For example, the general view is that when it comes to young people in 
company offences such as robbery or break and entry, should be covered by the Act, 
and YJC referral made an option. According to the magistracy, the fact that these 
offences are committed in company does not implicitly make them more serious, as 
youth offending, unlike that of adults, is often conducted in the company of others. In 
these instances, a willingness from the magistracy to use YJC is being restricted by the 
legislation.  
 
The discussion of domestic offences and sexual assault offences (currently precluded 
from diversion to YJC under the Act) generated division between magistrates. Some 
magistrates viewed these types offences as inadequate for referral to YJC due to the 
seriousness of the category.  However, other magistrates highlight that in the context of 
young people, most offences under these categories are not of a serious nature, and in 
some of those cases young people could benefit from diversion. However, preclusion 
of these offences prevent youth from accessing the benefits of YJC. These differences 
of perspectives and attitudes further highlight the differential in decision-making 
processes. This is a complex area of the law where given the context of some cases, 
some degree of discretion, in fact, is needed as not to administer a one-size fits-all 
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approach towards complex cases for vulnerable groups. Nevertheless, such discretion 
would account for inconsistencies of referrals across geographical areas.  
 
However, the NSW Children’s Court Magistrates suggest that more judicial flexibility 
and greater discretion to utilise the diversionary process as they think is appropriate 
would increase the number of referrals to YJC. The tensions in approach between 
magistrates taken alongside other broader social forces that need to be considered by 
magistrates, such as the requirement for efficiency, politics, the need to maintain public 
confidence in the courts, and perform morally, as well as structural characteristics and 
location of the court makes for a messy process in regard to consistency on diversionary 
decision-making. The significant issue is that many decisions are guided by high-risk 
factors, which in turn results in the exclusion of repeat offenders or/and those classified 
as serious. Thus, the current process fails to use court only as a last resort.  
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CHAPTER SIX - INTERVIEWS WITH JUVENILE 
JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the findings of one telephone and five face-to-face interviews 
with, one Aboriginal Legal Services (“ALS”) solicitor and five Assistant Managers for 
Juvenile Justice NSW (“JJ”). JJ supervises and cares for young offenders in the 
community and juvenile justice centres. Formerly known as the Department of Juvenile 
Justice (“DJJ”)64, under the YOA, JJ was assigned with the administrative responsibility 
for the conferencing programs. The department manages referrals to YJC from the 
police and the Children’s court.  
 
JJ’s views on the system of diversion under the YOA are paramount to understanding 
the factors that ought to be addressed to encourage an increase in the number of referrals 
to YJC in NSW. Equally, the views of ALS are significant to understanding some of 
the factors that contribute to a lack of referral to diversion, in particular factors relating 
to criminal responsibility. For example, as it has been previously noted, to be eligible 
for a police caution or a YJC under the Act the young person must admit to the offence 
in the presence of an appropriate adult. In chapter five, it was noted that according to 
the police, one of the major impediments to diversion is due to ALS advising children 
not to admit to the offence. ALS practitioners are in a position to add to the accounts 
 
64 As noted at the time of the enactment of the YOA, Juvenile Justice New South Wales (JJ) was known as 
Department of Juvenile Justice; and all those interviewed began their YOA related work with the criminal justice 
system in the DJJ, consequently at times during the interviews, they referred to JJ as the DJJ. To avoid confusion, 
all references to the organisation made by the author and/or those interviewed in this thesis will be noted as JJ.  
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relating to admission of guilt from a perspective closer to those that they represent, the 
Indigenous young people.  
 
The interview with the ALS solicitor took place in May 2015, and the interviews with 
the JJ Assistant Managers were conducted between October and December 2015.  The 
interview questions65 were designed to enable respondents to express their views on a 
broad range of issues relating to diversion under the Act. These included, firstly, their 
role in the process of diversion; secondly, their experiences on working and managing 
diversion processes, including experiences with other organisations involved, 
particularly the police and magistrates as gatekeepers to diversion; and finally, their 
views on why the system of diversion is failing.  
 
The findings from the interviews with ALS and the JJ personnel will be examined in 
this chapter to understand their contributions to decision making on diversion in NSW.  
 
The participants  
The participants included one Aboriginal legal services solicitor and five Assistant 
Managers from Juvenile Justice. The former will be referred to as ‘ALS Solicitor’, and 
the latter will be referred to as ‘Assistant Managers’ 1 through to 5. The entire group 
will be referred to as ‘youth justice personnel’. 
 
Demographic and professional trajectories for the youth justice personnel interviewed 
are summarised in Table 6. 
  
 
65 Refer to Appendix 5 for the Youth Justice Personnel interview schedule. 
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Table 6: Demographics of NSW Youth Justice Personnel Participants 
 
Gender Age Time in the 
CJS 
Time in 
current role 
Professional 
Background 
Regions 
covered*** 
 
Female 32 6 years ALS children’s 
court: 4 years 
Victims advisor in 
domestic violence court 
→solicitor with ALS 
Metropolitan 
areas in court; 
and all of NSW 
in regard to 
custody 
notification 
service (24 hour 
hot-line) 
Female 48  23 years *Assistant 
Manager JJ: 3 
years 
Mediation (domestic 
violence) →assistant 
manager of youth 
justice conference 
Woy Woy and 
Wyong; 
Newcastle 
District; 
Far South 
Coast: 
Batemans Bay, 
Bega and Eden 
Courts; 
Griffith, 
Delinquin, 
Albury, Wagga 
Wagga and 
Cootamundra; 
Fairfield 
District: 
Fairfield, 
Bonnyrigg, 
Cabramatta, 
Revesby, 
Merrylands, 
and Holroyd 
Male 52 18 years *Assistant 
Manager JJ: 4 
years 
Juvenile officer/YJC 
convenor→Juvenile 
Justice Management 
Female 55 20 years *Assistant 
Manager JJ: 17 
Adult Community 
corrections ACT→ 
NSW adult corrections 
(probation/parole) 
→Director of Youth 
Justice 
Conferencing→JJ 
(Conference 
Administrator JJ) 
Female 49  20 years *Assistant 
Manager JJ: 15 
Community Justice 
Centre Mediation → 
YJC Convenor 
Female ** 14 years  *Assistant 
Manager JJ: 10 
YJC Convenor→Project 
Policy officer JJ 
*The time in the current role indicates the number of years in the same type of role, and not specifically as 
“Assistant Manager” that has only been recently created to replace previous existent roles following some 
restructuring of the Department of Juvenile Justice. 
**Undisclosed 
*** To avoid the identification of the participants, the areas managed by each have not been singled out, but 
instead, are presented as a group 
 
 
ALS solicitors 
As noted in chapter three, only one of a number of ALS solicitors invited agreed to 
participate in this research. This participant had worked in the criminal justice system 
as an advisor to domestic violence victims for six years, and in her current position as 
solicitor for almost four years. The value that this participant brings to the data and 
findings is limited by, her junior status and that she is the only participant from ALS. 
Nevertheless, she provides valuable information of the administrative/policy side of 
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things, thus adding another piece to understanding the puzzle of youth diversion 
decision-making processes and the failure to divert. 
 
There are two ways in which an ALS solicitor will encounter dealings as they relate to 
the YOA, in the first instance, through the custody notification service and secondly, in 
the courtroom while representing the young person. At the time of the interviews, the 
ALS solicitor dealt with youth court matters across a number of metropolitan areas in 
Sydney. As part of her role, she also responded and provided advice to clients across 
all of NSW on the custody notification service. Through her experiences on the NSW 
custody notification service and the city court representations, this participant was able 
to provide insights as they relate to both the rural and the city context. 
 
The custody notification service refers to a 24-hour legal advice phone line for 
Indigenous people. The service was established in 2000, as a response to a key 
recommendation of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
(Australian Law Reform Commission, 2017). Under NSW law, police must contact 
ALS custody notification services whenever they have taken an Indigenous person into 
custody. This is to assure that the young person receives early legal advice ensuring 
that their fundamental rights are respected. For example, through the custody 
notification phone service, ALS solicitors not only provide immediate legal advice, but 
they are also able to make enquiries regarding the health and welfare of the Indigenous 
person detained. Threats of self-harm or suicide and/or concerns about access to 
medication are common amongst Indigenous youth detained (Aboriginal Legal 
Services (NSW/ACT), n.d.).  ALS solicitors are trained to check on client’s wellbeing 
and ensure appropriate standards of care are followed in relation to individuals in 
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custody. This will include, for example, access to medication and appropriate medical 
treatment; contact with family or friends, access to clothing or other basic essentials 
(Australian Law Reform Commission, 2017).  
 
All ALS solicitors take part in the custody notification service on a roster basis and the 
calls they attend to could come from any police station in NSW.  At the point a call is 
made, quite often police could be offering the person the opportunity to admit to the 
offence and become eligible for diversion, the suggestion being that they could be 
considered to participate in a caution or a conference without the matter having to be 
referred to court. It is at this point that the solicitor provides advice to the young person 
that might affect the referral process.  
 
As ALS Solicitor noted, providing advice over the phone is often very complex and 
time consuming. Firstly, there is the challenge of explaining the provisions of the YOA 
to a young person and/or their support person. Secondly, as the ALS Solicitor 
highlighted, at times the provisions also need to be explained to the police officer on 
the other end of the phone. However, there is no guarantee that an admission of guilt 
will result in a diversion, as at this point, the police are not willing to commit to it (ALS 
Solicitor). According to Solicitor, this means that often, the advice to the young person 
is not to do an interview or answer questions. This will be the advice most likely to be 
provided, even at times when the young person is being offered a PAS. This, once 
again, highlights the constraints placed by the legislative requirement of admission of 
guilt for the purpose of diversion under the YOA. This makes for a strong argument to 
have admissions of guilt excluded as a requirement for the purposes of the YOA. An 
alternative would be to treat admissions in the manner of the New Zealand system, 
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where the young person does not deny the offence (see Judge Becroft and Norrie, 2015 
for an overview of New Zealand’s model).  ‘Not denied’ is considered a useful 
mechanism in New Zealand youth justice, because it triggers a Family Group 
Conference66 without the need for an absolute admission of guilt (O’Driscoll, 2008).  
 
As previously noted, the second way in which the solicitors might work with the YOA 
is when young people are required to attend court. This is the point at which a magistrate 
has the discretion to refer the young person to a caution or a conference under the Act. 
It is also at this point that the solicitor has the opportunity to make a case for diversion 
under the YOA, rather than process youth offenders under the Children (Criminal 
Proceedings) Act 1987. The limitations placed on diversion due to the legal 
requirement of admission of guilt are still relevant at this point. Although some 
magistrates interviewed indicated that young people might sometimes change their 
minds and admit to the offence during court appearance, this is not always the case. 
Hence, limitations around access to diversionary alternatives are concerning and 
perhaps unnecessary, particularly as they arise from the YOA requirement to admit guilt.  
 
Juvenile Justice ‘Assistant Managers’ 
The JJ Assistant Managers interviewed provided management and administrative 
support for a range of geographical areas extending from metropolitan regions to the 
outer rural. These included Woy Woy and Wyong; Newcastle District; Far South Coast: 
Batemans Bay, Bega and Eden Courts; Griffith, Delinquin, Aubrey, Wagga Wagga and 
Cootamundra; Fairfield District: Fairfield, Bonnyrigg, Cabramatta, Revesby, 
Merrylands, and Holroyd. That each participant interviewed had at one point or another 
 
66 Family Group Conferences (FGC) in New Zealand are the equivalent to YJC in NSW. 
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worked at a diverse number of geographical locations meant that they had a broad set 
of experiences with regard to the use of diversionary options in NSW. As will be 
discussed later, those interviewed often indicated that the level of acceptance of 
diversionary options away from court varies across different institutions and different 
geographical locations. The findings of the Noetic Report (2010) confirm this, with the 
DAGJ (2011) suggesting that diversionary options are not being used uniformly and 
equitably across NSW. Thus, the youth justice personnel perspectives help to 
understand some of the possible institutionally driven factors contributing to such 
discrepancies. 
 
Youth justice personnel insights and perspectives on diversion derive from the length 
of their experience in the criminal justice system. The Assistant Managers interviewed 
had been in their current or equivalent position67 for between 3 to 17 years. Their time 
in the criminal justice system ranged from 14 to 23 years. As Table 6 shows, their 
professional backgrounds varied. Mediation and community corrections backgrounds 
proved to be a common trajectory into juvenile justice. Three of them had previously 
been YJC convenors in NSW, with one of them, continuing to convene conferences 
while working for JJ for a period of time. However, in recent years JJ put a stop to such 
practices due to what JJ perceived as a conflict of interest: 
I was one of the first convenors in NSW and conferenced hundreds of youth 
justice conferences. Up until about four years ago, the department said it was 
a conflict of interest to work for juvenile justice full-time and run conferences 
at the same time, so they stopped us from doing that as a secondary 
employment (Assistant Manager 2). 
 
 
67 “Assistant Manager” position has only been recently created to replace previous existent roles following some 
restructuring of Juvenile Justice New South Wales. 
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Convenors68 are contractors with JJ responsible for the coordination and facilitation of 
YJC. Following their positions as convenors, these participants found themselves one 
way or another working part-time or full-time for the JJ as well. For example, one of 
the participants noted that her ability to acquire a part time position as a project policy 
officer in JJ was a direct result of having filled in on numerous occasions for assistant 
managers YJC. As she noted, while a convenor ‘she began to be asked to backfill on 
the assistant managers YJC positions in the metropolitan area’ (Assistant Manager 3). 
According to this participant, the experience on YJC practices gained from being a 
convenor led to such opportunities to join JJ in management roles. As she noted, 
if you were going to backfill another manager who was going on leave, you 
really needed to know something about conferencing. And because we were 
kind of a separate division, that's where they got the backfill from, they didn't 
go to the rest of juvenile justice because YJC was just a division on its own. 
And so that's how myself and others [conveners] would have, sort of, got into 
this (Assistant Manager 3). 
 
This remark indicates that the ins and outs of YJC or/and the Act are not core knowledge 
to those working within broader JJ. This is not unusual of a large division that has a 
diverse number of functions and a long history of administrative re-structuring.  
 
Institutional framework for JJ personnel 
Juvenile justice in NSW was administered by the Department of Youth and Community 
Services until 1987, when it became Juvenile Justice Service and part of the Department 
of Family and Community Services. In July 1991, it was transferred to the Department 
of Corrective Services where it operated as a Division, until it was proclaimed a 
 
68 Youth Justice Conference Conveners are not Public Servants, but statutory appointees under section 60 and 
Schedule 1 of the Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW).  
 
 
 
251 
Department of its own, in November 1991, thus becoming the Department of Juvenile 
Justice (NSW Government, 1991). In 2009 the DJJ was amalgamated into the new 
Principal Department, the Department of Human Services (see Public Sector 
Employment and Management (Departmental Amalgamations) Order 2009 (2009 No 
352) cls. 28). Then, in 2011, the DJJ was moved to the NSW Department of Attorney 
General and Justice, renamed subsequently as the Department of Justice. Thus, as 
previously noted, the formerly known DJJ is ‘Juvenile Justice NSW’ (JJ), an agency of 
New South Wales Government and an administrative division within the Department 
of Justice of NSW (see Public Sector Employment and 
Management (Departments) Order 2011 (2011 No184) cl. 4.).  
 
JJ operates under the terms of the Children (Detention Centres) Act 1987 (NSW) 
the Children (Community Service Orders) Act 1987 (NSW), the Young Offenders Act 
1997 (NSW), and the Children (Interstate Transfer of Offenders) Act 1988 (NSW) 
(Department of Justice, 2016). JJ: • supervises young people sentenced to community-based or custodial orders 
and on conditional bail; 	• supports and supervises young people to meet conditions of bail; 	• supervises young people remanded in custody pending court matters; 	• prepares reports for consideration by the courts in determining sentences; 	• supervises the Work and Development Order scheme for young offenders; 	• manages the Youth on Track early intervention scheme; 	• delivers interventions designed to reduce juvenile re-offending; 	• provides funding to a number of communities to assist young offenders and 
their families; and	
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• as previously noted, administers the YJC scheme (Department of Justice, 
2016). 	
 
Role of the Assistant Manager as it relates to the YJC 
Traditionally, YJC was managed by an assistant manager position in JJ Community 
officers specifically recruited to administer YJC and manage conference convenors. 
However, as part of a community office restructure, the responsibility of administrating 
YJC become a generalist role that can be shared by all Assistant Managers in the 
community of JJ. According to JJ this change ‘streamlined a number of practices and 
provided professional opportunities for staff’ (Department of Justice 2016, p. 19). 
Although the purpose here is not to engage in a comprehensive evaluation of the 
organisation, the restructuring of JJ was an issue amongst those interviewed, with 
concerns expressed that restructures can affect the way decisions are made. 
 
There appeared to be a crisis of faith in relation to the best way to manage YJC diversion 
within the organisation. In fact, a common issue of concern noted by those interviewed, 
is that under the current structure, the Assistant Manager role is not specific to YJC 
or/and the Act matters and as such individuals in these positions do not share the same 
kind of in-depth knowledge regarding the many different aspects of youth governance 
that they have to manage. From their viewpoint, this is a negative factor because it has 
the potential to affect diversionary practices adversely. For example, from time to time 
the police seek the perspective and/or confirmation from Assistant Managers on the 
options available for a particular young offender. A common view from those 
interviewed was that specialists with a deep understanding in regard to diversion 
practices would best provide such advice. Such a specialist role was, in the past, the 
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‘assistant manager of youth conferencing’. However, following JJ recent re-structuring 
the position of ‘assistant manager of youth justice conferencing’ has been eliminated. 
The responsibilities once carried by those in such a specialised role have now been 
transferred to the aforementioned ‘Assistant Manager’, the current role of all those 
interviewed.  
 
The oversight and management of youth justice conferencing referrals is only one of 
many among other aspects and/or programs relating to youth justice that Assistant 
Managers oversee. For example, their duties include the management of community 
caseworkers and oversight of community-based orders, including probation, bonds or 
community service. The implications, according to those interviewed, were that some 
‘Assistant Managers’ who come to the position from the previous ‘Assistant Manager 
to youth justice conferencing’, would have a much deeper understanding of diversion 
under the YOA. Other Assistant Mangers coming to the role, might be more familiar 
with other aspects of youth governance, for example, with the community-based side 
of justice, rather than diversion and/or YJC in particular, having no previous experience 
in this section of youth governance.  
 
It is important to note that at the time of recruiting for this research, the re-structuring 
of roles within JJ was relatively recent. Thus, JJ agreed to provide access only to 
‘Assistant Managers’ that were previously involved, under the old structure, in the 
formerly specialised role of the management of YJC. Thus, it is important to be cautious 
in regard to the participants’ views on the potential to undermine diversion through a 
lack of specialisation. These views come from the position of having been ‘specialised’ 
managers. Concurrently, by having progressed to their current role from the previous 
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specialised position of ‘assistant manager of youth justice conferencing’, all Assistant 
Managers interviewed had extensive knowledge of YJC and the diversion process. 
Their knowledge and previous experience placed them in an excellent position as 
participants for this research as they contextualised the role of the Assistant Manager 
as it relates to the YOA. 
 
The ‘gatekeeping’ role of youth justice personnel 
Assistant Managers work with all aspects of conferencing, from the referral point, 
whether the referrals are from the police or from court, through to notifications of 
completions to the parties involved. At the referral stage determinations are made as to 
appropriateness of the referral. All participants noted that occasionally, they get 
referrals from both police and court, that cannot be conferenced, or where more 
information is needed to assure that a YJC is appropriate. For example, Assistant 
Manager 2 noted, 
Occasionally, we get a referral of offences that can't be conferenced. So, our 
guiding tool, I suppose, is the Young Offenders Act. So, everything I do is 
guided by the Young Offenders Act… sometimes we get things that we can't 
conference, sometimes we might get something from police where a young 
person is only 12 or 13 and we need to make sure that they've asked the doli 
incapax questions. So, is it conferrable?...[H]ave all the legal processes been 
covered?  
 
Once the referral is found to be appropriate, the Assistant Manager will try to match 
the convenor to ‘not only the young person but also the victims and the circumstance’ 
(Assistant Manager 1). Factors such as gender, location, the demographics of the people 
that may attend the conference, as well as their cultural requirements, are all considered 
to adequately provide the optimum setting. Adding to this, concerns around disability 
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factors are also taken into account. For example, a screening disability tool is used to 
make a decision whether or not the young person is capable of participating in the 
conference, and whether or not they have an appropriate support network, and ‘we liaise 
with the convener over that; where the Assistant Manager is the only contact that the 
convener has with JJ’ (Assistant Manager 1).  
 
Once all considerations have been taken into account, this will be followed by approval 
to run the conference and in turn approval of the outcome plan. In turn, upon completion 
of the conference, the case manager will allocate a caseworker to monitor the 
completion of the outcome plan and finally notify all participants and of the result in 
regard to whether the young person has completed the outcome plan or not. Finally, the 
police and/or court will be notified.  
 
In cases where the outcome plan is not completed, the referring agent, either police or 
court, is notified. This notice affects the system’s responses. Regarding police referrals, 
it is important because:  
...that is the same as not participating at all in the conference, it’s like it never 
happened. Because they haven't, they haven't completed the requirement to 
say that they've actually attended a conference. So, then the police have to 
make a determination of whether or not they will give them an extension of 
time to complete the outcome plan or they will then refer it back onto another 
method of dealing with the matter, which is most likely to be court (Assistant 
Manager 1). 
 
On the other hand, if the YJC was a court referral, and the outcome was not completed, 
the court is notified and will often, in turn, issue a warrant for the young person to 
attend court.  
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The Assistant Managers engage with the many actors involved during this 
administrative process, including police, court magistrates and referral agents in their 
respective roles. In this sense, the Assistant Managers, in their administrative 
capacities, have much to contribute in regard to the understanding of the decision-
making and practices around diversion, even though they do not have a direct role in 
youth referrals.  
 
Overall, all youth justice personnel interviewed (Assistant Managers and the ALS 
solicitor) make the significant claim that from their viewpoint diversion under the YOA, 
in particular YJC is under-utilised. From their point of view, the YOA’s aim to consider 
detention as a last resort is compromised by the offences precluded by a number of 
factors including the Act, training and knowledge on diversion, interpretation and/or 
application of the legislation, and lastly a lack of uniform practices, lack of resources, 
lack of training in the management of diversion. 
 
Challenges to YJC diversion: the perspectives of youth justice personnel  
Common to all Assistant Managers interviewed was that they had very positive 
attitudes in regard to diversionary alternatives and restorative justice process – attitudes 
that they felt were not shared by all within JJ. For instance, one of the participants who 
first worked as a convenor in a community youth conferencing pilot program that ran 
from 1995 until 1996, prior to the establishment of the YOA, remarked in regard to her 
interest for this type of work, 
I think is the social aspect of what the intended outcomes for YJC. I think 
that at heart I am kind of a bit of a peacemaker. And yes, I was attracted to 
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the possibility for people to make amends and move on in their life after 
making mistakes (Assistant Manager 4). 
 
Similarly, another participant noted that she decided to pursue a professional position 
in JJ where she could help young people. Having worked in community corrections 
with offenders 19-20 years-old in parole, she remarked,  
I saw young people that had come into the system, who hadn’t had a chance, 
really to divert out of it [offending]. And at the same time, I heard about 
family group conferencing in New Zealand and had read a book about it and 
it just seemed to make a lot of sense to me that … it would help, particularly 
for young people, but any offenders I guess, to help them understand more 
(Assistant Manager 5).  
 
This participant began work with the JJ in the early days of YJC. At one point, she had 
been the Director of Youth Justice Conferencing, a position that at the time of its 
existence carried the responsibility for making sure that YJC, which was at the time a 
separate entity within the department, happened properly across the state. These are 
optimum examples of those cases where some ‘Assistant Managers’ have a much 
greater in-depth knowledge of the complexities and logistics of diversion under the Act. 
The significance of this is in regard to whether the new administrative decisions that 
have seen the specialist manager role of YJC amalgamate might undermine the focus 
on diversionary alternatives and, in turn, the outcomes of diversion. All of those 
interviewed expressed their concerns to this effect. As illustrated by the following 
remark, 
when there is a specialist role that people become knowledgeable and they 
become skilled and they have, and when their attention is solely directed 
towards particular aims that it is, that the outcomes … are greater. They are 
more substantial. I think that with the combined role now that the attention 
of these positions has been, you know they’ve been divided between the 
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different types of work; I think that as far as conferencing I think that perhaps 
some of the … some of the attention will be diluted (Assistant Manager 4). 
 
Adding to this, specific concerns were also raised in regard to the lack of training for 
new Assistant Managers coming to these roles. For example, Assistant Manager 4 
remarked, 
So, they’ve been trained on how to check whether the referral is covered 
under the Young Offenders Act, but my understanding is that the training 
hasn’t really talked about … hasn’t really addressed the principles and the 
objectives of the Act, that kind of stuff wasn’t really covered.  
 
More generally, as one of the participants noted the lack of training on this front is 
simply reflecting a broader issue in regard to resources that are spread thin. The 
sentiment is that under the current constraints of JJ, diversion is not a priority in the 
agenda: 
When we have team meetings and we had training for our regional area, like 
we had two days training earlier this year and not one agenda item was a YJC 
agenda item (Assistant Manager 4). 
 
This remark illustrates the mood at the time this research took place. With JJ 
undergoing significant structural changes, some of those interviewed felt JJ and the 
government more broadly were failing to prioritise much-needed training, resources 
and overall focus on diversionary practices/processes. The following sections will 
elaborate on these issues including, the offences precluded by the Act, training and 
knowledge on diversion, interpretation and application of the legislation, lack of 
resources and the lack of uniform practices in the management of diversion. All these 
factors, according to Assistant Managers, undermined the use of the YOA and diversion 
away from court, contributing to a generically more punitive political agenda for youth 
offenders. 
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The need for even practices within JJ 
One of the key issues raised by some of the participants was that there is a lack of policy 
guiding practices in JJ on how to handle things, particularly in recent years.  This, 
according to those interviewed, in turn, results in localised approaches within JJ, 
whereby different solutions might result in different outcomes. For example, one 
participant noted,  
the assistant managers for youth justice conferencing [referring to the role 
prior to re-structuring] used to get together twice a year and have a 
conference and meeting about what's working, what's not, what they could 
do better, what are the challenges? And we had a meeting last year and it was 
probably the first time in four years that they'd met. So, there was a core 
effective practice of a group of people from conferencing and I was in the 
committee. But, as far as I’m concerned, I think it would be helpful for all 
conferencing managers to get together to talk about things like that. Because 
we're working in silo really you know, very rarely talk to each other. I think 
that’s the department across board; the lack of consistency (Assistant 
Manager 1). 
 
 
Overall the claim made is that more resources are needed to increase dialogue, training 
and sharing of knowledge that allows what is working to be emphasised and turned into 
practice. This lack of consistency in relation to managing YJC referrals across JJ was 
noted by some as an existing problem since the early days of the YOA, and as something 
that undermines the potential to promote diversionary alternatives within and outside 
JJ. This in turn, undermines the use of those diversionary alternatives, specifically YJC 
referrals, within and outside the department:  
 
I think one of the limiting factors when we first, in the first five years of 
operation of the Act is that we thought very much about our partners the 
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police, our partners the courts, our partners the legal profession. But we 
didn’t think a lot about our partners in Juvenile Justice. And so, where 
particularly Juvenile Justice officers are writing back to the courts and/or 
making recommendations or providing advice to the court that…that 
influencing that to also put diversion front-and-center, I think we forgot about 
that a little bit (Assistant Manager 5).   
 
A better forum for internal and external discussion around diversion was noted as a key 
feature needed to increase the overall use of the YOA, and in turn, the number of 
referrals to YJC. This type of relationship was noted to vary across jurisdictions/local 
areas of command due to a lack of uniformed practices. In addition, some participants 
had concerns that with the recent restructuring in JJ and the responsibility of 
administrating YJC becoming a generalist role, the strength of relationships with the 
police specifically might be compromised. This was highlighted in the following 
remark, 
So, in each LAC the police have a Youth Liaison Officer who’s the contact 
point and so, for much of the last 15-17 years, that’s been a one-on-one with 
the conference manager and the Youth Liaison Officer, so that you do built 
quite a strong peer support almost. And you do seek advice from each other, 
and… Whereas under the new structure that may or may not continue. So, in 
some areas it will continue, like for me it’s south coast I still have a command 
that I’m responsible for. But I think in other locations there’ll be more than 
one person dealing … with the police. So, it still remains to be seen how that, 
what happens (Assistant Manager 5). 
 
This quote highlights a key reason for concerns about the weakening of the relationship 
between the police and youth justice workers as a removal of the rapport that may lead 
to casual consultations. Such consultations, as indicated by this participant, relied on 
established relationships. Further, the outcome of those consultations would indeed 
have implications for diversionary decisions to be made, in that the decision to divert 
or not can be affected by discussions taken place. This challenge becomes compounded 
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by the lack of specialist training provided to all stakeholders, JJ and other key criminal 
justice actors such as the police and magistrates. 
 
Lack of training  
The YJC Directorate, which was responsible for the overall operation of YJCs in NSW 
(since the inception of the scheme), was abolished in 2007. Now such responsibility 
lies with JJ. However, as noted previously, concerns were raised by those interviewed 
that due to resources spreading thin, YJC is not a priority in the JJ.  
 
The participants noted that there has not been enough capacity to address training and 
education of stakeholders, rather much of the time is taken in administrative tasks. This 
was noted to have been further the case, particularly over the last two years. For 
example, regarding internal JJ personnel training, it was noted, 
[s]ee, about eight years ago there was a Youth Justice Conferencing 
directorate and the directorate looked after, they looked after the Youth 
Justice Conferencing managers, and they guided and supported the work of 
the managers. And then about eight years ago, in 2007, the directorate was 
dissolved, and the broader department looked after [us], so we were just 
looked after by regions, and our capacity to do that kind of community 
consultation and stakeholder support and focus diminished (Assistant 
Manager 4). 
 
The point here is not in regard to whether outcomes and the use of diversion was better 
or worse prior the dissolution of the YJC Directorate. Instead, the point made is in 
regard to a lack of capacity, due to lack of resources, to address needs on community 
consultation and stakeholder support, as well as training. For instance, some noted that 
co-training with police has also diminished over-time,  
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The other thing that we used to do that I’ll just mention; we used to do joint 
training with police for Specialist Youth Officer training and it was always, 
it was agreed that Juvenile Justice would participate in the two days of that 
training and that we would sign off people’s accreditation. But over the years 
that’s kind of been diluted too; so, I think that a lot of areas police will do the 
Specialist Youth Officer training without the co-facilitation of Juvenile 
Justice. And again, I can see why, I can see why they would take advantage 
of having those police in training and want to ensure that their other youth 
targets were met, but I think that Juvenile Justice had a lot to contribute and 
I think that their participation around some checks and balances that perhaps 
aren’t there now (Assistant Manager 4). 
 
The participants’ perceptions that perhaps there is an issue surrounding the adequacy 
of training/education of police with a focus on diversion match some of the concerns 
raised by the YLOs that were interviewed in this study (see chapter four). The 
significance of issues regarding training is two-fold, firstly a lack of adequate training 
focusing on the reasons for the prioritisation of diversion, may, in fact, undermine the 
use of diversion. Reflecting on the early days of the Act, one of the Assistant Managers 
noted, 
when the SYO training was first developed I ran a pilot with my Youth 
Liaison Officers, police became aware of it, I worked with the senior tutor to 
enhance the program which was then rolled-out state-wide. But a big part of 
that was talking about youth offending, the reason that we should divert 
young people, some of the research about it, etcetera. So, and part of the deal 
to the police was that over the years Juvenile Justice would have an active 
[role], like we’d continue to develop the training together…But that’s kind 
of fallen off a little bit as well, so the last iteration of the training has not had 
as much Juvenile Justice involvement, and I think it’s just, it’s a bit more 
about the job, it’s a bit more –how they [the police] do the paperwork for 
their charges and stuff (Assistant Manager 5).  
 
The sentiment here is that the significance of why young people should be treated 
differently to adults and diverted away from the court system (see Richards, 2011b) 
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needs to be further emphasised to those making diversionary decisions and needs to be 
a constant highlight in training sessions.  
 
Secondly, a lack of co-training between the JJ and police YLOs can also have the 
potential to undermine the use of diversion by not fostering strong relationships 
between the stakeholders. Assistant Manager 3 notes, 
with the police, we used to do all that [YLO training] locally and that used to 
really help you get to know the new police officers, but now they do it 
centrally at Hurstville, and I feel that's a great pity because we are not getting 
to know our local police officers in the same way. 
 
The importance of ongoing and strong rapport - which builds on trust and peer-
consultation between the decision-makers and others managing the process in JJ – the 
police, magistrates and JJ cannot be underestimated. As will be further illustrated, 
throughout the process of decision-making on referral to YJC, opportunities present 
themselves for conversations to occur between JJ and the YLOs. Such conversations 
are focused in regard to the best outcome for a young person whilst keeping a focus on 
diversion and court as a ‘last resort’. An open dialogue is more likely to occur when 
there is a well-established relationship between all interested parties. Such a dialogue 
has the potential to increase the number of youth referrals to diversionary alternatives. 
 
Institutional cultures and attitudes affecting diversion to YJC 
I think with the police it’s the entrenched culture... I think, that you know, I 
think if the crime managers and the top have this view that conferencing is a 
load of rubbish, and that just trickles through. And I don't think anyone - even 
if they did believe conferencing was going to work - I don't believe that they'd 
be speaking up about it when you've got your hierarchy within the police 
system (Assistant Manager 1). 
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The words above reflect the views of all youth justice personnel interviewed, from the 
solicitor to the Assistant Managers in JJ. Such views have been informed from 
exchanges and experiences with police. This is clearly illustrated by this participant’s 
remark, 
I used to encourage the YLOs to come to convenor’s training [sessions] and 
they never did. But I used to say, “Is there any feedback you want me to give 
to them? Is there anything we can be doing better? Are there any gaps in 
conferencing?” And their [the police area of command] feedback to me was 
always like: “The outcomes are too soft. The outcomes are too wishy-washy. 
They are always the same; an apology letter, what's an apology letter going 
to do?”  And so, I always have those questions around, “Well, it might be the 
first time the kids ever verbalised that they are sorry, and it might be, what 
might seem an easy task for you might be enormous for a 15-year-old.” So, 
I think even the YLOs have that view. The last YLO meeting I had, I said to 
the part-time one at Gosford, I said “Is everything okay because you really 
seem like something’s wrong?” She said, “I’m sick of having these meetings 
saying the same things and nothing changes in our station.” And she said, “It 
needs to go to a higher level.” She said, “We all know at this table know what 
needs to happen; it’s up above [that they need to know]” (Assistant Manager 
1). 
 
The entrenched police culture referred to here, as well as occupational opposition to 
diversionary alternatives has been well documented (see Chan, 2005) and discussed in 
the early chapters of this study. Culture is to a group as personality is to a character of 
an individual (Schein, 2010). Police culture has been largely noted as monolithic, 
homogenous, authoritarian, suspicious, distrustful, socially isolated and highly resistant 
to change (see Chan, 1997; Kingshott, Bailey, and Wolfe, 2004; Reiner, 2010). 
Generally, regarded as a bi-product of modern police work focus on the danger of the 
street environment, officer discretion and authority to use violence conflicts between 
front line officers and managers (see Reiner, 2010). Police culture is often viewed as a 
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set of beliefs shared by all police officers that stem from their working conditions 
(Reiner, 2010). Within such a police culture, attitudes are defined by punitive and law 
enforcement approaches whereby there is a clear reluctance to move away from 
traditional methods of policing. These attitudes are highlighted by the following remark 
made by one of the Assistant Managers interviewed, 
I think the last training session I did, I think I had about 24 male officers and 
2 female officers and in the beginning of it they were very upfront; they 
thought it was a load of crap, it was a very soft option, juvenile justice is soft 
and [they told me]: “we want these kids to have consequences and if we hit 
them hard they are less likely to reoffend” (Assistant Manager 1). 
 
As noted in earlier chapters, there is no evidence to suggest that with a punitive 
approach young people are less likely to reoffend (Chen et al. 2005; Weatherburn, 
McGrath and Bartels, 2012; Richards and Lee, 2013). Conversely, as noted in earlier 
chapters, there is significant research to show that young people grow out of crime (see 
Mukherjee, 1985; Richards, 2011b), and the earlier the contact with the criminal justice 
system, the more likely the young person will become entrenched in the system (see 
Chen et al. 2005; McAra and McVie 2007, 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, ‘tough on crime’ attitudes such as those noted above are entrenched 
within institutions such as the police. According to the youth justice personnel 
interviewed, the police have always displayed a disapproval of diversionary options for 
not being part of a tough on crime approach. However, it was the view of the 
participants that since the earlier days of the Act, police attitudes have slowly shifted 
becoming more accepting of diversion. A 2004 study by Chan et al. have noted such 
shifting police attitudes towards the Act. However, when comparing the percentages of 
referrals to YJC by police to those by court, over the years, there is no evidence to 
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support that an acceptance of diversion by police has increased or at least had a major 
impact on the number of YJC referrals. Table 7 illustrates the percentage of distribution 
by police and courts, of the total numbers of YJC referrals per year since 1998-1999 to 
2016-2017, as recorded by JJ.69 
Table 7: Youth Justice Conference referrals by Police or Courts 
 
Year YJC Referrals 
by Police 
YJC referrals 
by Court 
1998-1999 53% 47% 
1999-2000 51% 49% 
2000-01 44% 56% 
2001-02 43% 57% 
2002-03 43% 57% 
2003-04 42% 58% 
2004-05 41% 59%  
2005-06 48% 52% 
2006-07 49% 51% 
2007-08 44% 56% 
2008-09 43% 57% 
2009-10 47% 53% 
2010-11 46% 54% 
2011-12 46% 54% 
2012-13 49% 51% 
2013-14 45% 55% 
2014-15 48% 52% 
2015-16 41% 59% 
2016-17 42% 58% 
Source:  DAGJ/DJJ/JJ Strategic Information System as 
reported in Annual Reports (see footnote 70) 
 
It can be noted that the median percentage of referrals to YJC by police for the period 
1998-2017 been 45.5%, while the median percentage of referrals to YJC by court for 
the same period 54.5%. A year-by-year comparison illustrates that the first two year-
periods, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000, following the implementation of the YOA, were the 
only years to date, in which more referrals by percentage come from the police rather 
than the court. Further to this, in the recent years, for the periods, 2015-16 and 2016-
 
69 The information in Table 7.2 was compiled from data source DAGJ/DJJ/JJ Strategic Information System (note 
this is a live database subject to changes) as reported in the following Annual Reports: NSW Department of Juvenile 
Justice Annual Report 2016-17, 2015-16, 2014-15; Juvenile Justice NSW Annual Report Summary 2013-14, 2012-
13; 2010-11, 2009-10, 2008-09; Department of Attorney General and Justice Annual Report 2011-12; Department 
of Juvenile Justice Annual report 2007-08, 2006-07, 2005-06, 2004-05, 2003-04, 2003-02, 2002-01, 2001-2000, 
1999-2000, 1998-1999. 
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17, the data illustrates a decline to the lowest percentage of referrals to YJC by police, 
41% and 42% respectively. In contrast, YJC court referrals, for the same year periods 
increasing to 59% and 58%.  
 
While the majority of referrals to YJC come from court rather than police, the young 
people will increase their chances of exposure to the criminal justice system, thus 
undermining the YOA principles.  Further attention needs to be placed on how police 
as the first point of contact for young people apply the YOA, so it can meet its original 
intention of diverting young people from the criminal justice system effectively and 
consistently.  
 
The youth justice personnel interviewed for this study believe that cynical attitudes 
towards diversionary options amongst police still prevail and have resulted in 
differential referrals across different LACs. Some LACs embrace diversionary 
alternatives more than others. As one Assistant Manager points out in the interview: 
Different LACs have different attitudes. I’ve got a couple who are excellent 
and a couple who you never hear anything from and some who are in 
between. We've got one LAC where they are just not interested in YJC at all. 
Nothing. I haven't had a referral from them for so long I can't remember; they 
just don't even think about it (Assistant Manager 3). 
 
Such observations align with the most recent review of youth justice in NSW (see 
Noetic Solutions, 2010) where it was highlighted that the rate at which police diverted 
young people to YJC varied considerably across LACs. Similarly, Ringland and Smith 
(2013) found that while 85 per cent of LACs diverted at least 70 per cent of eligible 
cases, the rate of diversion per LAC was as low as 30 per cent in some LACs.  There 
are, of course, many possible explanations for the disparities of referrals across all 
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LACs, some of which have been discussed in previous chapters. For example, diversion 
under the Act is complex as it only applies in certain circumstances (for example, 
admission of guilt, eligibility of the offence). In addition, there are five factors to be 
considered by the police and magistrates in the decision-making: the seriousness of the 
offence; the degree of violence in the offence; the harm caused to any victim; the 
number and nature of offences in criminal history of the offender and times dealt with 
by YOA previously; and any other matter the official thinks appropriate (see chapter 
one, pp. 55-56). As noted in previous chapters, the legislation offers a great leeway for 
interpretation on the weight of such factors. Lastly, the profile between the offenders 
might differ across LACs. Any of these factors and others could be the reason behind 
the variation of referrals across LACs (see Ringland and Smith, 2013 for a study 
examining the proportion of all eligible young people who were diverted across LACs 
in NSW). For example, a study by Ringland and Smith (2013) found that characteristics 
such as being older at the time of referral, being male, identifying as Indigenous, having 
more charges and having previous cautions or conferences were associated with a 
decreased likelihood of diversion.  However, the unexpectedly low rates of diversion 
by some LACs, even after adjusting for case and individual-level characteristics, 
remain noteworthy.  
 
The youth justice personnel interviewed here, believe that in some LACs, the under-
utilisation of diversion results from a lack of support within the LAC’s management 
and its police community. For example, one of the participants noted,  
if the Superintendent is, you know, the local area commander, if they are, if 
they promote the Young Offenders Act within their local area command then 
it does quite well. I think that if you have a Youth Liaison Officer who has 
some … a significant level of on-the-ground experience and if that Youth 
Liaison Officer is respected by their colleagues, that there are better 
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outcomes for, under the Young Offenders Act both in the way of cautioning 
and in the way of conferencing (Assistant Manager 4). 
 
Adding to this a further issue undermining diversion is that some YLOs choose the role 
for reasons unrelated to a passion for promoting diversion. JJ personnel’s frustration is 
not so much with the individual YLOs, but the real frustration lies with the failures of 
a broader system within a particular social and political context. According to some 
youth justice personnel, the more administrative nature of the YLOs role, ‘sometimes 
attracted people who are less enthusiastic and do not promote it [diversion] to the same 
degree as what others do’ (Assistant Manager 4).  
 
The administrative nature of the YLO role was discussed in chapter four. As some 
YLOs noted during the interviews, their attraction to the role had been based on its 
better fit to personal commitments, due to its administrative nature. It was noted by 
those YLOs that the administrative nature of the role, meant a Monday to Friday, nine-
to-five schedule, which is unusual for a police role. According to the youth justice 
personnel the YLO role becomes attractive to some due to the working schedule rather 
than the focus of the role. For instance, Assistant Manager 3 observed that at times 
‘there is not a lot of enthusiasm with a lot of police officers about learning about YJC’, 
and adds that a possible explanation for this is a high turnover of YLOs:  
[t]hey always have different YLO’s so there's no one, sort of, permanently in 
a position. They seem to have a lot of maternity, women who are pregnant 
go into the YLO role and so they are only there for six months, maybe, and 
then they’ve moved on. 
 
 
According to youth justice personnel, YLOs occupy an important gatekeeper role to 
diversion and therefore need to be more enthusiastic about the values behind such 
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diversionary alternatives. Enthusiasm will encourage further engagement with training, 
further stakeholder interactions, and in turn, the overall promotion of the Act within 
each institution to lead the process of diversion to maximum capacity. According to the 
youth justice personnel interviewed an enthusiastic approach to diversionary 
alternatives, or lack of it, also results in variations on the referral numbers to YJC. 
 
The youth justice personnel interviewed believe that, in a similar manner, there are 
great differences on the utilisation of the Act across courts, particularly the number and 
frequency of referrals to YJC. As with the discrepancy of referrals across LACs, there 
are many possible explanations. No specific research has been done on this front. 
However, the youth justice personnel interviewed, having worked with both local 
magistrates and the specialist children magistrates, believe that ‘outside of specialist’s 
Children’s Court, it’s very difficult to get magistrates on board’ (Assistant Manager 2). 
An example illustrating the difference of interest across courts jurisdictions, children 
versus local courts, was pointed out in the interview, 
the magistrate in Newcastle has been great, we’ve had three different 
magistrates here over the last ten years and all three of them have been 
terrific; regular referrers to conferencing. They see the value in it because 
they see the direct results. The outcome plans and the conference report go 
back to the magistrate, so they directly get to see the impact of the conference 
on the young person, on the victims and on the families…I worked in 
Campsie for an extended period of time, 12 months, filling in the same role 
up there. And the Campsie magistrate at the time would not refer, just did not 
refer to conferencing at all. And I took it upon myself to find out why; so, I 
set up meetings and that sort of stuff. Basically, [I was told] that it was a soft 
option. He told me: “No, no, no by the time these kids get to court, they 
should be punished” (Assistant Manager 2). 
 
According to the interviewee, the different level attitudes towards using the Act, 
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between the two magistrates in the two locations above is a direct result of Newcastle 
having a dedicated children’s court, and having, 
somewhere like Campsie, they’re just at the local Court and then they empty 
the local Court and have the juvenile matters heard. And then it's back to 
local Court again, the gallery is full. So, you know, it's very difficult for them 
to take a punitive hat off and put on a diversionary hat (Assistant Manager 
2). 
 
Observations above are concurrent with claims made by some magistrates and 
discussed in chapter five, in regard to challenges of managing a non-specialist children 
court. Further, the perception by Assistant Manager 2, that certain magistrates are less 
likely to be supportive of diversion under the Act is significant because it undermines 
diversion in a number of ways. Firstly, if the perception is true, the magistrate is less 
likely to divert the young person. Secondly, even if the perception has been wrongly 
formed, it might also lead to a reduced likelihood of diversion due to reactions to this 
perception by others. An example of this was provided by the ALS solicitor 
interviewed: 
Like with any situation, as a solicitor you’re conscious of who your audience 
is when you’re addressing them. Some magistrates are a lot more willing to 
use the YOA than others. But if it was that typical situation of a less serious 
offence with no criminal history, I would always suggest that [to have the 
matter dealt with the YOA]. But, and there are some magistrates where, even 
if the child does have a criminal history, they might think it’s appropriate and 
of course in that situation I’d be suggesting it. But there are some magistrates 
who I may not even suggest that because I know it was out of the question 
(ALS solicitor). 
 
In chapter five, it was noted that some magistrates, particularly the local court 
magistrates (non-specialist) in regional communities acknowledged not to be aware 
“off the top of their heads” of all matters that might qualify for referral under the Act. 
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Further, some magistrates noted that they expected, that whether a matter should be 
dealt with the YOA, should be a suggestion coming from counsel. However, the quote 
from the solicitor above suggests that at times, such suggestions will not be 
forthcoming, due to the solicitor’s perception that the magistrate is not ‘willing’ to use 
the YOA.  Thus, less positive attitudes towards diversion by magistrates, or even the 
perception by someone else that they exist, can clearly undermine opportunities for 
diversion for a young person. 
 
It was a belief of the youth justice personnel interviewed that some of the less positive 
attitudes towards diversionary alternatives under the Act by the Local court magistrates 
was something that could be resolved with further education/training on diversion. 
Nevertheless, it was also acknowledged that this is ‘very difficult’ (Assistant Manager 
2). The key role of education and training to widening the application of the YOA and 
thereby increasing the diversion rate to YJC was previously noted by Chan et al.  (2005) 
and more recently by the Youth Justice Coalition70 in 2011, in a submission to the 
Department of Attorney General Justice on the Review of the YOA and Children 
Criminal Proceedings. As Chan et al. (2005) note in their study, rules including those 
in the form of legislation are an ‘open texture’ (see Hart, 1961) and generalisation that 
might include or exclude issues, consequently they need to be interpreted in order to be 
applied. Accordingly, there is a need for an informed audience that understand the 
context and aims of the legislation. Thus, Chan et al. (2005) conclude that promotion 
and education may help reduce some disparities in applications of the law. The 
observations made by JJ Assistant Managers interviewed in this study regarding the 
potential for further training and education to increase the use of diversion to YJC, 
 
70 The Youth Justice Coalition is a network of youth workers, children’s lawyers, policy workers and academics 
working to promote the rights of children and young people in New South Wales. 
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coalesce with YLOs opinions in this regard. Equally, as noted in chapter five, the 
interviews with the magistrates in this study raises concerns about whether a lack of 
training might limit diversion, particularly for the non-specialist magistrates in the rural 
areas. 
 
Adding to this, a JJ Assistant Manager who mainly works with local court magistrates, 
noted, that in general, magistrates were more open to a conversation in the earlier days 
of the Act, whereas  
now, I know there are some magistrates who just - see I don't work with 
[specialist] children's magistrates, I work with local magistrates, there are 
some magistrates across the state who just don't believe in it and won’t refer 
to Youth Justice Conferencing. And also, they are not interested really in 
having [training]… don't think there's anything to learn about it. So, I think 
that it's changed a little bit. But it does depend on the magistrate (Assistant 
Manager 5). 
 
It is possible to argue here, that perhaps local court magistrates have lost interest as the 
Act has never seemed to be given the support to be taken to its full potential. 
Alternatively, perhaps, as discussed in chapter five, it is to do with the overall lack of 
training, particularly for local court magistrates. The youth justice personnel noted, that 
occasionally since the early days JJ has been asked to address magistrate’s forums once 
or twice a year, however there has never been any official training on diversion for 
magistrates. Further, as discussed in chapter five, magistrates interviewed indicated that 
these forums are likely to be attended only by the specialist children’s court magistrates. 
Thus, local court magistrates, the most likely in need and/or to benefit from information 
in such forums would not have such opportunity. 
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Aside from the lack of official training, JJ Assistant Managers interviewed emphasised 
that as with police, there is also value in having conversations with the court in regard 
to diversion.  They indicated that, depending on the relationship between the court and 
JJ, there is opportunity for some discussion regarding conferencing between 
magistrates and the Assistant Manager (or their administrator assistant) of JJ. This, 
according to youth justice personnel, was not found to occur equally across different 
areas, as it is not an official part of the management process. Yet, a few Assistant 
Managers have managed, with some success, to build good rapport with the court. Such 
conversations provide insights into some of the reasons as to why some magistrates do 
not implement diversion as much as they might.  
 
According to the youth justice personnel, some magistrates, particularly in ‘small 
country communities’ (Assistant Manager 4), had clearly noted that they felt that their 
role was to support police decisions. For example, an Assistant Manager interviewed 
noted,  
I’ve also had magistrates who’ve said things like, that they won’t refer to 
conference because the police obviously think that it should go to court: “If 
the police wanted to refer, they would have referred [to YJC] and so they 
should. Because the police have decided that if they’ve sent it to court, well 
then, it’s obviously more serious” (Assistant Manager 4). 
 
In a similar manner, some youth justice personnel noted that a concern to appease 
communities with more punitive sentiments was also a reason for some decision-
making by magistrates. An Assistant Manager illustrated this by noting: 
I remember once, - it was a long time ago now though – but a magistrate had 
referred [to YJC] a young person for riding their bike on the footpath without 
a helmet on. And so, I got in touch with the magistrate and I said: “Look, 
with respect this isn’t, this isn’t something that we would, that we would deal 
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with [a YJC] because there’s no victim and it’s not very serious” - and the 
young person could have been in trouble before, I think that they’d been, it 
wasn’t the first time they’d been before court. And the magistrate said to me, 
he said: “Look, you know, this is a small community and people take this 
kind of things really seriously, so I refer it to a conference, for a conference” 
So, we did the conference because the magistrate said (Assistant Manager 4). 
 
Focusing on occupational cultures, training/education issues and inter-agencies 
relations has signalled some of the issues that need to be addressed to increase the 
implementation of diversion. It appears that part of the reason for the long-term failure 
to apply the YOA to its full potential, emanates from a lack of investment on resources 
needed to support it, including training across all agencies involved and interagency 
co-operation. Further barriers were highlighted as the youth justice personnel discussed 
the implementation process. 
 
Issues with implementation process  
This section focuses on some of the most significant impediments to the 
implementation of diversion in relation to complexities faced by decision-makers under 
the Act. The issues raised relate to determining the level of intervention, the ambiguity 
of the legislation, admissions of guilt, and specific challenges in regard to Indigenous 
young people. As it will be seen, some of these factors of concern have been previously 
discussed in chapters four and five, as they were raised during the interviews with the 
judiciary and NSW Police Force. 
 
PAS, does it solve the ‘Admission of Guilt Problem’?  
When you say to a young Aboriginal boy who has heard his parents, his 
uncles, his aunties all saying: “Don’t trust the white fellas, don’t trust the 
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white fellas, they’re a bunch of ass holes, they’re going to get ya”. You know: 
“You’re behind the eight-ball already, you know? They’re all out to punish 
ya”. Kid is in the police station, after having committed several offences, 
they’re sitting in the police station and the police say: “Do you admit to the 
offences?... No. Wasn’t me.” Any chance of a conference gone out the 
window (Assistant Manager 2). 
 
The Act specifies that the person must admit having committed the offence in order to 
be eligible for a caution or a YJC (see Young Offenders Act 1997: Section 19 (b); 
Section 36 (b)). Chapters five and six highlighted that both police and magistrates 
interviewed noted that often children cannot be referred because they do not admit guilt. 
There are no records kept on this, however, as noted, no admission equals no referral.  
 
This issue has been acknowledged as a fundamental impediment to diversion since the 
early days of the Act. As noted in previous chapters, this knowledge led, in very recent 
years, to the introduction of the Protection Admission Scheme, referred to as PAS.71 
However, as noted in previous chapters, there are concerns in regard to the 
appropriateness of the PAS. PAS is problematic due to issues of due process and 
whether such a scheme genuinely protects the interests of the young person. For 
example, an Assistant Manager noted,  
the idea is that a young person can admit the offence, gain the advantage of 
being referred to a conference but not have that admission held against them. 
How do you explain that to a young person? How do you explain that to a 
14-year-old at 2 o’clock in the morning when they’re being charged for break 
and enter; their mates all done a runner on them; they’re the only one that’s 
got picked up? They’ve got a very tired and very angry father sitting there, 
who is continually saying to them: “What the hell were you doing? You told 
 
71 As noted in previous chapters PAS is a scheme, by which if a young person decides to exercise their right to 
silence, the police may offer them the opportunity to make a protected admission. To make a protected admission, 
the police may conduct a formal interview in which the young person will admit their part in the offence, by signing 
the admission form. This is not considered an admission of guilt by law, and it prevents the police from asking about 
any other offences during the interview. 
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us …” And then the father is saying to the police officer: “We thought he was 
at a mate’s place; I don’t know what’s got into him, we can’t handle him 
anymore. He’s being disrespectful,” blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. So, [as a 
young person] you’re sitting there being hammered by absolutely everyone 
and then the police say to you: “If you admit the offences you won’t really 
be admitting them”. That, for a young person, that’s not going to wash 
(Assistant Manager 2).   
 
PAS has been designed to operate where a young person has declined to make an 
admission but a court alternative under the YOA is appropriate. It is an understanding 
that by signing the PAS, the young offender can maintain their right to silence in 
relation to admission that can be used as evidence in court. Thus, the PAS scheme has 
been developed assuming complete autonomy of the young person, rather than 
considering the realities. According to ALS Solicitor, this is a hard scheme to explain, 
particularly when a quick look at the form shows that this is a record of admission to 
offences for the child to sign. The policy is made by people who are completely 
divorced from these sorts of circumstances. It is made in a vacuum considering a 
fictional young offender who would have the presence of mind to respond in the manner 
expected by the legislation and authority figures. 
 
Furthermore, PAS prevents the police from asking questions about other offences other 
than those listed on the PAS. However, this does not prevent the offender from 
incriminating themselves by providing details of other offences. According to PAS, if 
this is to happen, the interview may be suspended and what the young person has said 
in the interview will not be used in criminal proceedings against them. But, as ALS 
Solicitor explains, this does not eliminate the possibility that the police could start new 
investigations relating to any offences disclosed as part of a PAS. According to ALS 
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Solicitor, PAS is not necessarily something designed with the best interest of the young 
person in mind.  
 
As noted in chapters four and five, both police and magistrates noted that the most 
common advice from Legal Aid to the young person while in police custody is not to 
admit to the offence. This has been further emphasised by youth justice personnel 
interviewed,   
The first thing they'll do is there'll be given, offered their phone call to the 
legal aid or the Aboriginal legal aid hotline and the hotline’s first piece of 
advice has always been, and to this day stays: “Don’t say anything”. Because 
remember, their first responsibility for the Aboriginal legal aid is protective 
of the person, protective of the client regardless of their age (Assistant 
Manager 2). 
 
According to the ALS solicitor interviewed it is not always the case that the advice 
provided by the 24-hour hotline is ‘say nothing’. Nevertheless, she acknowledged that 
it is a likely scenario. Several reasons were put forward for this. Firstly, according to 
the ALS solicitor interviewed, when the call comes, usually the ALS solicitor does not 
get to speak directly with the YLO, but ‘rather with the custody manager or the officer 
in charge at the station’ (ALS Solicitor). This means that although the option to be 
diverted might be available, and suggestions might be made, there is no guarantee that 
this will be the action taken.  
the young person is under arrest at the police station, so they’re not free to 
leave. And the custody manager is there but doesn’t know, hasn’t been able 
to confirm that they’re eligible to be dealt with under the young offenders’ 
act. Normally in that situation before giving advice to the young person I 
would ask the police to find out and to make a decision – are they dealing 
with them under the Young Offenders Act? Or are they going to be charged? 
Because then obviously it drastically changes the nature of the advice that we 
give to the young person. So, I’ll make them make the call first and commit 
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to someone before I give them advice. Because it’s … first of all if I’m giving 
a child advice about two different possibilities it’s going to be 
overwhelmingly confusing; it’s already a confusing process for them, they 
don’t need more information than is necessary. So, if I can make the police 
go and find out, ring me back and then tell me, “Are you going to offer him 
diversion? Or are you going to charge him?” And then I will give him advice. 
 
 
However, according to the ALS Solicitor, the problem is that there are no guarantees 
on what the young person might say if police interview them. As, the ALS solicitor 
further states,  
quite often we don’t know enough detail about exactly what happened and 
because I’m talking over the phone to the young person quite often the police 
officer is sitting there listening to them, to their end of the conversation 
talking to me. So, I can’t have a completely thorough discussion with the 
young person about what their role was. And so, normally I just say to them, 
“If you agree with what the police say you did then it’s fine to talk to them 
about it.” But that can be problematic because you can get a kid who then 
admits to other things in the process of the interview (ASL Solicitor). 
 
Adding to this, according to the ALS solicitor, the best interest of the young person 
does not always equate to advising on considering a YJC or a caution. For example, the 
ALS Solicitor noted, 
I would also explain to them, if it’s relevant, - doli incapax – so, if they are 
under 14, explain to them that they do have the opportunity, if they wish, to 
elect to go to court because they may be able to defend the charge based on 
the doli incapax; rather than having them, you know, taking the option of the 
caution or the conference…Another thing we need to give advice to young 
people on is the consequence of having a caution or a conference and it, that 
it is recorded on the police system that they only get a certain number of 
them, that they’re not something that you can get over and over. And, also 
that it shows up on a Working with Children check; so if, for example, when 
they get older they want to work in childcare or be a police officer or 
something that involves working with kids and they go through that process, 
 
 
280 
their employer may be notified about the fact that they were cautioned or 
conferenced as a juvenile (ALS Solicitor). 
 
The above remark illustrates that legal advice in person is needed. There are great 
complexities involved in providing advice to young people, when as ALS Solicitor 
explained, ‘you might be 800kms away from what’s happening. So, they can say one 
thing to us on the phone…hang up and then do something entirely different’. The 
practical problems of giving legal advice over the phone to young children has been 
well documented before (see Chan, 2005; O’Sullivan 2003). It appears that nothing has 
changed since, except the addition of an extra layer of complexity, with having to 
explain PAS to the young people involved.  
 
According to the youth justice personnel interviewed, the PAS is not being utilised by 
NSW police. Although there are no records available on this, according to the youth 
justice personnel interviewed, if the PAS is used, it needs to be included in the 
paperwork that comes through to JJ and the Assistant Manager would be aware of when 
and how it is used. Those interviewed noted that for the most part, they had not seen 
this type of paperwork being used: ‘I’ve never seen one. And everything, every 
conference in the Hunter would come through this office and I've never yet seen a 
protective admissions form’ (Assistant Manager 2).  
 
The interviews with YLOs discussed in chapter four showed that there was an 
unwillingness to admit their reluctance to use PAS. Nevertheless, a reluctance to utilise 
PAS was obvious. Interviews with the youth justice personnel, confirm that for the most 
part, PAS is not being used by police. For instance, Assistant Manager 1 notes ‘in all 
my meetings with YLOs every single one has said: “we have never used this in out 
station; we have never used PAS”’. Thus, the PAS, introduced to solve the ‘non- 
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admission problem’ that is considered to be a significant factor undermining the use of 
diversion, is not implemented as expected. Consequently, the YOA requirement of 
admissions of guilt continues to undermine diversion.  
 
Ambiguity of the legislation: level of intervention  
I think you just never know when something’s going to change for a young 
person and you never know how they’re going to react to a situation. So, I 
think, people think: “They’ve had two conferences, it hasn’t worked so 
bloody hell they’re on their next line up to, they need bonds, they need this 
…” (Assistant Manager 1). 
  
As previously noted, the YOA places a limit of three on the number of cautions a young 
person can receive upon repeat offending. However, the Act does not place a limit on 
the number of YJC referrals a young person can be given. The Act, however, prescribes 
that the number of times the young person has been dealt with under the YOA should 
be considered. This leads to a high level of differential decision-making on diversion. 
Youth justice personnel expressed frustration with misinterpretations of the legislation 
due to its ambiguity. For some of the youth justice personnel interviewed, the reason 
that the number of YJC is unlimited on the Act is to be able to rely on this option as 
many times as needed in order to keep young people away from court: ‘Maybe at 13 
they were too immature to get it and maybe at 17 they’re at a good place in their life to 
actually have a conference, you know, after having two failed ones’ (Assistant Manager 
1). The standpoint on the maximum number of YJC referrals as appropriate varies 
across those making the decision. This indicates that outcomes for young people vary 
depending on institutionally informed individual practitioner perspectives on the 
appropriate number of referrals. 
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For example, YLOs were quoted as saying ‘you’ve had your three cautions, you’ve had 
your two conferences, you’re to the big house now. You’re going to court’ (Assistant 
Manager 1). This lack of agreement on the appropriate number of referrals exist within 
JJ as well. As Assistant Manager 1 noted, 
I was even, at an area managers’ meeting where one of the area managers 
was saying: “Once our kids have had two conferences, we don’t have them 
for conferencing after that”. And that was quite a controversial conversation 
within that area manager’s meetings where some executive staff were saying: 
“Well, that’s not right, you know, there is no limit on it.” And he was saying: 
“Bad luck, I don’t think they should be conferenced after two”. 
 
The legislation’s lack of specification in regard to the number of YJC becomes 
problematic for two reasons. First, as illustrated above, there is a possibility that due to 
differential standpoints on this topic, some police and/or magistrates would be less 
inclined than others to provide young offenders with a history of previous referrals to 
YJC with further diversion to YJC. This, in turn, would undermine diversion in an 
‘inequitable’ manner, as the alternative is chosen based on personal opinions that vary 
across the state.  
 
Secondly, the placing of some arbitrary number by those referring, on the number of 
YJC that are appropriate or not, undermines the purpose of the Act. The legislation was 
designed to allow a maximum number of three cautions. Yet, no maximum number of 
YJC are specified, hence it appears illogical to consider that there should be a given 
number that guides this decision. Nevertheless, the interviews with all participants 
(police, magistrates and youth justice personnel) illustrate that most youth justice actors 
have decided that ‘two’ YJCs is the optimum limit. As a consequence, most young 
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people will rarely be given the opportunity for more than two YJC referrals. As the 
following quote illustrates, some see a positive on this,  
the majority of young people would not have more than two conferences if 
known to the police for several years perhaps three, but this is rare, they [the 
young people] don’t view conferencing as a revolving door (Assistant 
Manager 4). 
 
The implication here is that not providing too many referrals lets young people know 
that if they do not comply, they will be more serious consequences. This reflects the 
tendency towards a punitive approach by those in youth justice. Such punitive 
approaches also lead to decisions to divert to YJC in cases when a young person does 
not have a criminal history, when in fact diversion to a caution, might be seen as more 
appropriate by other individuals in the gatekeeping role. For some, at times, the history 
of the offender is more significant than the seriousness of the offence. Assistant 
Manager 4, provided the example of a ‘break and enter’ into a school where some items 
were ‘taken’ and some mess left behind, and a police referral might be generated for a 
YJC, and noted, 
So, the legislation in the Young Offenders Act said that less restrictive 
sanction should be applied in all cases when you’re making a decision about 
how to deal with the young person. So, I would say that in that instance that, 
yes, it is kind of serious that a young person would break into a building and 
make a mess but if you compared that to, say, if they broke into somebody’s 
house and made a mess; it’s less serious. There was no violence caused and 
let’s say the clean-up for the school, you know it’s not very good for the 
school to have to clean up any mess or whatever but it’s less onerous for a 
school to clean up something like that than what it would be to an individual 
person. So, I would say that that criteria would not be strongly met 
either…And then if a young person has got no criminal history…I would say 
said that that criteria hasn’t been met. So out of those four criteria, only one, 
being the seriousness, has been met… So, I would say to the police that 
really, that quite possibly that the young person should be issued a caution. 
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And then if they did something similar again, then we could certainly … look 
seriously about accepting a Youth Justice Conference (Assistant Manager 4). 
 
Other youth justice personnel cited similar examples. According to these personnel, the 
ambiguity of the legislation makes it possible for criminal justice actors in this area to 
apply the Act to fit their purposes. 
 
Ambiguity of the legislation: different outcomes to suit different agendas and 
the effect on Indigenous young people 
The scope for discretionary decision-making in the YOA is broad, which can result in 
different outcomes for the same cases. Some of the youth justice personnel interviewed 
believed that at times, different criminal justice actors used this to their advantage to 
pursue specific agendas. For example, as Assistant Manager 4 noted, a typical scenario 
that tends to occur more in smaller rural communities rather than in more densely 
populated cities – ‘in a smaller LAC where, perhaps, the populations are less, and the 
community expectations are higher’ – the police will choose to focus more on one, 
rather than others, of the five criteria on decision-making from the Act in order to justify 
an outcome that satisfies a ‘tough on crime’ community. Thus, a young person that 
could be eligible for a caution might end up with a YJC diversion; or a person that could 
be eligible for a YJC might end up with a charge in court. The implication of such 
remark is that rural youth might not be given the same opportunities for diversion. Thus, 
diversion in rural communities might be further undermined by a greater focus on 
community expectations for a tough on crime approach. This corresponds with some of 
the discussion in chapter five. 
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It was further noted that this issue tends to affect Indigenous young people more often 
than non-Indigenous population. Some youth justice personnel interviewed remarked 
that there is also a ‘massive difference’ (Assistant Manager 2) in the way Indigenous 
juveniles in the communities in the city are treated compared to those in the country 
areas. Assistant Manager 2 explained that, 
this is because in the city, they are treated as children across the board; so, 
there’s a much more level playing field. And the communities, the Aboriginal 
communities in these areas [city] are less active, certainly less noticeable; 
whereas they are very militant in the country because they are more visible.  
 
The visibility of Indigenous communities makes then subject to ‘moral panics’ (see 
Cunneen 1987, 2008; White, 2009) which in turn calls for tough on crime policies in 
response to those seen as a threat to order in the community. As Assistant Manager 2 
further notes, 
Those Aboriginal communities are more visible, they had heard more, there’s 
more issues related to their behaviour. So, you, know, magistrates are 
reacting to community opinion; and if community opinion is poor their 
decision-making process will be a reflection of that. 
 
The perceptions of some of the youth justice personnel interviewed was that overall 
there is a need for further cultural awareness and sensitivity from magistrates, police 
and JJ personnel. The youth justice personnel interviewed noted that all new employees 
take part in two day ‘cultural respect training’ delivered as part of the introduction 
training to JJ. Identifying himself as an Indigenous man, one of the youth justice 
personnel, noted: 
knowledge around my culture is limited, therefore the ability to influence 
people’s decision making is also limited. Unfortunately, the same thing 
happens with the magistrates, who I can honestly say in the last 18 months, 
no magistrate in NSW have received cultural awareness training from JJ 
(Assistant Manager 2). 
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Indeed, all actors in the criminal justice system will benefit from cultural awareness 
training. Yet, such training ought to be one framed in terms of what Indigenous youth 
have internalised about themselves that has been fed to them by the broader colonialism 
system (see for example, Fischer, 2010 for the effect of internalised racism and the 
phenomenon of the self-fulfilling prophecy; and Gorringe, Ross, and Fforde, 2011 for 
language of deficit echoed in the words used by Aboriginal people to describe 
themselves as well as lateral violence as a consequence of the internalisation of negative 
perceptions of Aboriginality). 
 
As argued throughout this dissertation, the overrepresentation of Indigenous young 
people in the criminal justice system is one of Australia’s most significant social 
problems. In 2016-17, approximately 54% of the average number of young people in 
custody were Aboriginal, this is despite that Aboriginal young people constitute less 
than 5% of the young people in NSW (AIHW, 2018a). Yet, historically, young 
Aboriginal people have not been offered the same opportunities for diversion as non-
Aboriginal people (see for example, Allard et al., 2010; and Ringland and Smith, 2013). 
Data obtained from BOCSAR (File Reference sr18-16582)72 for this study and shown 
in Table 8 provide a comparison by Indigenous status on diversionary cautions and 
YJCs by NSW Police Force for the years 2010/2011 to 2016/2017.  
 
  
 
72 The data were extracted from a live database and figures are subject to change.  
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Table 8: Persons of Interest aged 10 to 17 years proceeded against via a caution, 
YJC and to court by NSW Police by Indigenous status 
 
Year  2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 
 Dealt with by NSW Police by the way of YJC diversion 
Indigenous 248 194 227 198 316 192 140 
Non-
indigenous 915 712 675 591 575 463 422 
Unknown 52 47 98 68 91 90 86 
 Dealt with by NSW Police by the way of caution  
Indigenous 1688 1385 1383 1248 1252 1182 1149 
Non-
indigenous 9166 7989 6709 5680 5455 5535 5142 
Unknown 634 644 777 780 821 1004 1206 
 Proceeded against by NSW Police Force to court 
Indigenous 6847 6927 5825 6050 6609 6485 6393 
Non-
indigenous 14646 13092 12154 11267 10247 10504 10174 
Unknown 2131 2119 2522 2388 1984 2035 2164 
Source: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) File Reference sr18-
16582 
 
 
The data above clearly illustrate that Indigenous young people are being diverted at a 
lower rate than non-Indigenous young people. Furthermore, the likelihood of diversion 
for Indigenous compared to non-Indigenous young people has not changed much over 
time. The most recent year figures show that in the 2016-2017 year-period, 83.22% of 
the total of Indigenous young people that become persons of interest to NSW Police 
Force were proceeded to court, 14.96% were dealt with by the way of caution, and 1.8% 
were proceeded via a YJC referral. In contrast, for the same period, 64.45% of their 
non-Indigenous youth counterpart were proceeded to court, 32.67% dealt with by the 
way of caution and 2.68% proceeded via a YJC referral.  
 
 
 
 
288 
Assistant Manager 2, of Indigenous descent, reflected on many experiences in his long-
term career working with the NSW Police Force, the courts and the YOA. He strongly 
claimed that from his experience, Indigenous young people’s opportunities for reduced 
contact with the justice system will continue to be undermined by poor decision-making 
so long as cultural ignorance remains. This participant was the only interviewee willing 
to acknowledge a bias in the system. As noted in previous chapters, the issue of 
Indigeneity affecting the chances of diversion was a taboo topic, with both magistrates 
and NSW Police Force adhering to the narrative that ‘everyone is equal under the law’, 
so it should not matter. Such equality is predicated on white colonialist terms. 
 
Further challenges: The lack of resources for desirable outcome plans  
Adding to the factors previously discussed, youth justice personnel noted that further 
challenges to the success to diversion derived from the limitation of resources available 
in regard to outcome plans. The substance of the outcome plans in YJC has been an 
issue of concern for some magistrates (see chapter five). If a referral to YJC comes 
from the police, JJ does not need approval in regard to the outcome plan. However, if 
the referral comes from the court, JJ needs approval to the proposed outcome plan. The 
youth justice personnel interviewed indicated that this has resulted, at times, in outcome 
plans not being approved by magistrates who wanted something more substantial. This 
is frustrating for youth justice personnel that believe,  
plans are complex, and always well considered. They are at times driven by 
resource limitations, but whenever possible great efforts are put in making 
sure they address the core issues at work in a positive manner for the 
offender…For example, we had a young person who stole a car and damaged 
it. The outcome plan involved him participating in a program where they fix 
up cars; so, he did some repairs on the car. He was also asked to do a 
snorkelling course. And then, some clean-up along the literal zone of the 
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beach; so, it was a bit of community work, a bit of skills, and something for 
the victim (Assistant Manager 5). 
 
The example above was one of many provided to illustrate the positive manner, in 
which outcome plans are considered whenever possible. However, resources in 
government services and the community are too few and unevenly distributed to always 
have options for outcome plans. Adding to this, according to youth justice personnel, 
resources available for outcome plans have become more difficult in recent years due 
to a focus on risk assessment, 
 
Look, these days everything is a risk assessed out; we do very little voluntary 
community work, just simply because you can't let the young person just go 
and do it on their own, they've got to be supervised. Hardly anyone has 
resources that can give one-on-one supervision to a young person. So, the 
kind of things they might do is, they might go to a youth centre and, maybe 
the youth centre is having a clean-up, so they could go and do something like 
that. They might help handing out brochures for a community event. We can't 
do barbecues anymore because it's too dangerous … They can't really do 
lawn mowing anymore because you have to make sure the lawnmower was 
safe to use, that it had been serviced, that they [young people] had the proper 
clothing - like boots and goggles and earmuffs. So, it's harder and harder 
because we’re such a risk averse society (Assistant Manager 3). 
 
The accounts above reflect an obsession with risk, in a broad sense. Anxieties over 
ubiquitous risks in the 'risk society' (Beck, 1992; see chapter two) have reduced the 
options available for inclusion in outcome plans. Health and safety consciousness for 
the young person taking part informs the kinds of activities possible. Nevertheless, the 
critical issue that causes frustration amongst the JJ managers is regarding some YJC 
outcomes plans not being approved by the court. From the viewpoint of JJ personnel, 
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even that outcome plans might be rejected on rare occasions. It is nevertheless 
frustrating to see magistrates not approving them. 
 
There is an overall frustration from all youth justice personnel interviewed in regard to 
the perception held by YLOs and magistrates that outcomes plans are ‘soft’, particularly 
if they do not go much beyond ‘a letter of apology’. This is consistent, with some of 
the magistrate and police narratives discussed in previous chapters. Overall it is a 
reflection of institutional cultures, historically and typically, focus on intervention 
practices (see ‘Police and Magistrates as Key Decision Makers’ in chapter one). 
However, it is also a reflection characteristic of a punitive approach to youth justice 
administration. This punitive approach is not meant as a singular monolithic and 
abstract ideology that is consciously known and acted upon across youth justice, but, 
as explained in previous chapters, it forms part of the backdrop to decisions that exclude 
young people from diversion.  
 
Nevertheless, as discussed, the availability, quality, location and level of resources play 
a major role in determining whether young people can be diverted from the criminal 
justice system, as well as influence the quality of the diversionary measure. For 
the YOA to be successful in its goals, the appropriate funding needs to be directed to 
provide support services to meet the expectations of diversionary alternatives such as 
YJC outcome plans. 
 
This is consistent, with some of the magistrate and police narratives as discussed in the 
previous chapters. Overall it is a reflection of a punitive approach to youth justice 
administration. Furthermore, the availability, quality, location and level of resources 
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play a major role in determining whether young people can be diverted from the 
criminal justice system, as well as influence the quality of the diversionary measure. 
For the YOA to be successful in its goals, the appropriate funding needs to be directed 
to provide support services to meet the expectations of diversionary alternatives such 
as YJC outcome plans. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The findings in this chapter corroborate some of the concluding remarks in the previous 
two chapters. Although there is a general commitment to the Act among practitioners, 
the consultation of youth justice personnel indicates that there is resistance among 
police and some magistrates. The success of the implementation of diversion in each 
LAC hinges on the support of diversionary alternatives at a management level. 
Additionally, such success relies on the attitudes and commitment to the principles of 
the YOA by the YLOs. The findings suggest that some YLOs are less committed than 
others. As well, there was a suggestion that official training is needed to further educate 
police and magistrates on the need to prioritise diversion alternatives and improving the 
process.  
 
Adding to this, some findings suggest that localised approaches to the management of 
diversion in JJ result in different levels of consultation with police and/or magistrates 
across localities. Consultation and sharing of information have been repeatedly 
identified as a good unofficial training tool through which JJ is able to further promote 
diversionary alternatives to the courts and the police. There is an indication that the 
strength of relationships between JJ and other institutional actors vary across LACs and 
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court jurisdictions. Internal discussions focusing on strengthening relationships with 
other stakeholders are needed to maximise the use of diversion.  
 
As with the police, court referrals to diversionary alternatives appear to be affected by 
location. The specialist magistrates in the Children’s Court demonstrate more positive 
attitudes to diversionary alternatives whilst regional country court magistrates appear 
less supportive of diversion. A lack of exposure to the training that Children’s Court 
magistrates received on diversion, places the Local court magistrates in a position 
where they are having to rely on other practitioners such as legal counsel for 
suggestions on dealing with matters under the YOA. Furthermore, typically in small 
country communities, the Local court magistrates are more likely to focus on public or 
community confidence in the courts, which in turn might undermine the use of 
diversion, particularly for Indigenous young people.  
 
The YOA specification that the young person must admit to the offence in order to be 
eligible for diversion continues to be problematic and undermines diversion; 
practitioners feel restricted by the requirement. As noted in previous chapters, the PAS 
scheme recently introduced as an attempt to solve the problem of admission is not being 
utilised by NSW Police. Furthermore, for legal advisors, the PAS has further 
complicated the process of providing legal advice to young people over the Legal Aid 
hotline, as it has added the need to explain a further complex issue on admission 
legalities to a child. Most significantly it has been highlighted that PAS might not be a 
good solution to overcome the need to admit guilt, as still a signed admission to an 
offence, placing the young offender in a vulnerable position, because they rarely 
understand the scheme. 
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The ambiguity of the legislation has been noted to result in numerous interpretations to 
the appropriate level of intervention amongst police, magistrates and JJ. This, in turn, 
results in differential treatment of offenders based on individual personal opinions and 
allows for institutions to promote their own interests. A significant issue of controversy 
amongst practitioners is that the unlimited number of YJC available to a young offender 
is not committed to by decision-makers, with most actors having taken upon themselves 
to reduce the unlimited to two. Such actions are considered to undermine the objectives 
and principles of the Act. The broader cultures, institutional/occupational worlds and 
the individuals within them making diversionary decisions, as well as the broader social 
and political context, are partial to punitive responses. Consequently, the Act, as it 
stands, does not serve well its own purposes. This is why diversion is failing.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This study has provided an overview of discretionary decision-making processes on 
youth diversion under the Young Offenders Act 1997 in NSW (YOA).  In doing so, it 
focused on the institutional and individual actors directly involved in the application of 
the Act to explain the wide failure to divert in NSW. Using a mixed of quantitative and 
qualitative data but relying heavily on qualitative material from in depth interviews 
with experienced NSW police, magistrates and youth justice personnel the study has 
analysed the decision-making process on diversion presenting rival perspectives on the 
under-utilisation of youth diversion under the YOA.  
 
The thesis addressed one overarching question: why has diversion of young people 
failed in NSW? The use of diversionary practices away from court by implementation 
of the YOA rests heavily on the various criminal justice actors that trade in youth justice, 
namely the NSW Police Force and the Children’s Court magistrates. Therefore, the 
study first sought to explore how these institutional and individual actors performed a 
gatekeeping function around diversionary practices. On this front, the thesis first 
examined attitudes and understandings of diversion by individual criminal justice 
actors, within the framework of their roles in particular institutions including, the 
police, the courts and juvenile justice personnel.  Second, the thesis moved from 
exploring individual attitudes that at different times both reproduced and departed from 
the prevailing institutional cultures to identifying broader political and policy 
constraints and opportunities surrounding the pursuit of existing forms of youth 
diversion. This thesis was particularly interested in exploring what factors have 
impacted the implementation of the YOA to its full potential. Lastly, this research 
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sought to utilise the information gathered (from the participants and/or other research 
gathered to inform this thesis) to propose what the researcher believes are the necessary 
reforms to juvenile justice73 in order to confront the failure to refer young people to 
diversion in NSW. 
 
The research and analysis have adopted a critical perspective to explore the nuances 
and inherent contradictions of decision-making by understanding the inner workings of 
the system with a focus on the divided sectors of state policing, the magistracy and the 
juvenile justice bureaucracy. Aspects of social control, the dichotomy of punitivism 
and welfarism, theories of ‘risk’ management, and, police culture and other 
occupational/professional cultures were integrated to analyse the findings of this 
research critically. In doing so, the study has attempted to enrich current understandings 
of youth justice by examining the array and intersection of influences on youth justice 
decision-making and law and order in NSW. 
 
This dissertation argues that diversion in youth justice in NSW has failed by reason of 
court as a last resort, as intended by the Act, not having been achieved as an outcome. 
The study has identified that there are a number of co-existing factors that alone or/and 
with others undermine diversionary decision-making under the YOA. These factors can 
be grouped into one of two categories, internal challenges and external/structural 
factors. The individual/institutional and structural practices are inseparable in affecting 
decision-making. Accordingly, the individual decision-makers can influence 
 
73 Throughout this thesis, the terminology used to refer to the system has been ‘the criminal justice system’. 
However, given that the system at times fails, a great number of academics are now using the terminology ‘criminal 
proceedings’. While others use the term ‘criminal injustice system'. 
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diversionary practices but not in isolation from the institutional and broader socio-
political framework. 
 
Internal challenges refer to challenges that emerge from within the institutions. These 
might include organisational, bureaucratic structures, occupational status or rank, 
specialisation (for example specialist Children’s’ Court magistrates as opposed to non-
specialist, or in the case of NSW Police Force, Youth Liaison Officers (YLOs) as 
opposed to general duties/arresting officers), and lack of internal training/education on 
the YOA, as well as the cultures norms and micro-politics within those institutions. Co-
existing with internal challenges, external challenges, thus, the broader political law 
and order challenges refer to factors such as legislative constraints and limitations and 
public attitudes. The findings indicate that all diversionary decision-making emerged 
in the context of rules/guidance of the policy, the YOA. However, the negotiated order 
of such legislative rules/guidance is fluid and in constant relation to internal and 
external challenges that provided limits on when it becomes possible to divert a young 
person away from court. 
 
Overall, the findings indicate that individuals in a position to make decisions regarding 
whether or not to divert young people away from the system have internalised the 
cultures, politics and institutional practices of their respective organisations, and 
therefore reproduce them. While they always have a choice to divert and are in part 
individually responsible for whether or not they divert, they are not wholly responsible 
because they are compelled to do things the way things are always done within their 
organisations, and/or generally in line with a broader political mood. This is 
demonstrated in magistrates’ desire to both balance the factors they are presented within 
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individual youth offender cases, as well as maintain public confidence in the courts in 
a particular social context. Similarly, police officers make decisions based on their 
expertise, attitudes and interpretation of the legislation while acting on a combination 
of institutional/occupational and social and political forces. Thus, the YOA decisions on 
diversionary alternatives are made in micro worlds that are situated in the macro 
social/political context. This undermines, most of the time, the utilisation of youth 
diversion under the YOA. 
 
There is a failure to divert under the YOA in NSW. The rest of this chapter presents the 
reasons for this failure. The police, magistrates and juvenile justice personnel are 
discussed focusing on how their micro institutional worlds (that is, 
structures/cultures/politics within an organisation), along with broader cultural, social 
and political context (that also differs between different geographical locations within 
NSW) had a significant bearing on the decisions that were made by the individuals in 
those organisations. In turn, the implications of those decisions for youth and society 
are noted. The chapter finishes proposing an alternative to the way diversion is done in 
NSW to address the failure of the current diversionary system. Finally, should such an 
alternative not be embraced, observations are made on the factors that ought to be 
addressed and/or changes to the current practices that would encourage an increase of 
referrals to diversionary alternatives under the YOA. 
 
The failure to divert 
In 1997, the YOA introduced a hierarchical diversionary response to juvenile offending 
intending to keep children and young people out of the criminal justice system by 
reducing the number of young people proceeding to court and ultimately in detention. 
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Warnings, cautions and YJC are the diversionary options available under the 
framework of the Act. This study argues that youth diversion is being under-utilised, 
and the current system of diversion in NSW fails for a variety of reasons pertaining to 
individual decision-making within the context of particular institutional cultures and 
broader political tides. Most significantly, this study argues that youth diversion has 
failed because court as a last resort as intended by the Act, is not the outcome the system 
has been able to achieve. The most recent statistics show that diversion to YJC is the 
lowest it has ever been since the introduction of the Act.  
 
Certain youth populations bear the brunt of the failures in youth diversion. In particular, 
Indigenous young people are being diverted at a lower rate than non-Indigenous young 
people, where the likelihood of diversion for Indigenous compared to non-Indigenous 
young people has not changed since the introduction of the Act. The study has reported 
that in the 2016-2017 year period, of the total of Indigenous young people that become 
persons of interest to NSW Police Force, 83.22% were proceeded to court, 14.96% were 
dealt with by the way of caution and 1.8% were proceeded via a YJC referral. This is 
as opposed to their non-Indigenous counterparts of which 64.45% were proceeded to 
court, 32.67% dealt with by the way of caution and 2.68% proceeded via a diversion to 
JYC. Thus, the current system of diversion in NSW is failing to divert. 
 
It has been twenty years since the introduction of the YOA, and the commitment of the 
NSW criminal justice system to the principle advocated by the Act of detention as ‘a 
last resort’, the principle described in Article 37(b) of the Convention of the Rights of 
the Child 1989. The Act has been subject to several reviews over the last two decades 
regarding its implementation. However, this thesis argues that the picture today is 
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evidence of a long-term criminal justice reticence to apply the YOA to its full extent 
and deliver young people the imperative of detention as ‘a last resort’. This is 
particularly the case for Indigenous young people.  
 
 
Findings overview 
Exploring decision-making processes in this study unveiled that the ambiguity of the 
legislation and the level of discretion provided to gatekeepers results in numerous 
interpretations regarding the appropriate level of intervention amongst police, 
magistrates and JJ personnel.  
 
This dissertation argues that amongst the key factors informing the interpretative lenses 
of each individual decision-maker are, welfare/justice pragmatism (at times shaped by 
cultural institutionalised traditional practices and/or community expectations), 
insufficient training/education provided on the Act and general attitudes towards 
diversion whereby high levels of expectation and focus on ‘recidivism’ result in 
abandonment of the principles of diversion in favour or ‘risk’ management practices 
and a focus on the protection of the community.  
 
NSW Police as decision-makers 
The findings on the role of the NSW Police Force in the decision-making process 
regarding the diversion of young people under the YOA indicate that the success of the 
implementation of diversion in each Local Area of Command (LAC) exceeds YLOs 
control, and it hinges on the support of diversionary alternatives from management 
level to arresting/general duties officers.  
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The findings report on an existence of power conflict, and disparity of knowledge and 
attitudes towards diversion under the YOA, between groups within NSW Police Force. 
This is attributed to a lack of training/education and time constraints.  It has been noted 
that SYOs, YLOs and general duties police officers had a different level of access to 
training/education on the Act, with general duties having the least. Further, while SYOs 
and YLOs are given the legislative power of implementation and administration 
(respectively) of the Act, the findings show that the final decision is mostly left up to 
the general duties officers. Discussions on these issues revealed that the high level of 
discretion within the Act when it comes to applying the criteria for diversion, allows for 
a high level of differential application of the Act. Decision-making is informed by level 
of knowledge and attitudes towards YOA, potentially leading to un-equal decisions.  
 
Discretion in this context is necessary because no laws can possibly predict, and/or 
cater for all individual circumstances. However, the discretionary decision making 
becomes, in these contexts, a means of reproducing the norms and cultural tendencies 
of an organisation which is conservative and tends towards law enforcement and 
punitive practices. The findings illustrate that punitive discourses guide arbitrary 
interpretation of the legislation with the seriousness of the offence and the history of 
the offender, often out-weighting the eligibility of the offence in the decision-making 
process. Similarly, occupational culture factors, such as the tendency to favour 
intervention approaches, coupled with a backdrop of punitive discourses guide arbitrary 
decisions among decision-makers to cap the unlimited number of YJC (by legislation) 
to a maximum of two as a norm.  
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Further, findings indicate that the admission of guilt requirement by the Act, continues 
to undermine diversion. The findings show that the protection admission scheme (PAS) 
recently introduced to overcome such issue, is seen with scepticism and resistance by 
most police officers, and the scheme is hardly used. In interviews with YLOs of NSW 
Police, it was indicated that the PAS was rarely used, and more significantly, it became 
apparent that the overall resistance to the scheme, stemmed from within a police culture 
where the traditional value of an admission of guilt as evidence was to be protected at 
all costs. This illustrates that policy makers while intending to protect young people, 
are divorced from the realities of youth situations, plus the attitudes from police which 
youth are met with when they are brought into the station. Thus, PAS rather than being 
used to protect (and despite its other flaws, such as issues of due process), it generates 
further hostility from police because they deem it as something that undermines their 
role.  Lastly, findings reveal frustration by YLOs with the incoherence of the legislation 
regarding many types of offence exclusions that are unwarranted and prevent the 
diversion of children in cases they regard as appropriate cases for diversion. 
 
The Magistracy as decision-makers  
Findings on the NSW magistracy’s perspective reveal that the NSW Children’s Court 
magistrates are generally supportive of the use of YJC. However, objections discussed 
through-out the analysis of the data place doubts on the readiness of the magistracy to 
fully embrace diversionary alternatives. The findings indicate that high expectations on 
diversionary practices and a focus on recidivism lead to reluctance to further referrals 
for the young people. For example, there is an unspoken arbitrary decision amongst 
most magistrates on a maximum of two YJC referrals for most individuals as 
acceptable. The findings show that YJC is seen as a sentencing tool rather than a true 
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alternative to move children away from the court system. Further, some findings 
highlight a city versus rural divide whereby justice modes of operation, as well as 
differences in training/education and resources, are factors that divide the rural versus 
city, undermining diversion further in rural areas. It was also revealed that community 
expectations are at the forefront of decision-making, and there is a general claim that 
communities view YJC as a soft approach, which undermined the opportunity to divert 
young people. The findings on NSW magistracy, also show that YJC referrals might be 
undermined by the perception that outcome plans are not demanding enough of the 
young person. Lastly, the magistracy also expressed their frustration towards the 
preclusion of certain offences, considering this unwarranted and preventing the 
diversion of children in appropriate cases.  
 
Youth justice personnel perspectives 
The perspectives of youth justice personnel reveal that there is a general commitment 
to the Act. However, there are still certain levels of resistance remaining among police 
and magistrates. The findings indicate that the success of the implementation of 
diversion in each Local Area of Command (LAC) hinges on the support of diversionary 
alternatives at a management level, attitudes and commitment to the principles of the 
YOA by the YLOs, and training/education amongst general duties police officers. It was 
also found that localised approaches to the management of diversion in Juvenile Justice 
NSW (JJ) result in different levels of consultation across localities. Findings from the 
data emerging from interviews with these participants concurred with the findings 
across the other fields of data, in that PAS as a scheme is very rarely utilised. Lastly, 
the ambiguity of the legislation was found to result in numerous interpretations of the 
appropriate level of intervention amongst JJ personnel. It was found that the unlimited 
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number of YJC as per legislation, is meaningless, with an arbitrary maximum of two 
being the norm.  This was also concurrent with findings emerging from the interviews 
with NSW Police Force and the NSW magistracy on this issue. 
 
Specific issues regarding the ethos of the YOA 
In chapter one, the trajectory of juvenile justice stressed the growing tensions between 
welfarism and punitivism towards children and young people in the youth criminal 
system that encapsulated the second part of the 19th century. Such tensions are palpable 
in the YOA, as the Act does not fully represent one philosophical position or another. 
Rather, it is a compromise between the two contradictory philosophies. For example, 
focusing on the welfare of the child, the Act contains a number of principles to guide 
its operation whereby the least restrictive form of sanction is to be applied against a 
child who is alleged to have committed an offence, and that criminal proceedings are 
not to be initiated against a child if there is an alternative way of dealing within the 
matter (Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 7(a) and (c)). However, the Act 
scope does not apply to strictly indictable offences or a range of other offences that are 
excluded by the Act (Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 8), thus promoting 
opposing practices where more traditional justice punitive measures are to be favoured.  
The overarching principles of the YOA are eroded by other legislation applied to young 
people. For example, the NSW Bail Act 1978, Children and Young Persons (Care and 
Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) and the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act, whereby an 
increased focus on law and order and getting tough on crime has driven policy changes 
that shift the rhetoric from welfare of the young person to community protection. It is 
within this context that ‘risk management’ and recidivism takes forefront in decision-
making. Indeed, interviews with the discretionary decision-makers suggest that 
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opposing agendas coexist through-out the decision-making process. This is important 
because it reveals that a commitment towards the ethos of the YOA to divert children 
and young people away from the traditional court system is at times too difficult to 
adhere to with other priorities taking place. 
 
Responsibilisation of young people 
From the perspectives of key actors within youth justice, key merit of the YOA is that 
it provides a better alternative to dealing with young people, an alternative that gives 
young people a chance not to get caught in the system. One of the important findings 
was individual actors’ lip service to the YOA because it provides an approach predicated 
on understanding the individual circumstances of the child and allowing a welfare-
practice that takes into account that children are different from adults.  
 
However, when delving into the police and magistrates’ perceptions, and processes of 
decision-making in practice, the theme to emerge was the continued responsibilisation 
of young people. These actors stress that until the young person gives consent and 
makes admissions, they are not eligible for a caution or YJC and the process cannot be 
undertaken. As admission is a legislative requirement, gatekeepers see this aspect of 
the procedure out of their control, and in doing so, they shift full responsibility to the 
young person.  There appears to be a lack of consideration of the difficulties that young 
people may face in complying and engaging with the complexities of the YOA. Further, 
the lack of will by NSW Police to facilitate the understanding and use of the PAS to 
young people emphasises that this issue is not so much about being out of their control, 
but rather about their desires on preserving the traditional justice requirement and value 
of obtaining an admission of guilt, and responsibilisation of the young person. 
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Responsibilisation of the offender is key to the legislation. Accordingly, cases 
involving non-admission of the offence proceed to court, but equally, cases where 
young people fail to engage with a caution or YJC diversion referral requirements will 
be referred back to police/court where there is a clear potential for the ‘up-tariffing’ of 
cases. All interviewees indeed noted this. Given research has shown that young 
people’s non-engagement with criminal justice processes need to take into account the 
complexities of their offender identities, including anti-authority and class matters 
(McAra and McVie, 2012), the emphasis on responsibilisation in such ways described 
is problematic. At the very least, it undermines diversion, while in the worst-case 
scenario in expands the net of the traditional criminal justice system. 
 
Findings in this thesis have unveiled that diversionary decision-makers have high 
expectations on outcome plans regarding the responsibilisation of the young person 
through some form of punishment as a deterrent. This results in scepticism by some 
decision-makers on diversion, regarding the adequacy of the outcome plans in YJC for 
not being rigorous enough. Further, some gatekeepers, lament the ‘McDonaldization’ 
(see Bohm, 2006; Umbreit, 1999) of YJC, in that outcome plans are very similar to one 
another. In turn, YJC is seen as a failure to meet the young person individual needs, 
and in turn, a failure to influence young people’s criminogenic needs by not being 
enough of an intervention. These high expectations on YJC outcomes to focus on 
deterrence and intervention, have the potential to undermine diversion, particularly for 
those young people seen more likely to reoffend due to ‘risk’ factors.  
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Interviews with all participants further revealed that there is an acknowledgement that 
outcome plans are dependent on resources and program availability, which are thin in 
this context. Yet, for some gatekeepers looking for a deterrent as a result of the young 
person having to do more, this factor can have a negative effect in the decision-making 
process. The findings further indicate a perception amongst police and magistrates that 
resources and availability of programs will diminish in rural areas. Thus, this study 
argues that dissatisfaction with outcome plans potentially undermines the use of 
diversion, particularly more within the non-specialist courts in the rural areas of NSW. 
This is adding further to the rural/city divide on diversionary decision-making 
processes. 
 
The scope of the YOA 
The scope of the YOA undermines its very own principle of court as a ‘last resort’. The 
YOA does not apply to strictly indictable offences, or a series of other offences that are 
precluded by the Act (see Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 8). Warnings are 
limited to only summary offences, excluding by regulation a graffiti offence – for which 
a police caution is also unavailable (see Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 18). 
Indeed, the interviews with the decision-makers revealed their views on the incoherence 
and unwarranted aspect to some of these restrictions. This is significant because firstly, 
from the gatekeeper’s viewpoint, it undermines the use of diversion in cases where it 
could be the most appropriate action. Secondly, the unwarranted aspect seen on this 
undermines the commitment of the system to diversion, and in turn, the value of the 
YOA. As some YLOs interviewed noted, there are further consequences of this. For 
instance, a hard to sell effect regarding the value of the YOA during training/promotion 
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of the Act within the institution, as the legislation is challenged for not making good 
sense. 
 
In interviews with magistrates, traffic offences were noted to be one of the unwarranted 
exclusions of the Act. The YOA does not apply to traffic offences committed by a young 
person old enough to obtain a learner licence at the time of committing the alleged 
offence (Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 8, Part 2 (b)). Magistrates 
interviewed emphasised that while a warning, caution or YJC may not be appropriate 
in all traffic offences, in some instances, these offences would be appropriately dealt 
with by way of a YOA diversionary outcome. Adding to this, the magistrates 
emphasised that the fact that at present all traffic matters are heard and determined by 
the Local Court, rather than the Children’s Court, is inconsistent with the principles of 
the Children (Criminal Proceeding) Act 1987 (NSW) and fails to recognise that 
children are young people that should be treated differently to adults. Ultimately, this 
dissertation argues that the jurisdiction of the Local Court on traffic offences 
undermines diversion in appropriate circumstances. 
 
Most sexual offences are also excluded from the YOA (Young Offenders Act 1997 
(NSW): Section 8, Part 2 (d)). Regarding sexual offences, the interviews with 
magistrates revealed that the judiciary is divided on this. For some, a duty to respond 
to community expectations on tough punitive approaches on offences labelled as 
‘sexual’, is sufficient not to consider it appropriate to divert sexual offences. However, 
as a majority of magistrates highlighted many sexual offences committed by children 
are the result of sexual experimentation, for example when a teenager briefly exposes 
or touches another, ‘flashing’, ‘mooning’ or calling out sexual comments, and 
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consensual sex between two children of similar age are most common. This dissertation 
argues that some sexual offending by children, in appropriate cases (for example those 
mentioned) could be dealt with under the YOA, as the current preclusion of sexual 
offences undermines diversion and the principle of the Act. 
 
A similar argument was unveiled by most of the magistrates interviewed regarding 
domestic type offences. The YOA precludes offences that are allegedly committed 
under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (Young Offenders Act 
1997 (NSW): Section 8, Part 2 (e)). As magistrates highlighted, in their experience, the 
majority of the domestic type offences dealt with in the Children’s Court in NSW do 
not involve the typical domestic violence incident seen in adult domestic violence 
offences. For the most part, domestic violence types of offences in the Children’s 
jurisdiction involve conflict between siblings and young people and their parents, often 
resulting or having resulted from a large number of Apprehended Domestic Violence 
Orders (ADVOs) matters. In addition, magistrates and police highlighted that a high 
number of these ADVOs are taken out in cases where parents and/or social carers of 
young people with mental/cognitive health impairments in out-of-home-care called the 
police to settle behavioural issues that would ordinarily be a simple disciplinary matter 
in a family home. This research argues that this current common practice neglects 
children’s welfare factors and is punitive in nature. Furthermore, it potentially leads to 
the breaches of ADVOs conditions, often not understood by the young person, and in 
turn, the ‘up-tariffing’ of cases. Consequently, it is argued that the current stance 
regarding domestic violence offences undermines diversion and the principle of the 
YOA of court as a last resort. 
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Graffiti offences, as noted previously, cannot be dealt with by a police warning or 
caution. Under the Graffiti Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (NSW) young offenders 
cannot be diverted from court if charged with a graffiti offence. As a result, young 
people charged with graffiti proceed to court. Although courts could use cautions and 
refer young people to YJC, interviewees unveiled that most young offenders are 
sentenced with a fine under the Graffiti Control Act 2008 (NSW) which contains a 
prohibition on diverting offences to be dealt with under the YOA. The Graffiti Control 
Act 2008 (NSW) undermines diversion and the principles of the YOA. Furthermore, as 
discussed in chapter five, the use of fines can have a disproportionate effect on young 
people, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds, as well as having proven 
to be an ineffective option for young people in that it lacks deterrent and rehabilitation 
effects.  
 
In contrast, diversionary opportunities under the YOA offer better opportunities to deal 
with young people allegedly committing graffiti offences. The Act provides an 
opportunity for education and reparation regarding property damage. For example, 
under the conditions of a YJC outcome plan provisions can be included for graffiti 
clean-up, providing rehabilitation focus opportunities that a court fine sanction would 
not provide. 
 
Lastly, regarding offences preclusions challenging diversion and the principles of the 
YOA, the interviews reveal significant concerns regarding drug offences. The YOA 
excludes most offences listed in the Drug and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW), while 
summary offences eligible to diversion under the YOA are identified by the quantity of 
substance involved in the alleged offence (Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 
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8, Part 2, (e1); (2A)).  The interviews with police unveiled that the complexities and 
incoherence of the rules and guidance regarding quantities and circumstances 
surrounding the drug offence result in what the police see as a lack of consistency within 
the YOA regarding the eligibility of minor drug offences. For example, police 
highlighted the incoherence in that under the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985, 
an offence involving a small quantity of a prohibited drug other than cannabis leaf is 
eligible for warning or cautioning under the Act. However, for cannabis leaf, a young 
offender having more than half of the small quantity is not eligible for diversion under 
the Act. These inconsistencies were reported to lead to a lack of clarity for police. Such 
lack of clarity has the potential to produce inconsistencies on diversionary decision-
making amongst different police officers and in turn, undermine the utilisation of 
diversion. 
 
Regarding drug offences, interviews with magistrates highlighted further issues of 
concerns. Noting that drugs are an underlying cause of involvement in crime for many 
repeat young offenders, magistrates noted their frustration with the closing down of the 
Youth Drug Court in NSW in 2012. Operating as a pre-sentence program, the Youth 
Drug Court was seen by the magistracy as a positive diversionary option to deal with 
the underlying cause of involvement in crime, particularly for cases where the YOA is 
not applicable. Without the Youth Drug Court and the current restrictions of the YOA, 
the magistracy feels that they are left with minimal capacities to address one of the 
major causes of youth-related crime. A lack of focus on diversion and rehabilitation for 
young people charged with drug related offences undermines the principle of court as 
a last resort as per the YOA. 
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Interpretation of the guidelines and rules of the Act 
The interviews in this study revealed participants belief that, throughout their decision-
making, they adhere to the guidelines and rules of the Act. Accordingly, from their 
viewpoint youth diversion is utilised as much as possible within the legislative scope. 
However, when delving into the decision-making processes, particularly regarding the 
application of the rules and guidance of the Act, indeed the pattern to emerge was that 
at times certain guidance is prioritised over other, depending on the attitudes of the 
individual decision-maker to a particular set of circumstances. This potentially leads to 
two negative consequences, first, the under-utilisation of diversion, and secondly, the 
possible net-widening effect due to diversion of some young people that would possibly 
result in a case dismissal if sent to court. 
 
Firstly, this dissertation claims that the hierarchical order of the legislation is not 
necessarily adhered to. This is, possibly, due to the loose guidance within the Act. As 
noted through-out the thesis, firstly, the YOA contains a number of principles to guide 
its operation and exercise its functions whereby the least restrictive form of sanction is 
to be applied against a child who is alleged to have committed an offence and that 
criminal proceedings are to be instituted as a ‘last resort’ (Young Offenders Act 1997 
(NSW): Section  7 , (a) and (c)). Secondly, the Act on providing some guidance on 
decision-making refers to the seriousness of the offence, the level of violence involved, 
the degree of harm caused to any victim, and the offending history as important 
considerations to be taken into account (Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 37, 
Part 3). Thirdly, the Act allows decision-makers to consider ‘any other matter the 
official thinks appropriate in the circumstances’ (YOA: Section 37, Part 3 (e)).  
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In Chapter One, it was noted that the Act intended to direct police and courts to consider 
prior offending history after having considered the other criteria. However, the police 
interviews unveiled that offending history (particularly, the number of times the child 
has been dealt with under the YOA) and seriousness of the offence out-weighs the 
eligibility of the offence in most diversionary decision-making by police (see Chapter 
Four). The interviews with the magistracy also revealed offending history to be a key 
determinant on diversionary decision-making (see Chapter Five). Such a significant 
focus on offending history, in turn, results in arbitrary decisions regarding the number 
of times a young person should be cautioned or conferenced. 
 
While the YOA provides that a child can only be cautioned a maximum of three times 
(Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section, 20, Part 7), the Act does not place a limit 
on the number of YJC referrals a young person can be given (Young Offenders Act 1997 
(NSW): Section 34). However, interviews with all stakeholders, police, magistrates and 
youth justice personnel unveiled an unspoken agreement on the arbitrary limit of two 
YJCs referrals in most cases to be appropriate before scaling up the response to the 
alleged offence. The need to cap the number of YJCs was justified as they judged YJC 
alone on the basis of reducing reoffending. The high expectation on YJC to provide a 
quick solution to recidivism and judging legislation based on this alone, is 
inappropriate. Further, the number of times that a young person reoffends does not 
remove the responsibility to protect the rights of the child upon which the principles of 
the YOA rest. Rather, most likely, it points to the inadequacies of the system to assist 
the young person to meet the requirements. Thus, it reflects the need for review 
regarding the level of support in the interventions. 
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The findings in this thesis further unveil, that at times, opting for punitive approaches 
also leads to the decision to divert to YJC in cases when a young person does not have 
any criminal history, when in fact a caution might be seen as appropriate by other 
individuals in the same role. Hence, the above described practices guiding diversionary 
decision-making are part of routine activities that produce and disseminate the 
messages embedded in current ‘risk society’ discourses and actuarial techniques around 
youth, and an overall punitive attitude, particularly for those that have been deemed 
more risky. It is in this way that certain young individuals gain entry to diversion under 
the YOA, while many others are excluded from diversionary options.  
 
Inconsistent use of diversion across NSW 
Based on interviews with youth justice personnel (JJ NSW Managers and ALS 
solicitor) the findings indicate that there is concern regarding the variation in the use of 
diversion, firstly, across LACs, and secondly, between the dedicated Children’s Courts 
and the Local Court sittings operating as Children’s Courts in rural areas. Regarding 
the latter, interviews with the magistracy unveiled that there is a lack of familiarity with 
the YOA by practitioners in generalist Local Courts. Such unfamiliarity can be 
attributed to the different training and experience with children matters. The nature of 
the Local Court presents a challenge and potentially undermines the use of diversion.  
 
Regarding the concerns of variation on the use of diversion across LACs, the interviews 
with YOLs suggest that this could be attributable, first, to a variation level of support 
for YLOs and the Act in general across different LACs. Secondly, different 
training/education of arresting/general duties officers across different LACs. The 
findings in this thesis indicate that training/education is dependent on the quality of 
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internal relationships between arresting/general duties officers and YLOs, but also on 
the quality of external relationships with JJ NSW Managers, whereby good 
relationships foster training/education through peer consultation.  
 
Challenges in diversion of Indigenous young people  
As noted in the earlier chapters of this thesis, one of the specific objects of the YOA is 
to address the over-representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children in 
the criminal justice system through the use of youth justice conferences, cautions and 
warnings (Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW): Section 3).  However, the statistics on 
diversion since the introduction of the Act clearly illustrate that the YOA is failing to 
meet this objective. Young Indigenous people always have been, and continue to be, 
less likely to be diverted than their non-Indigenous counterparts. This, in turn, affects 
later interventions resulting in the much higher use of custodial orders for young 
Indigenous people.  
 
The link between disadvantage, child protection (child at ‘risk)’ and crime, especially 
in Indigenous communities, was noted as a concern by all those interviewed. There was 
a consensus that current systems are inadequately resourced to respond to children and 
young people with complex problems and disadvantages. However, the emphasis was 
on the need to expand early intervention and supportive services to enable communities 
and young people to take responsibility for their actions. Such insights highlight the 
responsibilisation of the individual in a typical neoliberal fashion whereby the goal is 
for young people to manage their own risks, rather than providing interventions that 
respond to social structures and causes of crime. Overall, responses from respondents 
in this research indicate that the disproportionality of Aboriginal children in the 
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criminal justice system is a result of the system failure to focus on specific cultural 
groups, however at no time was it acknowledged that decision-making on diversion 
might contribute to this.  
 
Gaining deeper insights into diversionary decision-making specifically within the 
context of Indigenous youth was a desired outcome of this research. However, attempts 
to discuss decision-making specifically as it might apply to Indigenous young people, 
were quickly terminated by both, NSW Police, and the magistracy who stated that 
‘everyone is equal under the law’. Consequently, they claimed that Indigenous young 
people are assessed and provided with equal opportunities for diversion as all other 
young people. However, this study emphasises that equality in this context does not 
translate to equity. Therefore, it argues that the current practices on diversionary 
decision-making are another systemic bias in the criminal justice system. The most 
socially disadvantaged, the Indigenous young people, will continue to be disadvantaged 
by the system. 
 
It is argued that, firstly, the current trend to prioritise offending history in the process 
of diversionary decision-making has further adverse effects for Indigenous people, by 
far the most grossly over-represented population in Australian prisons. This aligns with 
Mirko Bagaric's work on reducing over-representation of Indigenous people, where 
discussing sentencing he claims ‘attaching less weight to prior convictions will ensure 
that every time such offenders are sentenced, their punishment will be no more than 
what is imposed on the affluent offender who has committed the same crime’ (2016, p. 
38). Thus, a focus on recidivism is not only inappropriate but does not serve well for 
the diversion of Indigenous young people. This is significant, given that the over-
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representation of Aboriginal children and young people in detention in NSW has 
worsened. As noted in the introduction chapter of this thesis, the increase in Aboriginal 
over-representation is likely an artefact of the decrease in incarceration of non-
Indigenous young people (AIWH, 2017). In turn, this suggests that diversionary 
measures may have been successful for non-Indigenous young people. 
 
Secondly, Indigenous young people are more likely to come from remote/rural areas. 
Therefore, they are more likely to appear before a non-specialist court. Additionally, as 
the findings of this thesis report in previous sections, diversion might be further 
undermined in rural non-specialist courts. This is due to, training/education disparities, 
pronounced emphasises on community expectations, and lower level of confidence 
with the adequacy of outcomes plans. Thus, it is argued that the rural/city divide 
undermines diversion overall, but more so for Indigenous young people. 
 
Bail legislation, a challenge for diversion 
As noted in the early chapters of this thesis, research concerning bail conditions in 
NSW, highlights that children are most often remanded for a breach of bail conditions 
rather than a new offence (see Wong et al., 2010). Indeed, the magistracy interviewed 
in this research, highlighted their frustration that breach of bail conditions and the lack 
of suitable accommodation directly leads to being taken into custody.  
 
In NSW, in the event of inconsistencies, the Bail Act prevails over specific legislation 
for children in criminal matters (see chapters two and three). Further, the bail legislation 
has been noted to contradict the spirit of the YOA, in that decisions under the Bail Act 
do not foster a philosophy whereby arrest on a breach of bail should be a matter of last 
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resort (see chapter three; and for a fuller discussion see Stubbs, 2010a). The 
inappropriate bail conditions and lack of suitable accommodation that draw children 
further into the criminal system, in turn increasing their offending history, hamper the 
diversion of young people under the YOA.  
 
Where to from here?  
The final section of this thesis provides suggestions for future practice and policy based 
on the key themes which emerged from the findings exploring the criminal justice 
perspectives on diversionary decision-making under the YOA.  
 
The YOA represents a piece of legislation emerging as a new strategy to youth justice 
governance in the late 1990s. As a strategy developed within the context of broader 
political, economic and structural changes, the Act advocated for the protection of the 
rights of the children and to hold detention as a last resort. Since its development, there 
have been several reviews. However, little has been written about gatekeepers’ 
decision-making and the exercise of discretion. Nonetheless, the reviews have provided 
recommendations to improve the implementation of the Act. So far, there have been no 
significant changes, if any, regarding the policy. Neither, it has been any changes 
regarding the implementation of the policy since its earlier days.  
 
This thesis has provided an account of the complexities of policy implementation 
regarding the YOA (NSW). Drawing on, theories of police culture, the dichotomy of 
punitivism and welfarism, theories and practices of risk management, and punitiveness 
and law and order, this study has sought to show the influence of micro and macro 
contexts on policy implementation. Focusing on the case study of youth justice in NSW 
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as it relates to the YOA, the thesis draws out the issues relating to achieving the aims of 
the Act and achieving some level of consistency across the state while providing equity 
for all young people. 
 
The thesis has highlighted that while the YOA (NSW) has been now in effect for twenty 
years, the system is not any closer than it was twenty years ago to the desired outcome 
of court as a last resort. Further, the thesis has highlighted that some of the key 
challenges regarding the implementation of the Act to its full potential, are deeply 
rooted in a complex system of youth governance where the paradigms of welfarism and 
justice result in competing interest and outcomes. It has also highlighted how 
institutionalised cultures adhere more to one or other of these paradigms because of the 
perceived nature of their roles. 
 
Based on the findings, this thesis recommendation is radical: to completely overhaul 
and rebuild the youth justice system starting from the legislation. The best way forward 
would be to introduce a mandatory diversion model whereby alleged offenders under 
the age of 18 cannot be prosecuted for an offence, except for the most serious offences 
such as murder or manslaughter. Thus, discretion will not be needed in the context of 
deciding whether to divert or not, but rather for deciding the most appropriate 
diversionary scheme to follow. Such a model will be similar to that implemented in 
New Zealand. 
 
New Zealand’s approach to youth justice is unique in that it has remained immune 
towards punitiveness (Lynch, 2012; Muncie, 2008). Solid foundations to the New 
Zealand juvenile system are provided by a set of legislation emphasising diversion and 
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decarceration and encouraging the contributions of family and community and the 
maximising of community resources (see Lynch, 2007; Maxwell, Robertson, Kingi, 
Morris, and Cunningham, 2004). When a young person becomes a person of interest to 
the police, under the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 (CYPF) 
police power to arrest is strictly limited. Instead, the options available are warnings, 
alternative action (referral to Youth Aid Officer that can arrange alternative action, such 
as reparation/community work), and family group conferences (FGC). In cases, when 
a young person is arrested and brought before the court, the Youth Court is required to 
refer all cases coming to it for FGC. Thus, judges cannot sentence offenders who have 
been arrested without first referring them to conferencing (Maxwell and Morris, 2006). 
Due to the stringent limits to arrest placed on police, 80% of young people in New 
Zealand are diverted rather than charged (Ministry of Justice, 2010; Cleland, 2016). 
This is an exemplary model of commitment to diversion. 
  
A key issue in the New Zealand model is that it identifies FGC, not the youth Court as 
the central decision-making forum for young people cases (Cleland, 2016). The 
Children Young Person and Their families Act 1989 was designed to develop 
community alternatives to the traditional court system. The aims include to make young 
offenders accountable and responsible for their actions; provide better support for 
families and their children; respond more effectively to the needs of victims; to allow 
Maori involvement in decision-making about their children; and to reduce the number 
of young offenders appearing in court (for a fuller discussion see for example, Maxwell 
and Morris, 1993; Maxwell, Kingi, Robertson and Morris, 2004). 
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To date evaluations of the youth justice system in New Zealand have been positive with 
several desirable outcomes achieved (Maxwell and Morris, 1993; Maxwell et al., 2004; 
Maxwell and Morris, 2006). First, regarding diverting young people from courts and 
custody, research reports growing confidence within the police to use diversionary 
warnings and cautions for minor offences (Maxwell and Morris, 2006). Second, 
research shows that young people are being made accountable, with as many as 95% of 
children being dealt with FGC made accountable in some way (Maxwell and Morris, 
2006). For example, research by Maxwell et al. (2004) shows that in most cases family 
groups conferences emphasise accountability, particularly through restoration; and that 
in 60% of cases it provides measures devised to enhance wellbeing through 
rehabilitation or reintegration. Third, although it has been noted that more can be done 
regarding cultural appropriate processes and services (see Maxwell and Morris, 2006), 
FGCs are inclusive of some formal aspect of Maori protocols and those facilitating the 
conferences are representative of the range of the young people ethnicity (Maxwell and 
Morris, 2006). Thus, FGC in New Zealand is more culturally appropriate as a process 
that the traditional justice processes are. Fourth, as previously noted, the system 
achieves diversion for 80% of young people who offend. Thus, this system reflects the 
principles in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of 
Juvenile Justice Beijing Rules (United Nations, 1995) and the UNCRC. As noted in 
previous chapters, such principles state that responses to youth offending should further 
the wellbeing of the young person (Beijing Rules,  r1.1, CRC Art. 3) and that young 
people should be diverted from formal criminal proceedings whenever possible 
(Beijing Rules, r11.1 CRC Art. 40(3)(b)). Lastly, according to the World Prison Brief 
(ICPS, 2009), minors in New Zealand make up only 1 per cent of the prison population. 
Such detention rates fare reasonably well in comparative global terms (ICPS, 2009). 
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Therefore, it is clear that the outcomes in the New Zealand system are worth aspiring 
to. 
 
Focusing on diversion for young people recognises that not all young offenders are or 
will become dangerous criminals. Diversion has the potential to allow young children 
to learn from their mistakes and have their needs met. To reach its potential, the system 
of diversion must be genuinely committed to protecting the children’s rights and to use 
court as an absolute last resort. Formal court processing should only be used for the 
most serious incidents, such as cases of murder and manslaughter. 
 
Thus, the need to rethink the legislation and framework that guides diversion in NSW 
is imperative. Redrafting, enacting and implementing new policy of this sort requires a 
cutting-edge progressive political approach with a strong commitment against 
punitiveness and unnecessary interventions. Further, it requires a commitment to 
funding, ownership, and the strong provision and access to community resources. 
Lastly, the system overall needs to be decolonised, allowing Indigenous groups to lead 
the way regarding their diversion. This initiative would enable NSW to reap the benefits 
of a fully functional diversionary system. However, if the political will does not exist, 
what follows is a set of modest suggestions that might help in a lesser way to address 
some of the current factors undermining the implementation of the YOA. 
 
Alternatively, modest suggestions 
It has been noted that the themes emerging as challenges from the findings could be 
grouped into one of two categories, internal (within institutions) and law and order 
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challenges. Accordingly, propositions for moving forward will be framed within these 
two categories. 
 
Responding to law and order challenges 
Based on the findings of this research and responding to the themes emerging from 
NSW police and magistrates that relate to law and order factors, what follows are this 
thesis’ recommendations/suggestions to increase the number of referrals to 
diversionary alternatives under the YOA. 
 
First, the scope of the YOA as a legislative framework for diversion ought to be 
expanded by, removing the exclusion from the Act of certain offences that prevent 
diversion of young people in appropriate cases, such as, less serious sexual offences 
and offences under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007. 
Furthermore, the Act ought to be expanded by removing all current exclusions on 
graffiti offences, thus allowing police to divert through warnings, caution or YJC such 
offences. Lastly, legislation ought to be amended to provide the Children’s Court with 
the jurisdiction of all traffic offences allegedly committed by children. Further, the YOA 
ought to be expanded to allow diversion for traffic offences, at both police and court 
level.  
 
Second, the Act requirement for an admission of guilt should be replaced with a 
requirement that a child ‘does not deny’ the offence. This will facilitate police use of 
cautions and YJC. Requiring an admission of the offence before allowing diversion 
may discourage participation. Diversion should be available without admission of guilt. 
A real commitment to court as a last resort and the rights of the child should prioritise 
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such practices over the focus on traditional justice practices of punishment, such as 
‘admission of guilt’. 
 
Third, the limit of three cautions should be removed from the legislation. A system 
genuinely committed to court as a ‘last resort’, should not provide a limit on the number 
of diversion practices. Some young people may re-offend after diversion, however 
placing automatic limitations on their capacity to re-engage in further diversion 
programs limits the value of diversion practices. The removal of the limit of cautions 
will be hard to implement in practice.  After all, the thesis identifies that the unlimited 
number of YJCs is not implemented and that two JYCs is considered maximum in 
practice by the decision-makers on diversion. Thus, removing the limit of cautions can 
only be effective as part of a broader set of changes, and once those changes allow for 
a shift of focus away from recidivism and the history of the offender (see upcoming 
recommendations sixth, seventh and eight). 
 
Fourth, concerning YJC, the Act should provide legislative requirements to extend the 
requirements that ought to be included in outcome plans. As an effective diversion 
scheme, YJC should include individually tailored, and culturally appropriate outcome 
plans incorporating multiple components, targeting and including rehabilitation 
programs, cultural activities, employment pathways and community services, substance 
abuse and health services. Overall, outcome plans ought to be used as a pathway to 
include welfare responses/services. Currently, welfare responses/services in NSW do 
not fall under the jurisdiction of criminal courts. This will require further tinkering. 
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Fifth, as a follow to the previous recommendation, adequate resourcing needs to be 
available to develop and support outcome plans of a comprehensive nature as described 
above. This is particularly significant in remote rural areas for all young people, and 
specifically for Indigenous youth. A government genuinely committed to diversion 
away from court must take responsibility for the provision of funding that will ensure 
that the schemes in place achieve desirable outcomes. The responsibility of such 
schemes working should fall on the system, rather than on the young individual. 
 
Sixth, the evaluation of diversionary options under the YOA should not be based on 
recidivism measures, but on positive effects on all components targeted, such as 
education, employment pathways and rehabilitation. Often offending and re-offending 
point to the failure of the system to assist the young person in basic areas, such as 
accommodation, family, education and health. Regardless of the number of times, a 
young person offends, there would be benefit from diverting the young person from the 
court system.  
 
Previous research has documented the risk factors in youth offending to include, 
difficulties in schools, unstable accommodation/homeless, substance abuse, 
unemployment, poverty, family disruptions, negative peer association, limited 
recreational opportunities and mental health issues. The YOA recognises such risk 
factors and allows time for the risk factors to be addressed. The key will be, therefore, 
to increase resources in the community and government services and link the young 
people to such program opportunities through the outcome plans in YJC. Thus, the 
adequacy of the YOA should never be based on recidivism measures, but rather on the 
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ability to preserve the principle of detention as ‘a last resort’ based on the observation 
that holding a young person in custody is not in the best interest of the young person. 
 
Seventh, the gatekeepers responsible for diversionary decision-making under the YOA 
ought to be provided with adequate comprehensive education/training on the principles 
of the Act and the reasons behind its implementation. Such training needs to be 
extended beyond the magistrates and YLOs of NSW Police Force, to specialist NSW 
Police members such as SYOs, arresting/general duties officers. This is critical as these 
are the police who are interacting with young people and must understand the 
diversionary options available and their appropriateness. In addition to this, police, 
magistrates and any of those responsible for youth diversion, need to receive 
comprehensive training on Indigenous cultural awareness.  
 
Eight, discretion is a vital part of police and magistrates work; however, it must be 
properly exercised. The findings in this study have shown that, when making 
diversionary decisions, gatekeepers place over-emphasis on the offenders’ history and 
the seriousness of the offence, despite the other number of factors outlined for 
consideration as provided by the Act. Accordingly, the recommendation is that the 
legislative framework is amended to include the implementation of a monitoring 
compliance system. This will require a specialist monitoring body, perhaps from JJ 
NSW or independent. Such a body could also be responsible for the approval of the 
outcome plans, removing the need of the Court to approve them. 
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Responding to institutional challenges 
Institutional challenges are harder to address, particularly those that emanate from 
cultural or/and historical practices on youth governance. As shown in this study, certain 
practices and frameworks are often deeply entrenched in the occupational structures 
within institutions. Additionally, the aims and principles of the YOA often sit at odds, 
and in contradiction with practices and legislative frameworks co-existent in the 
criminal justice system.  
 
Some challenges within this context, such as interpretation of the legislation (including 
the over-emphasis on offending history) and attitudes towards the YOA would be 
addressed upon implementation of the recommendations presented in the previous 
section when responding to law and order challenges. Others, however, will require 
specific internal responses within the institutions. This is the focus of this section where 
based on the findings of this research and responding to some of the themes emerging 
from institutional challenges affecting decision-making processes by NSW Police 
Force and magistrates, what follows are this thesis’ recommendations/suggestions to 
increase the number of referrals to diversionary alternatives under the YOA. 
 
Those responsible for youth diversion need to be resourced to provide a comprehensive 
diversion system with specialist decision-makers to prioritise the use of the YOA. In the 
NSW Police Force, this will include the requirement that YLOs be available to provide 
oversight and consultation beyond their current 9 to 5, Monday to Friday appointments. 
This is critical because as it currently stands the power to oversee diversionary decision 
falls within the YLOs. In the case of the Children’s Court, this will translate to a need 
for all matters concerning children to be heard by a specialist children’s court 
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magistrate. This is significant as it particularly affects Indigenous youth in remote/rural 
areas. Following on the last point, if some children’s matters continue to be heard by 
Local Court magistrates, these magistrates should undertake the training proposed in 
the previous section of recommendations.  
 
Finally, concerning the different use of diversion across LACs, there should be further 
specific evidence-based research to determine the areas where improvement is required 
and the best ways to achieve this. Further, yearly reviews should be undertaken 
concerning the processing of young persons of interest per LAC to ascertain that 
changes to practices are implemented where needed, and the overall outcome of equity 
across LACs is achieved. 
 
Concluding remarks 
This is the first research of its kind to examine the reasons behind NSW failure to refer 
young people to diversion, focusing on both broader social/political and micro 
institutional reasons for those failures. As such, the current research is in a position to 
see where changes should be made to the system, thus making a significant contribution 
to the landscape of youth justice. 
 
The research presented in this thesis has provided an examination of the discretionary 
decision-making processes on youth diversion under the Young Offenders Act 1997 in 
NSW (YOA). Focusing on the institutions involved with the application of the Act, the 
failure to divert in NSW has been explained. Relying mostly on the qualitative analysis 
from in-depth interviews with experienced NSW police, magistrates and youth justice 
personnel, the thesis has analysed the decision-making process on diversion presenting 
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rival perspectives. This provided a credible examination of the implementation of the 
Act and its under-utilisation. 
 
The findings of this thesis show that police and magisterial diversionary decisions are 
guided by individual, institutional (occupational cultures), and structural (legal/extra-
legal) practices. The individual/institutional and structural practices are inseparable and 
co-affect decision-making. Accordingly, the individual decision-maker can influence 
diversionary practices but not in isolation from the institutional and broader socio-
political framework. 
 
The findings confirm that theories of individual responsibilisation, risk-based strategies 
(with a focus on intervention) and punitivism, form a major part of the backdrop to 
decisions that shape law and order. This, in turn, undermines and contradicts the 
principles of diversion, and court as a last resort. These findings must be considered in 
the context of certain limitations related to their generalisability, specifically due to the 
low participant involvement from the NSW Police Force. The findings nevertheless 
provide important implications for both theory and policy. 
 
These results document a failed system, a lack of, political will, and bureaucratically 
entrenched practices to completely overhaul it.  Any positive steps, towards the 
development of an expanded framework to diversion to assure that court is the absolute 
last resort are urgently needed in NSW.74 
  
 
74 NSW Police, NSW juvenile justice, and NSW Magistracy will be provided with a copy of this thesis findings. 
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Appendix 1- Youth Justice Conference referrals by LAC 
(2008-2009) 
 
Number of referrals to youth justice conferences by NSW Police Local Area 
Commands for the 2008/09 financial year. 
 
 
Retrieved from Noetic Solutions (2010)  
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Appendix 2 – Protected Admissions Form 
 
 
Retrieved from NSW Police Force. (2015). Protected Admissions Young Offenders Act 
1997. Operational Programs Command Protected Admissions Scheme SOPs. 
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Appendix 3 – PAS Information Sheet 
 
 
Retrieved from NSW Police Force. (2015). Protected Admissions Young Offenders Act 
1997. Operational Programs Command Protected Admissions Scheme SOPs. 
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Appendix 5 – Interview Schedules 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Group 1: Youth Liaison Officers of New South Wales Police Force 
The purpose of this schedule is to elicit the understanding and attitudes of Youth 
Liaison Officers of NSW Police in regard to “diversion” from court under the Young 
Offenders Act 1997 (“YOA”). Also, to find what policy provisions and requirements 
affect their decision-making process in regard to “diversion”. 
 
Demographics 
• Rank 
• Age 
• Gender 
• Time with NSW police force 
• Time as youth liaison officer 
 
Role of the youth liaison officer 
• Initial interest in the role of youth liaison officer (career trajectory) 
• Differences between youth liaison officers and mainstream police officers 
• The Young Offenders Act 1997 (YOA) and the relationship to the work youth 
of liaison officers  
• Non-legislated schemes/policy or initiatives used by the NSW police force (e.g. 
The protected Admissions Scheme)  
 
The process of diversion 
 
• Describing the process of diversion including any organisations that play a role 
in the process 
• Key decision-making points for a youth liaison officer in the process of 
diversion 
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• Factors affecting a youth liaison officers decision making within the process of 
diversion 
• Strength and weaknesses of the process of diversion 
 
Experiences 
 
• Experiences of working with the Young Offenders Act 1997 (YOA) (managing 
the letter of the law)  
• Experiences of working with NSW police officers that are not youth liaison 
officers (positive and negative) 
• Experiences of working with the range of organisations involved in the process 
of youth diversion (positive and negative) 
• Experiences of working with young offenders involved in diversion (positive 
and negative) 
 
Recommendations 
• On the process of diversion 
• On the law governing diversion 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Group 2: Magistrates of the Children’s Court (NSW) 
 
The purpose of this schedule is to elicit the understanding and attitudes of Magistrates 
of the Children’s Court (NSW) in regard to “diversion” from court under the Young 
Offenders Act 1997 (YOA). Also, to find what policy provisions and requirements affect 
their decision-making process in regard to “diversion”. 
 
Demographics 
• Rank 
• Age 
• Gender 
• Time with a career in The Criminal Justice System 
• Time as a Magistrate of the Children’s Court 
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Role of the Magistrate of the Children’s Court 
• Initial interest in the role of Magistrate of the Children’s Court (career 
trajectory) 
• Differences between Magistrate in Children’s Court and Judge in the adult 
Criminal Court  
• The Young Offenders Act 1997 (YOA) and the relationship to the work of 
Magistrate of the Children’s Court 
• Non-legislated schemes/policy or initiatives used by Magistrates in the 
Children’s Court  
 
The process of diversion 
 
• Describing the process of diversion including any organisations that play a role 
in the process 
• Key decision-making points for a Magistrate in the process of diversion 
• Factors affecting a Magistrate decision making within the process of diversion 
• Strength and weaknesses of the process of diversion 
 
Experiences 
 
• Experiences of working with the Young Offenders Act 1997 (YOA) (managing 
the letter of the law)  
• Experiences of working with the range of organisations involved in the process 
of youth diversion (positive and negative) 
• Experiences of working with young offenders involved in diversion (positive 
and negative) 
 
Recommendations 
• On the process of diversion 
• On the law governing diversion 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Group 3: Youth Justice Personnel 
 
The purpose of this schedule is to elicit the understanding and attitudes of key Youth 
Justice personnel in regard to “diversion” from court under the Young Offenders Act 
1997 (YOA). Also, to find what policy provisions and requirements affect their 
decision-making process in regard to “diversion”. 
 
 
Demographics 
• Rank 
• Age 
• Gender 
• Time with a career in The Criminal Justice System 
• Time on current role 
 
Role of the ‘participant’ 
• Initial interest in the current role (career trajectory) 
• The Young Offenders Act 1997 (YOA) and the relationship to the work of 
someone in ‘your’ role 
• Non-legislated schemes/policy or initiatives used when acting on this role 
 
The process of diversion 
 
• Describing the process of diversion including any organisations that play a role 
in the process 
• Key decision-making points in the process of diversion 
• Factors affecting a decision making within the process of diversion 
• Strength and weaknesses of the process of diversion 
 
Experiences 
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• Experiences of working with the Young Offenders Act 1997 (YOA) (managing 
the letter of the law)  
• Experiences of working with the range of organisations involved in the process 
of youth diversion (positive and negative) 
• Experiences of working with young offenders involved in diversion (positive 
and negative) 
 
Recommendations 
• On the process of diversion 
• On the law governing diversion 
 
